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Introduzione
Luigi Muzzetto
Il Life-World non è un semplice tema della sociologia fenomenologicamente 
orientata. È il tema. Il tema intorno al quale ruotano vari problemi inter-
connessi. Il nucleo verso il quale convergono teorie relative a temi specifici e 
insieme interrelati. L’idea di Lebenswelt è presente sin dal momento in cui viene 
proposta un’alternativa alla lettura positivista del mondo sociale. Dobbiamo 
a Dilthey una prima formulazione embrionale dell’idea di Lebenswelt. Idea 
che nell’autore è connessa alla ricerca di un fondamento epistemologico delle 
Geisteswissenschaften. Fondamento che si presenterà, infine, nella forma di una 
critica della ragione storica. Critica che implica una ricostruzione della genesi e 
della struttura del mondo umano (è evidente la simmetria con La critica della 
ragion pura e il fondamento delle scienze della natura).
Le scienze dello spirito “riposeranno”, nella terza fase della riflessio-
ne dell’autore (1905-1911) (cfr. Magnano San Lio 1998), sulla relazione 
triadica tra esperienza vissuta, espressione e comprensione. Concetti non 
semplicemente nati dalle astrazioni dell’osservatore, ma tratti da elementi 
radicati nel concreto mondo vissuto intersoggettivamente dagli attori. Più 
ancora: le categorie delle scienze dello spirito “sono forme strutturali del 
mondo umano tradotte concettualmente” (Rossi 1971: 78).
Non sarebbe corretto dichiarare di scarso interesse le fasi precedenti. 
L’idea di una psicologia descrittiva era presente già nella prima fase del 
suo percorso teorico. E questo è uno dei punti di interesse che Dilthey 
condividerà con Husserl1.
1  “Together, Dilthey and Husserl, were involved in the struggle against logicism on the one 
hand, and the naturalism on the other. Their positive common alternative was descriptive 
psychology. For both men there was always the scientific ideal, the firm objective grounding 
of  truth upon the solid basis of  leibhaftig evidence; the return of  the things themselves, to lived 
experience and the Lebenswelt” (Tillman 1976: 123). Mary K. Tillman nell’articolo ricorda i 
rapporti tra Dilthey e Husserl nel periodo dal 1900 al 1911, anno della morte di Dilthey.
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Semplificando molto il pensiero di Dilthey possiamo riassumere la sua 
analisi, riguardo il nucleo essenziale del mondo della vita (nucleo che ri-
guarda la co-costituzione di soggetto e sociale), indicando le due dimen-
sioni in cui è articolata: dimensione verticale e dimensione orizzontale2.
Nella prima dimensione viene ricostruita più direttamente la costitu-
zione del senso nel tempo, viene seguito il paradigma della biografia in-
dividuale, della formazione del soggetto. In questa abbiamo così concetti 
come relazione vitale (Lebensbezug) e di insieme vitale (Lebenszusammenhang). 
Sono relazioni vitali le relazioni primarie, le relazioni più elementari tra il 
singolo soggetto e il suo ambiente (persone e cose). L’insieme vitale è la 
risultante del processo.
Nell’ottica orizzontale l’autore si concentra principalmente sulla genesi 
del mondo storico-sociale, sulla sua costruzione e ricostruzione. Due le 
categorie principali richiamate in quest’ottica: l’oggettivazione della vita e la 
connessione dinamica (Wirkungszusammenhang). L’oggettivazione rappresenta 
il dominio esterno delle scienze della spirito. La connessione dinamica 
indica una struttura interagente autocentrata e teleologicamente guida-
ta. “Tanto il mondo umano preso nella sua totalità, quanto ognuno dei 
suoi settori costituisce una connessione attiva e produttiva, fornito della 
propria struttura e avente in se stessa il proprio centro” (Rossi 1971: 84). 
Il mondo storico-sociale è quindi una connessione dinamica composta 
da insiemi di connessioni dinamiche avente ciascuna un carattere attivo 
e teleologico. Il che riguarda un qualsiasi rapporto interumano, come un 
qualsiasi sistema culturale, una qualsiasi forma di associazione.
La separazione tra dimensione verticale e orizzontale è analitica. 
Non si ha un prima e un dopo. Individuazione e socializzazione sono 
co-originarie.
L’insieme vitale, la totalità significativa della vita esperienziale del sin-
golo, è necessariamente e intrinsecamente legata alla dimensione della 
socialità. La presenza di una comunità è la premessa della comprensione. 
“Tutto ciò che viene inteso, -sostiene Dilthey- porta con sé, per così dire, 
il marchio della sua conoscibilità sulla base di […] [una] comunanza” 
(Dilthey 1982). Vi è così una doppia dipendenza reciproca. Le esperienze 
singole, per essere rese comunicabili e condivisibili, hanno bisogno essere 
selezionate e raggruppate in forme o contenuti generali socialmente co-
struiti. Così la scelta dei caratteri singoli presuppone i caratteri generali; 
e questi ultimi, a loro volta, implicano la presenza necessaria degli ele-
2  Seguiremo in particolare il percorso indicato da Zaccaï-Reyners nei due volumi seguenti: 
Zaccaï-Reyners 1995; Zaccaï-Reyners 1996.
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menti singoli. È questa una delle modalità attraverso la quale si manifesta 
il circolo ermeneutico. Circolo che nelle analisi di Dilthey opera a vari 
livelli come rapporto tra “le tout et les parties, entre le général et le parti-
culier, entre l’individuel e l’universel, entre le systématique et l’historique” 
(Zaccaï-Reyners 1995: 69).
Nel rapporto individuo-società Dilthey intende evitare, da un lato, di 
cadere in una forma di individualismo atomistico: l’individuo è, infatti, 
sempre parte di un insieme interattivo, senza tuttavia annullarsi in esso. 
Dall’altro lato l’autore deve evitare di cadere nella reificazione del mondo 
sociale. L’insieme interattivo non costituisce mai una realtà ontologica. 
Questo insieme rappresenta sempre “des créations du sujet réfléchissant 
cette expérience: l’ensemble interactif ‘est seulement une construction de 
la pensée’”. Non si ha così nessun dualismo. Ma l’integrazione tra un 
individualismo non atomistico e un “holisme méthodologique” (Mesure 
1990: 192).
Occorre inoltre ricordare che in Dilthey la dimensione storica è on-
nipervasiva: sono soggetti storici gli individui singoli, i sistemi sociali, i 
sistemi culturali e le loro connessioni. Questa modalità di lettura rifluisce 
sullo stesso pensiero delle scienze storico-sociali. Dato che i concetti delle 
scienze delle spirito rappresentano forme della struttura sociale concet-
tualizzate, da ciò deriva che anche le concettualizzazioni sono storica-
mente condizionate.
Come è evidente, il contenuto di ciò che si intende per mondo della vita 
al suo primo apparire è molto più spoglio del modello costruito in seguito 
da Schutz3. E ciò anche se vi sono, oltre all’importantissima rivendicazio-
ne della non assimilabilità epistemologica delle scienze dello spirito alle 
scienze della natura, convergenze di indubbio interesse tra le analisi dei 
due autori, per quanto le analisi di Dilthey siano allo stato embrionale.
Tra le similitudini ricordo il modo in cui è inteso il rapporto tra scien-
ze dello spirito e mondo vissuto dagli attori. Dilthey tende a considerare i 
concetti dell’osservatore come concetti di secondo grado, rispetto a quelli 
dell’attore, prefigurando in tal modo una posizione più vicina a quella di 
Schutz, che a quella di Weber4. Un altro punto di convergenza riguar-
3  Alfred Schütz, nato a Vienna (1899), si trasferisce negli Stati Uniti (1939) in seguito all’avven-
to del nazismo. Negli Stati Uniti il suo cognome perde l’Umlaut, viene trasformato in Schutz. 
Nondimeno questa trasformazione non viene assunta universalmente. Molti autori, in parti-
colare europei, mantengono l’originale Schütz. Noi riporteremo la versione usata da ciascun 
autore in libertà.
4 Possiamo intendere quella di Dilthey una prefigurazione del fondamento degli ideal-ti-
pi dell’osservatore nelle tipizzazioni di senso comune. Noschis e de Caprona ritengono che 
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da la natura sociale della conoscenza: la conoscenza, dice Dilthey, por-
ta impresso il marchio della conoscibilità, sulla base di una comunanza. 
Schutz dà una base fortemente strutturale a questa intuizione sostenendo 
che non esiste una tipizzazione che non abbia in sé l’impronta del sociale5.
Certo in Schutz si coglie il salto che vari fattori hanno contribuito a de-
terminare: il passaggio dal neokantismo alla fenomenologia, l’approdo a 
un costruttivismo metodologico che rende molto più fluido il rapporto di 
co-determinazione6. Così come un’idea di soggettività, che tra i punti co-
stitutivi vede la teoria del flusso di coscienza, colta principalmente attra-
verso Bergson e Husserl, unita alla visione del sé di Mead. Fondamentale 
è inoltre la categoria dell’intersoggettività mondana che, come categoria 
di intermediazione, porta a un salto decisivo l’analisi soggetto-sociale a 
partire dalla We-relation che Natanson considera la “radice sistemica del 
mondo condiviso”. Si tratta, come è evidente, solo di pochi esempi, ma 
forse sufficienti per indicare il senso del percorso.
Esula necessariamente dagli obiettivi di questa rapida introduzione 
ripercorrere gli sviluppi teorici che vengono compiuti, dopo Dilthey, da 
autori come Simmel, Weber, Bergson, Husserl, James, Mead, ecc.
Richiamare Dilthey ha solo lo scopo di richiamare un progetto comples-
sivo che riguarda le scienze sociali a partire dal problema della loro fonda-
zione, quindi dei loro caratteri costitutivi, della loro legittimità epistemica7.
È innegabile che la posizione teorica di Schutz rappresenti un vero e 
proprio passaggio di fase per le scienze sociali. La sua architettura teori-
ca, per quanto complessa, è costituita da un modello unitario che contie-
ne al suo interno un ampio sviluppo di temi classici e meno classici (senso, 
soggetto, sociale, teoria dell’azione, rilevanze, segni simboli, ecc.) organi-
camente collegati all’interno della teoria delle province finite di signifi-
cato8. L’approdo alla fenomenologia dell’atteggiamento naturale consen-
te a Schutz di compiere un decisivo passo in avanti. È l’assumere “the 
life-world […] [as] the alpha and the omega for any kind of activity”; è 
Schutz, nell’esplorare le basi fenomenologiche dell’ideal-tipo, faccia riferimento sia a Dilthey 
sia a Weber (Noschis et de Caprona 1987).
5 E ciò perché, come sottolinea Barber, in Schutz il sociale è presente nelle tipizzazioni come 
carattere eidetico (Barber 1987: 111-120).
6  Sui caratteri del costruttivismo di Schutz vedi Muzzetto 1997: 119-197.
7 Sul senso di questo percorso vedi Bakker 1995: 187-212.
8 Questa organicità rende più significativo il tutto. Per esempio: la teoria dei segni e dei simboli 
ha rilevanza e capacità esplicativa autonoma. Ma, nel momento in cui Schutz collega segni e 
simboli intesi come strutture appresentative ai livelli di trascendenza (piccoli, medi, grandi), 
rende maggiormente coerente e significativa la struttura globale, il progetto complessivo.
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l’ancorare “the mundane certainty to “the natural attitude which bestows 
the Schutzian conception of the life-world with unparalleled originality” 
(Belvedere 2013: 79).
Ma soprattutto è innegabile che Schutz rappresenti l’autore che ha 
dato la maggiore enfasi al tema del fondamento, cogliendone la grande 
rilevanza non solo per il piano epistemologico, ma per l’intero impianto 
delle scienze sociali.
Sostiene Gurwitsch: “I […] venture the opinion that Dilthey’s expec-
tations may find fulfillment in the original development that Schutz gave 
to Husserl’s phenomenology”. E dopo aver ricordato la centralità del pro-
blema della storia in Dilthey e il carattere meno enfatizzato che ha questo 
tema in Schutz, dal momento che la sociologia di quest’ultimo ha come 
riferimento principale i contemporanei, nondimeno Gurwitsch conclude 
sostenendo che la “clarification of the foundations of the social sciences 
(in a more restricted sense of the terme) prepares for and contributes to 
the clarification of the foundations of the historical sciences. For this re-
ason I suggest as a desirable and promising enterprise a study of Schutz’s 
concepts and theories from the point of view of their significance for the 
work inaugurated by Dilthey and continued by some of his successors” 
(Gurwitsch 1975: XXX-XXXI).
Non è difficile quindi assumere le parole di Endress come sintesi del 
significato di questa prefazione: “the main concept Schutz introduced to 
the social sciences is the concept of the life-world (“Lebenswelt”). Schutz’s 
analyses of the structures of the life-world have to be viewed as one of 
the most important contributions to general sociological theory” (Endress 
2005: 1-2).
Questo spiega perché le analisi sul mondo della vita sono molto nu-
merose nel panorama internazionale. Come sono molto numerosi i temi 
che sono stati affrontati richiamando il mondo della vita. Mi riferisco 
sia a temi che costituiscono sottotematizzazioni del mondo della vita sia 
a temi che comportano estensioni del paradigma schutziano. Estensio-
ni sia verso numerosi problemi sociologici emergenti, sia verso proble-
mi che riguardano l’intero fronte delle scienze sociali. Così il paradigma 
schutziano (o più latamente fenomenologico-sociologico) ha mostrato, in 
modo crescente dall’inizio del nuovo secolo, la sua straordinaria capacità 
di rendere conto di tratti essenziali di discipline come economia, diritto, 
politologia, psicoterapia, ecc. che non appartengono direttamente al mai-
ne stream della sociologia.
Ritengo opportuno aggiungere che la costituzione dello Schutz’s Circle 
ha notevolmente contribuito a un deciso innalzamento della qualità del 
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dibattito. Nel senso che, mentre non era difficile trovare ancora alla fine 
del secolo scorso volumi e articoli su Schutz e la fenomenologia che tra-
visavano platealmente le analisi e le teorie di quest’ultimo, ora letture di 
questo genere sono diventate meno frequenti.
Ringrazio molto i colleghi che hanno accettato di partecipare a que-
sto numero monografico dedicato al pensiero di Alfred Schutz. Da molti 
anni mi occupo del pensiero dell’autore. E da molti anni costato che in 
Italia vi è un interesse assolutamente inadeguato verso questo approccio, 
verso le sue potenzialità analitiche, critiche, teoretiche. E ciò malgrado 
siano evidenti i grandi contributi dati al rinnovamento delle scienze so-
ciali. Ritengo sia necessario non arrendersi. Anche per questo i contributi 
dei colleghi sono preziosi. Ritengo che questa chiave di lettura del mondo 
sociale sia un patrimonio che nessuno studioso può trascurare. 
Come auspicio di un futuro atteggiamento di maggiore attenzione ver-
so la fenomenologia e come messaggio ai colleghi italiani intendo lasciare 
l’introduzione del numero della rivista in lingua italiana e realizzare dello 
stesso numero, in tempi brevi, una versione in lingua italiana.
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Husserl on Lifeworld and Experiential World
Chung-Chi Yu
Husserl brings up the lifeworld notion in his discourse on overcoming the crisis of European sciences 
that results from the objectivism or naturalism of scientific research. He puts forward the concept of 
experiential world as he works on the foundation for socio-cultural sciences. Both concepts depict how 
the subject is not enclosed in itself, it is instead the subject in the world. Yet the distinction of lifeworld 
and experiential world reveals that Husserl thematizes this problem in two distinguished ways, the one 
has the transcendental phenomenolog y as background, the other the phenomenological psycholog y. My 
paper aims at an explication of these two different ways of how Husserl deals with the relationship 
between subject and the world and explores the possibility of an lifeworld discourse that looses itself from 
the transcendental bond.
I. Husserl on Lifeworld
In the modern age the natural science developed in a way that no science 
can compare with. Its methodology is widely recognized and imitated. The 
pursuit of knowledge in natural science is based on the belief that its object of 
inquiry is the nature in objective reality. The objectivity of the nature signifies 
that it is free from the impact of human being. As long as it has nothing to do 
with the human experiences, the human perception of nature plays herein no 
substantial role. It is even taken to be irrelevant in the research for objective 
knowledge. Subjectivity is entangled with relativity, which for the sake of ob-
jectivity just needs to be dispensed with. In general, in the division of scientific 
researches, the objectivity of nature belongs to the subject matter of natural sci-
ences, whereas the aspect of subjectivity is ascribed to psychology, which deals 
with the psychic phenomenon based on the physical nature. Since Galileo and 
Newton, natural science has made tremendous development and set up the 
model for all scientific researches. Even the old tradition of philosophy cannot 
but recognize this fact. Yet is the viewpoint that the subjectivity can only be 
seen to be relative and unworthy of being the subject matter of scientific re-
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search also justifiable? To be sure, how objective is the nature at all in view of 
its being as the object of scientific research? How is the nature to be disclosed, 
anyway? With all these questions in mind, Husserl asks more questions about 
the status of subjectivity. He wonders how to legitimate the claim that subjec-
tivity has only to do with the relativity? Is there no invariant structure in the 
human experiences of nature in spite of all varieties and differences? It is from 
here that Husserl begins his lifeworld discourse. He asks about the possibility 
of a science of lifeworld and explores the relationship between human experi-
ences in lifeworld and the objective natural sciences. In the end he brings up 
his transcendental phenomenology to help clarify all these questions.
Husserl delineates the lifeworld as “universal field of establishable 
facts”(Hua VI 141/Carr, 138).These facts are related to the individual per-
sons, such that the lifeworld is in the realm of the subjective (Reich der Subjek-
tiven)( Hua VI 114/Carr, 112). Husserl mentions that the facts recognized by 
the Congos in Africa, the Chinese farmers will not have the same validity 
for the Europeans (Hua VI 141/ Carr, 139). In such a case asks Husserl, can 
there be a core that is commonly valid to all people, no matter which culture 
or tradition they belong to? Both the traditional philosophy and the natural 
sciences in the modern age can be said to have overlooked this question. It is 
actually uneasy to thematize the lifeworld in a scientific way as long as it has 
since long been questioned whether such a science about lifeworld is possible. 
Even the legitimacy of such a questioning is bracketed. Is the experience in 
lifeworld not just subjective and therefore relative? Is it not what we need to 
dispense with in our pursuit of objective knowledge? The lifeworldly experi-
ence is shadowed by its untrustworthy subjectivity, which is undesirable in 
our demand of rigid objectivity. In pursuit of objectivity one should jump over 
the subjectivity that is inherent in the lifeworldly experience. As a result, the 
lifeworldly experience is regarded as valueless for scientific research and one 
seems to have sufficient reason to suspend it. Either traditional philosophy or 
modern science has dismissed it as a whole. However, the more it is dismissed, 
the more Husserl sees the urgency to take it up as a problem. How then does 
he approach this problem? Wherein lies the appropriate way of access to it? 
Suppose that the lifeworldly experience cannot be merely regarded as rela-
tive, through which way we can claim its universality? Are there indeed uni-
versal aspects to be worked out? In order to deal with these questions, Husserl 
suggests to introduce the epoché of objective sciences as its method (Hua VI 
138/ Carr, 135). He holds that we need to get free from the impact of natu-
ral science, which aims to work on the objectivity of nature. The purpose of 
practicing epoché is not to do away with scientific thinking. In Husserl’s eyes 
the science is not restricted to natural, objective science. Working on lifeworld 
without objective science does not mean that we give up scientific thinking 
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at all. In Husserl’s view in order to make clear the meaning of lifeworld, one 
needs a science that can handle the problematic of lifeworld correspondingly. 
As mentioned above, lifeworld is the “universal field of establishable facts”.
The question arises as regards the facts in lifeworld: do they remain the 
same after the epoché? Husserl gives a positive answer to this question be-
cause for him the aim of epoché is not to dismiss these facts, rather, it aims to 
facilitate our recognition of these facts. But does it mean that the study of the 
lifeworld lies in the collection of all kinds of facts spread all over the planet? 
Obviously not, Husserl holds that despite the differences on the surface there 
is universal structure to dig out. He deems these universal structures a prio-
ries. And it is the task of his phenomenology to depict all these a priories. Now, 
what are the universal a priories to understand substantially? First of all, Hus-
serl points out that as persons, people are living in the world, he is existent in 
the lifeworld. As such he has all kinds of lifeworldly experiences. The practical 
actions in everyday life show that people experience the world and the objects 
in the world incessantly. Though people never cease their experiences in life-
world, they seldom notice their own involvement in such kinds of experiences. 
So long as their attentions focus more on things that are relevant to their basic 
needs, vocational activities or enjoyments, they fail to thematize the world as a 
whole. Such awareness remains concealed unless special occasion occurs, for 
example, when they start philosophizing. Philosophy, as Husserl conceives of 
it, has paid attention to such a thematization from beginning on. He claims 
that in the seventh century before Christ the philosophy was born in Greece. 
This counts as unique event in the whole development of human history. The 
philosophers thematize the world rather than just living in the world like the 
ordinary people through theoretical attitude. They are highly motivated in 
this attitude to know what the world is rather than just being involved with it. 
In this way, the philosophy made great contributions to the human culture as 
a whole. It constitutes a breakthrough in the human history. From then on, 
not only the philosophy was born, so was the science in the narrower sense, 
that is, the discipline that is separate from philosophy. This special event has 
evolved to become one of the essential characteristics of European or Western 
culture (Hua VI 325/Carr, 279).
Even though the philosophy in ancient Greece was interested in the ques-
tion about what the world is, he sees that the main trend of traditional philoso-
phy, particularly the traditional metaphysics became more and more objectiv-
istic with the culmination in the modern age as the natural sciences emerged1. 
The objectivistic tendency leads to the consequence that the question regard-
1  Husserl calls the natural science as the residuum of  the metaphysics (Hua VI 232/ Carr, 229).
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA16
ing the relationship between human experience and the world as experienced 
remains concealed first by the traditional metaphysics and then the natural 
science in the modern age. In view of this, Husserl regrets quite a lot about the 
unthematization of the realm of the subjective in scientific research (Hua VI 
114/Carr, 112). The subjective experience is commonly relegated to merely 
relative and becomes valueless in the eyes of natural scientists who claim to 
pursue the objective truth in nature. For this reason Husserl aims to work out 
a science of lifeworld and suggests to practice the epoché of objective sciences 
as first step. On such a basis Husserl develops what he names “ontology of the 
lifeworld”(Ontologie der Lebenswelt)2 in order to work out the aprioric, universal 
structures (Hua VI 145/Carr, 142). To make clear such a universal structure 
is to depict how the world is experienced by subjects in a flow of experiences.
The life in the lifeworld is a “life within a universal unthematic horizon”(Hua 
VI 148/Carr, 145). That means, in the lifeworld, the subjective manifold (das 
mannig faltige Subjektive) has been in function, though in a concealed manner 
(Hua VI 149/Carr, 146). Thus, to make clear how the subject and world are 
correlated to each other would become the task of the ontology of lifeworld. 
Such a correlation is aprioric and universal. According to such a conception, 
the manner in which an object is revealed is also the manner how a subject 
is revealed. In a word, the world is correlated to the subjective consciousness. 
Though the world and objects can be displayed in a variety of ways, yet the 
correlation between the world/objects and the subjective consciousness is uni-
versal and aprioric. Husserl acknowledges such an essential fact and takes it to 
be the task for the ontology of lifeworld.
In this context another question arises as regards the ontology of lifeworld:
How is the ontology of lifeworld related to the transcendental pheno- 
menology? The answer to this question will concern how Husserl conceives 
of subject. The subject that is correlated to the world is a subject in the 
world. Despite its status as  subject, it can be just objectified. It has dou-
ble aspects of subject and object, which seems to be paradoxical (Hua VI 
§53). Suppose that the human being is nothing but an object, then we may 
explain how the worldly experience proceeds, how the aprioric structures 
of lifeworld functions without having to think of how the thematization of 
lifeworld is made possible. It is exactly in consideration of such a problem-
atic that Husserl introduces his transcendental phenomenology following 
the ontology of lifeworld.
Husserl in his transcendental phenomenology works on the ultimate 
foundation of philosophy. In this way he intends to provide philosophy with 
2  David Carr translates it as “life-world ontology”(Carr, 142).
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a way to overcome the antitheses of all kinds—subjectivism vs. objectivism, 
empiricism vs. rationalism, absolutism vs. relativism, ontologism vs. tran-
scendentalism, positivism vs. metaphysics etc. (Hua IX, 300/McCormick 
eds., 34). In Husserl’s conception phenomenology in its complete form is 
no other than universal philosophy, which is a rigorous science that results 
from radical self-reflection. Only transcendental phenomenology is legiti-
mate to fulfill this requirement. And it is in this sense that Husserl regards 
the “ultimate and highest” problems as phenomenological problems. So 
explains he:
In its universal relatedness-back-to-itself, phenomenology recognizes its par-
ticular function within a possible life of  mankind at the transcendental level 
(Hua IX, 299/McCormick eds., 33).
With this in mind, Husserl holds that the ontology of lifeworld has to be 
transformed into transcendental phenomenology if one wants to work out a 
science about lifeworld in the full sense. And Husserl makes it very clear that 
the motivation behind his thematization of lifeworld is for the sake of intro-
ducing transcendental phenomenology. However, it is exactly here that we 
need to ask the following questions:
1. Has Husserl only make use of lifeworld for another purpose instead of tak-
ing seriously the theme of lifeworld? As a result, one might wonder how his 
treatment of lifeworld is corresponding to the thematization of lifeworld in 
the full sense?
2. Can the ontology of lifeworld get hold of an independent status, that is, can 
it have its own value without referring to transcendental phenomenology?
3. If it is reasonable to distinguish two sorts of the ontology of lifeworld and 
argue for the independence of the ontology of lifeworld successfully, then 
what impact does it have on Husserl’s discourse on Europe, which he dis-
plays over and over again in his late philosophy, particularly in his Vienna 
Lecture in 1935?
In what follows, I would like to focus on the second question by invoking 
the “Lecture Summer Semester 1925: Phenomenological Psychology”3.
3  Together with “Article for the Encyclopedia Britannica (1927)”, “Amsterdam Lectures (1929)” this 
lecture is included in the Husserliana Band IX. 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA18
2. Phenomenological Psychology 
Husserl’s phenomenological psychology touches on the natural world-concept 
(natürliche Weltbegriff ) (Hua IX, 93/Scanlon, 70), the universal science of the 
world (universale Weltwissenschaft) (Hua IX, 92/Scanlon, 69) and the correlation 
of our experiences and the world. In phenomenological psychology Husserl 
lays foundation to the factual sciences with help of the concept of experiential 
world. 
Husserl uses the term psychological phenomenology or phenomenological 
psychology alternatively, I myself prefer the former term than the latter, be-
cause the empirical psychologists have taken it for granted that the phenom-
enological psychology is a qualitative methodology for the empirical study in 
psychology as a specific science, yet Husserl makes it very clear, that phenom-
enological psychology is more embracing than psychology, that is, it is related 
to all socio-cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), even all sorts of sciences. 
Husserl points out that as long as all the socio-cultural sciences are related to 
the mental (das Geistige), they all can be seen to belong to psychology (Hua IX, 
221/Scanlon, 169). In this sense, psychology is treated as the universal science 
of the mental (universale Wissenschaft vom Geistigen)  (Hua IX, 91/Scanlon, 68).
Husserl on the one hand determines the psychological phenomenology or 
phenomenological psychology as pre-stage or propaedeutic to transcendental 
phenomenology, yet on the other hand he also underlines that the former is par-
allel to the latter. Because the transcendental phenomenology is extremely alien 
to the people of common sense, Husserl regards the phenomenological psychol-
ogy as helpful device to ascend to transcendental phenomenology. With help 
of phenomenological psychology one might get familiar with phenomenology 
step by step and then becomes well-prepared to go upwards to transcendental 
phenomenology (Hua IX, 296/McCormick eds., 31-32). The final step requires 
a “mere reversal of its doctrinal content” (Hua IX, 296/McCormick eds., 32), 
which concerns the change in attitude. To which Husserl explains:
While the psychologist, operating within what for him is naturally accepted 
world, reduces to pure psychic subjectivity the subjectivity occurring there (but 
still within the world), the transcendental phenomenologist, through his ab-
solutely all-embracing epoché, reduces this psychologically pure element to 
transcendental pure subjectivity (Hua IX, 293/McCormick eds., 30).
Concretely speaking, it concerns the apperception of the world (Weltapper-
zeption) and its transformation. The psychologists, be they empirical psycholo-
gists or phenomenological psychologists, never stop their reliance on such ap-
perceptions, so are the pure psychic subjectivities (Hua IX, 340-341/Sheehan 
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eds. 246).The apperception of the world includes not only the apperception of 
objects, but also that of themselves, through which the personal ego (Mensch-
Ich) is constituted. This kind of ego is that which is objectified in the world. 
All this requires a Copernican turn in order to get to the transcendental level 
(Hua IX, 341/Sheehan eds. 248). The transcendental pure subjectivity posits 
within itself the validity of such apperception. The process of such a trans-
forming process delineates Husserl as follows:
They are transmuted into my transcendental mental process if  through a radi-
cal epoché I posit as mere phenomena of  the world, including my own human 
existence, and now follow up the intentional life-process wherein the entire 
apperception ‘of ’ the world, and in particular the apperception of  my mind, 
my psychologically real perception-process, and so forth, are formed (Hua IX, 
293/McCormick eds., 30).
The contents of these processes are preserved. That is, all that is included 
in the mental process of pure psychic subjectivity are preserved in the tran-
scendental pure subjectivity; and all these contents become “transcendentally 
inner experience”. As a result, this new kind of transcendental field of being is 
parallel to the purely psychic one. 
Husserl contends that there are not two separate egos (i.e. the personal 
ego and the transcendental ego), but the same ego functioning in different 
attitudes. In view of contents they are parallel to each other, only in regard 
to attitude, the one is mundane and the other transcendental. Because of this 
parallel «the field of transcendental self-experience…can, through mere al-
teration of attitude, be changed into psychological self-experience » (Hua IX, 
294/McCormick eds., 31).
What this signifies is that, conversely, whatever is the result of research in 
the transcendental field, there is the possibility to apply such a result to the 
mundane level. And whenever one is well acquainted with the practice of phe-
nomenological psychological reduction and consequently knows the psychic 
subjectivity well enough, one is ready for the transcendental reduction and get 
to know the transcendental pure subjectivity. 
Here we notice that Husserl distinguishes two different kinds of reduction: 
the phenomenological psychological and the transcendental. This distinction 
is first introduced in First Philosophy (1923/24), yet not made completely clear 
until in the articles concerning the phenomenological psychology such as En-
cyclopedia Britannica Article in 1927, Amsterdam Lectures in 1929 and finally Part 
Three of Crisis in 1936.
Generally speaking, Husserl localizes phenomenological psychology be-
tween the empirical psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Yet as 
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mentioned above, he also renders it as the central science to all socio-cultural 
sciences. In addition, it is also universal science for all empirical studies on 
human phenomenon because of its aprioristic characters (Hua IX, 127, 128/
Scanlon, 96, 97). It is very close to transcendental phenomenology, but it re-
mains positive science because it is confined to the natural attitude. In view 
of all these characteristics of this discipline, one may see its role as bridge 
between the transcendental phenomenology and empirical researches, but it 
also involves the seeming contradictions as well. It is eidetic as well as positive 
science, it practices epoché to get access to the purity of the psychic subjectiv-
ity, but it also retains the presupposition of the world. If we follow Husserl to 
see how he talks about the duplicity of human being – he is at the same time 
the person living in the world and the transcendental ego for the validity of 
the world (Hua IX, 294/McCormick ed., 31; see also Hua VI, §53), then the 
psychological phenomenology can be seen to best reflect such duplicity in 
regard to the status of the world. Husserl on the one hand dispenses with the 
presupposition of the world through reduction and on the other hand insists 
that the world has never been completely dispensed with due to its connection 
to natural attitude, which is opposed to transcendental attitude evidently.
In Husserl’s conception, psychology should not be only restricted to the em-
pirical psychology. Psychology can be also understood as that which aims at the 
study of the essential part of psychic phenomenon—the intentionality. In this 
sense, phenomenological psychology is an aprioric, eidetic, intuitive, and purely 
descriptive field of investigation. The objects of such a psychology are the con-
sciousness-life (Bewußtseinsleben) of the individual subject, subjects or communi-
ties of subjects in the world (Hua XXVII, 213-214; Hua IX, 335; Hua XV, 142).
In order for the investigations to be made possible, the phenomenological 
psychologists need to practice reduction such that they may become “the non-
participating onlooker” (der unbeteiligte Zuschauer) (Hua IX, 313/Sheehan eds., 
222) and become aware of the consciousness-life of the research objects. They 
need to give up all that they hold on in the natural attitude and do their best to 
get access to the purity of the psychic subjectivity and describe the essence of it 
(Hua IX, 312/Sheehan eds., 222). They also need to dispense with the world 
and what remains is all kind of being conscious of, for example, perception 
of, remembering of, judging of etc. (Hua IX, 282/McCormick, 24). With all 
these practices they become different from the objects they investigate. The 
purity of the psychic phenomenon, secured by “psychological-phenomeno-
logical reduction”, means mainly liberation from the psycho-physical aspects 
of psychic phenomenon (Hua IX, 308/Sheehan eds., 218). The reduction de-
mands that whatever irrelevant to the essential part of the psychic needs to be 
bracketed. The investigators concentrate solely on the correlation between the 
psychic activities and their intentional objects. 
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As indicated above, the objects that the psychological phenomenology 
aims to study are the individual subject, subjects or communities of subjects 
in the world. The subjects of these sorts are deeply involved in the world, so 
deeply that without the correlative part of the world, the psychic phenomenon 
of the subject(s) can be hardly explained. In this sense, the investigation has to 
presuppose the world. And this results in contradiction regarding the status 
of the world, i.e. on the one hand the world is bracketed through the practice 
of reduction, it is on the other hand retained for the sake of research so long 
as the objects they investigate are deeply involved in the world. In transcen-
dental phenomenology such a contradiction is overcome because the world as 
a whole has turned into phenomena. Consequently the reduction practiced 
by the psychologists is so to speak incomplete compared to philosophers and 
consequently the purity attained therein has also only relative purity (Hua 
IX, 225/Scanlon, 172).
3. Phenomenological Psychology and the Experiential World
Nevertheless one should never denounce the value of phenomenological psy-
chology in view of such contradiction. As long as this discipline works on the 
liberation from the “transcendent factors,” that is, the psycho-physical aspects 
of the psychic phenomenon, it gets hold of the basis to work out the essence of 
psychic phenomenon. And this leads to the study of the “unitary experiential 
world” (einheitliche Erfahrungswelt), which is “all-inclusive world for natural sci-
ences and socio-cultural sciences” (Hua IX, 232/Scanlon, 178). 
All the socio-cultural sciences need to deal with what proceed in the men-
tal (das Geistige) of the people, what they think and how they think. But as long 
as the  human beings are living in the world, the worldly aspect just requires 
to be taken into consideration. Traditionally, the relation between material 
nature and the mental has concerned the philosophers and scientists since 
Descartes in the early 17th century. Though Husserl poses similar question, 
yet he declines to see either “nature” or “mind” as indubitable notions from 
which we can start dealing with this question. As a matter of fact, these two 
concepts result from our theoretical thinking instead of our original experi-
ence. As long as the concepts of “nature” and “mind” are results of theoretical 
interests, they should not be taken for granted in such a context.
The world revealed through pre-theoretical experiences is never the world-
in-itself, i.e. the pure material nature, it is instead related to the subject. Hus-
serl delineates such a world as surrounding world (Umwelt). This is a pre-sci-
entific, pre-theoretic world of experience that involves the subjective aspect. 
Even though every subjective experience has its particular, concrete content, 
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it nevertheless contains the stable sense ( fester Sinn), that is, the invariant (das 
Invariante) in the world (Hua IX, 225/Scanlon, 172). The phenomenological 
psychology of Husserl aims at exactly the clarification of such invariants in 
the world. So long as it is related to the subjective moments, it is not devoid 
of the mental or mind. Besides, one has to add that the subject is closely con-
nected to the world. It is “subject in the world”. How, then, is such a subject 
to understand? 
The subject is a being with the mental, with mind, yet it is not purely men-
tal, it is also a being with bodily existence. The subject is involved in space, 
closely related to the physical phenomenon and material nature. How then is 
such a connection to be explained? Husserl takes up this old question with a 
new orientation. 
Basically, Husserl holds the view that the mental is more essential than the 
body in the definition of human being. However, to the extent that the mental 
cannot exist on its own, the mind is not irrelevant to the space. The mind is 
involved with space through the body, with such involvement the mind can 
be said to localize in space, though mediately. Husserl regards this as the 
way how the mind is originally given in space. When we determine that the 
mental cannot exist without the physical subsistence, the latter can be said 
to constitute the presupposition for the former. As a result, when the body 
is annihilated, so is the mental or mind. This is how Husserl thinks of death 
as a real event in the world (Hua IX, 109/Scanlon, 82). Accordingly Husserl 
does not support the idea that the soul may survive the decay of the body. He 
insists on the necessary precondition of the bodily existence for the mental. 
However, he is not in accordance with the naturalistic view that the mental 
or mind can be treated as no more than the by-product of the physical body, 
either. It is unacceptable to him to study the mental or mind with the devices 
borrowed from natural sciences. For him this sort of approach makes up the 
biggest obstacle to understand the mental or mind. He explains:
In a completely one-sided fashion, one attempted always to continue proceed-
ing exclusively in the mode of  natural science and to reduce all research con-
cerning reality to inductive research. Inductive science and empirical science 
fact stood and still now stand for many as equivalent expressions. Connected 
with that is the unclear transfer, one which is as a rule even false in principle, 
of  the idea of  a science of  nature to the science of  mental essences and of  the 
psyche itself  (Hua IX, 142/Scanlon, 108). 
In the eyes of the natural scientists the mental or mind is nothing but the 
phenomenon that is based on the physical occurrences. The mental is thus 
interpreted as objectified phenomenon in the natural world. The human be-
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ing is normally conceptualized as such, and the ego is basically regarded as 
spatial existence. But Husserl rejects such a conception of the ego. In his eyes, 
the pure ego is far beyond what the bodily phenomenon reveals4.
Husserl reinterprets the traditional philosophical question of mind/body 
by inquiring: how the mind comes to be involved in the spatial world? The 
answer to this question lies in animation (Beseelung), which can be made clear 
against the background of what Husserl calls the personalistic attitude.
As the subject in the world the human being deals with the things in the 
surrounding world with a attitude that Husserl calls the personalistic attitude. 
This attitude signifies the interest in the meaning and value of the things. 
And in this attitude, «my body is … given for me in the surrounding world as 
the center of the rest of the surrounding world, as a spatial thing of the sur-
rounding world with somatic properties, in which I hold sway, and even as 
that by which I exercise an influence upon the rest of the surrounding world, 
etc.» (Hua IX, 228/Scanlon, 175). This attitude is definitely different from the 
naturalistic attitude, which has exclusively interest in the pure nature that is 
deprived of value and meaning. For Husserl the surrounding world is related 
to the personalistic attitude and the pure nature results from the privation of 
personalistic attitude. 
Originally, the world is never independent of our experiences, the items we 
encounter are never just natural material, but always involving some senses 
beyond pure nature, not to mention the persons we encounter. As personal I 
(Mensch-Ich) I am living in the world with all these things and other persons. 
And it is the socio-cultural science that deals with the personal subject living 
in his surrounding, cultural world (Hua XXVII, 211). In such a situation, 
the things around him are significant (bedeutsam) (Hua IX, 111; Scanlon, 84). 
Husserl even notifies that between the personal subject and his objects there 
is intertwining relationship (Hua IX, 226; Scanlon, 173). In brief, cultural 
objects are produced for the sake of some uses or purposes that constitute their 
meaning and value. 
The knowledge about the pure nature is not at all equal to the understand-
ing of the world. The things in the surrounding world are things full of mean-
ing and value, they are cultural objects. Although the cultural objects have the 
components of natural material, they are not merely natural objects. Husserl 
holds that « (t)he purpose and sense of the work which accrued to the object in 
its original production is something permanently appropriated to that mate-
rial object » (Hua IX, 115/Scanlon, 87). The value and meaning are adherent 
4  As long as the pure ego is the origin of  constitution, the body can even be said to be consti-
tuted by the pure ego (208).
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to the cultural objects as their inseparable parts. Taking up arrow as example, 
Husserl explicates:  
physically the arrow is sensually seen and is at the same time, as we say, un-
derstood in its final sense as an arrow. It shows itself  to be that in possible 
and actual experience whenever it is shown and demonstrated as having been 
produced for the sake of  this sense and as corresponding to it (Hua IX, 115/
Scanlon, 87). 
Seen as such, the eidetic description of the personalistic attitude can pro-
vide us with an appropriate approach to understand the world. A study of this 
world calls Husserl also as «the eidetic study of the world of natural experi-
ence» (die Eidetik der natürlichen Erfahrungswelt). As long as this science aims at 
describing the a priori of the experiential world, it is close to the aforemen-
tioned phenomenological psychology and universal science of the world (uni-
versale Weltwissenschaft). 
Phenomenological psychology, the universal science of the world, or 
«the eidetic study of the world of natural experience», all of them are to 
be characterized as aprioric, eidetic, intuitive, descriptive and intentional. 
Beyond that it remains in the natural attitude instead of transcendental 
attitude. A priori implies that between subject and the world there is a uni-
versal structure, which is revealed through constant styles and types. Such 
aprioric, universal structures are presuppositions of the daily life. Yet these 
presuppositions are not being aware of. Even the subject that is involved is 
not being aware of, either. In daily life people have their preoccupations 
with all kinds of object that concern their living. One needs to step back in 
order to get in touch with these presuppositions as well as the subject that 
has been constantly in function. It is what Husserl means by reduction. 
First is the stage of psychological-phenomenological reduction, and then 
the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.  In this context, the first 
one will suffice.
Through the reduction we become aware of the presupposition of daily life 
and come in touch with the experiential world, which Husserl explains:
By the title ‘experiential world’ we mean clearly what makes up the unity of  
concordant total actuality which is continually reestablished in the course of  
our experiences (Hua IX, 59/Scanlon, 44).
The world is a world that is related to the subject, not just the world-in-it-
self, as already mentioned before. And such experiential world has a universal 
structure that is revealed in stable types and styles. The structure is on the one 
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hand related to the subject, it is on the other related to the world. The subject 
and the world are just correlated to each other. 
Husserl points out further that the experiential world with its eidetic structure 
is the «all-inclusive world for natural sciences and socio-cultural sciences»(Hua 
IX, 232/Scanlon, 178). It contains the world-truth (Weltwahrheit) (Hua IX, 63/
Scanlon 47) that constitutes the basis for all the truths in factual sciences, be it 
natural or socio-cultural. The truth revealed in the world of original experienc-
es signifies that such a world of truth is not a world without contents. Only be-
cause of its fruitful contents can it become the foundation of all sciences. Based 
on the truth of such a world we can be sure of truth in scientific knowledge. The 
world is a domain of pre-scientific experience, the structures of which will be 
reflected in other sciences (Hua IX, 64, 46, 232/Scanlon, 33, 47, 178).
Thus, the experiential world is the foundation of all the scientific research-
es. The experience has it that, as human beings living in the natural attitude, 
we hold lots of unshakable believes which concern the reality and totality 
of the world. It is accepted by us as firmly as possible. But that which is re-
vealed in the original experiences is for Husserl much too contaminated by 
the scientific culture that we may find it extremely hard to return to the world 
in original experiences and recognize it. For this reason Husserl suggests to 
overcome such difficulties by phenomenological reduction, here once again 
the psychological-phenomenological reduction.
Conclusion
In the first part of my paper, I delineate the Husserlian notion of lifeworld 
ending with the question: Can the ontology of lifeworld get hold of an inde-
pendent status, that is, can it have its own value without referring to transcen-
dental phenomenology?
In the second and third part of my paper I explore the meaning of phe-
nomenological psychology by indicating the position of this discipline as be-
tween transcendental phenomenology and empirical psychology. In addition, 
I also indicate the parallel between phenomenological psychology and tran-
scendental phenomenology. Husserl himself handles the relationship between 
phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology quite a lot 
when he deals with phenomenological psychology. However, in the lecture 
held in 1925, we hardly find Husserl articulate much about the relationship 
between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, 
rather, it concentrates on the relationship between phenomenological psychol-
ogy and the factual sciences, in particular that of socio-cultural sciences in the 
context of which the experiential world plays a pivotal role. 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA26
As long as phenomenological psychology works on the correlation of our ex-
periences and the world, and as long as it deals with the natural world-concept, 
the phenomenological psychology corresponds to the universal science of the 
world. If, as the mind’s self-knowledge (193/Scanlon, 148), the phenomenologi-
cal psychology focuses on the side of subject, then it is the universal science of 
the world that focuses on the side of the world. Like two sides of the same coin, 
these two sciences belong to each other and both of them correspond to « the 
eidetic study of the world of natural experience» as long as they are eidetic sci-
ences. In such a case, a phenomenology without the subsoil of transcendental 
phenomenology seems sustainable. Looking back to the question raised above, 
why not also grant the ontology of lifeworld an independent status?
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Phenomenology and Sociological Research:  
The Constitution of “Friendship”
Jochen Dreher
This analysis combines phenomenological and sociological research for an investigation of the social re-
lationship of “friendship”. From a phenomenological perspective, it focuses on the epistemological basis, 
on the subjective constitution of the phenomenon of “friendship”. The social construction of friendship 
however, is described from a sociological research perspective with reference to concrete empirical expres-
sions of this specific social relationship. The key for the reflections on friendship is the adaptation of 
Edmund Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction for the analysis of social phenomena, based on 
the argumentations of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch. This leads to the assumption that friendship 
is symbolically constituted with reference to everyday transcendent ideas which substantially define the 
specific expression of this social relationship. 
Introduction
The aim of this investigation is to describe a possibility of how phenomenolo-
gical reflections can have a purpose for questions focused by the social scienc-
es. I will demonstrate how analogous to the application of phenomenological 
reduction – the basic methodical procedure of phenomenology – there can be 
a specific reduction, oriented towards the analysis of the constitution of social 
phenomena. I will focus on the analysis of the constitution of “friendship” 
as a specific form of human relationship to be described as example for ap-
plied phenomenology on the interface of sociological and phenomenological 
research. The essential intention of these phenomenological reflections is to 
discover the subjective preconditions of the social relationship of friendship.
Phenomenological reduction, on the one hand, can have a specific pur-
pose for an epistemological reflection of the methodology of the social sci-
ences, which will be of less relevance for these reflections. Essentially, I will 
show how analogous to the application of phenomenological reduction, this 
methodological procedure can be used to analyze specific social phenome-
na. (1) First of all, I will briefly describe the fundamental procedures of phe-
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nomenological reduction, relying on Edmund Husserl’s respective writings. 
(2) Secondly, I will follow the ideas of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch who 
work out the “epoché of the natural attitude,” adapting Husserl’s method to 
confront social scientific problems. (3) In the third part of my paper, I will 
demonstrate how a modified reduction method can be used to analyze a spe-
cific social phenomenon; my “applied theoretical” reflections will concentrate 
on the constitution of a specific form of human encounters, in analyzing the 
constitution of “friendship.”
The Phenomenological Reduction
The basic methodical procedure within phenomenological philosophy is the 
“phenomenological reduction” as it was essentially developed by Edmund 
Husserl in his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Phi-
losophy (Husserl 1982 [1913]) and Cartesian Meditations (Husserl 1960 [1931]). 
The phenomenological reduction is characterized by the fundamental inhibi-
tion of any statement about the world or existence with the aim of describing 
the mechanisms and potentialities of the intentionality of the subjective con-
sciousness. Husserl’s reflections on the meaning of “existence” are searching 
for an answer to the question of how the world “exists,” i.e. how our ideas, per-
ceptions, and judgments can be considered “objective.” All of our statements 
on meaning and existence have to be identified as well-founded. According 
to the tradition of the Kantian transcendental philosophy, not the objects are 
being focused; it must be analyzed how they appear to our consciousness. It is 
precisely the phenomenological reduction which aims at revealing the consti-
tutive principles of the subjective consciousness. Husserl mainly differentiates 
between (1) the eidetic reduction, (2) the transcendental reduction and (3) the phenom-
enological reduction (also called phenomenological or transcendental epoché). I will now 
briefly describe these three reduction procedures, and I will also point out 
their relevance for the analysis of social scientific problems. 
(1) The eidetic reduction leads to a description of the intuition, of what pre-
sents itself as the eidos of the constituted object being in the focus of conscious-
ness. As Husserl argues, it serves to uncover noetic-noematic correlations, the 
noetic-noematic structures that are present within the constituting process of 
objects. The “eidetic variation” reveals the eidetical structure in abstracting 
from the coincidences and individual particularities of factual acts of thinking. 
(2) The transcendental reduction serves to describe “pure phenomena” in a 
sense that these are liberated from anything that is part of reality. From such a 
perspective, phenomenology is supposed to be not only the theory of the eidos 
of real phenomena but also of transcendentally reduced phenomena.
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(3) What Husserl denotes as phenomenological reduction is also called “phe-
nomenological” or “transcendental epoché.” What is being achieved with this 
methodological procedure is the “bracketing” or “inhibition” of the world; as-
sumptions and previously constituted knowledge are bracketed with the help 
of phenomenological reduction. With the bracketing of the unquestionable 
validity of the being of the world, this world is being focused as constituting 
world of a constituting consciousness. The world which is being constituted in 
the natural attitude, which is discovered as real in experience, has to be put 
into brackets, has to be inhibited.
What significance do these phenomenological procedures have for the 
social sciences? Why should this highly subjectivist position be relevant for 
the analysis of social phenomena? Of course, as Schutz and Gurwitsch have 
demonstrated, the phenomenological method can be used to epistemologi-
cally challenge the methodology of the social sciences. Alfred Schutz in his 
basic work Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (Schütz 2004 [1932]) phenom-
enologically revises Max Weber’s notion of social action in the heart of his 
interpretive sociology. Using phenomenological reflections, Schutz shows that 
Weber’s perception of the individual actor who confers meaning to his ac-
tions, needs to be formulated more precisely, taking into consideration the 
perspective of the constituting subjective consciousness. Finally, in revising 
Weber’s basic sociological concepts, Schutz establishes the phenomenological 
foundations for the social sciences. 
In analogy to the different reduction procedures as described by Husserl, 
Schutz challenges the issue of “subjective meaning” being conferred to social 
actions by the acting subject. He does not explicitly refer to the reduction 
method, while challenging Weber’s notion of subjective meaning. What be-
comes obvious is the fact that Schutz is using the phenomenological position 
to epistemologically found Weber’s sociology. 
The aim of this argumentation is to apply the phenomenological reduc-
tion method to analyze concrete social phenomena. The question for me is 
whether insights on the constitution of social phenomena can be reached 
through the application of phenomenological reduction, or, to be more pre-
cise, through an analogous procedure to phenomenological reduction. In my 
opinion, neither Schutz nor Gurwitsch explicitly applied this methodological 
procedure to analyze concrete social phenomena. One could argue that for 
example Alfred Schutz, in his studies on the stranger and the homecomer, 
is using reduction procedures, which still remain on the level of a sociology 
of knowledge. Anyhow, he does not evidently relate to the reduction method 
when conducting these studies in applied theory.
I will elaborate on this interface between phenomenology and the social 
sciences by referring to what Schutz and Gurwitsch developed following Hus-
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serl’s position on phenomenological reduction. They further develop Husserl’s 
perspective – I would not say they distance themselves from Husserl, in estab-
lishing the epoché of the natural attitude. 
The Significance of Phenomenological Reduction for the Social Sciences
In his reception of Husserl’s earlier phenomenology and coming from the 
social sciences, Alfred Schutz focuses on a “phenomenology of the natural 
attitude” rather than transcendental phenomenology. Although he acknowl-
edged “the importance of the phenomenological and the eidetic reductions 
for the foundations of a presuppositionless philosophy”, Schutz analyzes social 
reality on the account of time-consciousness, discovered by Husserl within the 
transcendental sphere but still valid within the natural attitude (cf. Michael 
D. Barber 2004). According to his theory of the life-world, Schutz empha-
sizes the life-world as science’s substrate, unquestioned unless there were some 
motivations for questioning it, and admits that his idea of the “epoché of the 
natural attitude” surpassed Husserl’s work without being incompatible with 
it. The way I argue, Schutz’s reflections “sociologize” Husserl’s subjectivist 
position in concentrating on the we-relationship as the fundamental social 
relationship from which subjectivity needs to be explained.
In his essay on multiple realities, Schutz describes the “natural attitude” 
as an epistemological position that takes the world and its objects for granted, 
until counterproof imposes itself. “As long as the once established scheme of 
reference, the system of our and other people’s experiences, works, and as 
long as the actions and operations performed under its guidance yield the de-
sired results, we trust these experiences. We are not interested in finding out 
whether this world really does exist or whether it is merely a coherent system 
of consistent appearances” (Schutz 1962 [1945]: 228). This attitude, which is 
part of our everyday life experience, can only be interrupted if a “strange,” 
not expected experience appeares. Comparing the “natural attitude” to a 
phenomenological attitude, Schutz discovers the relatedness of the phenom-
enological epoché and the natural attitude. He describes phenomenological 
epoché as the suspension of our belief in the reality of the world as a device to 
overcome the natural attitude by radicalizing the Cartesian method of philo-
sophical doubt. Schutz suggests that human beings within the natural attitude 
also use a specific epoché which is of course rather different to the one used 
by a phenomenologist. Human beings within the natural attitude do not sus-
pend their belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the contrary, they 
suspend doubt that the world and its objects might not be how they appear to 
them. Schutz calls this epoché the epoché of the natural attitude (ibid.: 229).
33THE CONSTITUTION OF FRIENDSHIP
While the phenomenological attitude, reached through phenomenological 
reduction, is so to speak artificially assumed by the scientist, the epoché of the 
natural attitude is a position taken by human beings in their everyday life. 
When describing different reality spheres, such as the world of dreams, 
of imageries and phantasms, the world of art, the world of religious experi-
ence, the world of scientific contemplation, the play world of the child, etc., 
Schutz argues that a peculiar cognitive style belongs to each of these different 
provinces of meaning. A specific tension of consciousness and, consequently, 
also a specific epoché, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self 
experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective belong 
to these provinces of meaning as well. It is crucial that the world of working 
in daily life is the archetype of our experience of reality. All other provinces of 
meaning may be considered to be its modifications. 
Schutz proposes a systematical grouping of these provinces of meaning, 
according to their constitutive principle. This analysis would prove, he says, 
that the more the mind turns away from life, the larger the slabs of the eve-
ryday world of working which are put in doubt; the epoché of the natural at-
titude which suspends doubt in the existence of the world is replaced by other 
epochés which suspend belief in more and more layers of the reality of daily 
life, putting them in brackets (Schutz 1962 [1945]: 232f.). Like this, a typo-
logy of the different provinces of meaning could be established, and each one 
– this is highly important for my argumentation – could be described with a 
particular epoché. Dreaming, reading a poem or novel, playing with children 
requires some kind of suspension of what is pre-given by the everyday life-
world. Following Schutz, this is in each case achieved through a specific kind 
of epoché. 
A slightly different argumentation is presented by Aron Gurwitsch who 
describes the interface between phenomenology and the social sciences. The 
central notion for him would be the concept of the life-world which, the way 
I argue, is the key concept to connect the two disciplines. Gurwitsch argues 
with the following words: «Whether we concern ourselves with the life-world 
along the lines of Husserl’s orientation or, following the direction of existen-
tialism and philosophical anthropology, we deal with human existence within 
the life-world, in raising the problem of access, we are led to consider con-
sciousness and its acts. These include the acts through which the life-world 
presents to us and is interpreted in the sense it has for the sociohistorical group 
to which we belong […] and the acts through which we conceive of ourselves 
as mundane existents, as human beings in a sense which is congruous in that 
we interpret our life-world. Acts of consciousness are in play in all our conduct 
– in all our doings, involvements, commitments, hopes, fears, actions, and 
projects» (Gurwitsch 1974 [1970]: 12). 
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When, the way Gurwitsch argues, consciousness in this context is con-
sidered to be «the universal and sole medium of access», a special methodo-
logical device is required «by means of which consciousness is stripped of the 
sense of mundanity or, as it may also be put, one which permits us to consider 
consciousness exclusively under the aspect of its presentational or presentify-
ing function, that is opening up access to objects and entities of every kind, 
including those which pertain to the life-world. The device is the phenomeno-
logical or transcendental reduction» (Gurwitsch 1974 [1970]: 13). 
What the phenomenological reduction does, according to Gurwitsch, is 
putting the existential character of the world and the objects out of play, out 
of action, so that it is no longer in use. «The belief in question is suspended and 
correlatively the existential character is placed between parentheses; it is inhibited, but 
inhibition is not suppression» (Gurwitsch 1974: 185). Therefore, according 
to the phenomenological attitude, an object which continues to offer itself to 
consciousness as existing is considered not simply as existing, not as such and 
such a reality, but as presenting itself as existing, as laying claim on existence. 
Comparing these reflections to what is achieved in the natural attitude, Gur-
witsch argues that in the natural attitude the subject is convinced that he or 
she is in the midst of a real world, confronted by levels of being whose objects 
also comport themselves as existing in one form or another. Phenomenologi-
cal reduction is less concerned with the objects themselves, or with the convic-
tions the subject has about them, than with the way in which these objects and 
convictions enter into phenomenology. 
Strictly following Husserl’s reflections on phenomenological reduction, 
Gurwitsch does not see any possibility to connect phenomenology with philo-
sophical anthropology and the biological and psychological sciences. These 
disciplines refer to consciousness in its relation to mundane realities, as per-
taining to the concrete human self, and therefore are impregnated with hu-
man reality. Above all, consciousness can be described as a pure field of expe-
rienced acts which are related to objects, acts by which the real concrete self 
is itself grasped and in which it is constituted. This is, as Gurwitsch argues, 
why consciousness possesses the absolute character assigned to it by Descartes 
and reaffirmed by phenomenological reduction. «Therefore no anthropologi-
cal element may be allowed to enter into phenomenological considerations. 
One of the fundamental reasons for the phenomenological reduction is that 
it carves an impassable gulf between phenomenology and every species of 
philosophical anthropology» (Gurwitsch 1974: 187f.). When phenomenologi-
cal reduction is being practiced as a methodical procedure, what is retained is 
the reduced consciousness, that is, consciousness viewed solely in terms of the 
appearing and constituting of objects before it. Reduced consciousness, above 
all, is defined as a field of experienced acts which refers to objects.
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If we follow Gurwitsch in this argumentation, the social sciences as well 
as philosophical anthropology remain separated from phenomenology, espe-
cially if the specific aim of phenomenological reduction was to be taken into 
consideration. Reduced consciousness is free of any kind of social category 
and predominantly consists of noetic-noematic structures. Still, I would say, 
that there is the possibility to analogically apply the reduction procedure to 
analyze the constitution of social phenomena. Basically, Alfred Schutz is pro-
posing a similar procedure when identifying a specific kind of epoché which 
belongs to each of the experienced multiple realities. As far as I can see, con-
crete descriptions of reductions by phenomenologically oriented social scien-
tists are missing. That is the reason why I would like to propose a possible 
social scientific equivalent to phenomenological reduction. 
Focusing on the social phenomenon of “friendship,” first of all, I will de-
fine it from a sociological perspective. To describe the sociological relevance 
of phenomenological reflections, after all, I will paraphrase three different 
reduction levels that can be established in analyzing this phenomenon.
The Phenomenon of “Friendship”: Transcending the Intersubjective Life-World
Although “friendship” is a common term in modern cultures, surprisingly 
it has rarely been the focus of  investigation by social scientists. There are 
differing cultural conceptualizations in relation to the quality of the phenom-
enon of “friendship” as a social relationship. The golden age of friendship in 
Europe was clearly the period of romanticism when Schiller and Goethe cel-
ebrated “friendship” as specific form of human relations. The idea of “friend-
ship” was most probably invented in antiquity, as is brilliantly demonstrated 
in Homeric legends. In all these contexts, friendship is not defined as a kin 
term; however, it does imply some type of reciprocity and obligation between 
otherwise unrelated individuals. Friendships can range from the relatively 
casual, dependent on shared activity or setting (such as a sports club), to deep 
and enduring relationships of mutual support.
Within highly differentiated societies, given social relations – such as fami-
ly and kinship relations – as well as  roles are not sufficient to provide complete 
orientation to human action (Simmel 1999: 383ff.), hence personal relations 
and especially friendship, consisting of two partners that were chosen volun-
tarily among themselves, become more and more important.  The crucial 
characteristic of friendship is that understanding and involvement are shared 
within a mutual spiritual and emotional relationship encompassing typified 
convictions and ideals agreed upon by the friends (Kracauer 1971: 45f.). One 
of the founders of the Western tradition of thought, Aristotle, disclosed the 
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core issue in the concept of friendship when he described a friend as one’s 
“other self.” Sociological interpretations of friendship share this view, arguing 
that the human being in the socially heterogeneous world does not find a sec-
ond ego in addition to a previously existent ego, instead he or she encounters 
his or her own ego in discovering an ego within a friend (Tenbruck 1964: 440). 
From a phenomenological perspective, “friendship” as an idea and as a specific 
form of human encounter transcends the everyday life-world of the individual 
and establishes a certain bond between human beings, thus constituting a 
unique form of social relation (Schutz 1962 [1955]: 316-318; Dreher 2003: 
147f.). The systematic phenomenological – one can also say proto-sociological 
– analysis of “friendship” as an element of the intersubjective life-world is the 
focus of this presentation. I will describe the basic constitutive activities of 
consciousness in establishing a “friendship” within the social world.
From a subjectivist perspective, the I as experiencing subject is confronted 
with the transcendences of space, time, the intersubjective (social) world and 
multiple reality spheres (worlds of dreams, imagination, play, religion, science 
etc.). Social phenomena such as “friendship” or “love” develop within face-
to-face-relationships (according to their original idea) – they require the face-
to-face-relationship as a basis, while simultaneously transcending this form 
of human encounter because they are symbolized at a higher level – and this is 
of crucial importance. In this way, these social phenomena endure independ-
ent of time and space. The fact that the person I love or a friend is on another 
continent does not necessarily affect the social relationship; no matter what 
temporal or spatial distance exits between lovers and friends, this social re-
lationship in its specificity establishes a strong bond between human beings. 
The phenomenon of “friendship” in its symbolically super-elevated form usu-
ally develops – within a face-to-face-relationship, so that for the two persons 
(the constitution within which the basic form of this social phenomenon most 
often occurs), a high level of individuality (cf. Simmel 1999) is involved in this 
form of human encounter. It is a highly personal and individual decision who 
is chosen to be one’s friend.
According to Alfred Schutz’s theory of the life-world, “friendship” must 
be symbolized by an idea originating in another reality – a reality transcend-
ing the everyday life-world and which is shared by the persons involved in a 
friendship. This idea of a unique “friendship” can be the result of common 
experiences of an existential character which form part of the unique biogra-
phy of each person involved in the friendship (Schutz 1989 [1956]: 255-257). 
For example, the shared experiences of adventures, catastrophes, journeys, 
coping with a crisis etc. often form the basis of a friendship. What these ex-
periences all have in common is that they transcend everyday reality – they 
are experienced by friends in a common reality sphere that lies beyond the 
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experiences of the everyday life and, because of their symbolic meaningful-
ness, they represent something crucial within one’s biography. 
Construction and Constitution of “Friendship”
Starting from Husserl’s, Schutz’s and Gurwitsch’s assumptions on the phenom-
enological reduction, I will analyze the social phenomenon of “friendship,” 
taking into consideration different reduction levels. My reflections part from 
the general differentiation between construction and constitution that is proposed 
by Thomas Luckmann (1999) (cf. also (Berger/Luckmann 1987 [1966]). On 
the one hand it can be argued that historical worlds are socially constructed in 
concrete experiences; on the other hand, reality is constituted on the basis of 
general structures of experience within consciousness activities. Therefore, so-
cial phenomena like “social relationships”, in this case “friendship”, can only 
be constructed within concrete historical worlds. As substantial phenomena 
they are constructed in each of these social worlds in a specific way. However, 
the construction of “friendship” occurs on the basis of general constitutive 
principles of the subjective consciousness. Typical mechanisms within the 
process of the construction of “friendship” are briefly mentioned to inspire 
the phenomenological reductions that I will develop. Friendship, as I argued, 
first and foremost, is symbolically constructed, that is to say it is established with 
reference to a collectively shared symbolism which includes the cultural cat-
egories used within construction processes. 
With phenomenological reductions the researcher describes the “formal” 
structures without which human experience would not be possible. The most 
obvious structures are the categories of the subjective orientation in space, 
like above/below, in front of me/behind me or categories of time. Life-world 
structures of social relationships with different levels of immediateness, famili-
arity/strangeness and anonymity are in contrast considerably more complex 
(Luckmann 1999: 20) and therefore more difficult to describe. I will now pro-
pose the three reduction levels of the analysis of the phenomenon of friend-
ship; of course, more of them could be described.
The Reduction Levels
(1) The first reduction I propose is called the mundane phenomenological reduc-
tion which serves to discover the typically ongoing construction mechanisms 
of “friendship.” From the perspective of a sociology of knowledge, it will be 
shown how friendship is constructed on the basis of knowledge structures that 
are part of the intersubjective life-world. On this level   substantial categories 
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related to friendship are to be found. What can be found on this first reduc-
tion level are “first order constructs” (Schutz 1962 [1953]); we find the “natu-
ral concepts” being used by individuals in concrete situations of interaction 
and everyday communication. On this level of reflection, one discovers sub-
stantial constructs that the experiencing individual is using for the construc-
tion of friendship.
I argue that in order to be communicated by friends and to serve as a 
means of establishing a friendship, these “existential” experiences must be 
symbolized within the Here and Now with the help of symbols that belong 
to our everyday life. Symbols in this sense are objects, facts or events from our 
everyday reality which refer to the reality of the unique “friendship” which 
transcends the everyday life-world. These symbols, on a further level, can 
then be used repeatedly in communication between friends and in this way es-
tablish the friendship again and again. Narratives of common experiences of 
the friends that are told ritually, are examples that demonstrate how symbolic 
appresentation of the social relationship of friendship is being constructed. 
If we concentrate on the sphere of the intersubjective life-world, these phe-
nomenological reflections on the symbol show us how the social relationship 
“friendship” is established through common experience and communication 
by means of symbols. Interaction and communication between human beings 
establish “friendship” as well as other forms of social relations. For this rea-
son, they serve to constitute the social world as an intersubjective life-world – 
in a specific way, the symbols of friendship enable the individual to overcome 
the transcendences of the intersubjective life-world. 
Alfred Schutz explains the social relationship of “friendship” from an 
egological perspective as a life-worldly phenomenon, that is to say as a phe-
nomenon based on the experience and perception of the ego, of the subject. 
On the basis of the we-relation – as the basic element of the social world or in-
tersubjective life-world – human beings are able to constitute their subjectivity 
within the process of socialization. In terms of the phenomenon “friendship”, 
we have demonstrated that a great part of individuality resulting from a certain 
subjectivity of a human being with a distinct biography is involved in this kind 
of social relationship; the friend is individually chosen and reflects one’s own 
typical characteristics, for example by repeatedly telling the crucial narratives 
about oneself from the past or just by memorizing the mutual “idea of the 
friendship” – this is constitutive for the phenomenon of friendship. 
As I mentioned before, there must be an implied agreement between the two 
friends about typified ideals and convictions. In other words, from their indi-
vidual perspectives they supposedly share basic elements of their world views. 
When their biographies crossed, in the situation when they first met each 
other face-to-face, when their “inner times” were synchronized in mutually 
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shared experiences (Schutz 1962 [1955]: 317), then and only then a specific, 
unique “friendship” could be established through the process of symboliza-
tion. The crucial aspect of the mutual experience is the condition that the 
experience in itself has an “existential” character for both of the potential 
friends and that, in retrospect, they are able to connect the experience with an 
everyday transcendent idea which is identified as “friendship”. 
In comparison to the love relationship, which is especially based on a sen-
sual and sexual union of the lovers, “friendship” is symbolized and “lives” 
exclusively through the everyday transcendent idea. No physical attraction is 
required for the establishing of a friendship, friendships are possible between 
older and younger people, gender first and foremost is not decisive for friend-
ship relations (although friendship frequently occurs in same gender constel-
lations), and also, one can imagine without any problems friendships between 
individuals with a completely divergent cultural background. The relation-
ship between Robinson Crusoe and Friday gives an excellent example of how 
extreme differences and contradictions can be overcome through the consti-
tution of a bond called “friendship”. 
From a phenomenological perspective the conviction that the social rela-
tionship of “friendship” is established through symbolization is relevant. The 
crucial mechanism within the structure of these symbols is their ability to 
harmonize contradictions or even paradoxes, and in that way, they serve to 
overcome borders between individuals (Soeffner 2000: 198-203). The two in-
dividuals who become friends may differentiate from each other tremendously 
– like Robinson and Friday –, the activity of consciousness called “symboliza-
tion”, a specific category of appresentation, enables them to establish a mu-
tual social relationship with each other. The relation with the friend becomes 
part of the intersubjective life-world of the individual. Through symbolization 
the friend becomes part of one’s individual existence. Without the friend as 
the “alter ego”, the individual would not be the same anymore; the “unique 
friendship”, as symbolized social relationship, forms part of the totality of 
the life-world of the experiencing subject. Other social relations – the family, 
kinship, the nation or a certain culture – are also experienced as elements 
of the life-world of the individual; they are constituents of the individual’s 
self-identity.
With the help of the mundane phenomenological reduction I described the typi-
cality of the specific social bond of friendship. Culturally and historically, this 
concept varies tremendously, however, common features of friendship can still 
be identified.
(2) The second reduction reaches the structural level of symbolic constitution of 
“friendship”. To get to this level, the substantial contents of cultural symboli-
zations of friendship are bracketed within the reduction. Relational structures 
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defining the Otherness or the familiarity of the interaction partner are used 
to constitute specific bonds among human beings. The individual, who ex-
periences and interacts in everyday life, structurally relates to an everyday 
transcendent realm of “friendship” in encounters with the Other. The indi-
vidual relates on an everyday transcendent reality which contains construc-
tions of this specific relationship relevant to interacting individuals. At this 
point of the argumentation, Alfred Schutz’s theory of the life-world is helpful 
(Schutz 1962 [1945], 1962 [1955], 1989 [1956]; cf. also Dreher 2003). The 
specific cultural symbolism which is used by the individual actors and which 
is present within the stock of knowledge of the interacting persons is used for 
the interpretation of the Otherness and familiarity of the opposed person. 
Everyday transcending ideas of friendship are exchanged in intersubjective 
relationships by communicating them in the everyday reality with the help of 
symbols. The crucial aspect about this second reduction level is the fact that 
on the basis of the structuring of the life-world of the experiencing subject – 
everyday life and multiple realities – the specific relationship of friendship is 
symbolically constructed. Because of the structurally prevalent potentiality 
to transcend the world of everyday life, these forms of social relationships are 
constituted by the experiencing and interacting subject. 
The second reduction level that I am describing – the structural level of sym-
bolic constitution – allows identifying subjective preconditions of this kind of 
social relationship, of friendship. Of course, at this point of realizing the re-
duction procedures, the concept of “friendship” has already been bracketed, 
which is why we are referring to the specific form of social relationship. As far 
as the subjective preconditions are concerned, we now know that this form of 
social relationship is highly dependent on the potentiality of human beings 
to use symbols. Experiencing and interacting subjects are able to establish 
common everyday transcending realities which include a common idea of the 
specific, unique social relationship.
(3) The third reduction I would like to discuss is the reduction of the sensual 
sensation of the Otherness and familiarity of the encountering human being. With this 
reduction level, “corporality” or “bodilyness” are in the center of the reflec-
tions. This reduction leads to a formal level of the encountering of the Other. 
The intentionality of the subjective consciousness on this level is directed to-
wards the Other as another human being. Experiences of “strangeness” and 
“familiarity” or “anonymity” and “intimacy” determine the subjective per-
ception of the Other whose appearance is perceived in relation to our analysis 
of “friendship” as familiar or acquainted. On this basic level of the encounter 
of human beings, language and also semiotic symbolic relations are brack-
eted and in reflection, they are not taken into consideration. What is reached 
is a pre-theoretical, pre-linguistic level of bodily human encounter in which 
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vague experiences of Otherness are constituted within the intentionality of 
the experiencing consciousness. On this proto-sociological or phenomenologi-
cal reduction level, the general foundations can be discovered which serve the 
experiencing subject as a basis for the constitution of the specific social bond 
as the basis for “friendship.” On this level we can especially determine the 
difference to the love relationship. Physical or sexual attraction as pre-theo-
retical conditions are important for the constitution of the “love relationship”, 
for “friendship”, as we have seen, they are usually not of any relevance.
Of course, as I have shown before, “friendship” is structurally and sub-
stantially established on the other two reduction levels. On this level of sen-
sual sensation of the Otherness and familiarity, it can be phenomenologically 
described how social bonds are being constituted. It gives an insight intohow 
these social relationships are formally and substantially conferred with mean-
ing and the way they are culturally coded becomes obvious form the first two 
reductions I described. 
This was an attempt to demonstrate how analogously phenomenological 
reduction is used to analyze the constitution and construction of social phe-
nomena. Instead of applying the epoché of the natural attitude, which is not 
the position of the scientist, I follow Husserl and Schutz and methodically 
use the reduction procedures for the reflection of social interrelations. This is 
achieved by focusing on the perspective of the experiencing subject with its 
life-world, but within situations of interaction of human beings. Therefore, the 
reductions have to stop on a level, on which the Other can still be perceived, 
that is to say the bodily level. Transcendental reductions would not make any 
sense in relation to the analysis of the social phenomenon of “friendship.” 
This analysis was meant to demonstrate how, with a focus on the constitution 
analysis of concrete social phenomena, phenomenology can be made fruitful 
for sociological research.
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Making humor together: 
phenomenology and interracial humor
Michael D. Barber
This paper explains humor through phenomenological concepts and methods. The three major theories 
of humor: Superiority, Relief, and Incongruity depend on the thwarting of intentional expectations.  
Since one experiences an incongruity between what is intended and what is actually experienced, the 
incongruity theory affords the best explanation, but intentionality remains fundamental for all theories. 
Theorists of humor rightly insist that the enjoyment of humorous incongruity completes the definition of 
humor, but such enjoyment also depends on a special epoché, usually elicited by the cues of an interlocutor 
who invites the listener to leap together into the humorous finite province of meaning.  In this province, 
actions and statements, hurtful in everyday life, such as a pie thrown at someone who ducks as the pie 
hits another, produce laughter. This comic epoché resembles the phenomenological epoché in its distanc-
ing from everyday life, and, like the phenomenological epoché, it opens everyday experience to reflection. 
Although one often experiences and enjoys humor alone, humor is thoroughly intersubjective and more 
frequently occurs when two persons participate in the humorous epoché together. The opportunities for 
making humor together are enhanced to the extent the partners differ in their expectations and responses 
to situations. Those differences, including bodily differences, often result from the complex intersubjec-
tive networks, including culture. As in the case of a seemingly solitary activity like reflection, which one 
learns from others and exercises on one’s own autonomously, one internalizes others’ styles of humor and 
discovers such internalization through reflection on one’s «because motives».
On the basis of these features – intentionality, epoché, and intersubjectivity, the paper concludes by 
briefly examining an example of interracial humor. Despite the racist character of much interracial hu-
mor, the example shows that interracial humor can produce a respectful bonding between representatives 
of different races who make humor together.  
Introduction
This essay will outline of a conception of humor that will draw on phenom-
enological concepts and methods. I will show that all three of the major the-
ories of humor: the Superiority Theory, the Relief Theory, and the Incon-
gruity Theory can be explained by intentionality that explodes, or, as Kant 
opined, expectations are suddenly transformed into nothing (Kant 1790: 200; 
Morreall 1987: 48) . Whereas perception for Husserl proceeds, for the most 
part, with a continuous fulfillment of intentions, humor depends essentially 
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on intentional expectations that are thwarted. Insofar as one experiences an 
incongruity between what is intended and what is actually experienced, the 
incongruity theory affords the best explanation of humor, though intentional-
ity is fundamental for all the theories. Nevertheless, we frequently experience 
intentional aiming that is thwarted, but humor does not necessarily result, as 
for example, when I believe that my wallet is on my writing table in the other 
room but discover that it is not or when we travel to meet a friend at the train 
station and they do not appear. While other theorists rightly insist that the 
incongruity must be enjoyed and that this enjoyment constitutes an additional 
element that completes the definition of humor, I will argue that such enjoy-
ment is also generated within a special kind of epoché that is usually elicited 
by the tips and cues of the humorous interlocutor who invites the listener to 
leap together into the humorous finite province of meaning. This comic epoché 
distances one from the everyday life experience that, as lived, might have an 
entirely different tone. Thus, actions and statements that would be hurtful in 
everyday life, such as a pie thrown at someone who ducks with the result that 
the pie hits someone else, produce laughter in the realm of humor.  The comic 
epoché resembles the phenomenological epoché in its distancing from everyday 
life, and, like the phenomenological epoché, this comic distancing opens up to 
reflection the everyday lived experience that by its lived intensity hinders such 
reflection.  
Although one often experiences and enjoys humor alone, humor is a thor-
oughly intersubjective activity, since more frequently it occurs when two 
persons participate in the humorous epoché together, as when children leap 
together into the sphere of make-believe play. The opportunities for mak-
ing humor together are enhanced to the extent the partners differ in their 
expectations and responses to situations. Further those differences, includ-
ing bodily differences—the stuff of humor—often result from the complex 
intersubjective networks that constitute the cultures from which we emerge. 
As in the case of a seemingly solitary activity like reflection, which one learns 
from others and goes on to exercise on one’s own autonomously, one is able to 
internalize others’ styles of humor discoverable through a reflection on what 
Schutz calls one’s «because motives»  (Schutz 1962: 69-72; Schutz 1967: 91-
96, Schutz 2004: 202-209).
On the basis of these constituents of humor, namely, intentionality, epoché, 
and intersubjectivity, I will briefly examine as an example interracial humor. 
I will suggest that interracial humor, which has often been racist in character, 
actually affords the possibility of a respectful bonding between representatives 
of different races as they make humor together.  
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1. Intentionality and the Three Theories of Humor
According to the Incongruity Theory, our normal intentional mental patterns 
and expectations are upset, or, as Schopenhauer points out, there is a discrep-
ancy between concepts and the way the things that instance those concepts 
appear (Schopenhauer 1988:70, Morreall 2009:10-11).  The pie thrown at one 
person who ducks with the result that the pie hits an unintended person or 
the winding down of the jack-in-the-box music when suddenly the lid bursts 
open and a comical clown pops out are paradigmatic examples of humor, the 
thwarting of intentional expectations experienced as incongruous. Of course, 
as opposed to situations of upset intentions which are not humorous (as in 
tragedy, when Oedipus pursues the murderer of his father only to find out it 
is himself ), in humor, the incongruity evokes laughter and/or a sentiment of 
bemusement and delight. For a fuller explanation of what is involved in hu-
mor, more phenomenological analysis is needed because several intentional 
syntheses take place insofar as there is a «quarrel» between an intention and 
the intuition that fails to fulfill it. For this quarrel to appear, both the act of 
intending and experience of an intuition that fails to fulfill that intending 
must be synthetically held together in consciousness (Husserl, 1984b: 575-576; 
Husserl 2001: 211-212).  Of course, such syntheses of conscious activity occur 
rapidly with such a little lapse in time that it takes subsequent, careful re-
flection to elucidate the several different consciousness experiences that have 
taken place. 
It is necessary to demonstrate the idea that the other theories of humor are 
based on the thwarting of intentionality, experienced as incongruity. Hob-
bes expresses the quintessence of the Superiority Theory of humor, when he 
states, «I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else 
but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency 
in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own 
formerly» (Hobbes 1649: 104). Historically, the ancients, Plato and Aristotle, 
also thought that the superiority theory accurately accounted for all humor, 
which, for them, involved an element of scorn (Morreall 1987:3, 1). Of course, 
one can conceive of many possibilities of humor in which no scorn for oth-
ers or sense of our own eminency is involved, but rather simply incongru-
ity, for example, humorous misunderstandings or puns. For instance, when 
a colleague named Voiss retired and left his Department, another colleague 
punned, «The Department has lost its Voiss», leading one to think that it was 
not allowed in some way to express itself («lost its voice»), when it had only lost 
a colleague named «Voiss». Similarly, Alfred Schutz’s secretary, intending to 
refer to his classic sinnhafte (meaningful) Aufbau der sozialen Welt spoke of it as 
the sühnhafte (atoning) Aufbau of the social world (Schutz, 1943).  Though this 
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misstatement might have led one to anticipate that Schutz would correct the 
error or even possibly be offended at it, Schutz, upsetting such expectations 
and producing humor, directed his humor at his own opus magnum by affirm-
ing that she may have spoken more truly than she thought. In such cases, it is 
the incongruity that underpins the humor, with Schutz defying expectations 
that he might have responded angrily to a misunderstanding of the title of his 
work, mocking his own work instead, and converting what appeared to be 
a mistake into a possible insightful comment. No scornful comparison with 
someone else is involved, unless one wants to stretch Schutz’s own self-effacing 
comment as involving some kind of scorn against himself. But this of course, 
would be to subvert the «Superiority Theory» which seems based in scorn 
adopted toward others and to broaden the meaning of «scorn» to include 
any dismantling expectations that something was of positive worth.  In fact, 
though, the source of the humor in Schutz’s self-effacing response lies in its 
unexpectedness, its incongruity with reference to the kind of response one 
would have expected. 
Not only are there many examples of humor that the Superiority Theory 
does not seem to explain, but also incongruity seems to underlie precisely the 
examples of humor to which the superiority theorists appeal in justifying their 
theoretical stance, as the previous cases suggest. Hence, when Hobbes speaks 
of the «sudden glory» arising from «some sudden conception» of eminency in 
ourselves by comparison with another’s infirmity, he is suggesting that we are 
focused on a world in which we are all pretty much equal or the same or in 
which the other is «greater» than me, until something «sudden,» something 
upsetting, interrupts our usual ways of approaching others, thrusting into our 
attentional focus our «eminency» by comparison with that other. John Mor-
reall provides the example of someone who had been hating for a while a next 
door neighbor, who flaunted his wealth, and then that neighbor, in a new 
$500 suit, falls accidentally into a swimming pool (Morreall 1987:136). Indeed 
that the wealth-flaunting individual with his brand new suit should fall into 
a swimming pool is humorous because of the incongruity of what one would 
expect. But this incongruity forms a base on which a higher layer of mean-
ing, the sudden sense of eminency of the one who hates his neighbor, builds. 
That this wealthy individual who continually flaunted himself and treated 
others as if they were inferior, should fall into a swimming pool reverses all the 
expectations of one thought to be inferior, who suddenly finds himself thrust 
into eminency over the wealthy neighbor, floundering in the pool, with his 
new suit destroyed. Hobbes’s repeated mention of «suddenness» highlights the 
incongruity between what was in place and the intentional expectancies that 
things would continue this way and the reversal and undoing of what was in 
place through the disappointment of those expectancies.
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The Relief Theory originally was based on a physiological model accord-
ing to which laughter involves the relief of pent up nervous energy, like a sigh 
of relief. For example, the energy used to repress feelings of hostility or sexual 
desire, is suddenly released when a joke expressing hostility toward another 
group or a sexual joke overrides our inner censor, and this released energy is 
expressed in laughter (Morreall 2009:15-18). Along this line, Freud argued 
that it is not the energy of the repressed feelings that is released, but the energy 
used to repress them.  Freud develops other versions of this source of humor 
in which the energy I would exert (e.g. to understand a clown’s erratic move-
ments) is not even allowed to be spent (when I compare the clown’s action with 
my own and see that the clown’s movements are unnecessary), and then that 
unspent energy is then released in laughter.  Or there are distressing situations 
in which we become ready to express affect as part of our distress, at least until 
the situation is defused, as when an explosion throws someone into the sky 
only to have her land in a hay cart, uninjured, to our relief. The energy that 
would have been spent in concern over the person thrown by the explosion is 
released in laughter (Morreall 2009:18-19).  
These examples exemplifying the Relief Theory seem to rely on a kind of 
mechanistic psychology that envisions sums of bound energy being freed to 
seep out elsewhere, and, of course, the strength of phenomenological analy-
sis is that it escapes mechanistic and physiological reductionism, and disclos-
es the foundation of conscious intentionality, which can be correlated with 
physiological accompaniments that do not, however, explain it. One can see 
the intentionality at play when someone’s expectation that hostility or sexual 
feelings are to be repressed is exploded when someone tells a joke hostile to 
another group or a sexual joke. Or when one draws a comparison between 
the clown’s movements and one’s own, the incongruity is highlighted and the 
out-of-the-ordinary gyrations of the clown, incongruous with what normal 
movements would lead one to expect, appear ridiculous and evoke laughter. 
Similarly, when someone is blown up high in the sky, one expects a severe 
injury to result, but the pleasant experience of seeing the blown-up person 
landing in a hay cart—an outcome incongruous with what one would have 
expected—incites  laughter. Freud, in effect, offers a causal account of the 
physiological origins of laughter insofar as pent-up energy denied one outlet 
flows into another channel like an unruly and mindless river might—and all 
of this taking place beneath the threshold of consciousness. This account, 
though, presupposes the intentional experience of the incongruous in which 
humor is experienced, and on the basis of this conscious experience, Freud 
builds a mechanistic causal account of laughter to supplement the intentional 
experience of humor. For phenomenology, of course, intentionality provides 
the fundament which scientific explanation presuppose.
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In fact, the Relief Theory further depends on a kind of bodily intention-
ality akin to that which pervades the writings of Merleau-Ponty. One can 
illustrate bodily intentionality by considering an example offered by Herbert 
Spencer to support the Relief Theory. Spencer suggests a theatrical scene in 
which a hero and heroine, after a long misunderstanding, are on the point of 
reconciliation, only to have a tame kid deer walk toward the lovers across the 
stage and sniff at them. Spencer, having presented the intentional experience, 
adds the mechanistic account:
A large mass of  emotion had been produced; or, to speak in physiological lan-
guage, a large portion of  the nervous system was in a state of  tension. There 
was also great expectation with respect to the further evolution of  the scene—a 
quantity of  vague, nascent thought and emotion, into which the existing quan-
tity of  thought and emotion was about to pass. Had there been no interruption, 
the body of  new ideas and feeling next excited, would have sufficed to absorb 
the whole of  the liberated nervous energy. But now, this large amount of  nerv-
ous energy, instead of  being allowed to expend itself  in producing an equiva-
lent amount of  new thoughts and emotion which were nascent, is suddenly 
checked in its flow. . . The excess must therefore discharge itself  in some other 
direction; and in the way already explained, there results an efflux through the 
motor nerves to various classes of  the muscles, producing the half-convulsive 
actions we term laughter (Spencer 1946: 305; Morreall 1987:106-107).     
Even in this mechanized, physiological account, Spencer cannot avoid ref-
erencing intentionality, as theater viewers expect the personal reconciliation 
that the deer’s appearance upsets. Of course, we are not merely minds, and so 
our bodies, accompanying our conscious experiences, experience a directed 
tension, aimed at an experience expected (the reconciliation of estranged lov-
ers). Only it is the intentionality of a body, tensed and aimed as it anticipates 
the reconciliation of lovers, which relaxes at the appearance of the tame deer 
that dissolves one’s expectations. Conscious intentionality lies at the root of 
the examples offered by the Relief Theory, and it is possible to explain the 
bodily component of such conscious intentionality through the kind of bodily 
intending that Merleau-Ponty described so well, instead of through mechanis-
tic, causal explanation.  
2. The Epoché of Humor: Clues for a Leap, Distance, Reflection
As has been mentioned repeatedly above, more is involved in humor, however, 
than merely the exploding of intentionality. For example, the intentionality of 
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an action is thwarted when one is driving to a concert and another car blind-
sides one’s own, injuring one of the passengers.  Or a friend might describe 
the chagrin she felt when a colleague introduced her to the main speaker at 
an intellectual conference, and, as she was chatting with that keynote speaker, 
suddenly and for no apparent cause, the speaker may have commenced berat-
ing her, in total contrast to the collegiality the situation might have called for. 
Or in a theatrical performance of the tragedy of Macbeth, one can observe 
Macbeth scheming and acting to achieve predominance, only to find all his 
purposes thwarted in the end by the armies that rise to oppose him. In all 
these situations, intentional expectations, especially the aims of action, have 
been thwarted, and yet there seems to be nothing humorous involved in any 
of them.  
What must occur for there to be humor, in addition to thwarted intention-
ality, is that one finds the upset intentionality enjoyable, amusing, or evoking 
laughter, as opposed to the sadness, awe, or pity that one might feel in the tragic 
disappointment of expectations. The emotions of humor, though, are insepa-
rable from an overarching attitude or mindset, which, when adopted, leads 
one to expect to feel these emotions, and, when the intentionally is thwarted, 
one feels them. Following Alfred Schutz’s essay «On Multiple Realities,» we 
can think of entrance into the humorous attitude, what Schutz would call a 
«finite province of meaning,» as involving a «shock» by which we break from 
the reality of everyday life, as when one leaps into the province of theatrical 
reality when the curtain opens in a play, takes up the theoretical attitude upon 
entering one’s laboratory, or enters literary reality by opening a novel one is 
reading. Schutz suggests that one enters the province of a joke when «relaxing 
into laughter, if, in listening to joke, we are for a short time ready to accept the 
fictitious world of the jest as a reality in relation to which the world of our daily 
life takes on the character foolishness» (Schutz 1962: 231). 
This «shock» or «leap» into another province of meaning, by which one 
takes up the humorous attitude, is also called a kind of epoché, resembling 
the phenomenological epoché by which one is no longer absorbed in everyday 
reality but turns toward it reflectively, no longer taking things for granted as 
existing, but focusing instead on how they appear and are experienced and 
the correlative experiencing acts to which such things are given.
Humor, too, involves a kind of distancing from everyday life, and the friend 
who was berated by the keynote speaker, perhaps, after some time has elapsed 
and she therefore has a certain distance from the event, can look back upon it 
as comical. Although the passage of time seems to make possible the distance 
from everyday life that enables the friend to find her being berated as comi-
cal, more often than not, we achieve the humorous distance from everyday 
life characteristic of the humorous epoché in a social relationship. Often one 
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or one’s partner invites the other through signaling to leap together into the 
province of humor. Perhaps, this signaling occurs in the formulaic announce-
ment of a joke, «Did you hear the one about the priest, the rabbi, and the 
minister ?». Or it could be that a mere mischievous smile on an interlocutor’s 
face lets the partner know that what is about to be said is to be taken in humor. 
Or it could be that one is so used to a friend’s sense of humor that without 
much signaling at all, any comment of the friend can catapult both parties 
into the realm or humor. Sometimes it is the case that only after a statement is 
made, perhaps because of its outlandishness, one realizes that it was intended 
humorously and that one has been, in fact, conveyed into the realm of humor, 
or at least was intended to be so conveyed. 
The distance from everyday life that the epoché of humor introduces be-
comes clear in that the intentional actions and statements made within this 
province are no longer seen as they would be in everyday life. Seen within the 
humorous attitude, statements that would be insulting or rude in everyday life, 
for instance, suddenly become comical, they take on a humorous significance. 
It is as though they undergo a kind of trans-valuation—grasped in an entirely 
different light.
For instance, an African-American friend of mine, whom I have come 
to appreciate as regularly plunging both of us together into the humorous 
province of meaning with little prior signaling, was walking through a store 
with me and greeted three white women, none of whom returned a response. 
After the third non-response, he turned to me and asked «What is wrong 
with you people»?  Of course, to find myself suddenly grouped by my friend 
as among those who were unresponsive to him possibly for racial reasons, 
simply because I was white like those women, evoked laughter. However, in 
everyday life, to classify someone as prejudiced against blacks simply because 
one’s skin color is white would be perceived as itself a prejudicial, aggressive, 
and insulting classification. But, in this incident, I simply took the classifica-
tion as humorous. My familiarity with my friend’s sense of humor is such that 
in his presence I am always prepared for the possibility that his comments 
are intended humorously; in his presence I am perpetually ready to be initi-
ated into the humorous realm with him. His comment not only invited me to 
leap with him into the finite province of humor, but within that province, the 
significance his statements would have had in everyday life, suddenly became 
trans-signified. They became part of a playful game in which expectations 
are disappointed and incongruities emphasized. In this case my expectation 
that my black friend of many years would not take me to be a racist was ex-
ploded, and the incongruity of his associating a long-time friend, for whom 
his race had made no difference, with those who may have been indifferent or 
even fearful of him because of his race, fueled the humor. By detaching this 
51MAKING HUMOR TOGETHER
statement from the aggressive and insulting significance it would have had 
in the context of everyday life, the humorous attitude establishes a context in 
which the classification of me as prejudiced could have been laughed at.
The humorous expression requires underlying layers of intentionality upon 
which it, in a sense, supervenes. The very construction of a sentence involves 
a lower layer of intentional purposive activity, ordering syllables, inflections, 
and word-order for the purpose,  or the «in-order-to motive» in Schutz’s lan-
guage, of asking a meaningful question («What’s wrong with you people?»). 
Furthermore, though the sentence my friend uttered has the structure of a 
question, it actually does not function as a question since no answer was ex-
pected in this case (I would not have been expected to reply «nothing.»). In-
stead, this rhetorical question serves the purpose of chiding me and my race, 
belying, in a sense, its grammatical form as a question.  This chiding of white 
people, me and the women who ignored him, of course, presupposes as part of 
its underlying intentional activity the «you people,» which effectively groups 
me with the women who did not respond to him. This grouping of me as 
among the putative prejudiced ones just because I was white, would have in 
everyday life normally been perceived by me as an insulting attack. But when 
the humorous epoché is enacted, a new purpose supervenes upon these under-
yling intentional linguistic processes, which now serve the goal of thwarting 
my expectations that I not be classified among these women but of doing so 
within a context intended to evoke laughter. These layers of intentionality are 
consistent with Husserl’s view that an expression subsumes within it a series of 
subacts (Hussel 1984a:416-419; Husserl 2001: 113-115) and with Schutz’s view 
that an overarching in-order-to motive furnishes the ultimate meaning for all 
the sub-acts leading to its realization (Schutz 1962:23-24). The idea of layers of 
intentionality could also explain how the thwarting of expectations at the base 
of humor (e.g. the man with the expensive suit falling into the pool), can also 
satisfy a purpose of taking oneself to be superior to another, as the superior-
ity theory suggested. This phenomenological appreciation for the layering of 
intentional acts even converges with speech-act theory that distinguishes the 
mere locutionary formation of a sentence («I pronounce you man and wife»), 
the illocutionary level by which the pronouncing of the locutionary statement 
actually effects a state of affairs (effecting a marriage), and the possibility that 
the previous levels might serve a per-locutionary purpose (e.g., I pronounce 
this couple married because I want them to live together so that they find out 
how difficult the personality of each is, with the final hope that they will soon 
divorce) (Austin 1965: 101-103). 
But my friend’s comment, which placed us both in the humorous attitude, 
also converted the unresponsiveness he had experienced in everyday life into 
that comic setting, and diminished the sting he may have felt in being ig-
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nored. At the same time, the unresponsiveness of the women, once detached 
from the hurt he might have experienced in the world of everyday life, would 
have been more easily discussible. After his transferring the experience of 
not being responded to into the realm of humor, I could have imagined us 
going on to discuss further questions. Were those women who were not re-
sponsive maybe unaware that he had said something? Had they heard him? 
Were they fearful? Were they prejudiced? Was my friend too sensitive or accu-
rately aware of how he had been treated?  Was this unresponsiveness typical 
of the way blacks are treated, but something which a white person like myself 
might not be conscious of and all too disposed to dismiss by attributing to my 
friend an oversensitivity on racial mattes?  Of course, my friend need not have 
embarked upon such a discussion or answered such questions. His humor-
ous comment transferred the experience of being unresponded to out of the 
context of everyday life, in which it was no doubt experienced by my friend as 
hurtful, into the humorous sphere. At that point, I felt I could have pursued 
with him all the questions I raised above, but we did not have to discuss them. 
However, if we had discussed them, we would no longer be in the humorous 
province of meaning, but perhaps in a reflective, semi-theoretical context. 
Humor, though, is a kind of first step in ushering incidents or situations 
that are explosive or difficult to discuss, such as racial prejudice, into a more 
reflective context or even a theoretical province of meaning. As such, humor’s 
distance from everyday life experience makes it an ally of reflection. At the 
same time and in contrast to what is involved in the theoretical sphere, humor 
is able to bring experiences to awareness without having to raise the further 
questions of whether one’s perceptions were accurate (in this case, whether 
these women were really prejudiced or whether my friend’s grasp of his be-
ing prejudiced against was accurate). My friend’s turning on me and asking 
what’s wrong with you people was humorous whether the women were really 
prejudiced or not, whether or not I should have been lumped with them as 
prejudiced against black men. The truth or validity of those claims became 
irrelevant in the humorous sphere. Humor resembles the theoretical epoché or 
the phenomenological epoché in detaching from the pragmatic world of eve-
ryday life, and yet it differs in not having to get to the bottom of whether the 
beliefs involved in one’s experiences are valid or not.
3. The Intersubjectivity of Humor: Derivation and Intercultural Humor 
Having seen that humor involves disrupting expectations within the context 
of the humorous province of meaning, we can consider another key feature of 
humor: its intersubjective dimensions. In fact, detecting humor can seem to be 
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a very solitary activity; one simply sees a situation of thwarted intentionality 
as comical, as we suggested might be the case with the friend who years later 
looks back on her berating at the hand of the keynote speaker as comical. 
However, as we have seen, often others signal us to invite us to adopt the 
epoché of humor with them. The invitation, as we have seen, can be issued 
through a specific announcement, a facial expression, or simply making a sur-
prising statement that transfers us to the humorous sphere. Because we live in 
our intentional, culturally reinforced expectations, usually without reflecting 
on them, someone who does not share our expectations or responses to situ-
ations is well-equipped to frustrate humorously our expectations. For example, 
my friend, who did not share my anticipation that I be regarded as someone 
who was not prejudiced against him, was freer to include me among those who 
did not respond to him and so to upset my expectation and to evoke humor. 
When others thwart our lived-in, unreflected-on expectations, they make 
those expectations visible to us. But there are other ways, non-humorous 
ways, in which others intervene in our lives to make us reflectively aware of 
the ways we intend the world. Beginning in childhood, for instance, it is often 
a parent or teacher, whose comments make it possible that children become 
aware that they are engaging in certain behaviors (toward the world or oth-
ers) or anticipating an outcome, of which they had been unaware. In addi-
tion, as we mature, others continue to assist us in becoming reflective about 
what we take for granted—and Plato himself recognized how knowledge is 
dialogically acquired is the fruit of Socratic midwifery. Though reflection is 
originally learned in an intersubjective context, a remarkable thing happens 
when one eventually internalizes the reflective processes learned from others 
and autonomously exercises self-reflection, uncovering what one has taken 
for granted. Such reflectivity attains a thoroughness and culmination in the 
phenomenological reduction. Similarly, it is possible to internalize another’s 
sense of humor, to become to a degree cognizant of one’s own expectations 
as the other might see them and to imagine them as being exploded by some-
one outfitted with another set of expectations or responding in a different 
way to the same situation as we do, without the other being present. In sum, 
the intersubjective intervention of another, whether in humor or reflection, 
helps one acquire the distance from one’s lived-in aimings-at and makes them 
accessible to reflection. In addition, just as one internalizes what may have 
been originally an externally induced process of reflection and becomes self-
reflective, so also one is able to internalizes another’s sense of humor in a way 
that heightens one capacity for becoming aware of the intendings of the world 
that another might have highlighted. As a consequence, one can begin to see 
how the seemingly highly individual processes of self-reflection and the seeing 
of the comical are socially learned.  
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Although we deploy humor creatively, discovering the comical as unique 
situations seem to call for, within the repertoire of our ability to detect the hu-
morous we can find various general styles of humor, and, by reflection on these 
styles, we are able to associate them with the styles of others from whom we 
may have learned and internalized them.  It is usually not the case that one con-
sciously decides «I am going to imitate x’s sense of humor» but rather through 
regular association with another and repeated experience of their use of humor, 
one acquires by passive assimilation another’s way of seeing the humorous, of 
focusing on expectations or the thwarting of them, and of strategies for inviting 
another to enter the humorous sphere or for pointing out the humorous. 
The discovery of how one’s sense of humor is acquired can happen after 
one has employed a particular style of humor, and then one undertakes what 
Alfred Schutz calls a «because motive analysis». Such an analysis begins with 
a past event, a decision made or a course of action completed or, in our case, 
the appreciation of a humorous situation, and then looks for those circum-
stances, events, or persons in the past before that action now completed, in 
«the pluperfect tense,» which could be interpreted as influencing or determin-
ing the actor to undertake that action now past (in our case to have exercised 
that style of humor) ( Schutz 1962: 69-72; Schutz 1967: 91-96; Schutz 2004: 
202-209). Of course, with the passage of time and depending on the inter-
ests prevailing when one undertakes a because-motive analysis, one might 
discover different events or persons to have played a more important role in 
influencing an action than one might have thought earlier.1 The entire process 
involves reflective interpretation that associates just completed actions with 
events or circumstances in the more distant past.  
For example, a former professor’s style of humor involved asking seemingly 
harmless questions in a quasi-sincere, dead-pan manner, but these questions 
were intended to deflate pretensions and elicit laughter. In developing the in-
troduction to my master’s thesis in theological studies, I had rather preten-
tiously and self-consciously expressed at length gratitude to «One» (God) who 
had been with me in all my trials. In the oral examination on the thesis, this 
professor, as if simply asking a question of fact, inquired whether this «One» 
referred to Professor Doyle, from whom I had taken many of my courses be-
cause I considered him superior to other professors, including this professor 
asking the question. When I find myself at times asking what seem like sincere 
1 1  In “Life-Forms and Meaning Structures,” the early Schutz recounts how different aspects 
of  a past event emerge into prominence depending on the temporal perspective and prevailing 
relevances at that time from which we undertake the act of  remembering, and one can extra-
polate from this account how one acts selectively and interpretively in selecting the events that 
are because motives of  an action that occurred after them (Schutz 2013: 68-72).
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questions, stated in a dead-pan manner, that are actually intended to deflate 
others’ pretensions in a humorous manner, I recognize the influence of the 
style of that professor’s humor on my own. His particular style of humor, in 
addition, has made me more alert to pretensions in myself and others, thereby 
bringing to light anticipations (e.g. of one’s self- importance) that one would 
rather not acknowledge. 
My African-American friend’s sense of humor, which plays across the ra-
cial divide, as the previous example illustrates, has also attuned me to the 
comical aspects of interracial relationships. For example, recently, when my 
friend, his children, and I were at a restaurant, the maître d’ pointed to an 
empty booth to which I proceeded immediately, and when my friend and his 
children caught up with me and arrived at the booth, a waitress offered to 
find me a seat elsewhere, since for her it seemed inconceivable that a white 
man and a black family would be in the same party. Although the waitress 
apologized for her mistake, I found the situation comical (as did my friend, 
though neither of us laughed out loud) and of a piece with the kind of humor 
that will surface when the expectations of people of different races intersect 
and contradict each other. My capacity to detect humor in such situations is 
something I believe I have a keener eye for because associating with my friend 
has attuned me to the comedy in such situations. 
A common theme in my friend’s humor is that of something or someone 
little or powerless assuming their rightful place with others. This theme is 
not foreign to African-American culture, which, in my experience, often de-
emphasizes competition between its members and practices a solidarity that 
appreciates the contribution of its less powerful members, such as children or 
the elderly. This theme appears prominently in the song «This little light of 
mine, I’m going to make it shine», which has often been thought of as a Negro 
Spiritual and which was prominently used in the civil rights movement in the 
United States in the 1950s and 1960s. One can detect the influence of this 
cultural background, as a because motive, in the following expression of my 
friend’s sense of humor. In 1993, when there was severe flooding in the Mid-
west United States and caskets, dislodged from cemeteries, were seen floating 
down a river, my friend, who recalled that I had accidentally cut off the tip of 
my finger years before, joked about the tip of my finger floating downstream 
in its own little casket. Now, on occasion I find myself detecting humor in situ-
ations in which those less powerful unexpectedly assume their rightful place 
with others, playing their part, however small it may be, in a common en-
terprise. When I notice such situations as humorous—but with a humor that 
involves feelings of affection and admiration for those assuming their rightful 
place (as the fingertip in the casket example suggests)—I attribute the because 
motives of my ability to perceive this type of humor to this style of humor 
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in my friend’s repertoire. Of course, I am also speculating on the because 
motives of this style in his repertoire, which I see as emerging from African-
American culture to which he belongs.2  
Because motive analyses like these unearth linkages to a past often forgot-
ten, and they suggest that most, if not all, of our present conscious activities 
could be traced, if we were omniscient, to previous experiences and social 
influences that we no longer remember. To be sure, these influences are exer-
cised on actions in which our own creativity is involved; we do not repeat by 
rote what we absorb from our associations with others, hence I have used the 
expression a «style of humor». A «style» is like a typification in Schutz’s view, 
something that is learned from the past and usually socially transmitted but 
which is generalizable, undetermined, and open to novel application in the 
present ( Schutz 1964: 281-288). However individual our ability to find humor 
may be, it no doubt emerges from a past and from others, however impossible 
it may be for us to reconstruct its origins.  
Our awareness of individual persons or situations from which we have 
learned the styles of humor we practice belongs to our stream of personal his-
tory, only a little of which present associations prompt us to recover and most 
of which is forgotten. But as the example of my friend’s deployment of humor 
about my finger-tip in its own little casket suggests, the style of humor we ex-
hibit also has its origins in the massive and complex intersubjective network of 
culture. Culture affects us beneath the threshold of recognition; and one way 
of discovering the subconscious influence of culture is to simply notice how it 
marks our bodies, thereby furnishing material for humor. For instance, my 
African-American friend once remarked upon how I, and most white people 
he has observed, press the remote control to lock or open a car. We aim the re-
mote at the car, whereas he and other black people he knows are more casual, 
simply pressing the remote buttons in their pockets. In addition, my friend 
imitates my exact pronunciation of English—and an imitation involves a kind 
of humorous explosion of expectation insofar as one does expect one’s man-
nerisms or manner of pronouncing words to be embodied in another person. 
My friend jokes that I pronounce even the silent vowels and consonants in 
words.  But the deliberateness or casualness with which one presses a remote 
button or the degree of linguistic precision which one deploys in colloquial 
settings indicate ways in which our cultures, our class, our families, and our 
2 2  Of  course one must be cautious of  broad generalizations, such as “African-American cul-
ture”, but when one finds patterns of  behavior that are similar to or associated with patterns 
found in a culture broadly defined, one can venture a because-motive explanation, without of  
course denying that the expression “African-American culture” encompasses a broad diversity 
of  sub-cultures.
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histories have left their mark on bodily actions which we carry out automati-
cally, with little or no reflection. As Schutz observes, even the way we walk 
is shaped by the socio-cultural contexts from which we emerge (Schutz 1973: 
110).  Perhaps, the power of outside socio-cultural and historical formation on 
us is reflected most clearly in our bodily actions, our pointing, our speaking, 
and our walking, which we assimilate passively merely by repeated exposure 
to others who share our cultural heritage. We often do not recognize the dis-
tinctiveness of these bodily patterns until we meet someone for whom they 
are strange, for whom they can be comical because so unlike their own, and 
for whom they can be the target of humor that they share with us. When we 
leap with another into the finite province of humor, patterns that culture has 
already shaped beneath the threshold of consciousness, become the stuff of 
humor, disconcerting our taken for granted suppositions that our way of bod-
ily engaging the world is the same as everyone else’s.   
In summary, humor is intersubjective in character because often another 
person subverts our expectations and often does so by inviting us to execute a 
particular epoché, that is, to leap with him or her, into the humorous province 
of meaning, like children leaping together into the realm of make-believe. 
In that province, the significances that words and actions have in everyday 
life undergo a transformation of meaning, a kind of trans-signification. The 
clash and exploding of anticipations are all the more likely to the extent that 
interlocutors differ from each other—and the different identities that are the 
stuff of humor are constituted, of course, along many different gradients, such 
as gender, race, culture, nationality, and class—to name a few. I have sug-
gested further that styles of humor one finds in one’s repertoire, what one finds 
funny, what one notices, what one is attuned to see as comical, how one prac-
tices one’s humor, how one cues and invites another to undertake the humor-
ous epoché (e.g., dead-pan, serious questions; a mischievous smile; an abrupt, 
confrontational comment for which one is not prepared) are intersubjectively 
derived. They are learned from others, as a because motive analysis, which 
associates just completed intentional activity with past experiences of others’ 
intentional activity, reveals. Finally even the differences in physical behaviors 
that we live out of and that impress upon us expectations easily contradicted 
by those formed in other cultures, reveal that the entire field on which humor 
plays, including our bodiliness, is socially shaped. 
4.Ethics, Trust, and Interracial Humor
In my friend’s disillusionment with the white women whom he took to ignore 
him, which he transformed into a comic moment; in the bodily differences be-
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tween us that he pokes fun at; and in the affectionate appreciation of the power-
less assuming their place alongside others, the differences between European-
American and African-American experience and the encompassing cultures 
may come to the fore. The broader American culture, as everyone knows, has 
developed widely shared interpretations of racial features, for example, typify-
ing black men as dangerous and to be feared, and, consequently in response to 
such typifications, black men, like my friend, are prone to interpret white un-
responsiveness to greetings as a symptom of such culturally formed fear. Such 
cultural significances, in the background of the humor we share, also form the 
cultural context for the non-humorous events that exploded in Ferguson in 
2014, when a white policeman shot an unarmed black man whom he perceived 
to be threatening his life. The typifications that the broader American culture, 
particularly European-American culture, has developed and upheld over cen-
turies has played a role in developing institutions that have isolated and seg-
regated African-American culture and that have produced massive and tragi-
cally destructive social and economic consequences for African-Americans. 
Within this long history of asymmetrical and oppressive relations, of course, 
racist humor has been pervasive, in which blacks have been cruelly presented 
as thwarting, often by falling short of, white expectations of how «civilized,» 
«intelligent», or «normal» people ought to act. Similarly, men have presented 
women, straights have presented gays, or members of majorities have presented 
minorities as falling short of their own expectations and as therefore deserving 
of ridicule. Hence, given the history of asymmetries across race, sex, gender, 
class or social groups, humor is always risky and always in danger of prolong-
ing and deepening the society-wide asymmetries that contextualize any dyadic 
encounter between representatives of these groups. Given this context, in this 
section, relying on the account of humor I have developed in the previous three 
sections, I would like to explore the possibility for an alternative, an example 
of a kind of interracial humor that might bridge and even to a degree heal the 
racial divide, without contributing further to it.   
One can imaginatively depict racist humor as involving a group (of racists) 
huddling together to build a type of someone from the despised race, much 
like the type an everyday actor would construct of a Contemporary, Prede-
cessor, or Successor or a social scientist of his subject. Racist humor, though, 
often involves portraying this type as failing to fulfill the racists’ expectations 
of how human beings ought to act, with the results that the type appears 
«stupid» or «ridiculous» and thereby evokes laughter among the racists who 
have leapt together into the humorous province of meaning. Of course, the 
victims of this humor (if they were even present as most often they would not 
be) would not leap with them into the realm of humor since they would be 
only the object of ridicule, laughed at, rather than participating in making 
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humor together with them. In fact, the racist group resembles the home group 
of the Schutz’s stranger, which develops a picture of the foreign group which 
«has not been formed with the aim of provoking a response or reaction from 
the members of the foreign group» (Schutz 1964: 98).  Likewise the racist 
group constructs its type of the victim group without any intention of sharing 
that type with them or eliciting their participation in this humor. In Schutz’s 
vocabulary, the racists enjoy a we-relationship with each other and construct 
a type of their victim, which, unlike the type one forms of Contemporaries, 
Successors, or Predecessors through which one relates to others, resembles 
more the type of the social scientist, constructed without any intention of re-
lating to the other through it (though racist types, unlike those of the social 
scientist, lack any scientific objectivity about their subject matter).  
However, in the case of my African-American friend, we leap into the 
province of humor together, and maintain within that province a direct social 
relationship, a «we-relationship», in which we share space and time. In this 
immediate relationship with the other, Schutz comments that «My ideas of 
him undergo continuous revision as the concrete experience unfolds»(Schutz 
1967:169, Schutz 2004: 321), and I become aware immediately of the correct-
ness or incorrectness of my understanding of the other person (Schutz 1967: 
171, Schutz 2004: 323-324).  In the immediacy of the face-to-face relationship 
with my friend, in which typifications and their expectations are continually 
revised, he usually takes the initiative in upsetting my typifications, such as 
the self-typification that I am a non-racist friend of his (unlike the women 
who ignored him in the store) or that my pronunciation or (remote) pointing 
behaviors are normal and universal (though they are not). In a sense, he assists 
me in even becoming aware that I am (culturally) «white» and that our worlds 
are different. In the case of all humor, expectations are exploded, but in the 
case of racist humor, the victim explodes expectations by falling short of them, 
whereas in the humor in my relationship with my African-American friend, 
he explodes my expectations by showing them to be false or too narrow. 
But one might argue that my friend’s humor is, nevertheless, racist, insofar 
as he grouped me with the unresponsive white women and attributed to me 
their «wrongness» (being unresponsive because of fear of black men?) seem-
ingly simply because my skin color was the same as theirs. In his defense, one 
might argue that, since his grouping of me among the women occurs in the 
province of humor, he puts in brackets the factual truth of the suppositions 
on which that humor is based, namely that the white women did not respond 
to him because they were afraid of black men or that I share their wrong-
ness. But, of course, the white racists could claim the same thing, namely that 
since their statements are uttered within the province of humor, one cannot 
conclude conclude to the truth of any racist presuppositions underlying their 
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jokes. Indeed, one hears the authors of racist or sexist jokes often offering such 
a defense, «It was only a joke». To excuse their racist jokes as implying noth-
ing factual about the races seems hypocritical insofar as their entire belief 
system seems predicated on the belief that cognitive or moral inferiority can 
be attributed to the bearers of the morphological features characteristic of the 
races mocked. 
The racist then by not including the victim in the humor he creates and 
by other beliefs he or she espouses seems to be engaging in the degradation 
of another on the basis of the other’s morphological features. But one might 
object, what if the racist were to tell racists jokes in the presence of someone 
from the race ridiculed, and what if that person were to find them comical 
but not offensive? Would such jokes cease to be racist just because they were 
uttered in the presence of someone from the race mocked? Schutz, in his es-
say, «Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World», points out 
that discrimination (racial or otherwise) not only involves the imposition of 
a typification by an outsider, in this case the humorous portrayal of another 
as inferior by a racist, but also «an appropriate evaluation of this imposition 
from the subjective viewpoint of the afflicted individual» (Schutz 1964:261). 
The key word here is «appropriate» because there seems to be something in-
appropriate, something needing explanation, if an African-American were to 
be in the presence of a racist joking about African-Americans and were to ex-
perience those jokes only as comical and not offensive. One might think that 
the victim of the joke had been so oppressed for so long and so cruelly that she 
may have lost all sense of  own dignity. Or perhaps the racist is coercing the 
victim in some way not to object (e.g., he will be fired from his job unless he 
laughs along). One could, of course, make the moral case that to reduce an in-
dividual’s moral or spiritual qualities to being nothing more than the product 
of physiological features is objectively wrong and to accept such a reduction is 
never morally appropriate.   
But what about my friend’s accusation, «What is wrong with you people»? 
It seems to group me among potential racists simply because of the color of 
my skin. It is necessary for me to show why from my subjective viewpoint this 
imposition of a typification should not be appropriately evaluated as an in-
stance of racial discrimination. The discussion of humor has up to now taken 
place in what might broadly be called a semantic context: there are a set of 
expectations (which could be articulated as propositions) that an individual 
has (e.g. that I not be treated as a member of group racially prejudiced against 
my friend) and they can be conjoined with a statement that contradicts or 
undermines those expectations («What is wrong with you people?»). In this se-
mantic setting, to produce humor, one has to be creative to be humorous, not 
to be bound by accepted expectations and to be able to break free of them, to 
61MAKING HUMOR TOGETHER
leap out of the province of everyday life, to make statements that mean some-
thing entirely different from what they would mean in everyday life, and to 
surprise an interlocutor’s train of thinking by going in a direction never antici-
pated.  My friend is a master at such humor, which involves undertaking, as 
we have seen, an in-order-to motive that orders all its sub-acts to a particular 
purpose. In order, though, explain why from my subjective point of view his 
humor is not racist, I need to address how the humor he deploys also achieves 
interpersonal in-order-to purposes within our relationship—and here one must ad-
dress the pragmatic (as opposed to semantic) dimensions of his humor (Morris 
1946: 217-220).  In a sense, what follows will show how my friend’s humor, 
which achieves the goal of producing comedy, serves further interpersonal 
goals, one that produces endearment and overcomes the racial divide while 
still preserving our difference from each other.      
His «What is wrong with you people?» precisely expresses a viewpoint that 
a black person frustrated with what could appear to be prejudicial unrespon-
siveness might feel, namely that all whites are fearful of black men, including 
me. Nevertheless, he also typifies me as someone in whose presence this point 
of view, which the humorous setting can render hypothetical in character (he 
never states factually that all whites are afraid of black men), can be expressed, 
however offensive such a statement might be to a generalized, decontextual-
ized white audience. He is also expecting to find acceptance for who he is de-
spite venturing this possible accusation, and he anticipates that our friendship 
will not be disrupted by it. In a sense, he is allowing me to enter into his point 
of view, sharing it with me, giving me a kind of access and intimacy to him-
self that he most likely would not make available to other whites. Similarly, 
I typify him as typifying me this way. He, at one and the same time, seems 
(the humorous context makes this ambivalent) both to be separating himself 
on the semantic plane from me with his «you people» and yet sharing himself 
with me on the pragmatic plane, both giving expression to the idea that there 
may be a racial distance between us and yet crossing the divide. Furthermore, 
since he intends to evoke humor, the supposition that I am afraid of black men 
(to which his spoken word gives expression) must contrast with my expectation 
that I am not. But this expectation appears to be not only my own, but also 
his, insofar as he is associating with me in the store, leaping into the realm of 
humor with me, and actually venting with me feelings and hypotheses that 
reveal a kind of trusting, intimate relationship between us.  
This pattern of using humor within a pragmatic, interpersonal context, in 
a way that reaches out to include me is one that he repeats often. For one thing 
his reaching out toward me, while upholding our differences, is consistent 
with his greeting the women who ignored him; he is an individual who seeks 
in many ways through kindness to cross racial boundaries. 
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But let me provide another example of his way of including while main-
taining differences. Once, at a basketball game in which there was only 
one white person on the court, with all the other players and referees being 
black, the white person felt that the referee had made an unfair call against 
him. My friend, detecting the white person’s dissatisfaction with the call, 
said to him, «Look, you are the only white person here, you can’t expect to 
receive a fair call». Of course, this sentence was incongruous and evoked 
laughter because one might have expected that he as black person would 
take the side of the black referees and dismiss the white person’s claim of 
unfairness, but he did not. When his comment suddenly launched the white 
person and him into the sphere of humor, one would have to be wary that 
he believed to be truthful anything he said. One should not conclude that he 
factually believed that black referees would be so determined by their racial 
background that they could not make an objective call. But the humor, again 
on a semantic level, seemed to posit a chasm between the races, as if people 
are so determined by their racial backgrounds that any hope of objectivity 
or fairness to the other race becomes impossible. On the other hand, he as 
black was empathizing with the white player, suggesting perhaps that the 
call was unfair. In addition, he sympathized with the suspicions that might 
arise for any minority person who is the «only one» of his kind in group 
dominated by a majority, namely that unfair decisions are made that always 
support the majority. At the same time, however, he perhaps gives the white 
player a glimpse of what it often must feel like for blacks when they are treat-
ed unfairly in predominantly white society, whether in searches for jobs or 
before legal tribunals. The humor, which on the semantic level suggests an 
unbridgeable gap between blacks and whites, on the pragmatic level serves 
the further goal of bridging that gap through empathy and through suggest-
ing to the white person that he in this moment is sharing with black people 
their experience of being unfairly discriminated against. In the same breath 
that my friend suggests an uncrossable breach, he welcomes the white player 
into the black world. 
Similarly, at one point in which I had been frustrated with my friend’s in-
sistence on the differences between us, I said to him, «Surely it is not impossi-
ble for white and black people to get along together?». He responded, «Yes, we 
can, after all I’ve learned to like your sorry ass». Here again the humor upsets 
expectations, with me asking a question, perhaps with the intent of bringing 
us into some kind of unity, and he, in his own sentence supporting that inten-
tion («Yes, we can…»), only to have that expectation shattered by the second 
half of the sentence,  «after all I’ve learned to like your sorry ass». The later 
part of the sentence stresses differences, that it was not easy to like me since I 
am a «sorry ass». Of course, the humorous context makes it dubious if he re-
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ally thinks that I am hard to like or if I am a sorry ass. At the same time, the 
very expression translates us together into the humorous province of meaning 
and also seems to affirm, however cryptically, that he does like my sorry ass. 
Here again the humor in the semantic dimension asserts at distance between 
us that is also overarched in the pragmatic level by friendship.
One thing to be observed about the humor in our relationship is that he 
usually takes the initiative to challenge my expectations, and it is rare, if ever, 
that I undermine his expectations or expose expectations that he is unaware 
of. Perhaps this is because I simply am not as quick as he is, but also it could 
be because I am reluctant to enjoy humor that might appear to be enjoyed 
at his expense, perhaps because of the cruel history of interracial humor in 
American culture. 
Perhaps the asymmetry I feel about not enjoying humor at his expense re-
flects the deeper notion of ethical asymmetry that Emmanuel Levinas has de-
scribed: the asymmetric summons to my responsibility for the other that any 
other person makes to us. Such an asymmetric, ethical summons only appeals 
to us but never compels us to act—and the history of American racists humor 
abundantly proves that the ethical summons of the other is easily disregarded 
(Levinas 1980: 5-7, 173).  It may be that, because of such a summons from 
another person, we are willing to follow the lead of any other, to trust any 
other, who invites us to leap with them into the province of humor with them, 
but even within that province, the ethical claims of others, beyond the one 
who has invited us to leap, continue to constrain us.  Having trusted someone 
to lead us into the realm of humor, we find ourselves recoiling at jokes that 
belittle others in sexist, racist, and homophobic ways, and in such examples 
of humor we feel impelled to withdraw abruptly from the province of humor 
into which we entrusted the other to lead us. Sometimes people attempt to 
tell jokes about the deceased (e.g. the Kennedy or Lincoln assassinations), and 
one finds oneself overtaken with a sickening feeling that such a joke is not 
funny, and one again retreats from the sphere of humor into which the joker 
was leading us. If, as Scheler observes, the value differences among people 
depends on what objects can have an effect on their possible comportment, or 
on what objects could even tempt them, we could say that the morality quality 
of a person with reference to others is dependent on what they would be will-
ing to laugh at (Scheler 1954: 178).   
The asymmetry, which Levinas speaks of and which may underlie my re-
luctance to venture to explode the expectations of my friend the way he does 
with me, could paradoxically lead to the reciprocity, which Levinas also val-
ues, as, for example, is evident when he praises the «egalitarian and just State 
in which man is fulfilled (and which is to be set up…)» (Levinas 1974: 203).  
When discussing with my friend my reluctance to mock his mannerisms or 
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highlight the narrowness of his expectations, as he does with me, he suggested 
that I should be able to joke with him as he does with me. Perhaps, my unwill-
ingness to exercise symmetric humor with him betrays a lack of trust, a fear 
that he will be offended and our friendship end. If that is the case, then his 
invitation that I be more reciprocal with him would paradoxically lead to the 
result that my feeling asymmetrical responsible to him—and hence respond-
ing to his invitation—could lead to greater reciprocity in our making humor 
together.  
However, a kind of symmetry is already to be found in our relationship 
based upon a mutual asymmetrical responsibility that each of us exercises in 
relationship to each other. While I, for fear of succumbing to the long history 
of racist humor, asymmetrically receive passively his interventions without 
taking initiatives as he does, from his side he has been asymmetrically respon-
sible for me, striving to prevent me from assimilating him in my world, ever 
reminding me that the black experience is not my own, all the while working 
to maintain our relationship, to honor me by giving me access to his world 
and offering me intimacy. My friend is an artist in his humor, and he shows 
the healing power that interracial humor can have, despite the delicacy it de-
mands because of the wounds it has inflicted and can so easily inflict on those 
who are different from us. 
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Phenomenological Alternatives of the Lifeworld: 
Between Multiple Realities and Virtual Realities
Denisa Butnaru
The concept of “lifeworld” is of high importance in the phenomenological context as well as in the 
comprehensive sociological theory, continuing to animate contemporary debates. Given the recent devel-
opment of what is known as ICT (information and communication technologies) and in particular of 
the virtual reality (VR), the lifeworld configurations changed. The aim of this paper is to show first how 
the concept of lifeworld has been modified by the presence of ICT and VR. Second it shall be stressed 
how such instances as subjectivity and intersubjectivity are challenged in their phenomenological conse-
quences by such transformations. In a further step, the discussion of these aspects shall be correlated to 
the postphenomenological orientation. 
1. Introduction
The concept of “lifeworld” has been since long acknowledged as being of high 
importance in the phenomenological context and it never ceases to animate 
contemporary debates. In the comprehensive turn in sociological theory, the 
lifeworld has been already discussed as early as in the writings of Wilhelm 
Dilthey. However its plenary significance and its definition in relation to 
the intersubjective sphere was stressed in particular in the late writings of 
Edmund Husserl. In the phenomenological sociological paradigm, the con-
cept of “lifeworld” has been particularly analysed by Alfred Schutz. His ap-
proach is innovative because he tries to orient open the phenomenological 
discussion towards an action-oriented perspective. In what follows I intend 
to show how the concept of lifeworld has been modified by the development 
of what is known as ICT (information and communication technologies) and 
more precisely by one of their recent outcomes which is the virtual reality 
(VR). ICT and VR modify both intersubjective relations as well as the social 
and pragmatic status of the subject and subjectivity. They also challenge the 
understanding of our relation to the real, qua “paramount reality” (Schutz 
1945 [1962]: 226-229) in that such basic categories of experience as tempora-
lity and spatiality are reformulated. 
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Understanding the world as a matrix of meaning possibilities cannot be 
phenomenologically discussed without a complementary instance, which is 
that of subjectivity. As it has been often shown (Dodd 2004; Schnell 2007) 
these two poles that play a crucial role in the construction and constitution 
of the meaning configurations are interdependent. A discussion on the world 
and subjectivity cannot omit a third element which is just as important phe-
nomenologically as the first two: intersubjectivity. 
Intersubjectivity raised many debates among different schools and led to 
a proliferation of analyses in phenomenology. Just as the status of the world 
qua lifeworld, to which it is intrinsically related, intersubjectivty is one of the 
formal structures without which the status of the subject as such cannot be 
conceived. The recent development of ICT challenges such phenomenologi-
cal notions as subject, world or intersubjectivity and the role they maintain in 
the constitution of our meaning possibilities.  
Given these transformations, one of the main questions that is raised and 
that has its full justification for a phenomenologically oriented sociological 
perspective is how these instances are affected in their procedural position. 
A second question emerges if one considers the consequences that the new 
media structures have for a phenomenological understanding of the lifeworld. 
If some years ago ICT were still a realm of a special type of knowledge, being 
associated with a strictly specialized field of technology, at present their status 
changed.  Such a redistribution of knowledge and experience requires thus 
a different understanding of the above mentioned instances: subjectivity, in-
tersubjectivity and lifeworld. In addition, the media raise another problem, 
which is that of the presence and growth of the VR in the configuration of the 
everyday structures of the lifeworld. This state requires a further elaboration 
of such a concept as that of “multiple realities”, discussed by Alfred Schutz. 
Given the presence of the “virtual” in the paramount reality, one witnesses 
not only  a phenomenological mutation concerning general structures of expe-
rience, but also a shift in our conception of the real at a larger scale. 
In order to sketch some answers to these issues, I shall consider in a first 
step classical views on the concept of the lifeworld in phenomenology, namely 
that of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz. I will proceed with a discussion of 
the concept of “multiple realities” as developed by Schutz and further inquire 
on the pertinence of “multiple realities” when confronted to recent theori-
es on virtual reality (Cogburn and Sicox, 2014) and “technological forms of 
life” (Lash, 2001). For a phenomenological perspective the main task would 
be whether such concepts as lifeworld, and its correlated instances, namely 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity, retain their pertinence in the context of a 
discussion of the VR and how their transformation may be understood in the 
light of the new orientation known as postphenomenology. 
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2. Phenomenological conceptions of the world and the virtual reality   
2.1. From Husserl’s concept of the world to digital media. Redistribution of the 
principle of reality 
Husserl’s late interest in the function of the lifeworld as universal matrix upon 
which any meaning possibility is realized brought him to a re-evaluation of 
the topic of eidetics, as well as of the presence and role that the egological 
consciousness plays in its determination. As many studies in phenomenology 
have shown by now (Carr 2010; Follesdal 2010; Farges 2006; Bermes 2004) 
the concept of lifeworld has a cardinal role in the Husserlian phenomenology 
and in the phenomenological debates tout court. What is important to retain 
for the present demonstration is the Husserlian idea according to which the 
lifeworld represents the background of any experiential possibility and of any 
practical and praxeological project. As Husserl argues in The Crisis of European 
Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology, “the lifeworld […] is always there, 
existing in advance for us, the “ground” of all praxis, whether theoretical or 
extratheoretical. The world is pregiven to us, [...] always somehow practically 
interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the univer-
sal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-
in-certainty-of-the-world” (Husserl 1936 [1970]: 142).
The lifeworld is the milieu where the subjectivity situates its specificity 
and also a common structure which the subject shares with other subjects. 
As experiential and intersubjective background the lifeworld has therefore a 
crucial role in that it legitimates any intentional and sub-intentional projects, 
holding a primordial originarity and originality in relation to the egological 
sphere (Husserl 1954: 469-470). It is in the lifeworld that the subject acqui-
res experience. Further, through the structures of the lifeworld (Schutz and 
Luckmann 2003) new layers of knowledge and praxis become imaginable. 
The lifeworld is the level of the doxa which represents our possibility for fur-
ther interrogations and constitutes the departing point qua epistemological 
separation for any scientific project. Actually the role of the lifeworld is crucial 
for the understanding of two types of knowledge in the Husserlian view: on 
the one hand, as it is argued in the Crisis, the lifeworld is the universal matrix 
of any experience and conditions the scientific stance (Follesdal 2010: 43-44). 
On the other hand the lifeworld is also the condition for the performance 
of the transcendental reduction, since originally the experience starts at the 
mundane level and acquires its transcendental status only in a second step, 
precisely through the realization of the reduction.    
The reality of the lifeworld affects also the production of the scientific 
knowledge in itself and conditions the very result of the phenomenological 
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method in that the results acquired in the transcendental sphere can only be 
achieved by the presence of the mundane sphere. Thus, it justifies  all possi-
bility of meaning constitution and construction initiated by the subject, in-
cluding her own subjective institution. Therefore, as Husserl notes, “we shall 
come to understand that the world which constantly exists for us through the 
flowing alteration of manners of givenness is a universal mental acquisition, 
having developed as such and at the same time continuing to develop as the 
unity of a mental configuration, as a meaning-construct [Sinngebilde] – as the 
construct of a universal, ultimately functioning (letztfungierende) subjectivity. It 
belongs essentially to this world constituting accomplishment that subjectivity 
objectifies itself as human subjectivity, as an element of the world” (Husserl 
1936 [1970]: 113).
If the general mundane frame remains a constant presence, regardless any 
cultural and social variations, with the development of the ICT the redistri-
bution of main meaning configurations; such as our representations of time 
and space, challenges the phenomenological status of the lifeworld. The VR 
produced by means of digital media has a strong impact on the practical prin-
ciple characterizing the lifeworld and at a larger scale on the constitution of 
intersubjectivity. For if the Husserlian phenomenological conception of mun-
daneity expressed in the Crisis of European Sciences stresses a form of generality, 
the quality of being virtual introduces a redistribution of the semantic consi-
stency in the worldly horizon to which we have access.  
The VR was often understood as an alternative of the real concrete world 
(Wittel 2001) and shares principles of functioning with the world of life. It has 
similar inner horizons of meaning and provides in its turn a formal unity re-
quiring from all the subjects participating to its creation and maintenance an 
analogous relation, despite any cultural or contextual differences. Actually it is 
precisely this levelling created by the existence of the network qua network that 
reinforces the similarity between the VR and the world of the everyday life.
For sure, at the level of the everyday world of life, the social and cultural 
structures introduce differences in the meaning that the subject realizes, and 
given these differences, the subject’s place and her capacity of giving account 
of the relation to different experiential spheres may change. By their genera-
lization and use digital media introduce a redistribution of the principle of 
reality as well as that of world/ worldliness, precisely by the semantic parallel 
they induce to many structures of the lifeworld.
Digital media are similar to any  other technological products. They 
accompany and transform the articulation of the lifeworld. But their deve-
lopment and the way their functions are constantly redefined lead to hypo-
thesize something new: despite their understanding in terms of a parallel 
reality, they have become a part of the everyday life itself. By this process 
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through which they colonize the structures of the lifeworld, digital media do 
not operate anymore in terms of a subtraction from the basic principles that 
constitute the paramount reality. They become the everyday life, offering the 
preliminaries for a new phenomenological approach to the lifeworld itself. 
Therefore the principle of generality which has been previously evoked and 
which characterizes the world as a constant presence is a characteristic that 
digital media and VR hold. Such a transformation has major consequences 
for the understanding and the role of the subject, of intersubjectivity and for 
the role that technology plays in configuring meaning.
ICT questions the status of the world as primary background of meaning 
and intrinsically the status of reality. Being responsible for the VR, digital me-
dia challenge the idea of a unique and unified mundane principle, as defended 
in the Husserlian perspective (Husserl 1936 [1970]: §37).  
This transfer between the everyday world of life and the virtual reality 
is based on a meaning reorganization, which revises the status of the real 
and the virtual. Phenomenologically, the presence of digital media and their 
outcome in the support of the virtual reality reinvest as well the principle of 
intentionality. Such a transformation is related in Don Ihde’s view to a more 
general principle of technology. Thus according to him, “technologies can 
be the means by which ‘consciousness itself’ is mediated. Technologies may 
occupy the ‘of’ and not just be some object domain” (Ihde 2009: 23). 
This change modifies our experiential background and our relation to ba-
sic structures of the lifeworld since in many aspects, the virtual enhances the 
real. As Steve Woolgar argues, taking the classical example of a paperless offi-
ce, “the new forms of electronically mediated communication sit alongside the 
continued use of memos, notes and so on. This gives rise to interesting forms 
of interrelationship between the virtual and the real, and the modification 
of both modes of communication” (Woolgar 2002: 16-17). The Husserlian 
principle of originarity of the lifeworld gains new facets precisely by the inte-
gration of new aspects coming from the virtual world. 
2.2. Schutz’s concept of the lifeworld and the multiple realities
Being interested in the continuation of Husserl’s phenomenological project 
on the status of the lifeworld and on intersubjectivity, Alfred Schutz proposes 
a new perspective, which is necessary to mention in order to understand our 
experience of virtual reality. In a classical text, he defines the lifeworld as 
follows: “Our everyday world is, from the outset, an intersubjective world of 
culture. It is intersubjective because we live in it as men among other men, 
bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others 
and being an object of understanding for other. It is a world of culture be-
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cause, from the outset, the lifeworld is a universe of significations to us, i.e., a 
framework of meaning (Sinnzusammenhang) which we have to interpret, and of 
interrelations of meaning which we have to institute only through our action in 
this life-world (emphasis added)” (Schutz 1940 [1962]: 133).
In one of his famous articles, namely On Multiple Realities (1945 [1962]) 
Schutz evokes a few characteristics that give even more importance to the 
lifeworld and confirm it as a paramount reality. This perspective is parallel to 
the Husserlian view according to which the lifeworld is the main ground for 
any experiential project that we may elaborate; it is our originary horizon of 
experience and is characterized by an ideal unity (Husserl 1936 [1970]: §38). 
The originality of Schutz’s perspective is that he acknowledges the importan-
ce of the lifeworld as being the matrix of our existence and the background 
for our pragmatic engagement. Thus, says Schutz “the world of daily life shall 
mean the intersubjective world which existed long before our birth, experien-
ced and interpreted by Others, our predecessors, as an organized world. […] 
All interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous experience 
of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our parents and 
teachers, which in the form of ‘knowledge at hand’ function as a scheme of 
reference” (Schutz 1945 [1962]: 208).
The analytical importance of the world of daily life is major both because 
it stresses its position in the forming of our experiences and our concrete en-
gagement with one another, more precisely, our possibility to accomplish ac-
tions Further, the lifeworld is understood as the basic reality from which any 
type of knowledge and any type of intentional project shall be justified. In his 
intention to refine the phenomenological project, Schutz uses the concept of 
the lifeworld in order to complement the Husserlian idea of epoché. Actually, 
when discussing the relation that we have with the paramount reality, Schutz 
argues that the “man within the natural attitude also uses a specific epoché 
[…]. He does not suspend belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the 
contrary, he suspends doubt in its existence. What he puts in brackets is the 
doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to 
him” (Schutz 1945 [1962]: 229). It is by this operation that what Schutz names 
“the epoché of the natural attitude” is achieved. 
What is also necessary to recall in Schutz’s theory of the lifeworld is that 
the concept of everyday life and the natural attitude are strongly related to the 
concept of reality, which can be declined as it shall be shown in many layers 
according to a specific principle: that of meaning bestowing (Schutz 1945 
[1962]: 230). The process of meaning realization is in its turn legitimated star-
ting from the property of attention. It is attention that individualizes different 
realms derived or based on the principle of reality. Schutz names these realms 
“finite provinces of meaning” (Schutz 1945 [1962]: 230) or multiple realities. 
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These provinces of meaning are qualified as “finite” because, as Schutz ar-
gues “[...] all of them show a specific cognitive style and are – with respect to this 
style – not only consistent in themselves but also compatible with one another. 
[...] To the cognitive style peculiar to each of these different provinces of mea-
ning belongs, thus, a specific tension of consciousness and, consequently, also 
a specific époché, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self ex-
perience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective” (Schutz 
1955 [1962]: 230; 232).
Among these “finite provinces of meaning” Schutz mentions the following: 
first, the world of phantasms (where he includes the day-dreams, the reality of 
playing, that of fiction, the fairy-tales and the myths), second, the world of 
dreams and third, the world of scientific theory (Schutz 1962: 234-246; 340-347). 
It is also important to mention that even the paramount reality is considered 
according to Schutz in terms of a “finite province of meaning”. However, 
one needs to note that the number of the “finite provinces of meaning” is not 
restricted only to the Schutzian typology. This concept of “finite province of 
meaning” may for sure refer to other experiences of the human mind and can 
therefore be extended. The VR for instance can also be included among these 
“provinces of meaning”. 
Another characteristic of the provinces of meaning is that, despite an expe-
riential congruence, they display a certain complexity. One may experience dif-
ferent meaning organizations and thus different layers within the same provin-
ce. According to Schutz, one has access to these provinces of meaning by means 
of a “shift” or “leap” which marks the change in the attitude of the subject and 
imposes the organization of a new “cognitive style”. The cognitive style contri-
butes to differentiate provinces from one another, and from the lifeworld.  
The VR like the experience of other finite provinces of meaning, imposes a 
particular attention à la vie, a concept initially developed by Henri Bergson and 
often evoked by Schutz. The virtual reality is an imagined construction that 
detains a particular status in relation to the everyday world of life. If one takes 
the example of the video games, or of such metaverses as Second Life, they 
fall under a special category of narrative construction which is parallel  for 
instance examples as the world of myths or fairy-tales. The status of being “fi-
nite” of the virtual reality starts to be strongly challenged by the development 
of the social networks and the new modes of communication and sociality 
that emerged. In this case, the pragmatic principle is redefined and we expe-
rience a transposition of the paramount into the virtual and vice versa. The 
emergence of VR questions the project of separation between the paramount 
reality proper and the virtual realm as such. 
Similarly to other finite provinces of meaning, the VR of digital media plays 
highly upon a representative function. In relation to a literary work of art or to 
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a painting, our faculty of representation detains a certain degree of freedom, 
usually generated by an aesthetic attitude that is acknowledged by the reader or the 
person who is the addressee of the work in question. It is this attitude that con-
tributes to what Schutz names “shift” of meaning from the “paramount reality”. 
In the case of the virtual experience one is engaged in a representational 
transposition that does not involve aesthetics, although it may, as the example of 
video games or of Second Life shows. However, other aspects and functions of 
the VR influence our pragmatic engagement with one another and therefore 
our “belief”. The status of the virtual integrates and is in return integrated by 
the structures of the lifeworld. Moreover, as Steve Woolgar argues, “not only 
do new virtual activities sit alongside existing ‘real’ activities, but the intro-
duction and use of new ‘virtual’ technologies can actually stimulate more of 
the corresponding ‘real’ activity” (Woolgar 2002: 17).  
The Schutzian conception of provinces of meaning helps to understand 
our relatipn to the VR  in terms of a change of cognitive style having an own 
specificity. But this needs a conceptual clarification. If on the one hand the co-
gnitive style that characterizes the VR is understood as derived and therefore 
in terms of a “shift” from the paramount reality, on the other hand the VR 
is at present a clear structure of the lifeworld. As a consequence, the virtual 
world holds phenomenologically a double position: it remains partly factual 
by the consequences it has on our actions and activities in the everyday life, 
legitimating a praxeological aspect. And still, its virtual character individua-
lizes it as a specific realm in itself, with own rules and possibilities. 
Schutz’s theory of multiple realities helps in such a context to understand 
virtuality in terms of a characteristic common to any use of technology de-
veloped and used all along the history of mankind. In order to exist, the VR 
depends on technology. Its possibility comes to fact as mediation. Similarly 
to such technological devices as glasses or pencils, computers, tablets and I-
phones , which support materially experiences, the existence of the VR con-
firms actually an intrinsic modification of the structures of the lifeworld from 
a “non electronically mediated” (Woolgar 2002: 18) moment, often identified 
with the real, to a mediated perspective of the real, which becomes actually 
real by its consequences. In this context a new question arises. Does the passa-
ge to the virtual world question the validity and the status of its being a finite 
province of meaning? And if so, how?
In the Schutzian discussion on multiple realities the possibility of a special 
epoché in the context of the transition from one reality to another is also 
evoked. The passage to the virtual reality imposes a bracketing. And yet, by 
the pragmatic implications it has within the lifeworld, the virtual, unlike the 
realm of art or of scientific theory, holds a special status. As Don Ihde evokes 
when referring to the quality of our body to incorporate different techno-
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logies, the same relation can be transposed to the case of the two types of 
worldly configurations (paramount and virtual) that are here discussed. What 
is suggested is that the relation between the paramount reality and the VR 
is one of incorporation. If as Don Ihde argues “embodiment or bodily inten-
tionality extends through the artefact into the environing world in a unique 
technological mediation” (Don Ihde 2009: 36), the structures of the lifeworld 
are also extended by means of the virtual world. 
In the Schutzian and Husserlian phenomenology, the primordial role of 
the paramount reality has been steadily highlighted. With  the development 
of new digital technologies and of the virtual reality, one is confronted thou-
gh to a crucial change. It is precisely by those mechanisms in which former 
functions and structures of the lifeworld migrate and transform themselves 
within the VR, that the digital media confirm their new status as a part of the 
real. As a consequence, our stock-of-knowledge at hand and our typifications 
are strongly affected.
Furthermore, communication which is one of the basic elements through 
which intersubjective processes are established and maintained is fundamen-
tally influenced by the development of the VR. We assist therefore to a redi-
stribution of the principle of reality which is highly important in the discus-
sion of the status of the lifeworld but also of the principle of intersubjectivity. 
The latter is phenomenologically and sociologically just as important in the 
context in which both experience and social structures are reformulated due 
to the existence of the VR. Such transformations would lead implicitly to ano-
ther understanding of what Don Ihde defined as “interrelational ontology”1.   
3. Virtual reality and technological forms of life: a phenomenological 
reconsideration
As Cogburn and Silcox note in a recent article (2014), the term “virtual rea-
lity” comes from an artistic field, namely theatre. It is Antonin Artaud who 
was the first to propose this concept long before its actual use to describe the 
reality constructed by the ICT. Artaud defined virtual reality as the reality 
displayed by a theatre play. In his view “virtual” is equivalent to “fictional”, 
since, so he argues, “[…] the theatre […] is developed from a certain number 
of fundamentals which are the same for all the arts and which aim on the spi-
1  See Don Ihde, Postphenomenology and Technoscience, Albany: State University of  New York, 2009, 
p. 23, where the term “interrelational ontology” refers to the fact that “the human experiencer 
is to be found ontologically related to an environment or a world, but the interrelation is such 
that both are transformed within this relationality.”
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ritual and imaginary level at an efficacy analogous to the process in which the 
physical world actually turns all the matter into gold” (Artaud 1958: 48). With 
the development of the digital media and more recently of the social networ-
ks, the status of the VR  changed from the fictional-like to a specific form of 
reality in itself, which is borrowing characteristics from both the paramount 
reality and fictional realm. However, by the concrete impacts it has, the VR 
intrudes in the lifeworld and modifies it. It is not a reality in itself to which one 
may have access to by means of a shift, as the Schutzian theory promotes, but 
it is a form in which the lifeworld presents itself.
As Thomas Sutherland argues, “technology is never neutral – in utili-
zing various technologies […] that very experience becomes a property of 
the technology itself” (Sutherland 2013: 6). This view comes to reinforce the 
postphenomenological postion defended by Don Ihde, according to whom 
“technology […] becomes quasitransparent […] and thus the technology here 
is not “object-like”. It is a means of experience, not an object of experience in 
use” (2009: 42). Under such circumstances, Schutz’s division between para-
mount reality and multiple realities is strongly challenged, precisely because 
the experiential and cognitive shift that was evoked as a main mechanism 
for the transition from one realm to another does not function anymore. It is 
because technologies are responsible for different shifts that such a process – 
in as far as the status of the VR is concerned – does not rely on a separation 
mechanism, but rather on a connecting mechanism. 
Thus, when discussing the status of the lifeworld in the context of the de-
velopment of digital media one is confronted to a a crucial challenge: that of 
the consistency and coherence of the worldly character in which our experien-
ces are embedded. It is precisely the constant transition, the fluidity of these 
new everyday life configurations, their liquidity, as Zygmut Bauman mentions 
(Bauman 2000) that challenges the idea of a separation between worldly le-
vels, between multiple realities and paramount reality. Such a characteristic 
destabilizes basic parameters that ground experience, as time and space or 
the combination of the two, our timescape as Barbara Adam names it (Adam 
in Sutherland 2013: 6). By influencing time and space, flow and liquidity mo-
dify the consistency of our experiences and our intersubjective relations. 
In Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology, the lifeworld is strongly connected to 
the intersubjective presence. This association between lifeworld and intersubjec-
tivity is not a completely new principle in phenomenology, since Schutz relies 
on a former discussion developed by Husserl on this theme in The Crisis. Howe-
ver, the originality of the Schutzian theory relies in his temporal stratification 
of intersubjectivity.  According to him, there are three intersubjective layers 
which can be individualized, namely predecessors (Vorwelt), contemporaries 
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(Umwelt) and consociates (Mitwelt), and succesors (Folgewelt)2. Contemporaries 
and consociates are differentiated according to a spatial principle since both 
belong to the temporal layer of the present. Consociates are those individuals 
who are spatially closer to the subject, and belong to the same Alltagswelt, to 
the same context and with whom the subject may establish a face-to-face rela-
tionship. The intersubjective relation they facilitate is of a deeper consistence 
than that with contemporaries. 
The development of the VR challenges precisely these relations in presentia, 
since contemporaries may become consociates, and face-to-face relationships 
are replaced by mediated relationships which exist via internet connections 
and through interfaces. These new infrastructures acknowledge a new un-
derstanding of the worldly principle in terms of a complex of “technological 
forms of life”, as Scott Lash names them (Lash 2001). Lash borrows this term 
from Ludwig Wittgenstein and he understands this concept in the sense of 
“an empirical ‘way-of-doing’, and has to do with how a society accomplishes 
things” (Lash 2006: 327). 
According to this author “in technological forms of life, we make sense of 
the world through technological systems. As sense-makers, we operate, less 
like cyborgs than interfaces. These interfaces of humans and machines are 
conjunctions of organic and technological systems. […] We do not merge with 
these systems. But we face our environment in our interface with technological 
systems. […] As technological nature, I must navigate through technological 
culture. And technological culture is constitutively culture at a distance” (2001: 
107). The challenge that the VR addresses to the Schutzian understanding of 
intersubjectivity is precisely this culture of distance, in which the distinction 
between consociates and contemporaries becomes very fluid, in which time 
and space as categories of experience gain new representational forms. For sure 
technologies have always influenced the development of our actions and inte-
ractions with one another. And yet the digital revolution has consequences that 
are unique in the cultural history of the mankind. Especially their influence 
on the representation and living forms of temporality has major consequences. 
In the world of life, history and the face-to-face relationships are characte-
ristics which deeply influence the configuration of our experiential flow. In 
the VR and in technological forms of life, interactions are reduced to the 
very moment. The meaning that constitutes a principle of congruence for our 
being with one another and for our actions is influenced by the contingency 
of the networks and by their fluid character. It becomes a deeply “empirical 
2  For a detailed description of  this stratification, see Schutz’s main work, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der 
sozialen Welt, Konstanz: UVK, 1932 [2004] especially the fourth chapter. 
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meaning”, to quote once more Scott Lash. In his view, “empirical meaning is 
neither logical (as in classification) nor ontological, but everyday and contin-
gent” (Lash 2001: 109). The effacement of the borders between the real reality 
and the VR results precisely from this characteristic of fluidity and sharpened 
contingency.
The empirical meaning is also characterized by a special form of tempora-
lity. “In this empiricist phenomenology” so he argues, “sense-making loses its 
interiority. There is a flattening of the interiority of the subject. The expres-
sive subjectivity of the artist, the analysand, the philosopher, the interiority 
of proletarian is eroded” (Lash 2001: 109). What the VR imposes upon the 
lifeworld is a dissolving of the individual stance into the flux, into the network. 
“In technological forms of life, sense-making is for others” (ibid.: 110). Being 
defined initially as the originary soil of our experiences , and connected to 
our use of cultural and action typifications in the Schutzian perspective, the 
lifeworld is being challenged by the development of the VR and of the techno-
logical forms of life precisely in its being a field of originarity.
Technological forms of life and their implementation have strong pheno-
menological consequences in that they play upon both the construction of 
meaning and on the configurations of our experiences. It is in such a context 
that classical notions elaborated in the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz 
need further definitions. Lifeworld, paramount reality, multiple realities, or 
the above mentioned classification of intersubjective layers are at presented 
redistributed by the presence of the VR, which as Andreas Wittel claims is 
not a reality separated from the real reality, but it has become an important 
component of it. Some examples that Wittel mentions to defend his thesis are 
emails, online chat, or web surfing. These says he “are very real experience 
for the people utilizing them” (Wittel 2001: 63). They are real in their impact 
on our concrete life and they are real in the manner by which they condition 
our interactions and their meanings. 
4. Conclusion
Considering the existence of the ICT and of the VR under a phenomenologi-
cal perspective is certainly a provocation for both phenomenologists and social 
scientists. In the first case it is difficult to defend a phenomenological position 
in which technology is reconciled with the lifeworld if one sees it as a result of a 
positivistic implementation. This view is questionable because as James Dodd 
claims, “phenomenological philosophy itself is understood by Husserl as an 
expressive of this universality of the idea of science, one that recognizes the 
dependency of any sense of the universal on the historicity of thinking” (Dodd 
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2004: 211). Dagfinn Føllesdal argues as well in the same direction: “according 
to Husserl, the lifeworld and the sciences are intimately connected” (Føllesdal 
2010: 43). To support the embedding of these worldly structures, namely the 
scientific/technological and the natural attitude, such philosophical and episte-
mological programs as the one developed by Don Ihde show that phenomeno-
logy is not a discourse that closes and separates, but rather it evolves with the 
structures of the world which it precisely questions. These interrogations are in 
the end crucial for the main phenomenological topic, which is meaning.
Given the presence of the virtual reality(es) and their impact on the li-
feworld, one could admit that meaning is not annihilated but transformed. 
Meaning “becomes informational” (Lash 2001: 110). Individuals have learnt 
to use this new form of communication and social connection and their life-
worldly horizons have been modified accordingly. For sure the new structures 
of the lifeworld resulting due to the VR are part of former stocks of knowledge 
and they should not be considered only as pure results of a present devoid of 
historicity. They influence intersubjective relations and the emergence of the-
se relations, and they modify simultaneously the rhythm and the consistence 
of the real. The present implications of the VR confront us therefore with 
a new perspective on the foundations and functions of the worldly horizon, 
requiring a supplementary reflection on the active instances that are at work 
behind it (namely subjectivity and intersubjectivity). 
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Future Structure of the Life-World 
As an inevitable consequence of the «peer-to-peer»
Mototaka Mori
This article intends to draw theoretically a future structure of the life-world. The state interventionism 
in the late capitalism has been often argued by the critical theoreticians like Jurgen Habermas since 
the last half of the twentieth century. It was particularly the main problem how possible the life-world 
was in such the technologically systematized society. However, the highly technological development of 
telecommunication has changed our everyday life very rapidly and totally. If we know such the rapid 
change of coevolution between human life and technolog y, we have to fundamentally reconsider on the 
theory of life-world. Therefore, in this article I will firstly focus on the classical theory of mundane social 
world which Alfred Schutz presented in the early 1930s. Of course, his project of socio-phenomenolog y 
has been one of the most brilliant und important works still now. However, his theory also will have to be 
renewed. If we know particularly the «peer-to-peer» constellation of the computer network by the distrib-
uted anonymous persons, the classical model of life-world must be versioned up to a next theoretical level. 
Secondly, considering on the virtual currency like the Bitcoin, this article will show you a hypothetical 
aspect of transformation of the life-world. The mechanism of trust, which has been often understood as 
one of the most important key concepts for the community or the society, may be replaced with the com-
puter technolog y of cryptographic proof. Such a theoretical examination will finally lead to an important 
opened problem. We will have to inquire whether such the social order will be spontaneous, or whether 
such the ordering will have to be decided only by the speed of computer’s central processing unit.
1. Is the Critical Theory still possible?
In the 1970s Habermas described the critical and pathological situations of 
late capitalistic society as a well-known theme of the life-world colonialized 
by the system (Habermas 1973: 9). In those days it was an alternative to the 
next society that he would propose with this analogical dichotomy of the «life-
world» versus the «system». He assigned the very famous theoretical terms, 
which were presented as the symbolic media theory by Talcott Parsons, to 
this dichotomy. It means that the two media «money» and «political pow-
er» are matched to the «system», and the other two media «influence» and 
«value-commitment» are matched to the «life-world» (Habermas 1980: 96, 
Habermas 1982: 413). Moreover, he reconsidered a sphere of latter two media 
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as a problem of speech act theory, what he called the universal pragmatics 
(Habermas 1971: 101-141, Habermas 1984: 353-440). 
Indeed, it might have been very important at that time that the industrial 
society and social welfare state were interpreted as one of the most typical ex-
amples of the highly integrated complex society. According to the Parsonean 
presupposition, the members of a nation make their living with the internal-
ized common value for them. Their personalities are uniformly molded in the 
social system where they are growing up. They are strongly committed to a 
set of values which are known as «success», «affluence», «efficiency» etc. in 
the modern industrial society. Such the uniformly patterned persons in the 
advanced industrial society might be the most typical image of man in the 
Parsonean social system theory.
However, we have to point out another connotation of the term «system». 
The technology has been developed more highly and rapidly since the last 
decade of the twentieth century. The telecommunication technology, typi-
cally the Internet technology, has totally changed our everyday life. It means 
that our taken-for-granted valid references like some common concepts and 
values in a patterned culture, such as marriage, sexuality, family, has changed 
themselves very rapidly. The above mentioned symbolic media like money 
and political power also has rapidly changed themselves with such technologi-
cal development. For instance, the payment device of credit card has changed 
the form of money and its exchange style, and the mobile phone has strongly 
influenced on the action pattern of our everyday life.
Now we have to ask whether the critical theory, which was possible for 
Habermas in the late 1970’s, is still now critical against the today’s highly 
technologically structured society.  It would be very important how we could 
criticize the life-world colonialized by money and political power, because I 
assume that our hyper modern society should already have been designed to 
be colonialized by various technological media. 
For this purpose we have to grasp the life-world more fundamentally, be-
cause Habermas interpreted the life-world very simply as combinations be-
tween speech acts and their background cultural resources (Habermas 1982: 
182-228). Even if the life-world had already been colonialized, we had to know 
more conceptually an original structure of the life-world, which is spatially 
unfolded by bodily movements and their extension, and which is temporally 
ordered by lived experiences and their continuity.  
Therefore, we need firstly to refer to some fundamental issues on the origi-
nal structure of life-world (2). Secondly we are going to reconstruct a relation 
between the original life-world and the symbolic media of money and politi-
cal power (3). Thirdly we will examine a specificity of virtual currency and a 
constellation of the peer-to-peer computer network(4). Consequently we lead 
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to consider whether we will be able to maintain the original position of the 
critical theory, or whether we should newly find another theoretical way (5).
2. Classical Structure of the Life-World
Of course, if we would ask fundamentally, it may be proper that we refer back 
to the original conception of life-world by Edmund Husserl. However, we 
have to presuppose in this paper that the life-world is mundane structured. 
Alfred Schutz presented the society as a composition of four social worlds, 
and at the same time he grasped the life-world as the difference between the 
problematic and that which was taken for granted. In other words, his analy-
sis consists of two parts, firstly an analysis on the temporal differentiation of 
social worlds, and secondly an analysis on the spatial constitution by bodily 
movements and their perceivable arrangement and enlargement.
In his first book in the 1930s Schutz had already theorized the society as 
the four social worlds which were spatially and temporally articulated (Schütz 
1932[2004]: 313-387). If we follow the English translation, they are the four 
social worlds: «fellow-men in direct experience», «world of contemporaries», 
«world of predecessors», and «world of successors» (Schutz 1967: 176-214, 
Schutz, Luckmann 1973: 61-92).  
These articulations are based on the difference of intimacy and anonym-
ity. It means the difference between «Thou-orientation» and «They-orienta-
tion». The «Thou-orientation» arranges spheres of the life-world, which are 
constituted by various immediate lived experiences of the other. It is gener-
ally known as the «face-to-face» relation. In this point the first social world 
«fellow-men in direct experience» means this «face-to-face» relation. 
On the level of simultaneity the difference between «face-to-face» relation 
and «world of contemporaries» is articulated spatially. The differentiation of 
«world of contemporaries» and «world of predecessors», or that of «world of 
contemporaries» and «world of successors» will constitute a temporal axis. 
Such an theoretical image of articulations will be illustrated like the following 
picture.
As mentioned above, the difference between «Thou-orientation» and 
«They-orientation» corresponds to the articulation of intimacy and anonymi-
ty. It means the degree of intimacy and anonymity. These two types of density 
will be simultaneously distinguished in a situation. In other words a situation 
appears inevitably as a difference between the one sphere constituted by the 
address terms of «I» and «Thou», and the other sphere distinguished as that 
of «We» and «Others». The former sphere will be opened out with the «Thou-
orientation», and the latter one will be spread out with the «They-orientation».
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This simultaneity is supported by the dual structure of the present. It 
means, the present is firstly the difference between the present at the moment 
and the present which has passed just now, and the present is secondly the dif-
ference of the present at the moment and the present which will appear soon.
The «world of contemporaries» is spread out with the present. It includes 
the sphere of «fellow-men in immediate lived experience» which the «Thou-
orientation» will constitute. In other words, this «world of contemporaries» 
is assumed to be articulated with the difference between «Thou-orientation» 
and «They-orientation». Of course, the «We-relation» of «fellow-men in im-
mediate lived experience» is constituted not only by one-directed perspective 
of the «Thou-orientation» from ego but also through the reciprocal «face-to-
face» contingency of ego-alter perspectives. Moreover, it must be emphasized 
that such the reciprocal relation is not only sensorially immediate but also re-
flexively mediated. Therefore, I could change my standpoint with the others’ 
points in such a situation. I would experience something from the perspective 
in his position, as same distance and reach as he does (Schutz, Luckmann 
1973: 60).  It is such the idealized interchangeability of standpoints as the 
simultaneity that makes the life-world taken for granted.
In the «face-to-face» relation «I» and «You» are taken as «We». As I men-
tioned above, this social world is articulated as the difference between «face-
to-face» relation and «world of contemporaries». These «I» and «You» in the 
«face-to-face» relation grasp the others in their simultaneous level as «They». 
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However, including «I», «You» and «They», the «world of contemporaries» 
also can be taken as «We». We could call this «face-to-face» relation a «We-
relation» in the «Thou-orientation» level, and at the same time we could ar-
ticulate the whole «world of contemporaries» also as another «We-relation» 
on the fusion level of «Thou-orientation» and «They-orientation». 
Naturally each agent to whom each perspective is attributed is assumed 
to be a person. Each person has each own biography. Such a biography is 
constituted as the compiled knowledge stocks and it is already and always 
mediated reflectively between the objective ego «me» and the subjective ego 
«I». The personal relation between plural persons is also mediated through 
some habitual knowledge stocks. The person and the personal relation are 
both structuralized by variously arranged knowledge stocks.
Here is a reason why the Schuzean theory of life-world has been under-
stood as the sociology of knowledge. It was this theoretical main theme how 
the «immediate lived experience» and the «mediated knowledge» could be 
differentiated and compiled in each other.  This lived experience is always 
and already given originally, and the difference of this lived experience and 
the mediated knowledge is to constitute the fundamental core of life-world.
The «We-relation» of «world of contemporaries» is distinguished from the 
following two worlds: «world of predecessors» and «world of successors». The 
former is the past world which had already passed.  The latter is the future 
world which will come up from now.  These three articulated worlds are to be 
put on a temporal axis from the past to the future. 
This temporality is originally based on the sensory or bodily perception of 
each attributed persons. Its mode depends on how events could be perceived 
and how they could be lined up on an axis. Needless to say, such sensorially 
perceived events themselves are already intervened not only by the natural 
processes like day and night or four seasons etc. but also by the interactions 
with other persons. The concerned events could be sensorially experienced as 
appearances for agents, and each biography would be articulated by the ob-
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jective astronomical time and the interpersonal temporalities. Although any 
personal biography may be taken as each subjective consciousness, it may be 
difficult to continue to be a series of only subjectively closed lived experiences. 
Most of experienced events, although they could be experienced lively, would 
always be objectified and articulated as knowledge.
The phenomenological sociology of knowledge will observe such objectified 
and articulated events as the components of society, setting the difference be-
tween «face-to-face» and «world of contemporaries» as a fundamental premise. 
The articulation between «Thou-orientation» and «They-orientation» will be 
always and already given there originally. However, such an articulation or two 
kinds of density are given with the difference between intimacy and anonymity.
The difference between intimacy and anonymity derives from the distanc-
es articulated by the sensory perceptions, bodily movements and extensions. 
Such living activities are based on the difference between an attainable reach 
and an unattainable reach. This basic difference is developed to a more com-
plicated one with the temporal axis. If man has ever experienced an activity 
as reached or performed, man could imagine that the same event or some 
events similar to them will be anticipated and experienced as attainable or 
unattainable.
Such the activities always come out with various bodily movements. The 
bodily movements and their instrumental extension make it possible to per-
ceive something, to attain something and to reach to something etc. From 
such the perceived, attained and reached points of view, namely from a future 
point on a temporal axis, it is possible to control things and persons. Such 
the reflexively structuring is not anything other than the intention of living 
organism.
The differences between designed situations (of persons and things) and 
designing persons will appear on such a reflexively structured level. The latter 
designing persons could take the «observer-perspective» on their own tem-
poral axis. They could design and transform the above mentioned «world 
of contemporaries» into something new. They could observe their «We-rela-
tion» on their own ways. It means that the «world of contemporaries» could 
be partially or totally objectified from the outside of itself.
3. Symbolic Media, Money and Political Power
It was the so-called «We-relation» that could be objectified as something by 
someone. In other words, this sphere could not continue to be immediate 
between the concerned participants, but it could be variously mediated by 
symbolizing. It would be difficult to keep the sphere of «world of contempo-
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raries» continuously homogeneous. If anything, the division of labor and the 
functional differentiation presuppose such the inhomogeneous settings. Each 
of such the functionally differentiated societies must be properly symbolized 
and mediated by representing each own complexity. It is not difficult to enu-
merate such symbolic relations which are functioning as media: power, truth, 
law, love, city etc. They have been well-known as the «symbolic media» (Par-
sons 1977) or as the «communication media» (Luhmann 1974).
Money is used as a unit of account, as a means of payment, and as a store of 
value (Hicks 1967: 1). Firstly goods and services are exchanged and allocated 
by circulations of money as currency. Secondly we hold money for transac-
tion, as precaution or as speculation. The transaction of buying, paying, re-
ceiving etc. is an exchange at a point on the temporal axis. The precaution 
as well as the speculation is a temporalized action process to the future by 
the function of value store. In other words, money as a vehicle of information 
makes possible the appresentative paring of present exchange and not present 
exchange in a temporalized action process. The motivation of using money 
such as paying, buying etc. will be interpreted as a meaning of temporal pro-
cess of action. 
Any person cannot live his own life without risk calculation in various tem-
poralized processes. Since the nineteenth century the modern persons have 
been seeking more certain and more trustworthy instance for exchange and 
distribution of goods and services in the modernization and industrialization. 
The validity of money exchange must be secured by someone or something. 
The idea of the central bank has been a typical example in every nation state. 
As a result the next media of political power would be required for coordina-
ting it.
The function of bank is not always to be limited to deposit and loan. Bank-
ing is originally a deed, by which the credit papers are issued. To deposit 
money, or to open an account in a bank means drawing a bill receivable. If 
man saves money in a bank, man receives a bankbook from there. Such the 
reception of evidence would be nothing else but issuing bank notes. To deposit 
money at present will lead to withdrawing it in the future. Money as a vehicle 
could bridge between a present event and a future one. This activity of bank-
ing makes it possible to create various credits and trusts. 
Money connects one event (e.g. to want something) to the other event (e.g. 
to enjoy it). In this meaning, money plays a symbolic role of the appresenta-
tive paring between present occurrence and non-present occurrence. The 
material of this vehicle has historically been particular some goods, such as 
shell, cloth, fur, tobacco, rice, metal and paper. Today such the materials have 
transformed into the electronic signals, and the miners’ technique also has 
been evolving to a highly technical computer program of cryptographic proof. 
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The bond of appresentative paring makes possible the validity of general 
exchangeability. It creates a functional community as a sub-universe of eco-
nomic system. This economic relation relies on the paring between the ap-
presenting member and the appresented member (Schutz, Luckmann 1983: 
134). Such the difference between members is originally coming out from the 
contingency of their interactions. 
As far as the personal acts are originally based on the bodily movements of 
human being, the damage and injury of them would have to be assumed. The 
conflict of all against all is always possible in every human world. Such the 
problem of Hobbesian order was a typical classic theme in sociology. There-
fore, it was a serious problem how persons would organize the other persons 
without violence. The Hobbesian classical answer was an idea of social con-
tract. Of course, it leads to the next problem how possible such the social 
contract is. 
Generally speaking, any democratic government has police and military 
force, which should be known as the legitimately institutionalized violent 
power. However, the most important question would be how possible was the 
stable vantage point of the third party for legitimation. In this article, it would 
be asked who could mint coins and print bank notes and how possible is a 
stable vantage point required for the agency. 
4. Coevolution of Technology and Society
The «face-to-face» relation is based on immediately lived experiences. «I lit-
erally see my partner in front of me. As I watch his face and his gestures and 
listen to the tone of his voice, I become aware of much more than what he is 
deliberately trying to communicate to me» (Schutz 1967: 169).
Such the «face-to-face» immediate situation has been totally changed with 
the development of communication technology during the last century. We 
could consider this change as a coevolution of technology and human-being. 
Firstly radio, subsequently TV, these devices have opened a new situation to 
us. They opened us the simultaneous and far distant relation of «one to n-
persons». Of course, this relation is not immediate, but the broadcasted vision 
on TV could have often been taken as real, as if it were felt as immediate. 
The other classical mass media like book, magazine, newspaper also have 
delivered us various realities. However, the visually moving pictures on TV 
had decisively changed our everyday life during the last half of the twentieth 
century. We could have felt such mediated television pictures as real. They 
have fundamentally changed the classical structure of the mundane life-world 
which Schutz described in the 1930s.
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The «one to n-persons» simultaneous relation may be typically a relation 
of clergy and his believers in church, player(s) and his(their) audience in con-
cert, and teacher and his pupil in classroom etc. These relations are originally 
taken as «live».
However, the broadcasted relation, which may generally be presumed as 
«live», is always mediated as telecommunication. The broadcast like radio 
and TV has synchronized a spatial distant relation between the sender and 
the receiver, and it has developed another extended space and time. On the 
other hand, the recording, editing and compiling technique has bridged even 
the temporal distance. Such technological evolution has been transforming 
various materials of medium from the phonograph record through tape and 
CD to DVD and Blu-ray Disc. The devices which play them also have been 
metamorphosing themselves from the gramophone through the stereo record 
player and the Walkman to the iPod etc.
Moreover, in the last decade of the twentieth century the Internet has 
changed the simultaneous relation of «one to n-persons» to the freely ac-
cessible relation of «n-persons to n-persons». This network which as been 
stretched as the World Wide Web information system transformed our life 
scheduling tempo itself. Man can very easily access to this network and at the 
same time man can very easily get out there. Our human life itself has become 
to be totally adapted to the internet technology. The society has transformed 
itself very rapidly. Today we cannot live together without this coevolution of 
Internet-technology and society. 
The difference between «Thou-orientation» and «They-orientation» is 
naturally presupposed in the classical structure of the life-world. This original 
difference has made us the clearly articulated «face-to-face» lived experience 
possible. The address terms like «You» and «They» represent a certain spatial 
distance articulated by a certain range of attainment which the bodily move-
ments make possible. The life-worldly space and time perceived by the bodily 
movement and its extension are articulated and formed by two fundamental 
media of the light and the sound.
The immediate lived experiences also will continue to be perceived. All 
of them will not be replaced with the mediated ones which could be copied, 
duplicated, and altered. If anything, they will be related with the mediated 
lived experiences more complicatedly. Today we are experiencing the others 
in the «face-to-face» relation, at the same time, we can experience the human 
beings as well as almost everything, i.e. animal, machine, robot, animation 
picture etc., as if they were a kind of human beings, in a quasi «face-to-face» 
relation on the base of «n-persons to n-persons» network. Such the «peer-to-
peer» computer network is supported by a tremendously great deal of distrib-
uted anonymous persons. In other words, they are appearing and standing 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA90
on each terminal of the network from moment to moment. The difference 
of connecting-to-network and not-connecting-to-network in there is basically 
constructing the space and time of our everyday life today.
The Internet users would believe that they could perform their own acts as 
their own intention and decision. However, if someone could objectively ob-
serve them from the outside, they were only the persons who could be showing 
up as users upon the terminal units of computer network. They are always 
theoretically outside of this network system itself. They can be not only per-
sons in the meaning of human being but also organizations like co-operations 
or governments in the meaning of juristic persons. In a near future such the 
persons may be replaced by robots, cyborgs or androids. In other words, any 
ways of appearances of our everyday life could be decided from the outside of 
the network system itself. The Internet itself depends on the distributed anon-
ymous persons, i.e. human beings, robots, cyborgs, androids, co-operations, 
organizations and so on. At the same time such possible agents and their ex-
tensions appear variously with the evolution of Internet technology.
Money also has been based on the distributed anonymous persons and or-
ganizations. It is the general exchangeability that money has been originally 
symbolizing. The general exchangeability has been signed as the numeral 
quantity by money. The difference between exchangeable and not-exchange-
able makes possible an economic system, and the lemma of not-exchangeable 
itself is to be put on the next difference between exchangeable and not-ex-
changeable. Such secondary or sequential process has been transforming the 
human life to the monetary calculation world.
Moreover, even such money has been rapidly and highly changing itself 
with the evolution of computer technique. Metal for the coin and paper for 
the bank note have transformed themselves into electronic signals in the com-
puter network. The money is originally based on the distributed anonymous 
persons. Therefore, this «peer-to-peer» relation in the Internet could be very 
easily fit to the today’s monetized society.
Now in this context it will be the most important problem how the validity 
of general exchangeability could be guaranteed. Is it secured by the state or 
the nation? We know that various virtual monies like the Bitcoin are actually 
and world widely in circulation. What makes possible this currency? More 
briefly saying, it will be an interesting problem whether the trust of observer 
on the objectified position could be replaced with the cryptographic proof by 
the computer technology.
Satoshi Nakamoto, who created the Bitcoin protocol and its reference soft-
ware, writes: «A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow 
online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going 
through a financial institution» (Nakamoto 2008: 1). Very interestingly it will 
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be difficult to ascertain whether this Japanese male name attributes to a single 
person or a team, and it will be not so important whether this name attributes 
to the Japanese or the others. It may mean that the Bitcoin is a genuine money, 
because the origin of this creation itself has been maintained as anonymous.
If a payer A pays money to a payee B, its money itself will belong to this 
payee B. This payer A cannot pay the same money once more to the other 
payee C, because he has just paid it to a payee B. This impossibility of double-
spending is fundamentally important. As long as the Bitcoin also is function-
ing as money, any double-spending must continue to be impossible. The usage 
of copied bank-note is severely punished by the criminal law. It is a forgery. 
Therefore, any national currencies are very strictly checked and controlled by 
the authority concerned. It is the typical raison d’être of the central bank or 
the national government.
However, lots of digital currencies like the Bitcoin have already been 
used transnationally without any central authorities. It is the most impor-
tant theme how the validity of virtual currency can be secured. «What is 
needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof in-
stead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with 
each other without the need for a trusted third party» (Nakamoto 2008: 1). 
The cryptographic technique is a secure communication only between two 
concerned entities without any particular and established third parties. It 
means that the virtual currency does not rely on the trust of various authori-
ties like governments or central banks, but only on the special technique 
like cryptographic proof. The above cited «two willing parties to transact 
directly with each other without the need for a trusted third part» mean any 
two parties in the «peer-to-peer» constellation. In the case of the Bitcoin 
this transaction is supported by lots of distributed anonymous miners. The 
miners in this context mean the engineers who can engage themselves in the 
practice of cryptographic proof. They can gain profit by their engaging in 
this cryptographic practice.
If the rate of return in the virtual currency users’ community exceeds the 
cost which the miners need, this virtual community will be maintained, and 
if the miners who are expert in the cryptographic skills and their incidental 
problems could get enough profit to reflect their professional workmanship, 
this currency community will be growing up and enlarged. This growth will 
depend on the spread and scarcity of the technicians’ effort and skill. The 
limits of growth will lead to a birth of the next virtual currency. Already the 
competitions between virtual currencies and real currencies have begun in 
this present world.
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5. Open problem: Is Spontaneous Order autopoietic or culculated?
In the end of 1970s Friedrich von Hayek proposed the denationalization of 
money. His fundamental perspective was as follows. «History is largely a his-
tory of inflation, and usually of inflations engineered by governments and for 
the gain of governments» (Hayek 1978[1999]: 142). It would be here one of the 
most important philosophical themes how the political power and its arbitrar-
iness of governments could be reduced to the minimum. The practical plan 
that he proposed in his book was to create a competition among plural cur-
rencies. It was no more and no less than the total privatization of the banking 
business and the totally borderless dealing with various currencies. In his plan 
lots of private and free banks could issue their own bank-notes and mint their 
own coins on their own responsibilities. In this very constructive proposal it 
was assumed that the monopoly of issuing currency by the central bank or the 
national government should be denationalized and abolished. 
Undoubtedly Hayek supposed that people should be able to get proper 
information on the activities of various private banks and various markets 
(producing, consuming, exchanging etc.). He thought rather simply that the 
mass media like newspapers, radio, TV could deliver such information to the 
public. «For a decision so important for business as which currency to use 
in contracts and accounts, all possible information would be supplied daily 
in the financial press, and have to be provided by the issuing banks them-
selves for the information of the public» (Hayek 1978[1999]: 159). Certainly 
he assumed that the mass media co-operations also would put themselves to 
various competitions. Therefore, he could believe that such the competitions 
should assure the proper quality of information. 
The competition is originally similar to the constellation of distributed 
anonymous persons as a premise. The economic activity is a system of ac-
tions. It is constituted of actions (buying, selling, paying etc.) and is medi-
ated by a specific symbolic medium of money. The market exists as an envi-
ronment for the economic system. Therefore, it is only a fluctuation of prices 
that this economic system could perceive as market information. In this 
meaning the market is never any economic system. The agents, who buy, 
sell and pay etc., show up temporarily with the events, to which such the 
economic actions are attributed. Such the events would be observed on the 
border between the economic system and its environment. Of course, the 
agents who perform such actions could show up as either human beings or 
the others. The human beings can be various human subjects, who express 
themselves with personal pronouns like I, you, he, she, they etc. The others 
can be only non-human subjects like such as organizations, mechanisms, 
institutions, facilities.
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Observing various mechanical movements in a market, we could find out 
human players and impersonal effects in there. Such players include first-
ly distributed anonymous persons, and secondly their extensive derivatives, 
which should be considered as co-operations, governments, organizations etc.
Already in the end of the last century the information on market has be-
come to be based up on the Internet. Most of economic activities, such as 
shopping, buying, paying, have not been done without any computer net-
work. Such a combination between market and technology is functioning on 
the base of the distributed anonymous persons. Today it would not be sure 
whether such distributed anonymous persons in there always human beings 
were, as well as whether Mr. Nakamoto a human being were. We are not sure 
that making a decision would be done by a human being. Only a continuity 
of discontinuities which is constituted of the difference between access-on and 
access-off exists. It will be also uncertain that such the endless decision ma- 
king is necessarily autopoietic or not. However, I presume that this uncer-
tainty should be finally attributed to the speed of computer’s central process-
ing unit. But such electronic devices also will be attributed to the distributed 
anonymous persons like Mr. Nakamoto. Nobody knows whether human ac-
tivities will be attributed to human beings in the future. Nobody knows how 
the classical articulation of social worlds will be still possible. Therefore, I 
assume that the philosophical basement of critical theory should have been 
already worn out by the coevolution of technology and human being. Now it 
is very difficult for us to find a philosophical basis for human existence.
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On the reiterability of pragmata.  
A Schutzian «alternate» to the sociological concept 
of «practice»
Carlos Belvedere
My aim is to depict Schutz’s concept of pragma as a phenomenological «alternate» to the sociological 
concept of «practice». I will argue that Schutz offers a description of the ego ipse pragmatically constituted. 
This means that he is dealing with a particular kind of phenomenon – not with a mere idea but with an 
actual experience – . Nevertheless, it is a kind of experience which ethnomethodology cannot account for 
since it seeks to describe «the body’s ways» while Schutz observes not just the body’s but the ego’s pragma, 
which only in part can be externally observed since it not only has an objective but also a subjective aspect. 
Accordingly, pragmata are always pragmata of a self at work. They are the product of the ego working on 
its pragma. So the ego agens is the substratum and the origo of all pragmata and, through them, of social 
personalities. Finally, what makes Schutz’s conception of pragma so refreshing is that it takes into account 
what most sociologists emphasize nowadays – that practices are objective, blind, unconscious processes 
– and at the same time what those sociologists let aside – which they call «subject» with a derogative 
nuance – . Moreover, it articulates the subjective and the objective long before that contemporary sociology 
had claimed that it had overcame «dualism». To that purpose, the key concept is «reiterability». Pragmata 
are reiterable not only by the same ego agens that once started them but also by others. That’s why Schutz 
speaks of the «transferability» of pragmata, which makes possible the development of social habitus that 
play an important role in the constitution and stabilization of the system of our social attitudes.
The aim of this paper is to depict Schutz’s concept of pragma as a phenomeno-
logical «alternate» to the sociological concept of «practice». I am drawn to the 
fact that Schutz provided an early alternate to the concept of practice – which 
nowadays has become mainstream (and in fact a real fad) in social theory.
Just as Gad and Jensen: «Practice has become a topic of increasing empiri-
cal and conceptual concern within sociology and neighbouring fields» with 
«a very wide range of connotations» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 1). For instance: 
It can refer to a location, it can locate actors in a context, and it can refer to 
action, or to construction. It is possible to be ‘in practice’, to ‘have a practice’, 
or to be ‘constituted by practice’. Practice can be a cause, an effect, or an ex-
planation. Given the widespread use of  practice terminologies with conflicting 
definitions and analytical tendencies, practice seems to beg for disentangle-
ment (Gad and Jensen 2014: 1).
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Accordingly, «practice» has become an unproblematic category and a slip-
pery term. On the one hand, it is used as «an unproblematic empirical catego-
ry» as if they were «simply that of which the world consists, so as a matter of 
course one can find them wherever one looks» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 2). On 
the other hand, they designate «an analytical approach the scope and mean-
ing of which is rarely explicated. Thus, practice approaches are slippery: they 
can slide easily between empirical and conceptual registers, without at any 
point losing their aura of common sense» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 2). Thus, the 
notion of practice is «an elastic word, which can be stretched or tightened de-
pending on interest and orientation» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 5). Its vocabulary 
is often «applied without much argument» and as an «empirico-conceptual 
‘charm’», which is «more magic than real» (Gad and Jensen 2014: 8).
In the following, I will argue that, unlike the current ubiquitous and sloppy 
use of the term «practice», Schutz describes pragma with rigor and admirable 
precision and avoids the kind of flaws just mention by founding pragmata in the 
ego agens as its subtratum. That’s why my claim will be that he provided avant 
la lettre a phenomenological «alternate» to the sociological concept of practice.
1. Ethnomethodological and phenomenological «alternates»
It was Garfinkel who first spoke of «alternates» as «Lebenswelt pairs» (Gar-
finkel 2002: 73). By «alternates» he meant:
Any ordinary activity addressed in the fashion of  its availability in situ as the in 
vivo work of  living in and about and as and as of  the activity as what anybody 
in the world knows consists of  in its lived course of  things will, if  you use the 
certified methods of  the established literatures, respecify that concreteness to 
exhibit it in terms that then no longer retain what’s so coherent about those 
activities in the first place (Garfinkel 2007: 21).
Accordingly, «the ‘ethnomethodological alternate’ to the constructivist 
literature consists in the study of the methodical accomplishment of the phe-
nomena whose availability and intelligibility is otherwise taken for granted» 
(Hester and Francis 2007: 4). This taken-for-grantedness is the very possibility 
of its subject matters and «the topic of its inquiries» (Hester and Francis 2007: 
5). Alternates are autochthonous, grounded practices «that spring up and ex-
ist alongside formal analytic inquiries whenever and wherever participants 
or members pursue investigations of any kind» which are «asymmetrical to 
formal analytic theorizing» (Maynard 2012: 7) in an «alternate way» (Roth 
2009: 9).
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Based on the above, what Schutz offers as a description of pragma can be 
understood as an alternate. Indeed, this is my claim. Although, an important 
distinction must be made here: that for Garfinkel, the study of alternates must 
not be pursued as a philosophical work. See, for instance, his comments on 
Merleau-Ponty:
he had this marvelous love affair with philosophy. It was philosophy’s subject as 
embodied action that he needed to retain. The result is that he had to depend 
on the anecdotes and the textual accounts of  others to specify what embodied 
reflexivity could possible consist of  […] as he was so beautifully clear-headed 
about, it was not going to deal with simply the intentionalities of  consciousness 
and the circular, endless, going-over-and-over-again reflections on just those 
affairs held before consciousness with texts, even the literatures of  the gestalt 
experiments, and the rest (Garfinkel 2007: 22). 
In this viewpoint, the phenomenological description of intentionality from 
the first person perspective does not suffice. Garfinkel demands that the eth-
nomethodologist rely on accounts accomplished from the second person per-
spective. Consequently, he would not think of what I will show in Schutz’s 
manuscripts of 1936/37 of as being an ethnomethodological alternate.
Now, how can we access what Schutz is trying to reach – namely, the ego 
agens as the ultimate substratum of pragmata – within the limits of ethnometh-
odology as conceived by Garfinkel? Sure he would discard such an issue by 
considering it mere «generic representational theorizing» supported by the 
«analytic privileges of the transcendental analyst and universal observer»1 
(Garfinkel 2002: 127). Nevertheless that’s not what Schutz is doing since the 
ego is not an abstract, general concept but a concrete, personal experience2 
which one should think of as a singulare tantum (Schutz 2010: 41). What he 
offers is not mere general theorizing but a rigorous description of the ego ipse 
pragmatically constituted as the ground for social personalities and the prag-
mata performed through them. 
Consequently, he is not doing speculative metaphysics but a phenomeno-
logical description of different strata of human experience. He is not either 
taking for granted what mainstream sociology does but describing embodied 
1  Also Wes Sharrock, Bob Anderson, and Michael Lynch have opposed Husserl’s subjectivism 
and transcendental idealism from an ethnomethodological perspective. For a reply to them, see 
Barber (2012: 84).
2  This is also true of  transcendental phenomenology, which – counter to what most eth-
nomethodologists might think – «does not involve leaving experience, whether commonsense 
or scientific, but attending more carefully to it» (Barber 2012: 83).
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pragmata. So, in a way, he provides an «alternate» to Formal Analysis but it is 
a different alternate than that which ethnomethodology provides since he is 
observing what it cannot observe by being a mere empirical stance. Conse-
quently, it is also an alternate to ethnomethodology.
When I say that Schutz offers a description of the ego ipse pragmatically 
constituted, I mean that he is dealing with a particular kind of phenomenon 
– not with a mere idea but with an actual experience. Nevertheless, it is a 
kind of experience which Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology cannot account for 
since he states that «to define any phenomenon of human action is to describe 
the body’s ways» (David Sudnow, quoted in Garfinkel 2007: 22). That’s what 
Garfinkel called «the embodied reflexivity turn of affairs», which drove eth-
nomethodology to take «an interest in bodies » (Garfinkel 2007: 22). Even 
though Schutz is interested in «bodies», and while the ego agens he speaks of is 
an incarnated ego, what he observes is not just the body’s but the ego’s pragma 
which only in part can be externally observed since it not only has an objec-
tive but also a subjective aspect (as I will show latter, in Section 3).
Moreover, «the body’s ways» and the «embodied reflexivity» are inten-
tional themselves in many aspects. According to Garfinkel, any concern with 
intentionality leads to fantastic love-affairs with philosophy but not anywhere 
nearby sociology; contrarily, for Schutz, it is a precondition of any accurate 
description of many of sociology’s heart matters – for instance, pragmata con-
sidered as the origo of the social persons. Off course sociology – even philoso-
phy – must approach all practices as embodied but it’s not the body who acts 
by itself but the incarnated ego. Just as Descartes have said: «It is the soul 
which sees, and not the eye» (Descartes 1985 [1637]: 172); meaning that the 
body expresses an element heterogeneous to the manifestation of bodily deter-
minations (Henry 1985: 23). 
Therefore, what phenomenology must account for is not just the body (like 
in biology and the like) but the cogito, which is not an «I think» but an «I can» 
(Henry 2006 [1965]: 75). Our body is the ensemble of our powers upon the 
world (Henry 2006 [1965]: 80) and it is that originary, invisible experience 
– the phenomenological being of the body, its real, absolute and subjective be-
ing (Henry 2006 [1965]: 79) – what must be accessed by the phenomenologist. 
That is precisely what ethnomethodology cannot account for; in other words, 
this is the phenomenological alternate that Schutz’s phenomenology provides.
2. Pragma in egological perspective
Though Schutz approaches some main subjects of social phenomenology 
(such as the ones addressed here) in an egological perspective, he uses the 
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word «egology» only occasionally (Embree 2009a: 181). As a few respected 
scholars have pointed out in recent years, many of his «analyses of the modes 
of givenness of social phenomena proceeded in an egological perspective» 
(Eberle 2012: 288). In those cases, he seems to perform and assume something 
like an egological reduction (Embree 2009a: 204-205, 211) given that he actu-
ally operates within it (Embree 2009a: 206, 209). So, it is plausible to think 
that Schutz assumed that «the ego or I is something that accompanies the 
stream of consciousness in an inwardly transcendent way and that reflection 
discloses as always already and identically there » (Embree 2009b: 240).
I would like to add to this consensus that Schutz’s manuscripts of 1936/37 
on “The Problem of Personality in the Social World” are one of the most out-
standing examples of egology as they are based on a description of the ego ipse 
as an ego agens. For example, Schutz speaks overtly of «a transcendental or 
phenomenologizing ego» in reference to the self (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 211) and 
to «the transcendental Ego» reached through «Husserl’s transcendental reduc-
tion » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 233),  and he situates this analysis within «the ego 
after exercise of the phenomenological reduction » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 252).
Within this framework, Schutz establishes «the general positing of the ego 
agens as origo of pure pragma » (Schutz 1936 2013]: 210). More precisely, he 
states that the origin of the pure pragma lies in «a general positing ‘of my acting 
self ’ [which] corresponds to the general positing of the alter ego (which is a gen-
eral posting of the alter ego cogitans)» (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 209).
However, it is not easy to find a clear cut definition of pragma in these 
manuscripts. One thing to notice is that for some reason we have two differ-
ent versions of the same piece, which indicates that it is a work in progress. It 
also means that Schutz left these considerations unfinished, which compels us 
to complete the task of giving an explicit definition of pragma. Schutz’s manu-
scripts pay more attention to a classification of pragma and its relation to the 
ego agens than to an explicit definition of pragma as such. Although it furnishes 
insights and fragments that suffice for whoever want to work on an explicit 
definition. With that aim, I will briefly depict a number of features of pragma 
in order to systematize a unified concept.
3. Pragma and action
In his manuscripts of 1936/37, «Schutz moved beyond The Phenomenology of the 
Social World (1932) »3 (Barber 2013: 4). He developed «a theory of the complete 
3  See Schutz (1937 [2013]: 276-277).
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pragma»4; which can be systematized as a set of four features. 
The first essential note of pragma is that it relies on a general positing act. 
Secondly, note that this positing is related to duration since pragmata are acts 
of a self. Therefore, pragma is an experiencing in our durée (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 
209). Yet, pragma is not just any act in our durée but one in which the self is 
«founded in duration acts in the external world and accordingly gears into 
world-time » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 209).  So, the third feature of pragma is that 
it must gear into the world. Finally, we should think of pragma as a «sedimented 
experience […] accomplished by me»  (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 226).  Concisely, 
pragma is a sedimented experience accomplished by the ego as a positing act 
of its durée geared into the external world.
This fresh perspective on pragma shows Schutz’s theory of action contained 
in The Phenomenology of the Social World as «insufficient » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 
277). In his own words:
This is because the course of  thought in the Sinnhafte Aufbau, and its specific 
theme of  the ‘meaning which binds the acting to its action,’ does not go far 
enough even though here differentiation of  behavior [Verhalten] from action 
[Handeln] has already introduces difficulties (sic). However, our present theme, 
simply establishing the pragmatic motives in the constitution of  the self  and its 
partial aspects, requires the full development of  the pragma as pragma (Schutz 
1937 [2013]: 277).
Although action is a kind of pragma, not any kind of pragma is rational, pro-
jected action. Schutz himself makes this very clear:
We do not speak of  ‘acting’ [Handeln], because the term is also involved with an 
inner attitude [Einstellung]. Instead we explicitly speak of  ‘working,’ accordingly 
of  the execution of  the pragma in bodily movement itself, of  the engagement 
of  the self  in world-space and in world-time by the changing of  places by the 
body or its parts (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 276-277).
Indeed, bodily movements in space are clear-cut examples of pragma – for 
instance, a «change of place» (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 227) «by virtue of which an 
illic becomes a hic » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 286). Accordingly reflective, theoriz-
ing acts are «pragma-free actions» because «they are not bound to working in 
4  Barber (2013: 4) also observes that Schutz’s interest in pragma «reveal that even before his 
encounter with pragmatism on American soil after 1939, he was already thoroughly aware of  
and interested in the pragmatic dimensions of  everyday experience».
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the external world » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 231). So, there can be pragma which 
are not action as well as pragma-free actions. Moreover, only one out of for 
types of pragma is related to action, as it can be seen by taking a closer look to 
Schutz’s stratification of pragmata.
Schutz’s concept of pragmata is articulated into four strata: a) the pragma 
without the purpose and project; b) the pragma with the purpose but without 
the project; c) the pragma with the project and purpose; and d) the pragma with 
the project but without the purpose. 
In this perspective, only the pragma with the project and purpose is rational 
acting. So, pragma is both more and less than rational action: it is more because 
it covers a wider range than action, and it is less because – with the exception 
of the pragma with the project and purpose – it has fewer requirements – it does 
not need to be consciously aware of the end (purpose) and it does not pursue 
it nor does it need to know about the adequate means to achieve it. What’s 
more, Schutz believes that the first kind of pragma (without the purpose and 
the project) does not even need to be intentional.
Schutz developed these ideas further, explicitly distinguishing « conscious 
pragma » from «unconscious pragma». The conscious pragma is not only inten-
tional but also directed to a purpose, whereas the unconscious pragma «lacks 
purpose as well as project». Based on such distinction, Schutz renames the 
first type of pragma – which he formerly called «mere reaction» or «mere be-
havior» – as « unconscious pragma ». Of course, «unconscious pragma» is what 
he meant by «mere behavior », except we know now that it lacks the specific 
feature of conscious pragma : the intended purpose. Afterward, Schutz speaks 
of habitual behaving as the second type of pragma, i.e., the «empirical behav-
ior».  Although we don’t have here a new name for this, it is enlightening to 
know that this kind of pragma refers to habitualities since they play a role in 
the genesis of the social person. It is even more interesting to note that Schutz 
calls the third kind of pragma «action in the full sense»,  confirming what he 
had said about the pragma with the project and purpose.
Yet, the specification of actio as a kind of pragma poses one question. If the 
subject of social actions is the actor: Which is the subject of pragma? To address 
this question we need to retrieve egology since Schutz’s (1937 [2013], 265) an-
swer is that the subject who performs the pragma is the concrete ego or monad 
as a «subjective experiencing of temporality» – i.e. as a «constituted imma-
nence» – and, in turn, as «a constituting moment for the stratification of the 
self» through a series of modifications of the «pure pragma of the self at work ».
As the pure pragma is constituent of the self at work, the ego agens is always 
the self «working on its pragma». This is what Schutz calls «the ego ipse in its 
totality and fullness» (Schutz 1937 [2013], 270).  As such, it is a present self, 
actually working, and only this «self at work […] is the core of reality of the 
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surrounding world, the actual world within reach » (Schutz 1937 [2013], 284).
So, the ego agens as «the ego ipse in its totality and fullness» is the self now that 
operates and «creates its public time while operating » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 
270). All the other «basic attitudes of the self, comprised under the headings of 
‘interest’ and ‘attention,’ […] are themselves pragmatically conditioned, i.e., 
are modifications of that attention à la vie originating in the pure pragma of the 
self at work » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 265). 
Such kinds of attitudes – which are modifications of the pure pragma – 
«modify the experiences of expectation and of memory that arise from reflec-
tion on the course of duration» and «these ramifications can be traced back 
to the frames of spatio-temporality constituted in the ‘daily life’ […, where] 
no self is simply given but always given in need of a temporal index. It is the 
self now, the self before now, and the self later on,» which Schutz calls the 
«tempora of the self» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 265).
In this perspective, the ego agens (while «ego ipse in its totality and fullness») 
operates as my self now by constituting its actiones as pragmata and simultane-
ously co-constituting public time as «split up into a piece of world-time in 
which the acta have taken place in a sequential order of succession and in flow-
ing duration and which my acta have constituted » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 270). 
Briefly said, public time «is created by my pragma in the process of execution 
» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 270).
All this occurs in the present. Even though «my self before» has operated 
in the past, it does not operate now. That is why I think about its actiones «only 
as its acta »:
As actiones these pragmata are co-constituting of  public time which was the com-
plete Now for the previously operating self, but to me, as reflecting self, appear 
as ‘then’ emergent within the frame of  public time. For detached from the ac-
tiones constituting it, public time is split up into a piece of  world-time in which 
the acta have taken place in a sequential order of  succession and in flowing 
duration and which my acta have constituted (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 270).
Consequently, every actio is made up of two different but related phenom-
ena: on one hand, it is «a series of experiencings in duration»; on the other, it 
is a «working (pragma) in world-time» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 209).
4. Ego ipse and the social persons
Only pragmata accomplished by «my self now» can be said to be actual and 
real. On the contrary, pragmata accomplished by «my self before» are char-
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acterized as potential and, consequently, as a «reality in the mode of prob-
ability» derived from an «earlier core of reality» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 226). 
Accordingly, the «reiterableness of the same pragma» and of «an analogous 
pragma» by my self later on is «contained in the idealization of ‘I always can 
again’» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 226). One could think that this reiterability not 
only makes possible the development of personal habits but also the establish-
ing of social habitus since pragmata are reiterable not only by the ego agens that 
once started them but also by other egos.5 That’s why Schutz depicts them as 
reiterable and analogous.
Schutz not only distinguishes actual form potential pragma but also two 
different levels of potentiality. The first level is the one of «the previously ac-
tual pragma that potentially is reiterable» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 228). It is «the 
world of ‘phenomena of probability’,» which corresponds to «the full reality 
of the surrounding world in the extent of its reach » (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 
228). Although, these «phenomena of probability which previously stood in 
the surrounding world of the core of reality» refer not only to the actual world 
of my self now: they also «refer back to my prior self for which it was the core 
of reality» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 284). 
In so far as the level of  the first potentiality lies within the range of  the actual 
projects of  the self  at work, the phenomena attributed to the self  belong to 
my self  now. But that is also to say that the reiterability of  working under the 
pragmatic ideality of  ‘one can always again’ bears in this case the character 
of  greatest probability. For this level of  first potentiality it is characteristic that 
the protentions directed to the reactualization of  the pragma obtain their inten-
tionalities from reproductions and retentions of  their own receding pragmas 
(Schutz 1937 [2013]: 284-285).
Accordingly, the attention à la vie, which in the purely actual pragma is «lim-
ited to my self now», here is «extended to my self later on, however always 
related back to my previous self» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 228). This sort of ex-
tension makes possible that «protentions procure their intentionalities from 
reproductions and retentions of pragmas that have receded into the past» 
5  Even though Schutz does not mention it, his description of  how the reiterability of  analogous 
pragma works is quiet similar to Husserl’s argument on intersubjectivity as based on the past 
experiences of  my own transcendental ego (see San Martín 2008: 8-9). Schutz argument is that: 
«the sedimented experience is a pragma (e.g., kinaesthesias) accomplished by me, in the memory 
of  which this potentiality (reality in the mode of  probability) proves to be an earlier core of  
reality: Once this hinc, now a ‘phenomenon of  probability,’ was a reality for me, but a reality 
illinc. For by my pragma my earlier hinc has now become an illinc » (Schutz 1936 [2013]: 226).
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(Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 228) and thus it is a sine qua non condition for the reiter-
ability of pragmata.
The second level of potentiality is the one of the «potential pragma », which 
is «always stemming from the level of the ego ipse» and whose boundaries «lie 
only in the compatibility and compossibility of the in-order-to motives, of the 
projects, of specific relations of ends or means with the whole experience, es-
pecially with respect to the experience of one’s own pragma, its practicability 
and «its own powers » (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 228). Schutz describes it as «the 
level of the world in reachability» and as being «quite different in structure» 
in comparison with the first level: it is «a level of the reality of future working» 
(Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285). As such, it «belongs to my later self, at the most to 
my self itself later on and is without an essential relation back to my prior self. 
It is then the case that, like all anticipations, it is founded in the actual stock 
of experience of my self now which, for its part, genetically refers back to my 
prior self» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285).
That the experience of one’s own ego’s pragma is related with the experi-
ence of one’s own powers means that the self is a pragmatic unification since 
human powers are always, in the most radical sense, powers of an ego. Indeed:
The ‘self  per se’ is a pragmatic unification: ego agens et semper idem agens (volens). In 
this context, agens as self contains as well, to be sure, the relevant index to the 
social person (ego qua pater familias, qua civis Romanus, (\\iaphilosophus, etc.). As a 
consequence, all of  these modifications are shown to be precisely modifications 
of  the one ego ipse agens (volens) (appearing in the general positing of  the ego 
agens as origo of  pure pragma) (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 209-210).
Around the ego agens there is a stratification of the social persons based on 
the «split of temporality» between durée and cosmic time originating from «the 
subjective experiencing of temporality as constituting immanence” (Schutz, 
1936 [2013]: 220) which is stratified «into my self now, my self before now, my 
self later on…» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 221). 
Thus, social persons are based on «the subjective experiencing of tempo-
rality as constituting immanence» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 220) which, in turn, 
is «the situation in its original fullness» and «the basic attitude of attention à 
la vie in the solitary self » (Schutz 1936 [2013], 238). My acting self, «the ego 
ipse agens is constituted at the same time as the center of working (the center of 
action) from which all habitualities and automaticities take their departure» 
(Schutz 1937 [2013]: 279). Thereafter, through habituality (as well as through 
will, sociality, education and culture), an interdependence and hierarchy of 
attentions à la vie is formed (Schutz 1936 [2013], 239). In accordance, the new 
levels of personality become «eccentric from the levels of personality that until 
107ON THE REITERABILITY OF PRAGMATA
now were central» and also, in the reverse process, potentialities that have 
become eccentric «can become central again or devolve into ‘partial death’ » 
(Schutz 1936 [2013], 239).
The «orientation of all other personalities around the ego agens» (Schutz, 
1936 [2013]: 224) produce a stratification of the self (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 265) 
arranged in «a continuous transition from the absolutely intimate person to 
the highest anonymous behavior» (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 236). While «only 
actio creates a unity of relations» and is «ascribed to the unitary ego ipse»,  acta 
are to be ascribed «to partial social persons» which are constituted in the 
sedimentation of these acta (Schutz, 1936 [2013]: 221).
5. All of my selves and the reiterability of pragmata
The different tempora of the self that were mentioned in Section 3, open 
the horizons (past, present and future) of all possible pragma. As we already 
know, personalities are created around the ego ipse which is a pragmatic unifi-
cation. As such, the ego ipse is produced in the Now, which provides for it the 
opportunity 
to come into view in its fullness and totality as an operative [wirkendes] self  in 
its action, while my self  before now is already split up into its partial aspects 
and can never be visible in its fullness and totality but always only in its partial 
aspect. For only the action creates the relationship of  unity [Einheitsbezug] of  the 
ego ipse [...] Only the self  now operates so as to be able to achieve this produc-
tion [Leistung] of  the relationship of  unity (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).
Unlike my self now, my self before now does not operate but has already 
operated. That is why it does not create the unification of my ego ipse, although 
its acta are constitutive of my past, partial self. This is Schutz’s exact wording:
My self  before now does not operate, it has operated and its acta do not become al-
lotted to the unitary ego ipse. Rather they are already revealed as acta of  a partial 
self. Indeed, we can say right away that each of  the partial selves which, in 
retrospect, make up my self  before now, are nothing else than my acta constitut-
ing each of  the partial selves such that I allot them specific attitudes of  my self  
(Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).
For Schutz, «to allot» means that the reproduction of my partial selves’ acta 
«results in specific attentional, and, for their part, new pragmatically condi-
tioned modifications, thus sedimented [geschichtet] according to hypsographi-
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cal contour lines of relevance the center of density of which likewise lies in my 
self now » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).
So, my self now is the center of all my partial social persons, constituted 
through the sedimentation of my pragmata. Some of these «partial persons of 
my self are referred to as belonging to my self now », while others, whose as-
pects «belong just to Now, bear the marks of the self later on-all of this to be 
sure only when in its totality the ego ipse does not presentively realize them in 
an actual pragma » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 273-274).
Besides, actual pragmata performed by my self now are phenomenologicaly 
real, while past and future pragmata remain or await in the horizons for my ac-
tual working self. This means that each tempora of the self has its own peculiar 
features. While it is essential to my self now and my self later on to constitute 
public time – along with its postestativeness, its possibility, and «its possibil-
ity of freely calculation probability and freely choosing among probabilities» 
(Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271) – , it is proper of my self before now to be complete, 
i.e., unchangeable and irrecoverable because it «is no longer postestative and 
no long allows for a choice» since «I no longer have the choice of what I will 
have done » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).
As far as I find my pragmata in the Before – which «is free of protentions 
and anticipations»  – , «they are reproducible or retainable as experiences 
of duration» and «carry their horizons open with them because they belong 
to my actual duration» though, «in so far as my self before now belongs to 
world-time, there no longer are no protentions and anticipations in a genu-
ine and original sense because my previous protentions and anticipations 
have either been fulfilled or unfulfilled» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271). This 
is why «the acts which have entered into my world-time are as they are, 
unique, unchangeable and can no longer be freely varied» (Schutz 1937 
[2013]: 271).
On the contrary, my present pragmata – performed by my self now as «the 
completed synthesis in public time of the present pragma» – have their «open 
and undetermined, freely variable protentions and anticipations» which are 
«protentions and anticipations-now that carry with them a maximal prob-
ability of fulfillment » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271).
The later on, in its turn, «simply remains undecided and open» while in 
the «genuine past» there are «only completion and certainty » (Schutz 1937 
[2013]: 271). Indeed, when it comes to the self later on, «the ideas of the future 
self accompanying protentions and anticipations are unfulfilled and remain 
essentially unfulfillable from the standpoint of Now» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 
274), as it is «universally the case of all expectations and also all phantasies 
whose transport into reality, whose realization, as we say, is not excluded be-
forehand » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 274).
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Schutz even draws up what could be thought of as a rule of proportional-
ity: the further in the future, the more vague and unrealizable the protentions 
and anticipations of the self are. He puts it in these words:
the protentions and anticipations directed to the future self  are the more vague 
the greater the distance at which the levels of  the self-phenomenon are ap-
prehended, until they are finally dissolved completely and, in fact, become also 
unrealizable [unvollziehbar], as soon as they are directed later on to the ego ipse 
in its totality. In fact, the future total self  can barely be imagined as an empty 
form (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 274).
Yet, another rule of proportionality is proposed by Schutz: the vaguer and 
more distant  the partial self is from the social person’s representation of the 
self later on, the closer they lie to the intimate person. In Schutz’s words:
even these partial selves later on are the more vaguely represented, are en-
dowed with more and more empty places, the closer they lie next to the central, 
intimate person. Conversely, in the standardized and normative attitudes that 
constitute the relative periphery of  the partial selves there are proportionately 
fewer empty places shown at least where the process of  self-typification of  the 
self  has advanced the furthest (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 274).
As mentioned before, the sedimentation of my acta constitutes my different 
partial selves allotted with specific attitudes (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 271). These 
attitudes are partial personalities orientated around the ego agens and consti-
tuted by «habitualities and their automatisms» (Schutz 1936 [2013], 224) by 
virtue of the transferability of one’s own pragmata (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285). 
Also, they do not exist disconnectedly but compose a system «defined by our 
attitudes toward the different phenomena of the social world » (Schutz 1937 
[2013]: 247). It is «a system of interconnections of motivations» simply accepted 
«as habitual, traditional or affective givennesses » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 247).
This system of attitudes is given in diverse ways, starting from standard-
ized normative attitudes in the cultural world of daily life, moving on to «the 
ultimate goals of our bearing on the great systems of the state, of the law, of 
the economy – in short, all of those phenomena of social being that form the 
specific object of the social sciences» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 248).
Accordingly, habitualities play an important role in the constitution and 
stabilization of the system of our social attitudes. The more habitualized and 
rationalized the different levels of the social person are, the more visible they 
become (Schutz 1936 [2013], 238) – here there is, by the way, another rule of 
proportionality – . In turn, this process of stabilization is based on common 
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knowledge since it retrieves apprehensions of the world which, as such, always 
refer back:
to the stock of  experience which the self  previously constructed out of  multiple 
polythetic and monothetic concatenations of  meaning already contained in 
previous experiences. And also belonging to this stock of  experience in princi-
ple are the memories of  modifications which the cores of  reality of  the previ-
ous surrounding world have undergone by acts of  genuine working (Schutz 1937 
[2013]: 282; Schutz’s emphasis).
In addition, «what can be anticipated as the reality of future working must 
[…] be compossible with this actual stock of experience» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 
285) which involves «experiencings of my own pragma, of its ‘transferability’ 
(actualizableness) and thus the ‘estimation of its own power’ » (Schutz 1937 
[2013]: 285).
Based on these estimations, I can work in the world within reach, which 
is related to my self later on and accordingly «remains subject to the double 
concurrence of probability which is universally characteristic for my self later 
on» (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285). Once again, Schutz sketches out what seems to 
be a rule of proportionality: «The farther the world within reach is spatially 
and temporally at a distance from the actual center of the surrounding world, 
the less probability [Wahrscheinlichkeit] there is. For the more the protentions 
remain open the more they remain unfulfilled » (Schutz 1937 [2013]: 285).
Summarizing what has been shown in this Section we may say that Schutz 
thinks of social personalities as being constituted in a process going from the 
intimate person pragmatically constituted by the ego agens, to the partial so-
cial personalities articulated by the system of our attitudes toward the social 
world. This process is, in turn, ruled by the four laws of proportionality already 
mentioned, which we can now formulate as follows:
1. Rule of the realizability of the future protentions and anticipations of the self.  The 
realizability and accuracy of the protentions and anticipations of the self are 
inversely proportional to their distance in time towards the future.
2. Rule of the intimacy of the representations of the self latter on. The distance from 
the representation of the self latter to the partial self of the social person is 
inversely proportional to the distance of these representations to the central, 
intimate person.
3. Rule of the visibility of social persons. The visibility of the different levels 
of the social persons is directly proportional to their habitualization and 
rationalization.
4. Rule of the fulfillment of the protentions of the surrounding world in the world within 
reach. The distance in time and space of the world within reach from the actu-
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al center of the surrounding world is inversely proportional to the probability 
of fulfillment of its protentions of the world within reach.
These laws can be ranked according to two interrelated criteria. On one 
hand, they follow an increasing order of constitution of higher ontological 
strata: the self now, the self latter on, social persons and the world within 
reach. On the other hand, they indicate a progressive expansion of our range 
of action: pretentions and anticipations, representations, visibility and poten-
tial reach. Finally, both articulated series show that the constitution of our 
being in the social world and our range of action in it is a gradual irreversible 
acquisition, giving the ego agens priority over the other elements of the set.
6. Egology as a way for Social Phenomenology (Final remarks)
So far, we have seen that Schutz conceives of pragmata as the pragmata of the 
ego agens, not as mere practices of social agents (like major contemporary social 
thinkers do6). Pragmata are always the pragmata of a self at work. It is not that social 
agents (for Schutz, social personalities) do not exist. They are the product of the 
ego working on its pragma. Moreover, social personalities are not persons consti-
tuted in full but partial personalities which rely on the ego agens. Consequently, 
they do not act on their own. It is the ego agens which acts through them. There-
fore, Schutz’s way of articulating the social personalities with the pragmata and 
the habitualities is quite different from the way in which contemporary sociology 
articulates social agents, practices and the habitus (cf. footnote 5) since it is not 
circular. According to Schutz, pragmata belong to the ego agens who constitutes 
the social personalities7 which in turn only «act» in a secondary, metaphorical 
way and by no means can act back on practices. This indicates that practices 
(for Schutz, pragmata) have a substratum, namely the ego agens, which is the origo of 
pragmata and, through them, of all my dead selves and social personalities.
This is precisely what neither sociology nor ethonomethodology can see, 
for different reasons. Sociology, because it is reluctant to accept any kind of 
foundation, somehow following Durkheim’s dictum of explaining the social 
through the social; ethnomethodology because – as shown in Section 1 – it 
6  Take for instance Pierre Bourdieu. As I argue elsewhere (Belvedere, 2012: 75; Belvedere 
213: 1096ff), he considers that agents are constituted by practices and in turn constitute those 
practices, in a circularity which leaves ungrounded the whole set of  actors, practices and habitus.
7  This does not mean that the ego constitutes the social personalities freely and in absolute 
loneliness. As Schutz shows elsewhere (1955 [1964]: 253), they are the result of  our participation 
in social circles constituted by «parts» of  the personalities of  the individuals integrating them, 
whose «total personalities» remain outside the «common area» of  social circles.
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rejects these kind of issues taking them as general, abstract and merely philo-
sophical. Both perspectives, in turn, object to an alleged subjectivism implied 
in any sort of first person perspective (which is needed to access the ego agens 
as an immanent flux of experiences). Thus they both look at Schutz’s stance as 
an unacceptable subjectivism. 
But things are quite different since Schutz is not just a subjectivist. Of 
course he made an eloquent praise of the subjective point of view but, as seen 
in Sections 2 & 3, pragmata are a twofold reality: they have a subjective, im-
manent dimension but also an objective, transcendent one. The former has an 
identity and systemic properties, the latter is schizophrenic-like and multiple; 
one of them acts, the other is just a mask for acting. So, the point is not to 
deduce the actual, in vivo, autochthonous practices from generalizing proce-
dures and formal analytic assumptions but to account for each dimension of 
the pragma for its own sake – including, of course, the one and only dimension 
which is accessed inwardly – . Accordingly, egology is not everything but it is 
needed; otherwise we would have a one-sided view of pragma, conceiving it as 
only external and self-organized. 
Precisely what makes Schutz’s conception of pragma so refreshing is that 
it takes into account what for many sociologists is nowadays like a mantra – 
that practices are objective, blind, unconscious processes self-organized that 
tend to reproduce themselves in a recurrent, naturalized, mechanistic way 
(see Giddens 1984: chapter 1, Giddens 1979: 66, ) – and at the same time it 
takes into consideration what those sociologists let aside – which they call 
«subject» with a derogative nuance (cf. Truc 2011: 158, and Swanson 2005: 
5). Moreover, it articulates with admirable rigor and precision the subjective8 
with the objective, the active and productive with the passive and reproduc-
tive – shortly, it offers an alternate to dualistic perspectives long before that 
contemporary sociology claimed that it had overcame «dualism» (Giddens 
1979: 4-5, Bourdieu 1979, 1980)9.
The key concept here – the one that allows to account for the subjective 
and the obejctive, the inner and the outer – is «reiterability». As seen in 
Section 4, pragmata are reiterable not only by the same ego agens that once 
8  Sure Bourdieu and, particularly, Giddens are aware of  the importance of  subjectivity; the 
problem here is not «subjetivity», «reflexivity» or anything like that but the subject which for 
Schutz is the very «subtratum» of  pragmata  – i.e. the ego agens – . Instead, contemporary soci-
ologists refuse to go further than just «practices», and take them as the ultimate field of  their 
interests, missing its very substratum or hypokeimenon  – which according to Schutz (1937: 252) 
is the ego ipse – .
9  Elsewhere (Belvedere 2011) I discuss further the misreading of  Schutz by contemporary so-
ciologists.
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started them but also by other egos. That’s why Schutz speaks of the «trans-
ferability» of pragma, which makes possible the development of social habi-
tus. Indeed (as shown in Section 5), habitualities play an important role in 
the constitution and stabilization of the system of our social attitudes. The 
more habitualized the different levels of the social persons are, the more 
we share experiencings of our own pragma and of its «transferability». This 
is what allows us to have a habitus –which, by the way, is a set of general-
ized schemes of comportment that can be transferred from one ego agens to 
another10. It is the reiterability of analogous pragma, facilitated by the stabi-
lization of shared social attitudes, what constitutes the social personalities, 
which are an interplay of subjective and objective aspects, real and irreal, 
actual and potential. 
That’s why Schutz thinks of the ego agens as being split up and teared apart: 
because it has to mediate between durée and social time, inner and outer expe-
riences, the individual and the social; briefly, the subjective and the objective. 
In accordance, Schutz’s theory of pragma does not need to criticize and over-
came dualism because it does not produce it in the first place since from the 
outset it takes into account both aspects of social practices, the subjective and 
the objective. And that’s why it can provide for an alternate: because better 
than to have a solution is not to have a problem. 
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Relevance as Social Matrix of Attention  
in Alfred Schutz
Enrico Campo
Attention is a critical faculty in contemporary Western societies. What is surprising is the fact that at-
tention has been mainly analyzed as an individual phenomenon. Scientific research that treats attention 
exclusively on the individual level simplifies an enormously complex situation. Instead, according to the 
idea  defended  in this essay, one cannot think of attention and perception without regard for cultural con-
ventions and social norms. This article  therefore proposes  to investigate attention precisely in its social 
dimension. In particular, the specific objective is to highlight the contribution Alfred Schutz’s theory of 
systems of relevance can give to the understanding of the social mechanisms that regulate attention. In 
order to demonstrate the viability of the Schutzian proposal, here are  discussed  some recent perspectives 
that explore the mechanisms of the social regulation of attention. The article will briefly revisit these 
contributions that explicitly investigate intersubjective and collective attention, and will focus especially 
on the proposals of Eviatar Zerubavel and Yves Citton. Then is analyzed the role of attention in the 
theoretical edifice of Schutz, to focus on the relationship between attention and systems of relevance. 
1. Introduction
To affirm that attention is a critical faculty in contemporary Western socie-
ties is by now a truism, almost a banality: in a world where the fundamental 
economic mechanisms essentially operate in real time on a global level; where 
virtually any event can be digitally reproduced and distributed in the network 
and thus become a possible object of experience on the part of anyone who 
can connect to the internet; where we have access to a quantity of information 
and experience that definitely exceeds our individual ability to manage them; 
where an incredible quantity of goods is offered daily to our attention; where 
diagnoses are formulated that certify an attention disorder; where a notice of 
our mobile devices (an email, a message, a call) can always reclaim our atten-
tion; in a world configured thusly, we can say that our ability to pay attention 
to certain stimuli (objects, human beings, events, actions) rather than others 
that are potentially accessible is in fact fundamental.
Yet, beyond this specific historical juncture, we should note how attention 
is still pervasive in our individual and collective life. To realize this ourselves 
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just think about the fact that every act of our mental life and all our actions are 
somehow attentionally modulated. Attention is pervasive, a sort of “basso con-
tinuo” of human activity (Depraz 2004: 12). It is not a coincidence then that 
attention has been an object of study central to Western thought. To outline the 
overall history of attention as a topic for analysis in Western civilization would 
imply reconstruction of the traces of a millennial path. What is amazing, how-
ever, is the fact that attention has been mainly analyzed as an individual phe-
nomenon (Desideri 2011: 49). Traditionally interest has mainly been directed 
at the means by which a subject (often male, Western and adult) directs atten-
tion to this or that object, to the number of simultaneous objects or operations 
to which he can simultaneously pay attention and so on. The idea that atten-
tion is separate from culture is based on a fictitious conflict between nature and 
culture, and thus a kind of bifurcation between the natural world (pre-cultural, 
of which have access through perception) and the cultural world, which instead 
is bound by our cultural conventions. Instead according to the definition that 
we want to defend in this essay one cannot think of attention and perception 
without regard for cultural conventions and social norms (Parsons 1988).
In this article, however, I propose to investigate attention precisely in its so-
cial dimension. I am convinced that attention should be understood primarily 
as a cultural and social phenomenon in order to try to grasp, at least in part, 
its complexity. Although Alfred Schutz analyzes the problem of attention and 
of relevance from an isolated subject, the social is still inherently present. In 
particular, the specific objective of this paper is to highlight the contribution 
the theory of systems of relevance of Alfred Schutz can give to the under-
standing of the social mechanisms that regulate attention. In the first section 
we will try to return briefly to the different definitions that one can follow in 
order to study intersubjective and social attention. In order to demonstrate the 
viability of the Schutzian proposal, we will discuss some recent perspectives 
that explore the mechanisms of the social regulation of attention. In particu-
lar, we will devote more space to the contributions of Eviatar Zerubavel and 
Yves Citton that, from very different perspectives, analyzed attention as a 
collective phenomenon. In the next section, we will recall Schutz’s theory of 
systems of relevance. Finally, we will attempt to identify within this theory 
some theoretical elements useful for clarifying the nature of social attention.
2. Attention as a social phenomenon
We have just said that, unlike most studies on the subject, we want to inves-
tigate attention as an eminently social phenomenon. Scientific research that 
treats attention exclusively on the individual level simplifies an enormously 
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complex situation. As a first step to better define our field of inquiry we ana-
lytically distinguish three different levels. At the first level attention detects in 
so far as aggregate attention of several subjects on a single object, or as col-
lective attention turned towards an object. The second level is that in which 
the purely intersubjective dimension emerges: my attention is driven by an-
other actually present subject with whom I share the same attentional scene. 
Finally, we can analyze attention, even at the individual level, as disposition 
anchored in a social context that then poses norms, constraints and the poten-
tiality to individual attention. The three levels are, of course, interrelated and 
interdependent; the boundaries are also not as clear as we have presented. In 
any case, we, through Schutz, will be interested primarily in the third. Yet, 
precisely because of this interdependence, we cannot help but revisit the oth-
ers, albeit very briefly.
2.1 The collective attention
The first level, that of collective attention, is probably the most investigated 
in sociology. Here, the interest is pinned on those events that have the abil-
ity to channel the attention of a large amount of subjects. In societies such as 
ours, whose dominant sectors potentially work in real time, one could give 
many examples. We can think of the constant and cyclical repetition of me-
dia events followed worldwide: the Olympics, the World Cup, Oscar night. 
Or even unique events that mark the memory and collective representations 
of entire generations: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the attack on the twin tow-
ers, and so on. Or finally, the fact that the very functioning of the means of 
mass communication is based on measuring the amount of collective atten-
tion (share) that the public grants to media products. That of the mass me-
dia, however, is merely one example, certainly macroscopic, of how certain 
events are able to capture the attention of various subjects and thus mark also 
their representations and collective memory. At this level, the fundamental 
question concerns the study of the mechanisms of construction of collective 
relevance and the identification of social groups that are able to control their 
operation. No wonder then that today the interest of research on collective at-
tention focuses mainly on the media and their ability to determine the politics 
of attention ( Jones and Baumgartner 2005).
2.2 Joint attention
At the level that we called intersubjective, attention is studied with respect to 
an interaction between individuals actually present. In psychology the ex-
pression joint attention is used to indicate an interactive situation in which 
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the adult and the child coordinate their attention on a third object. The 
child’s ability to follow the direction and focus of attention of the adult de-
velops around the age of nine months. In other words the child begins to 
follow the gaze of the adult and focus their attention on a common ele-
ment. At this stage, the interactions between the child and the adult pass 
more and more from a dyadic to a triadic structure, in which the child must 
learn to coordinate its attention and action with the attention and action of 
its partner in the interaction (Moore and Dunham 1995). Around the first 
year of age, children begin to use deictic gestures, the prototype of which is 
pointing. Despite its apparent simplicity, the deictic gesture has great com-
municative power (Tomasello 2008). Joint attention is therefore based on 
the child’s ability to coordinate its attention and action on the object and on 
the adults. In turn the other coordinates its attention and action on the child 
and the object. Already at this level therefore, a first form of cooperative 
communication of a prelinguistic nature is achieved. The child, in a situ-
ation of shared attention, can understand and act in the world along with 
and through others. We can then start to give more validity to the claim that 
attention can be read as a social phenomenon: already at this level in fact, 
“How I perceive the world, and what salience I find there, – writes Shaun Gallagher 
– are to some extent put in place by the gaze and the action of the others. My action with 
respect to the world, and with respect to the others, emerges in the context set by those 
other” (Gallagher 2010: 116 emphasis added). Consequently, the attention of 
others structures both the perception of the world and the salience of objects 
present in it. It is therefore through the attention of others that I can identify 
which elements are most important in my perceptual field. It is precisely for 
this reason, that attention must be investigated even in its contextual dimen-
sion. The interaction that occurs between child and adult is placed in a very 
complex network of social relations. If we expand the breadth of the context 
of interest, we move to the last level we identified previously. Let’s move on 
then to analyze the social matrix of attention.
2.3 The social matrix of attention
The contributions that we propose to place in this category investigate the 
social conditions of exercising attention. The premise behind this approach 
is that attention is exercised on the basis of social norms shared socially in a 
socially structured context. The aim of this essay is, we said, to highlight the 
contribution that Schutz’s theory of systems of relevance can give to the un-
derstanding of attention as a social phenomenon. We’ve already anticipated 
that, before turning to a discussion of this theory, we will revisit two recent 
theoretical proposals that precisely analyze attention from its social structure. 
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The first is that of Eviatar Zerubavel who continues under the banner of cog-
nitive sociology1; the second perspective that we propose to revisit is instead 
that of the Ecologie de l’attention as expressed in a recent book by Yves Citton 
(Citton 2014).
2.3.1 Cognitive Sociology
The proposal of Zerubavel is to analyze attention within a sociology of think-
ing that elects as its object of privileged investigation that which pertains to 
sociomental. According to this perspective, our cognitive faculties depend not 
only on their biological configuration. Nor would it be correct to analyze 
them solely on the basis of the specific individual. The scope of research is 
thus distinct from that of cognitive individualism, based on the idea of  the 
isolated individual whose thoughts could not be other than the product of 
his/her own personal experiences. But it is also distinguished from cognitive 
universalism, the dominant perspective in modern cognitive science. These 
in fact assume a “universal, human mind” and are dedicated to researching 
“the universal foundations of human cognition” (Zerubavel 1997: 3). Instead, 
according to cognitive sociology, it is possible to analyze our cognitive facul-
ties through a different formulation. Zerubavel distinguishes three different 
levels of analysis in light of the fact that “we think both (a) as individuals, (b) 
as social beings, and (c) as human beings” (Zerubavel 1997: 5). Obviously, 
cognitive sociology focuses on the second of these levels, the sociomental to be 
precise, to demonstrate “the social fondation of cognition in general” (Zerubavel 
1997: 116 emphasis added). That is, we live in Social Mindscapes, to borrow 
the title of the book-manifesto of this approach, that have a historical and 
conventional nature. 
The idea that there might exist an isolated individual is rejected in favor 
of the thesis that our cognitive faculties are hinged in a network of social rela-
tions that substantiate and make them possible. With respect to attention, this 
means that the image of the subject who directs his attention guided solely by 
his own will is incomplete and misleading: our attention is guided by rules 
that govern it. The study of attention within this perspective thus aims to em-
phasize the great cultural variability of the ways in which we manage our at-
tention. That is attention is drawn by certain objects, rather than others, also 
because we have been socialized to certain norms of attending. As Zerubavel 
wrote in a brief essay in 1993, “it is unmistakably social ‘rules of irrelevance’ 
1  However the term is to be understood in a different sense from that which is attributed to 
Cicourel in Cognitive sociology (Cicourel 1974).
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that make us perceive certain parts of social situations as mere background 
that can be practically ignored. Separating the relevant from the irrelevant is 
not a spontaneous individual act but, rather, a normative social act” (Zerubavel 
1993: 401). The selection of the perceptual field, in which we operate through 
attention, is therefore driven not only by universal laws of human perception, 
but also by purely social norms (Zerubavel 1993: 398). Attention as “social 
gate of conscioussness”(Zerubavel 1997: 35–52), determines what goes into the 
consciousness: a significant part of that which we perceive is guided by social 
norms of relevance and irrelevance.2 There are therefore social norms of fo-
cusing that guide the determination of that which is not worthy of attention, 
but also that which should be explicitly ignored. That is we can identify the 
rules that guide our attention, but also social norms that invite us to deliber-
ately ignore things that we actually notice (Zerubavel 2006).
The recent Hidden in Plain Sight (Zerubavel 2015) is dedicated to increasing the 
issues raised in previous studies with regard to attention. In this text, attention is 
investigated departing from a metaphor that Zerubavel had already introduced 
in previous studies: “Attending something in a focused manner – he writes in Social 
Mindscape – entails mentally disengaging it (as a ‘figure’) from its surrounding 
‘ground’, which we essentially ignore” (Zerubavel 1997: 35). Zerubavel therefore 
revisits the theory of the perception of Gestalt for the study of attention precisely 
because that which is recognized as a “figure” corresponds to the part of the 
world to which we pay attention, while “the background” is the unattended part 
of our world. The application of the figures-and-background model of percep-
tion is by Zerubavel extended far beyond the visual perception: “to non-visual 
(auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile) forms of perception as well as to altogether 
non-sensory modes of cognition” (Zerubavel 2015: 7). Unlike the Gestalt theo-
rists however, Zerubavel emphasizes the conventional nature of that which we 
identify as figure or as background: nothing is intrinsically figure (and therefore 
relevant) or background (and therefore irrelevant). We distinguish that which is 
figure or background as our attention is socially “deliniated” (Zerubavel 2015: 
8). That is we learn where to direct our attention through attentional socializa-
tion. Attentional socialization that is also revealed in the learning of a language 
(Zerubavel 2015: 63-65). The words somehow prestructure our perception as 
they provide a grid of relevance to our field of perception.
It is possible to study the conventional nature of attention through a sur-
vey of our socio-attentional patterns, or models of management of attention 
that are shared by some groups of subjects but not others. Attentional pat-
2  Zerubavel here makes explicit reference not only to Bateson and Goffman (with whom he 
studied at the University of  Pennsylvania) but also to Schutz.
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terns vary both in time and between cultures or within the same culture. 
Western culture, for example, stimulates a perception of objects of the “field 
independence” type, that is which tend to focus on objects in their individual-
ity as separate from the context in which they are inserted: “this remarkably 
distinctive feature of Western civilization is in fact a product of its emphasis 
on independence. Indeed, cultures that promote social interdependence tend 
to adopt a somewhat less-focused attentional style than those promoting so-
cial independence” (Zerubavel 2015: 54-55). According to this hypothesis, 
therefore, Westerners would be more likely to let emerge individual specificity 
as a figure and to relegate the background the relationships that connect the 
object to its environment. Conversely, for Easterners these relationships rep-
resent the figure of their perceptual field.
2.3.2 Ecology of Attention
The other approach we briefly revisit here is of Yves Citton. Despite the theo-
retical reference points of Yves Citton and Eviatar Zerubavel being very dif-
ferent, they both share a distance from the paradigm that confines attention 
exclusively to the scope of the individual. According to Yves Citton, the first 
operation to be accomplished to bring the analysis of attention out from an 
individualist paradigm is to place it on a historical level. Looking at attention 
from a historical point of view offers at least two important advantages. On 
the one hand, it shows the different ways of standardization of attention in 
different historical periods, and on the other it makes it possible to identify 
periods in which the management of attention becomes a real social problem 
(Crary 2001). The second theoretical operation consists of inverting the indi-
vidualist paradigm of attention, the order in which attention is traditionally 
thought about, in common sense as well as in the traditional sciences. If in 
fact we follow an individualist perspective, the starting point is the individual 
attention. Collective attention is nothing more than a mere aggregate of in-
dividual phenomenon, the sum of individual acts. Yves Citton sets us out to 
follow the opposite path, or to read attention as “an essentially collective phenom-
enon: I’ am careful about that to which we collectively pay attention” (Citton 
2014: 39 emphasis added). Therefore, according to the ecology of attention to 
also understand individual attention we must always take into consideration 
the ecological context in which individuals are placed. Attention, as a subjec-
tive act, is to be framed within collective “attentional regimes” that guide, 
bind and manage the ways in which individuals pay attention.3 According 
3  For this concept Citton refers to the work of  Dominique Boullier (Boullier 2009).
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to this ecological approach, attention is a fundamental mechanism for the 
adaptation of the organism to the environment. In this key, the relatedness of 
attention is to be emphasized above all: it is primarily an interaction (Citton 
2014: 45). According to Citton, collective attention must be considered a pri-
ority over that of the individual: “The attention I pay to what surrounds me 
and that which I encounter is sentenced, at least initially, to follow the routes 
pioneered by the images and discourses that circulate around us and in us. [...] 
Through me, it’s always us / nous who pay attention” (Citton 2014: 55). An affirma-
tion that perhaps is more evident today, if we think about the fact that we live 
in an environment of intense media coverage: according to Yves Citton, it is 
difficult for us to escape the representations conveyed by the media and thus 
to the structuring of relevance they build.
Attention should therefore be understood in relation to its operation in the 
social environment. Thus one of the first characteristics that emerges is the fact 
that my attention is magnetically attracted by the objects to which others direct 
their attention. Precisely because of the importance of attention with respect to 
our survival, it should not be surprising that we, as social beings, tend to notice 
that to which others pay attention. A principle which probably has its ontoge-
netic origin in the development of joint attention, which we briefly discussed 
above, and that today arrives at its maximum evidence thanks to the means 
of mass communication.4 Somehow for us it is important to pay attention to 
that which others pay attention. Yves Citton proposes the formulation of the 
principle of selective collectivization: attention has a dual function; on the one 
hand it ensures a functional adaptation to the environment through a pre-selection of what 
interests us, and on the other it simultaneously makes sure that there is a kind of 
automatic collective composition of individual desires (Citton 2014: 59). Obvi-
ously, here Yves Citton doesn’t aboslutely allude to some sort of harmonization 
of interests, but rather to the fact that through a spontaneous alignment of our 
individual attention to that of others, we share the same systems of relevance, 
to use a Schutzian term that we will discuss better in the next section.
For Zerubavel and also for Citton, perception is anchored in selection 
mechanisms that have their origin at the collective level. Our attention is 
therefore guided by networks of salience that are the precipitate of knowledge 
accumulated by previous generations. These clichés, operate as sensory filters 
that allow us to quickly select the relevant elements from our environment. 
“These clichés – writes Yves Citton – provide the basic tools that our ‘auto-
4  We note, only in passing, that the approach of  Yves Citton hollows out the apocalyptic criti-
cism of  the media as weapons of  mass distraction, while collecting the critical scope. The 
incredible “gregariousness” produced by the media is based on the same mechanisms that are 
constitutive of  our subjectivity.
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matic’ attention needs to quickly identify the objects around us as sources of 
pleasure or danger” (Citton 2014: 63). However, these clichés are not static 
selection tools that we inherit and simply use as they have been transmitted. 
Rather, we put them to the test regularly and then help to reproduce and 
modify them. If, for the principle of transindividual attention, I can pay atten-
tion to something only to the extent that we pay attention, it is because “this 
mutual fund of clichés in perpetual re-elaboration conditions my ability to 
identify phenomena that I meet in my environment” (Citton 2014: 65).
Let us now turn to the analysis of systems of relevance in Schutz. During 
our exposition, we will see how different points of contact exist between the 
approaches just mentioned and Schutz’s analysis of attention.
3. Attention and relevance
3.1 The function and role of attention in Alfred Schutz
Despite the fact that Schutz does not devote a systematic study to attention, it 
is still a central and recurring theme in his work. It is possible to try to identify 
three broad thematic areas in which attention emerges as an essential compo-
nent of the argument addressed.5 A first problem area, in which Schutz makes 
reference to attention, concerns the analysis of the tension of consciousness, 
of attention à la vie and the study of the constitution of meaning. The theme of 
attention then returns in the analysis of the transition from finite provinces 
of meaning and of the structure of consciousness. Finally, and this is the area 
that interests us most, attention is analyzed in the light of the system of rel-
evance. Before we turn to the central theme of this essay, namely the relation-
ship between attention and relevance, it would be good to touch briefly on the 
first two areas mentioned above.
As noted, in the first phase of his theoretical production, Schutz attempts 
to provide a more solid philosophical foundation for the comprehensive soci-
ology of Max Weber. According to Schutz in fact, some theoretical concepts 
fundamental to the Weberian framework remain unexplained and need to be 
further examined. The same notions of comprehension (Verstehen) and mean-
ing subjectively understood remain insufficiently investigated and Schutz ap-
proaches the phenomenology precisely to overcome these limitations of We-
5  This first schematic does not intend or claim to be exhaustive: precisely because of  what we 
already called pervasiveness of  the concept of  attention it is probably possible to identify areas 
other than those proposed by myself.
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ber’s thought. The only book published while Schutz was alive, Der sinnhafte 
Aufbau der Sozialen Welt, was driven precisely with this intent (Schutz 1967). 
At first however, Schutz believed he could tap into the thinking of Henry 
Bergson to provide an adequate theoretical foundation to comprehensive so-
ciology.6 So despite the fact that the framework of the 1932 volume was clearly 
phenomenological, the influence of Bergson is still visible, even if the concepts 
derived from the French philosopher are implanted in an entirely different 
structure. Then with time, the weight of Bergson in the overall economy of 
the Schutzian theoretical system became significantly reduced (Protti 1995: 
47-73). From Bergson Schutz revisits the dual structure of the levels of con-
sciousness: that of durée and that of spatialized and uniform time. In the durée 
experiences connect to each other in a continuous flow, from a now to another 
now, in a purely qualitative flow. The stream of consciousness in durée is nec-
essarily irreflexive: the conceptual reflection instead pertains to spatialized 
time and the work of “cuts” in this continuous flow of itself: “In everyday life 
the Ego, as it acts and thinks, lives on the level of consciousness of the space-
time world. Its “attention to life” (attention à la vie) prevents it from becoming 
submerged in the intuition of pure duration” (Schutz 1967: 47). Attention to 
life then, indicates the degree of interest in encountering reality, to face it, 
and therefore it is the principle that governs our power of consciousness. The 
highest level of attention to life corresponds to the plan of action in which 
the interest in encountering reality is maximum (Schutz 1945). Since the first 
early works, Schutz is interested in the concept of attention to life in order to 
emphasize the selective function: the subject acts in a world that preys upon 
him, that somehow imposes itself on him, and attention to life permits one to 
select and isolate certain objects of a perceptual field that otherwise would be 
potentially unlimited (Wagner 1977: 193-194).
Consequently, it is necessary that attention to life is relaxed so one can 
reflexively grasp the flow of consciousness. That it is possible to become aware 
of an experience only by turning our gaze in the direction opposite the flow. 
At this point, Schutz basically follows the analysis of Husserl on the turning 
of attention (Zuwendung). 7 It is that act of attention to an experience already 
6  Three manuscripts testify of  this early attempt: Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur, Sinnstructuren der 
Sprache and Sinnstructuren der Novelle: Goethe. For an analysis see Wagner H.R. (1977), The Bergso-
nian Period of  Alfred Schutz, in «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», Vol. XXXVIII, 
n. 2, and Id., Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography, Chicago and London, The University of  
Chicago Press, Id. (1983)..
7  As for the extremely complex problem of  attention in Husserl we will refer to the rigorous 
and original works of  Natalie Depraz (Depraz 2004; Depraz 2014) and the interesting consid-
erations that Fabrizio Desideri has dedicated to the subject (Desideri 2011).
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passed that confers to the same experience a new status; experiences are col-
lected, identified, while to simply live in the duration implies a continuous 
transition from one experience to another without them being clearly distin-
guished from each other. To fully understand the importance of attention in 
this context it is good to remember the objective of Schutz. The Austrian soci-
ologist wants to provide a more precise and solid foundation to comprehensive 
sociology, and then, in particular, the problem of meaning. An experience 
becomes significant when it is reflexively collected thanks to the ray of light 
of attention: it is attention to an elapsed experience that allows it to be given 
a meaning: “Only from the point of view of the retrospective glance do there 
exist discrete experiences. Only the already experienced [Erlebte] is meaning-
ful, not that which is being experienced [Erleben]. [...] From the point of view 
of passing experience, the predication of meaning is necessarily trivial, since 
meaning here can only be understood as the attentive gaze directed not at pass-
ing, but at already passed, experience” (Schutz 1967: 52 emphaisi added). 
Consequently, even if meaning can only refer to the predicative scope of con-
sciousness, it is necessarily based on the prepredicative: the act of attention 
reveals an experience that otherwise would remain “unilluminated”.8
As anticipated, a second area of  problems concerns the interrelated themes 
of the passage between provinces and the structure of consciousness. The the-
ory of finite provinces of meaning is fairly well known: Schutz picks up from 
William James the idea that we live in different orders of reality, but he prefers 
to use the term finite provinces of meaning to emphasize that it is the meaning 
of our experiences that delimits a province and not the ontological status of the 
objects. The essay On Multiple Realities, probably one of the best known of his 
theoretical works, explicitly addresses this topic. The provinces in which we live 
are many, Schutz cites the world of dreams, fantasy, art, religious experience, 
scientific contemplation, the games of children and the mentally ill, but the list 
could be enriched further still. The Austrian sociologist indicates that all other 
provinces are modifications of this intersubjective world of everyday reality, the 
paramount reality. The world of everyday life is the province from which we 
start and to which we return. In living a province, we bestow the focus of reality 
and in so doing we relegate the other provinces to the background. The transi-
tion between a province and another comes via a shift, subjectively perceived 
as a shock due to the change in tension of consciousness founded on a different 
attention to life. According to Schutz, at least in this essay, the transition is ex-
perienced subjectively in terms of a trauma. He returns to the theme of the pas-
8  For a detailed analysis of  the characteristics of  attention in Schutz on this theme see Perreau 
2010: 83-84 (Perreau 2010: 83-84)..
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sage explicitly and without significant changes in Symbol, reality and society, and 
implicitly in many other texts. The author explicitly addresses these issues in the 
Introductory Notes to Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, an unfinished volume that 
remained unpublished until 1970, to which we will return in more detail below 
(Schutz 1970). In this text, the image of the shift does not fully satisfy Schutz for 
the fact that, on closer inspection, each activity often involves the commingling 
of more than one province. The same for the essay on relevance, where Schutz 
says it implies the unification of a number of activities each belonging to its own 
specific field. As noted, for Schutz consciousness always has a theme, namely 
that which is the focus of attention, and a horizon, that which is merely coexpe-
rienced together with the theme. The focus here seems to have the function of 
unifying the field of consciousness and thus allows the pre-eminence of a theme: 
even if in the field of perception there are several potential objects to which to 
direct attention “none of these perceived things is at the moment thematic for 
me. My attention is concentrated on a quite specific task (the analysis of the 
problem of relevance), and my present writing under these and those circum-
stances is but one among several means by which I could bring about this goal 
and communicate my thoughts to others” (Schutz 1970: 94). The shifting of the 
focus of reality to a province and the turning of attention toward a particular 
activity seems therefore to be the first instance of determination of the field of 
consciousness that at the same moment allows its unification. The preeminence 
of a theme becomes the element able to bring up a series of activities belonging 
to different provinces as a single activity which confers the focus of reality to 
the prevalent province: “all others receive merely the accent of derived reality – 
namely, they become horizonal, ancillary, subordinate in relation to what is the 
prevailing theme”(Schutz 1970: 98). Although, in fact, the subject confers the fo-
cus of reality to a province, on closer inspection all the other activities involve us 
to varying degrees and so we pay some form of attention to them. Schutz there-
fore concludes the vision of the passage between the provinces through a leap is 
revealed to be “an oversimplifiation” (Schutz 1970: 14): we live simultaneously 
in many provinces. As evidence of the close relationship that ties the theme of 
attention with that of consciousness, Schutz feels the need at this point to make 
two assumptions about subjectivity that take into account the fact that we live 
simultaneously in different provinces. According to the schizophrenic-ego hy-
pothesis we can perform some typical or semiautomatic activities that involve 
only superficial levels of our personality and we can do it even when a particu-
larly moving event has altered the deepest levels of our personality. Although we 
can give our full attention to routine activities, we still haven’t abandoned the 
issue of the deeper level. But not even this metaphor fully satisfies Schutz, who 
aimed to introduce an additional image borrowed from music. The relationship 
that exists between two themes that run simultaneously in the same stream of 
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consciousness is similar to that of the counterpoint: two themes flow simultane-
ously and “listener’s mind” can pay full attention now to one, now to another 
topic, but continues to flow independently.
All these problems are, however, according to Schutz, expressions of a sin-
gle fundamental phenomenon whose analysis brings us precisely to the spe-
cific theme of this essay: “Living simultaneously in various realms of reality, 
in various tensions of consciousness and modes of attention à la vie, in various 
dimensions of time, putting into play different levels of our personality (or dif-
ferent degrees of anonymity and intimacy), the counterpointal articulation of 
the themes and horizons pertaining to each of such levels (including finally the 
schizophrenic patterns of the ego) are all expressions of the single basic phenomenon: 
the interplay of relevance structures” (Schutz 1970: 100-101). The phenomenon of rel-
evance for Schutz is therefore placed at a more radical level than the others. 
Through the concept of relevance he wants to give an account of the methods 
and norms that guide attention. The subject in fact is not completely free to 
direct attention at any object available in his/her perceptive and conceptual 
field, there are limits, conditions, paths that we must follow: “Husserl has inves-
tigated the functions of what he calls the “attentional ray” for the constitution of 
the thematic kernel and therewith for the structurization of the whole field. At 
any moment there are many experiences going on simultaneously. What con-
stitutes one (or better, one strain) of these temporally ongoing and simultaneous 
experiences as the thematic one is the fact that I voluntarily turn to it or reflect 
upon it (and hence this is an ego-activity, insofar as the ego is the source of all 
the activities of my conscious life). Husserl’s description of this activity may lead to the 
misconception that this selection, this choice, may be performed at random within an unlimited 
range of freedom or discretion” (Schutz 1970: 95 emphasis added). The decision to di-
rect one’s attention to certain themes, to focus attention on some objects and to 
relegate others to the background, takes place in a narrow range of discretion. 
These acts of selection, continues Schutz, have their own history and are inter-
connected: modes of relevance are in fact organized into systems. The systems 
of relevance are the “engines” of selective activity (Muzzetto 2006: 164), they 
determine the regulative principles of construction of reality over conscious-
ness and experience of objects, events and relationships (Nasu 2008: 92). The 
systems of relevance are thus the matrices, socially derived and socially condi-
tioned, which guide the attention and therefore the selection of useful elements 
to subjects to define and manage the situation in which they are immersed.
3.2 The Theory of Systems of Relevance
Before addressing in detail the analysis of Schutz’s systems of relevance it is 
appropriate to clarify the role of this concept in the overall theoretical system 
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of the Austrian sociologist. As we just mentioned, the concept of relevance is 
placed at a level of depth that permit us to treat all the other themes which 
have occupied Schutz. If it is certainly true that in light of the systems of 
relevance, attention emerges above all in its operational component (Perreau 
2010), as an essential element for action and reflection in the world of every-
day life. But it is also equally true that one must be cautious in attributing this 
new setting to the influence of the new American intellectual environment 
and in particular to pragmatism. I do not think it is entirely correct to estab-
lish a contrast between a European and an American period. According to 
this approach, in the period before his migration attention is analyzed mainly 
in its active and reflexive dimension, like the spotlight that can illuminate an 
experience. Following his migration, instead attention is detected especially in 
relation to a wholly grounded subject in the world of everyday life. In this sec-
ond moment attention would then be analyzed mainly in the passive dimen-
sion and in relation to its role in the constitution of the world taken for granted.
However, I believe that this change is all inside the original development of 
the phenomenological path of Schutz. A path that has been enriched thanks 
to the contributions of American authors, namely James and Mead, but that 
has maintained a substantial coherence (Luckmann 1973). There definitely 
exists a change of focus or perhaps rather of setting in analyzing the role of at-
tention, but this change should be framed within the complex relationship be-
tween transcendental phenomenology and phenomenology of the natural at-
titude in the thought of Schutz9 and particularly to the gradual self-autonomy 
of analysis of the mundane sphere. The world of everyday life is imposed pro-
gressively more and more as a privileged place of phenomenological analysis 
to the point at which Schutz in last phase of his life saw fit to proceed solely 
on the ground of mundane phenomenology (Letter to Gurvitsch of 22.3.1957 
in Grathoff 1989).
Therefore along this path the life-world in its everyday social dimension 
acquires an increasing role but the fact remains that some problems were well 
presented even before Schutz had reduced the role of transcendental phenom-
enology. Precisely for this reason it is possible to identify different references 
to some central questions of the problem of relevance across the theoretical 
production of Schutz and particularly in the works before emigration. Among 
the questions raised in this period, in fact, some of the issues that Schutz faces 
in the following years are already present in embryonic form. Especially the 
9  The analysis of  this particularly delicate and complex problem certainly can not be devel-
oped here. For a detailed analysis see Wagner (Wagner 1983: 287-328) and Muzzetto (Muz-
zetto 1997: 23-69).
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idea that selective attention can be read in terms of relevance to everyday life; 
a relevance guided by interest. Another manuscript then, that Wagner places 
between 1927 and 1928, is explicitly dedicated to relevance. The text, enti-
tled Relevanz (Schutz 1927), is of utmost importance because it testifies to the 
transition from the Bergson period to that one more strictly phenomenologi-
cal. Here Schutz is very clear in stating how the problem of relevance selects 
from the totality of a pre-existing world, an old problem in philosophy, which 
regards the social sciences, but is of vital importance in everyday life: “The 
concept of relevance is the central concept of sociology and of the cultural 
sciences [Geisteswissenschaften]. However, the basic phenomenon of relevance 
reaches beyond them into every life; it permeates our existing, our living and 
cognizing experience” (Schutz 1927: 3). In The Phenomenology of the Social World, 
then, the attentional modifications are analyzed in detail in paragraph 13 in 
relation to the constitution of meaning. And here, we have already said, atten-
tion is studied in relation to reflection and thus regards its active dimension. 
Yet, in the same text, the concept of relevance is revisited multiple times and 
in the concluding section, “A Glance at Further Problems”, Schutz affirms 
that among the issues to be addressed is certainly “the whole problem of relevance, 
which has kept cropping up again and again in the present study. The de-
finitive clarification of this problem will be possible only through an over-all 
phenomenological analysis, which nevertheless can be begun within the field 
of the social sciences” (Schutz 1967: 249). The central role is thus recognized, 
but the systematic treatment is postponed to a later date. Schutz follows this 
same strategy in many other later essays: even when explicitly dealing with 
certain aspects of the problem, he does not fail to specify how in reality it is a 
far more complex issue that deserves more space and a more detailed analysis. 
The Austrian sociologist tries this analysis only in The Problem of Relevance, a 
book that, as we have said, remained unfinished and was published in 1970, 
eleven years after his death. It is unclear why the planned book on relevance 
was not completed. On the other hand, these tormented pages (Protti 2001), 
although provisional and incomplete, represent the main source for studies on 
the concept of relevance in Schutz. Even as the project was abandoned, inter-
est in the issue has not waned. In the following essays, the author continued 
to make reference to the subject and devoted a substantial part of The Structure 
of the Life World to it.
If we look at the overall production of Schutz the problem of relevance 
meets a strange fate. In fact it seems the role of the concept of relevance in 
Schutz is similar to that of attention in Husserl: both are as central as they 
are hidden in the theoretical architecture of the two authors (Depraz 2004: 5; 
Depraz 2014). This is especially true if we look at the work that Schutz pub-
lished while he was still alive: the concept of relevance seems a sort of thread 
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that emerges only partially in published essays until 1959, the year of Schutz’s 
death. Yet, this concept can in fact be considered a sort of base concept of the 
whole concept of the social (Natanson 1986) that, according to Nasu, is pre-
sent in all the works of the Austrian sociologist and that connects them with 
each other (Nasu 2008: 91). So let’s now analyze the systems of relevance, 
particularly in relation to the problem of attention.
3.3 Systems of Relevance
The systems of relevance, we have already said, can be seen as the social 
matrix within which the individual attention operates. These determine both 
the form and the content of our stream of consciousness (Schutz 1945: 213) 
and, as a consequence, indicate what pertains to the situation with which the 
individual must come to terms (Schutz 1950: 284). As Nasu effectively wrote: 
“relevance is a regulative principle of reality construction in the sense that it 
is a regulative principle of knowing and experiencing objects, events, and, in 
turn, the subject, as well as a regulative principle for defining the situation” 
(Nasu 2008: 93). Schutz however does not begin with a general definition of 
the systems of relevance to then investigate the different types. At the outset 
of his study on relevance, the author resumes briefly the theory of percep-
tion as choice of Jankélévitch, that of the problematic possibility of Husserl 
and the theory of choice of Bergson. According to Schutz, however, the more 
complete description of the phenomenon was given by the skeptic Carneades 
with his theory of verisimilitude. The exploration of the theme of relevance, 
is therefore carried out on the basis of the example of Carneades: a man in 
winter enters a dimly lit room and his attention is immediately drawn to an 
object in the corner; the man is undecided: it is a snake or a coil of rope? 
Schutz chooses to frame the attention and relevance from a sample taken 
from an everyday situation. Already this is an indication of the path he wants 
to follow: the attention it is not a theme for his role in the reflection, but as a 
guide for the operation of our systems of exploration and management of the 
situation with which the subject has to come to terms.
In any case, what interests Schutz is that all these authors cited recog-
nize that within the field of consciousness there are a number of objects that 
compete for our attention: “Still, all of these theories – those of Carneades, 
Husserl, Bergson, Jankelevitch – have in common the assumption that with-
in the given field of our consciousness, several configurations (perceptual or 
fancied or otherwise) compete with one another for our interpretive assent. 
They compete in the manner of problematic possibilities or alternatives: each 
has a certain appeal to us, each has its particular weight, each is capable of 
being connected with previous experiences, at least as to the type inherent 
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to them” (Schutz 1970: 105). It is the absence of the problem of the alterna-
tive that Schutz criticizes the Gestaltists: who don’t explain why, among the 
different possible configurations, just this Gestalt configuration is privileged 
over another. Or put another way, every Gestalt already presupposes a choice 
between problematic possibilities, or alternative interpretations of the same 
object of perception. In the form of a question: why among the many objects 
present in my own field of perception does this object catch my eye? And why 
among the many possible alternatives am I undecided between a coil of rope 
and a snake? Obviously Schutz tries to answer these questions with the theory 
of systems of relevance.
3.3.1 Thematic relevance
Schutz identifies three systems of relevance: thematic, interpretative and mo-
tivational. The distinction is purely analytic and proposed for heuristic pur-
poses: in everyday reality the process is completely unified and the boundaries 
between the three systems of relevance are difficult to separate. But on this 
point we will return later; we begin now by addressing the systems individu-
ally. Schutz distinguishes between imposed thematic relevance and intrinsic 
thematic relevance. We see the first characterization that provides us with 
examples of imposed thematic relevance: “This is the first form of relevance: 
namely, that by virtue of which something is constituted as problematic in the 
midst of the unstructuralized field of unproblematic familiarity – and there-
with the field into theme and horizon. We shall call this kind topical relevance. It 
is worthwhile to note parenthetically the fact that the Greek root of the term 
“problem” is equivalent to its meaning to the Latin root of the term “object.” 
The original meaning of both is “that which is thrown before me. [...] to make 
an object a problem, to make it the theme or topic of our thought, means noth-
ing else than to conceive it as a dubious and questionable one, to segregate it 
from the background of unquestionable and unquestioned familiarity which 
is simply taken for granted” (Schutz 1970: 107). That which attracts the atten-
tion of the subject is what breaks the expectations, that is the object that can-
not be brought back automatically to the type of things that, on the basis of 
knowledge sedimented in its own foundation of experience, he expects to find 
in that given environment. The relevancies are imposed because it is the unu-
sual, unfamiliar experience that forces us to pay attention precisely because 
of its strangeness (Schutz 1970: 108). The thematic relevancies imposed thus 
concern the experiences that are not subject to making themes through an act 
of will. Schutz refers not only to unexpected and unfamiliar experiences as 
we’ve just seen, but also to other forms of imposed relevance, like the involun-
tary passages of the province or changes in the level of personality involved. 
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The author does not address in detail the different ways, but they all seem to 
implicate a certain thematic and cognitive discontinuity, or a discontinuity 
between the theme that occupied the consciousness before the onset of a new 
theme unrelated to the former. In fact, in an attempt to identify a general 
characterization of imposed thematic relevance, Schutz writes that “any in-
terruption or modification which necessitates discontinuing the idealizations 
of ‘and so on’ and ‘again and again,’ which are at the root of all our experi-
ence, created imposed topical relevances” (Schutz 1970: 109).
The intrinsic thematic relevancies, however, concern those cases of volun-
tary change of theme and that Schutz explicitly connects to the phenomenon 
known in psychology as voluntary attention. The sociologist distinguishes two 
cases of voluntary displacement of attention: the transition to the new theme 
can be done gradually by expanding or deepening the theme of departure, or 
by the voluntary changing of attention towards a theme that has no connec-
tion with the theme of departure. Especially in the latter case, the distinction 
between imposed and voluntary is thin and appears to relate to the presence 
or absence of motivation. As a result Schutz focuses on the first category and 
is sure to revisit how these remain ideal-typical distinctions: it is not possible 
to find them in concrete reality in their pure form.
The choice of the expression “intrinsic relevance” associated to voluntary 
seems however to want to emphasize that the voluntary nature does not mean 
full discretion. Although Schutz in the text on relevance is not entirely clear 
on this point (remember they are still notes), the two sub-categories identified 
seem to corroborate this hypothesis. We have just seen how they can give two 
cases of voluntary thematic relevance: extension of the theme of departure 
and identification of a new theme. The first case is easily distinguishable from 
imposed relevance that involves a thematic and cognitive discontinuity: the 
extension of the theme is to the contrary characterized by a continuation 
of the theme of departure. In this sense it is an “intrinsic” relevance to the 
theme; this means that an established theme of departure does not have full 
and complete discretion to further thematizations. As for the case of voluntary 
identification of a new theme, the situation is more complex since a disconti-
nuity exists. The latter however, is a limiting case for Schutz (Muzzetto 2006: 
172). The distinction between imposed and intrinsic seems to concern the 
existence of a motivation to change attention. In any case, that which we want 
to emphasize is that the reference of Schutz to motivation serves to clarify 
that also in the case of voluntary attention there exists a direction and limits 
(also these are social in nature). Schutz, on one hand, is reluctant to associate 
voluntary attention to full discretion but, at the same time, tries to safeguard 
subjective autonomy: “by the establishment of the paramount theme as home base both 
the direction of the intrinsic relevances leading into the horizon and the limit up to which 
RELEVANCE AS SOCIAL MATRIx OF ATTENTION IN ALFRED SCHUTZ 135
they must be followed are to a certain extent already constituted. To be sure a voluntary 
act is needed to perform this translation of horizonal material into topical 
terms, but this freedom is limited” (Schutz 1970: 112).
3.3.2 Interpretative relevance
Once an object has attracted attention it must be interpreted, and it is here 
that interpretative relevance comes into play. For Schutz, to interpret a phe-
nomenon means to bring it back to its typicality under other previous typi-
cal experiences. However not all sedimented experiences are useful in this 
process, but only those relevant to the thematic object for the subject. The 
systems of interpretive relevance thus serve to select those experiences that 
should be revisited for the interpretation of the object, but also which aspects 
of the object are relevant for interpretation: “This kind of relevance reveals, 
however, a curious double function. Not only is it interpretatively relevant that part of our 
stock of knowledge at hand has “something to do” with the thematic object now given to our 
interpretation; but, by a single stroke, certain particular moments of the object perceived 
obtain the character of major or minor interpretative relevance for the task of recognizing and 
interpreting the actually experienced segment of the world.” (Schutz 1970: 113). This op-
eration, of comparison between the percept and the material previously expe-
rienced, is often performed at the prepredicative level, through what Husserl 
calls passive synthesis of recognition. In this way, the percept, which has a certain 
shape range and color, is associated “with the recollection of previous percep-
tions of corporeal objects having typically similar, like, or same shape, exten-
sion, color, and so on” (ibid.). Therefore, most of the processes of interpreta-
tion takes place at this level without the aid of the sphere of judgment. It is on 
this basis that Schutz makes the distinction between imposed interpretative 
relevance and those intrinsic. The imposed relevances are such because they 
remain at the level of passive syntheses: the object is automatically brought 
back to the same objects or those typically similar to ones previously experi-
enced and the knowledge of this object is adequate to come to terms with the 
situation (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 200). Just because it does not reach the 
level of awareness, this relevance is according to Schutz imposed. Therefore, 
most of the objects that do not attract my attention, remain in the background 
because they are automatically led back to the already known. The intrinsic 
relevances come into play when the level to be involved is predicative. If the 
guaranteed automatic interpretation of passive synthesis is not sufficient or is 
not adequate, then it is necessary to resort to voluntarism. It is thus the case of 
the problematic possibility, for which an act of self-will is necessary that the-
matizes intrinsic aspects of the dominant theme. If I therefore should interpret 
an object that caught my attention, I have to voluntarily move my attention to 
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other aspects or objects that are associated with this theme. As for the intrinsic 
thematic relevances, Schutz specifies that even they have limits. To return to 
our example, Schutz says, the man who enters the room is undecided whether 
to interpret the object that attracts his attention as a snake or a rope, but he 
doesn’t ask himself whether the object can be a dog: “The system of interpreta-
tive relevances is founded, in short, upon the principle of compatibility – or, as Leibniz 
would call it, of compossibility – of all of its coexistent moments. And for this very 
reason the volitional acts which supervene in establishing additional intrinsic 
interpretative relevances are limited in scope (not everyone is freely available), 
as are the acts establishing intrinsic topical relevances”(Schutz 1970).
To introduce the motivational relevances, we can mention a theme that 
we will deal with more fully later. Schutz makes reference to interest both 
at the conclusion of the analysis of thematic relevances as well as to that of 
interpretive relevances. We have seen that something is the object of our 
attention and therefore needs to be interpreted by its strangeness, its non-
familiarity. We need to make it familiar. But what determines the level of 
familiarity necessary? In principle it is possible to penetrate indefinitely the 
exterior and interior horizons of a theme. According to Schutz it is “a set 
of current interests” of the subject that determines the degree of familiar-
ity sufficient: that is, it is only based on the interest that we can distinguish 
the portion of the world that needs further investigation and with which we 
want to familiarize ourselves, from that which can be taken for granted and 
therefore remain in the background. In turn however, the current interest “is 
itself a form of relevance” (Schutz 1970: 118) and to its analysis we will dedicate 
the next section. For now it is sufficient to note how the systems cannot be 
treated separately: when Schutz analyzes a system he must necessarily refer 
to the others.
3.3.3 Motivational relevance
Let’s return to the case of problematic possibilities and to our example of 
the man who enters a room and is undecided whether to interpret the object 
that caught his attention as a snake or a rope. If he has no further interpre-
tive elements to establish with a sufficient degree of probability what the ob-
ject in the corner is, he may decide to continue the process of interpretation 
and hit it with a stick. In this way, he would obtain additional interpretative 
material to resolve his dilemma. The man, that is, can not remain in a situa-
tion of doubt because the solution to the dilemma (rope or snake?) is relevant 
to his future conduct. The motivational relevance indicates that “what has 
to be done is motivated by that for which it is to be done, the latter being mo-
tivationally relevant for the former. It is a chain of interrelated motivational 
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relevances which leads to the decision concerning how I must act” (Schutz 
1970: 119-120). However, Schutz warned immediately, this formula is not 
entirely clear: the interpretative decision (to clarify whether it is a snake or 
a rope) motivates the action to hit with the stick; in turn however it is the 
end of this action (to avoid danger) that motivates the interpretive process 
(or the acquisition of other relevant elements of interpretation). There is 
thus an ambiguity that must be clarified between motivating and motivated 
experiences. To this end, Schutz distinguishes between “in order to” and 
“because” motives. The first refers to the planned end of the action, namely 
to the state of things that the subject intends to realize through the action 
taken. The imagined end of the action in turn motivates the single opera-
tions to be done to realize the state of things planned. So in order to remove 
the danger the man has intension to take a stick for striking the object. We 
can express the same concept through a language formula equivalent if, 
instead of asking ourselves at the moment that precedes the action, we look 
at the moment that follows the beginning of the action: the man took the 
stick because of the fact that he wanted to hit the object. These two forms 
are equivalent and thus for Schutz we are still faced with motives such as 
“in order to”: “in both the state of affairs to be brought about, the para-
mount project, motivates the single steps to be taken. In other words, the 
paramount project is motivationally relevant for the projecting of the single 
steps; the single steps to be performed are, however, “causally relevant” for 
bringing about the desired result”(Schutz 1970: 121). So if we express this 
kind of motive through the formulation “because of” we are facing the “spu-
rious because sentences” (Schutz 1970: 121).
The second form of motives is instead that of the genuine motive be-
cause. These have a different nature and concern the motives that underlie 
the determination of the dominant project. In our example, if the motive 
in order to of the action is to remove the snake, as the end of the action, the 
motive because, which is behind this end, is the fear of snakes. The genu-
ine because motives are therefore substantially different because they sink 
their roots into the experience sedimented in the foundation of knowledge 
and are not entirely available to the subject. Every because motive “has 
its autobiographical history as well, referring to many series of previously 
experienced relevances – topical, interpretational, and motivational ones 
which now ‘subconsciously’ stir the tension of my consciousness and deter-
mine the intimacy of the level of personality involved” (Schutz 1970: 122). 
The genuine because motives are not necessarily subject to the conscience. 
They are presented as a habitual possession constituted by a series of typical 
expectations present in neutralized form, but potentially actualizable when 
certain typical circumstances are verified. It is then this habitual possession 
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that activates the predominant project, present in its typical form at the bot-
tom of consciousness.10
We can note, as we did before, how Schutz should refer to the other systems 
of relevance in the analysis of a system taken separately. Before addressing the 
problem of the relationship between systems, which will be the subject of the 
next section, we must clarify the distinction between intrinsic relevances  and 
those imposed for the motivational relevances as well. Only the choice of the 
predominant project is an intrinsic motivational relevance, because only this 
choice is derived on a voluntary act. After having made the choice of the 
dominant project to be realized, all other motivational relevances will be ex-
perienced as imposed.
3.3.4 Interrelation between systems of relevance
The different systems of relevance are mutually distinguishable, but not sepa-
rable. We’ve seen during the course of our exposition: Schutz distinguishes 
three different systems and when he analyzes them individually he still must 
refer to the others. Every rupture between the systems is completely artificial. 
They show a “genuine interdependency” (Cox 1978: 91). They are therefore ex-
perienced by the subject in their absolute indivisibility; only the reflexive gaze 
can break them down. In everyday life that which is the theme is the “topic 
at hand”, not the because reasons of the action or the systems of relevance. 
Obviously, according to Schutz, even the systems of relevance can become 
thematic: we can ask ourselves why that object caught our attention, if our 
hierarchies are correct, and so on. Just as aspects of a single phenomenon, it 
is possible to choose any one of the systems of relevance as a starting point for 
the analysis.
We have already had occasion to note, when something catches our atten-
tion it becomes thematic for us, becomes a problem, a question emerges from 
the background of objects simply taken for granted. In this sense, that which 
draws attention and that which starts the interpretive process is not familiar. 
Familiarity therefore has a subjective meaning that depends both on the bi-
ography of the subject and on actual circumstances. When we encounter an 
unusual experience “What emerges as a strange experience, then, needs to 
be investigated, if it is interesting enough, because of its very unfamiliarity. It has 
become questionable. And there with new topical relevances arise” (Schutz 
1970: 132). It is the current interest that depends on the biographical and 
10  The structure of  because motives is highly complex and cannot be analyzed in detail here. 
For further reading see Muzzetto (Muzzetto 2006: 186-226).
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current circumstances which determines the level of investigation necessary, 
or put differently, how long an object is worthy of attention. But Schutz asks, 
what then is interest? At this point it should not be difficult to answer in terms 
of motivational relevances: “Interest in this sense is the set of motivational relevances 
which guide the selective activity of my mind. These relevances may be either actual-
ly operating when I turn to an “intrinsic topic,” or they may be present as the 
sediment of relevances which were formerly actually operative in a neutral-
ized form, namely as habitual possessions of my stock of knowledge” (Schutz 
1970: 127-130). In this case, the author points out, there is a dual, bidirec-
tional relationship between thematic and motivational relevances: the inter-
est stimulated by the unusual experience generates new thematic relevances; 
these new thematic relevances in turn can be the source for new motivational 
relevances: something that did not interest me, now attracts my attention 
and I can want to familiarize myself with it. This situation in turn, can only 
change the system of interpretative relevance, “those which bear ‘subscripts’ 
as regards the main topic prevailing thus far. On the other hand, it is quite 
possible that a shift in the system of interpretational relevances – as with the 
introduction of a new concept – becomes the starting point for building up a 
set of new motivational or topical relevances which do not thus far pertain to 
the familiar stock of knowledge at hand” (Schutz 1970: 133). Therefore, it is 
not possible to attribute a priority to one of the systems of relevance: the pro-
cess is unified and therefore each system can become the starting point from 
which originate the changes in the other two.
4. Systems of relevance as social matrix of attention
Now that we have reassumed the theory of relevances in Schutz, we can in-
vestigate the relationship between attention and relevance to show precisely 
the social nature of attention. First we must try to resolve an apparent con-
tradiction. In Reflections Schutz writes that “The most critical omission made 
thus far refers to the fact that we have handled our problem – and will in this 
and the following part continue to do so – as if there were no social world at 
all, as if an isolated individual experienced the world of nature disconnected 
from his fellowmen” (Schutz 1970: 135). Does this means that for Schutz the 
idea of an isolated subject is somehow possible? If it were so, Schutz would 
not come out from the individualistic approach to attention. We must there-
fore clarify this aspect.
We must first make note of the fact that Schutz moves within a noetic 
analysis of consciousness and this necessarily influences his vision of attention 
as well. As noted, the noesi designates the experience of the object while the 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA140
noema is the object-as-experienced. This point is very important for the im-
plications that this choice entails: in following this perspective, attention has 
been studied mainly in relation to the subjective experiences sedimented in 
personal history. The interests and the biography of the actor function as con-
stituent elements of his attention. Quite different instead is the approach of his 
friend and colleague Aron Gurwitsch, who follows the noematic perspective. 
Gurwitsch is interested in a theory of relevances as theme-relevance while 
Schutz in a theory of ego-relevances: “With Schutz a certain item is relevant to me 
on account of the projects and pursuits which engage me. As we use the term 
relevancy, a certain item is said to be relevant to the theme (which may well be a 
plan of action or a pursuit) and also to other items because of their relevancy 
to the theme” (Gurwitsch 2010:333)11. Embree believes the two analyzes com-
patible (Embree 1977) and proposes to carefully read the difference departing 
from the diagram ego-cogito-cogitatum: Schutz is focused on the first part 
(Ego-cogito) and Gurwitsch on the second (Cogito-cogitatum). Therefore in 
following Schutz, subjective interest is necessarily emphasized as an element 
that “colors” the objects for their greater or lesser ability to attract attention. 
Interests as we have seen, must be understood in a broad sense, to include 
fears and hopes, experiences sedimented at different levels of one’s personal-
ity. Due to the noetic approach, the biography of the subject thus has a key 
role in understanding the functioning of attention. The sociologist then is in-
terested above all on the basis with which structure is determined in theme 
and horizon. However this does not mean that the analysis of Schutz remain 
caged within exclusively subjectivist explanations.
The omission of sociality primarily has the function of simplifying the 
problem treated in the analysis. The option for methodological individual-
ism implies that Schutz always starts from a subject that may possibly relate 
to another subject. However this doesn’t at all mean that the social dimen-
sion isn’t present. In The Phenomenolog y of the Social World Schutz is already 
very clear on the fact that the reality of the You and the We precedes even 
the ego as mine. This means that the experience of us that is given in the 
We-relation, in which the self and the other are physically present and inter-
acting, is a primary pre-predicative experience and “that it is only after that 
relationship is established that individuals are born into the world, even phe-
nomenologist” (Natanson 1978: 70). Intersubjectivity is the foundation of all 
other human categories: “As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity 
11  This is not the place to analyze the interesting theory developed by Gurwitsch in The Field of  
Consciousness, written at the same time as The Problem of  Relevance during the period of  greatest 
collaboration between the authors. For a recent development of  Gurwitsch’s theory we refer to 
the work that Arvidson has continued over the years particularly (Arvidson 2006).
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and the We-relationship will be the foundation for all other categories of hu-
man existence” (Schutz 1957: 82). In the mundane sphere intersubjectivity 
is taken for granted, yet it is constitutively present: the world is common to 
most subjects and so my experience of it always refers to others. There is no 
subject in which society is not always present: society is an integral part of 
the individual (Schutz 1942). “Sociality, in these terms – writes Maurice Na-
tanson – is the always already existent milieu of man related to fellow man in 
multiform temporal, spatial, corporeal, as well as cognitive and emotional terms” 
(Natanson 1977: 110 emphaisis added).
Thus if the subject is always in society, and the choice of starting from an 
isolated subject has a heuristic function, any opposition between individual 
and collective is forced in the case of Schutz (Embree 1991: 210). The Aus-
trian sociologist categorically excludes the idea of  a private experience. On 
this point he is very clear in his letter to Gurwitsch of April 20, 1952 “I had 
of course only pedagogical reasons for taking a theoretical solipsistic ego as 
my point of departure and only subsequently introducing the structures which 
are involved in the social world. But that of course doesn’t mean that I believe 
that a private experience that is not socialized from the beginning is possible” (Grathoff 
1989: 177). We have also seen that sociality is always present at the cognitive 
level. If we also extend these considerations to the subject of attention, we 
must note that the treatment that provides an isolated subject that directs its 
attention towards an object is in fact a simplification. Therefore we can try to 
locate the first stable reference point of attention in Schutz, in connection with 
the framework that we have taken up in the second section. As it is for Eviatar 
Zerubavel and for Yves Citton, for Schutz attention is always socialized from 
the start. Attention is indeed an eminently social phenomenon.
We go even further in detail and see in what sense is it possible to identify 
the social dimension of attention in Schutz’s analysis of systems of relevance. 
First we will clarify the role of the systems of relevance within the stock of 
knowledge of the individual and then point out the role of the social in the 
concrete functioning of the systems of relevance.
The description of Schutz’s life-world always starts from the assumption 
that it is an intersubjective world and thus a social world. Every subject, to 
come to terms with this world, to interpret it and act in it, has available a 
stock of knowledge that is the result of the sedimentation of their previous 
experience. These are derived either from direct experience or from experi-
ences transmitted to the subject by others (peers, teachers, parents, and so on) 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 7). The stock of knowledge however does not 
consist merely of a necessarily explicit knowledge, it’s not propositional and is 
in fact intersubjective (Banega 2014). Although it has a certain unity, the stock 
is not an integrated and coherent system.
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Knowledge for Schutz is socially derived and socially distributed. The 
stock of knowledge has a intersubjective genesis: this means that a large part 
of the expectations and subjective values are learned and inherited from oth-
ers and that, consequently, only a very small part of my knowledge comes 
from direct experience (Schutz 1953: 13-14; Schutz 1976: 133-134). But not 
only: because the direct experiences are not private experiences (a hypothesis 
that, as we have seen, Schutz excludes) they are always socially mediated. In 
The Well-informed Citizen Schutz explains in detail what it means to say that the 
world is a common intersubjective world of culture: personal knowledge is in 
reference to that of the others and comes to us as an inheritance; it refers to 
a single world common to us all; and this world is subject to confirmation by 
the others (Schutz 1946).
Since the systems of relevance are also the result of sedimented experiences, 
they are a part of the stock of knowledge. However at the same time, they have 
a special position within the stock: they belong to it and they constitute some-
how its structure because they order the various elements based on the impor-
tance and appropriateness of typical situations. The systems of relevance rep-
resent the “driving force” (Hermida-Lazcano 2009) of the stock of knowledge: 
they govern its dynamics and its use. The stock of knowledge, that is, cannot 
be understood in static terms, like a warehouse from which the subject simply 
draws; it is not the subject of mere possession (Nasu 2008: 98). It is rather a 
flow that changes in the structure based on the specific situation: “It has to be 
constituted on each occasion according to the prevailing system of relevance” 
(Nasu 2006: 392). Consequently as a rule, the stock of knowledge is always 
unfinished and open: the acquisition of knowledge is never definitive, the prob-
lem always emerges within what is taken for granted. Each knowledge taken 
for granted is always subject to “new announcement” and always with respect 
to an end. For if the interpretation consists of the attribution of that which we 
have in front of us that is already noted, we can not fail to highlight the circu-
larity of the process: the new experience feeds back on the stock of available 
knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 161; Muzzetto 2006: 63). The system 
of relevance then regulates both the appropriateness of knowledge with respect 
to the concrete situation, as well as the importance of the new experience with 
respect to the stock as a whole and to the same system.
Therefore, since they are a part of the stock of knowledge, the systems of rele-
vance are also socially derived and socially distributed. Thus the ways in which 
we pay attention to objects based on the specific situation are, in large part, so-
cially derived. This approach also enables Schutz to escape the risk of sociologi-
cal determinism. Because, although it is certainly true that the systems of rel-
evance are mostly socially derived, it is also equally true that it is impossible that 
the systems of relevance are identical to its subjects. The systems of relevance 
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in fact depend ultimately on the personal history of the subject and since there 
cannot be two identical biographies, there can be no systems of relevance that 
perfectly overlap. The systems of relevance then, are socially distributed. As a 
result, not all social groups share the same matrix that guides attention. Schutz 
hasn’t particularly deepened these aspects, but we find an important indication 
in his essay on the stranger. The stranger has a hard time coming to terms with 
the new environment, not sharing the same system of relevance of the society 
in which he finds himself, he pays attention to elements the host group takes for 
granted. At the same time, he doesn’t pay attention to other elements that for 
the group are of vital importance. Ultimately, since he doesn’t have the same 
system of relevance, he has trouble identifying the pre-established alternatives 
for the appropriate definition of the situation (Nasu 2006).
The systems of relevance are socially derived and socially distributed. As 
for the former, we can say that the matrix that guides our attention has a 
social origin. The second aspect reminds us instead that not all groups and 
subjects share the same systems of relevance. Let us now move on to analyze 
the specific working methods of the systems of relevance. 
We have seen that an object12 draws our attention when it becomes a prob-
lem for us. Whether it requires our attention, or whether that attention is driv-
en by a voluntary act,13 this object becomes problematic for us and we have to 
familiarize ourselves with it. That familiarity is however a very complex con-
cept. The familiarity of an object cannot be understood in an absolute sense, 
as if it belonged to the ontological structure of the object. As we saw when we 
discussed Zerubavel, an object stands out like a figure in a background based 
on social norms. Similarly for Schutz, familiarity cannot be understood in an 
absolute sense for at least two reasons, which we’ve already discussed in previ-
ous pages. On the one hand something catches my attention depending on 
my current interest, which in turn depends both on the specific situation and 
on those experiences sedimented in my biography. On the other, the object 
that captures me is also that which is not within the typical expectations of the 
situation. But what does it mean to say that an experience is not within typical 
expectations? And how are these expectations built?
A characteristic of our habitually acquired knowledge consists in the fact 
that it typically refers to other potentially similar knowledge. Obviously, we 
12  Throughout our essay we followed Schutz and have always talked about a theme present 
in consciousness. Of  course this is a simplification, as Schutz has well presented. A theme is 
always inserted into a system, is always connected to a network of  other themes that are related 
with it.
13  Again for the sake of  clarity, as for Schutz, voluntariness does not correspond absolutely to 
the full discretionary power. The feelings that guide our will also have a social origin.
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constantly experience a certain atypicality compared to what we typically 
anticipate. An experience is therefore always unusual compared with the ex-
pectations built on the basis of typically accumulated knowledge: “It is pre-
cisely this ‘not so but otherwise’ which gives the new experience the character 
of being an unfamiliar one” (Schutz 1970: 132). These expectations however, 
even though they depend on my biography, have an eminently social nature. 
The world is, according to Schutz, experienced from the beginning ac-
cording to types. This implies that for the natural attitude, the world makes 
sense, is pre-ordained, is not merely an aggregate of disordered sensations 
(Schutz 1945: 208). It also means that each typification brings with it expecta-
tions, or the ability to repeat at least in principle similar experiences: “The 
unquestioned pre-experiences are, however, also from the outset, at hand as 
typical, that is, as carrying open horizons of anticipated similar experiences. 
For example, the outer world is not experienced as an arrangement of in-
dividual unique objects, dispersed in space and time, but as “mountains,” 
“trees,” “animals,” “fellow-men” (Schutz 1953: 7-8). Typification is therefore 
an important part of the social and cultural world: this means that as typifica-
tions certainly vary between cultures, there can not exist a cultural world that 
faces less typification. As clearly stated by Barber: “Hence, typification, that 
is, typified ways of conceiving the world and typified patterns of behavior, will 
vary from one social world, or cultures, to another, but it is necessarily the 
case that if there is a socio-cultural world, then people will function within it 
by employing some set of typifications” (Barber 1987: 117). On the other hand, 
typification is essentially social, that is, socially shared, derived, transmitted 
and constantly rebuilt. Barber masterfully sums up: “For Schutz the social 
character of typification is invariant and essential such that there cannot be 
typification which do not reflect the social milieu out of which they originate 
and in which they are utilized. The social is not just accidentally affixed to 
necessary structures of typification whenever they are concretely instantiated, 
but it is intrinsically necessary to every life-world typification pattern” (Barber 
1987: 118 emphasis added). The language of common sense represents “ the 
epitome of the typifications socially approved by the linguistic group” (Schutz 
1955: 233). So for Zerubavel and Citton, as well as for Schutz the language 
guides and prestructures, predominantly at the prepredicative level, our per-
ception and attention. Typification thus becomes one of the ways through 
which the cognitive organization of the world is socially transmitted.
Therefore, if interests guide the level of knowledge required to gain respect 
from the situation and the interpretation of the world is always done in terms 
of types, according to Schutz there can be no such thing as a pure and sim-
ple type: they always originate from problems of the group. The socially ap-
proved typifications, that constitute the systems of relevance, originate in com-
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mon situations and in collective problems: “the world taken for granted by the 
in-group is a world of a common situation within which common problems 
emerges within a common horizon, problems requiring typical solutions by 
typical means for bringing about typical ends.” (Schutz 1955: 236) The expec-
tations of the subject, even if they come from direct experience, still originate 
within the scope of typifications of the membership group. Let’s take a page 
from Schutz in which he summarizes some of the issues we tried to analyze in 
this section: “The socially approved system of typifications and relevances is 
the common field within which the private typifications and relevance struc-
tures of the individual members of the group originate. This is so, because the 
private situation of the individual as defined by him is always a situation within 
the group, his private interests are interests with reference to those of the group 
(whether by way of particularization or antagonism), his private problems are 
necessarily in a context with the group’s problems” (Schutz 1955: 238).
Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to highlight the contribution that the theory 
of systems of relevance of Alfred Schutz can offer to the understanding of the 
social dimension of attention. I have therefore briefly revisited some recent 
contributions that explicitly investigate intersubjective and collective atten-
tion, and we focused in particular on the proposals of Eviatar Zerubavel and 
Yves Citton. I then analyzed the role of attention in the theoretical edifice 
of Schutz, to focus on the relationship between attention and systems of rel-
evance in particular. I then tried to stress the importance of the mechanisms 
of social regulation of attention, with respect to both the origin of the systems 
of relevance as well as to their operation. Regarding the first aspect, I noted 
how for Schutz the systems of relevance are socially derived and distributed 
and are formed from sedimented experiences. With regard to their operation, 
I attempted to emphasize the elements of interest and social typification.
One of the great merits of the theory of relevance in Schutz is, as Laurent 
Perreau writes, in allowing attention to emerge as “an activity of conscious-
ness in direct contact with our practical enrollment in the world” (Perreau 
2012, 80). At the same time, the theory of systems of relevance provides the 
opportunity to read attention starting with the subject, but without tying 
it exclusively to a determinist theory of action or based solely on motives. 
Hermida-Lazcano for example, (Hermida-Lazcano 2009) sees the theory of 
relevance as an antidote to hyperrationalist theories of action for three main 
reasons: its relative concealment of projects in the consciousness, the plural-
ity of roles, and the problem of multiple realities and the schizophrenic ego. 
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Exporting these considerations to the subject of attention, we can say that for 
its relative concealment of projects my attention can also be drawn by objects 
without me fully understanding why. Perhaps for this reason it is important 
to reflect on the mechanisms through which we manage our attention, both 
individually and collectively. In an overstimulated environment it is crucial to 
cultivate our “reflexive” or “critical” attention (Citton 2014). Or to put it in 
Schutzian terms, it is essential that our systems of relevance are set to a theme. 
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Elements of a theory of social time.  
A Schützian approach
Gerd Sebald
The paper discusses in the  first place the Bergson’s pragmatic concept of time and successively    the Hus-
serl’s concept of time and the lifeworld  to define their  influences  for Alfred Schutz whose considerations 
on time started from Henry Bergson’s philosophy of duration.  The Austrian sociologist uses Husserl’s 
considerations on the inner-time consciousness as a complement of Bergson’s theory. It’s a well-know 
fact that time is a foundamental topic for Schutz expecially in his Fragments toward a Phenomenolog y 
of Music (1944). Schutz’s phenomenological research on music takes in to account the Bergsonian con-
nection of mind and body, of (inner ) time and space and their theoretical characterizazion.  The paper 
examines finally Ilja Srubar’s differentiation between constituted an produced time.  Coming a conclu-
sion the paper  distinguishes analitically a multiplicity of forms of time and the types of mechanism for 
their formation trying to describe the kind of interrelations are to found between these different  forms   as 
necessary elements in order to conceive  a sociological  theory of time. 
One of the genuine achievements of the Schützian Theory of the Social is the 
introduction of a concept of time into sociological theory both as central and 
fundamental. In starting from Max Weber’s concept of subjective meaning 
Schütz relies on Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl’s philosophical consid-
erations for his «philosophical founded theory of method» (Schütz 1967: xxxi) 
for the social sciences. Nevertheless, his theory of time is rather neglected in the 
reception of his work, with the exception of Ilja Srubar (1974, for a condensed 
version see Srubar 2007), whose differentiation between constituted and pro-
duced time is discussed later in this article. Neither Elias (1984) nor Nowotny 
(1989) mention Schütz at all. Nassehi (2008) at least mentions Schütz’ theory 
of time, but states that Schütz «remains a captive of phenomenological think-
ing» (110, my translation). Two more recent articles discuss certain aspects of 
time in Schütz’s works: Muzzetto (2006) asks for the function of time in the 
constitution of experiences, but in the end diagnoses a structural difficulty 
in Schütz, because in «the relationship between  the subject and the social 
world» there are used «two different modes of discourse» (25). Another way 
of investigation leads Renn (2006b) to a similar result. In starting from the 
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concept of constitution in Husserl and Schütz he detects two different modes 
of it in Schütz: appresentation and synchronization, which would lead to two 
different theories of communication. But in Schütz’ detailed analysis of the 
time horizons in communication he finds potential for an amendment both of 
pragmatically and phenomenologically based theory of communication. So, 
all in all theories of social neglect the Schützian approach, even if its potential 
is recognized. In order to work out some elements of a theory of social time, I 
will ask for the temporal dimensions as developed by Alfred Schütz, in order 
to pave the way onward to a sociological theory of time. Therefore, Bergson’s 
and Husserl’s  conceptualizations of time are shortly reconstructed. Then, 
the time concept that Schütz developed in his Phenomenology of the Social World 
(1932/1967) is outlined, before some clarifications and later considerations in 
his Fragments Towards a Phenomenology of Music (1944/1996) are discussed. After 
a brief sketch of Srubar’s distinction between constituted and produced time 
a short prospect will summarize draw the conclusions for a theory of social 
time under the condition  of social differentiation of high degree.
Bergson’s pragmatic concept of time
Schütz began his theoretical work in the 1920s relying on Henri Bergsons 
pragmatic philosophy of the durée. Bergson conceptualized the durée as a 
continuous flow of experiences constituting a «succession of indistinct ele-
ments» (Muzzetto 2006: 7), as a permanent coming-to-be and passing away 
of experiences. This stream is the inner kernel of consciousness, not accessible 
by reflection (or only in «rare moments», see Bergson 1913: 231), but it can 
be symbolized, spatialized, conceptualized, transformed into an discontinu-
ous and quantifiable time. It is the base of a lot of levels of consciousness, that 
differ in the degree of attention towards life. So, we have two forms of time 
in Bergson: the inner time of the durée, an unmeasurable continuity, and 
the reflected, symbolized and measurable time outside of it. The link and 
mediation between both forms is the body. It is conceived as the active center 
of the subject in the spatio-temporal world. Through the body experiences 
are transmitted into the durée and occurrences as stimuli from the durée are 
turned into action in the spatial world. Perception and action (or working) 
are located in the body, it is only a kind of transitional place also in a tem-
poral sense. It is located in the spatio-temporal sphere of the outer world and 
reaches into inner time through sensations and in taking on impulses from 
the durée. Thus, Bergson finds a way out of a dualistic conception. Bergson’s 
concept of memory adds two more important aspects to his theoretical stance 
of time. On the one hand recollections are triggered by pragmatic usefulness 
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for the present situation, a kind of pragmatic relevance (Bergson 1911: 188-89) 
that modifies also the recollected according to the present context.  On the 
other hand, it orders and stores away experiences. But to reflect upon expe-
riences they must have expired. Reflection is only possible in retrospection. 
Memorization means also the making of a kind of temporal succession in the 
inner time produced by memory. So, memory is a central concept in Bergson’s 
theory.
Alfred Schütz uses Bergson’s ideas as a foundation in all his writings in the 
1920s and also his conception of time (see Schütz 1982). But his early writings 
of this time are not least fragmentary, because he wrestles with the problem of 
the inaccessibility of the durée. He solved it, when he (re-)discovered Husserl’s 
phenomenology with the epoche as a methodological instrument to analyze 
the stream of consciousness. But, as we will see, his concept of time rests still 
on Bergson’s considerations for a great part.    
Husserl’s concept of time and the lifeworld
Edmund Husserl’s investigations both into time and the life-world are most 
influential for Alfred Schütz. Therefore, a very short sketch of his theory of 
time is necessary. I want to distinguish three forms or maybe strands of time 
in Husserl’s work.1 Husserl states in his Ideas I that «time is a name for a 
completely delimited sphere of problems and one of exceptional difficulty» 
(Husserl 1982: § 81, 193). Temporality designates for him not only something 
«belonging to every single mental process, but also a necessary form combin-
ing mental processes with mental processes» (194). Thus, a stream of mental 
processes is constituted and within the stream a temporal order. Each actually 
present «now» is punctual and  is accompanied by a «just now» (retention) and 
a «before» (reproduction). And it is also accompanied by a «soon» (protention) 
and an «after» (anticipation). So the temporal order of the stream of con-
sciousness constitutes in its constant references to the past and the future phe-
nomenological time. With his method of phenomenological reduction Husserl 
clarifies this inner consciousness of time, the «phenomenological time» as the 
«unitary form of all mental processes» (Husserl 1982: § 81, p. 192). That is 
the core of Husserl’s phenomenology of time: the detailed description of the 
constitution of subjective time in inner time-consciousness. 
1  I do not discuss the often problematic connections between the concepts and the develop-
ment of  them in the context of  the development of  his work. See Ricoeur (2012), Römer 
(2010), de Warren (2009), Mensch (2010).
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But, he distinguishes another form of time: the objective or cosmic time. 
This, from the point of view of a single consciousness, is a transcendent (not: 
transcendental) form of time. It resides in the outer world and is measurable 
by the position of the sun, clocks or other physical means. And it has to be 
suspended for all investigations into the subjective form of time.2  
And maybe there is also a third strand of time to be found in Husserl: the 
time of the life-world. The term ‘life-world’ as developed by Husserl has two 
functions. It is conceptualized as a foundation for all knowledge, especially the 
scientific knowledge,  as the «general ‘ground’ of human world-life» and the 
«foundation for science» (Husserl 1970: 155). And it is conceptualized as the 
social environment we live in: 
the concrete life-world must first be taken into consideration; and it must be 
considered in terms of  the truly concrete universality whereby it embraces, 
both directly and in the manner of  horizons, all the built-up levels of  validity 
acquired by men for the world of  their common life […] the world of  straight-
forward intersubjective experiences (Husserl 1970: 133).
As such it is a social world, given in its specific cultural and historical way: 
«The world is the sole universe as what is pregiven as obvious» (Husserl 1970: 
180). And in its givenness and validity inherent is a intersubjectively constitut-
ed time based on and constituting the transcendental intersubjectivity. Like 
all his attempts to establish intersubjectivity on phenomenological ground this 
one can also be seen as just a statement in the last resort. 
To sum up, there are three strands or forms of time to be found in Husserl’s 
work: the intensely and very lucidly analyzed subjective time, the intersubjec-
tively constituted time of the life-world and the objective time of nature (or of 
Newton’s physics?, see Römer 2010: 47 ff.). In attempting to found all these 
forms on the first one, Husserl tried to lay the foundations for the «unity of 
one time» (Husserl 1970: 169), but he never succeeded. Maybe that would be 
impossible, as Paul Ricoeur stated in his aporias of time. What remains, then, 
are three separated forms which have to be mediated and analyzed in their 
relation to one another. 
Alfred Schütz used Husserl’s considerations on the inner time-conscious-
ness as a complement of Bergson’s theory. Husserl’s method of the epoche, the 
way of observing the consciousness from within the consciousness offered him 
a way to access the stream of consciousness in a controlled way and to ask for 
the constitution of subjective meaning in its temporal dimensions.
2  On the other hand Husserl tried to base the objective time in the inner time-consciousness. 
For a critique see Ricoeur (2012) and Römer (2010: 47 ff.). 
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Schütz’s considerations on time in the Phenomenology of the Social World
a) Time and subjective meaning
Alfred Schütz used time always as a central concept in his philosophical 
foundation of Weber’s interpretative sociology. His first attempt started from 
Henri Bergson’s philosophy of duration: 
Our I-experience is banished into time and space; it is tied to consociates 
through language and emotions; it is accustomed to thinking, that is, to spatial-
ize streaming changes of  quality and to form them into concepts. […] This is 
so because our world of  thinking, our concepts, our science demonstrate their 
time-space character at every move (Schütz 1982: 32).
However, Bergson’s concept of duration or of inner time allows as de-
veloped above no controlled analytical access to the stream of experiences, 
because every form of description, of conceptualization, or representation 
involves alienation, exteriorization, and disassociation. When Schütz discov-
ered Husserl’s Phenomenology of inner time consciousness in 1928 or shortly after-
wards, he had an instrument to access the processes of mind and of constitu-
tion of time. But he didn’t abandon Bergson, instead he combines him with 
Husserl to solve his problem of a clarification of Weber’s concepts especially 
the concept of meaning: «The problem of meaning is a time problem» (Schütz 
1967: 12).  In his investigation he starts with «Bergson’s distinction between 
living within the stream of experience and living within the world of space 
and time» (Schütz 1967: 45). That opens up a double perspective, on the one 
hand we have enduring processes, like for example the flowing motion of an 
arrow, and on the other frozen, spatialized acts, the space traversed by the 
arrow divided into single points. 
Indeed, when I immerse myself  in my stream of  consciousness, in my duration, 
I do not find clearly differentiated experiences at all. […] I cannot distinguish 
between the Now and the Earlier, between the later Now and the Now that has 
just been […]. For I experience my duration as a unidirectional, irreversible 
stream and find that between a moment ago and just now, I have grown older. 
But I cannot become aware of  this while still immersed in the stream. As long 
as my whole consciousness remains temporally uni-directional and irrevers-
ible, I am unaware either of  my own own growing older or of  any difference 
between present and past. The very awareness of  the stream of  duration pre-
supposes a turning-back against the stream, a special kind of  attitude toward 
the stream, a ‘reflection,’ as we will call it (Schütz 1967: 47).
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Schütz combines this distinction with Husserl’s concepts of retention and 
reproduction, because especially retention allows the constitution of an order 
of different Nows in the duration, in the ongoing flow of experiences. Re-
production on the other hand ensures the identity of an object, as only with 
recollection a comparison and a judgement about likeness is possible. Because 
meaning constitution presupposes discrete experiences, it is not possible to 
ascribe meaning, while living in the stream of experiences. That is possible 
only in reflection, in a retrospective glance, an act of attention to the past ex-
periences (a movement taken again from Bergson). Then, a single experience 
can be selected as a discrete one and just in selecting it it is bestowed with 
meaning. It is also interpreted with schemes of experiences at hand. So, the 
memory functions, retention and reproduction and also protention and antici-
pation, arrange and order the unstructured stream of consciousness, so that 
subjective time is constituted. This way, Schütz could describe the production 
of order between the elements of the durée, which in Bergson’s conception 
remains unclear. 
We have here developed in combining Bergson and Husserl the form of 
time in Schütz’s theory: the subjective time of the consciousness, which is the 
base for all processes of subjective meaning constitution and action. 
b) Intersubjective time and simultaneity
While subjective meaning can only be bestowed to one’s own past experi-
ences, the situation changes with the establishment of intersubjectivity. This 
is done in leaving the transcendental analysis of the stream of thoughts and 
changing to the natural attitude of everyday life. Social situations imply the 
encounter of two or more individuals:  
By merely ‘looking’ I can grasp even those of  your lived experiences which you 
have not yet noticed and which are for you still prephenomenal and undiffer-
entiated. […] You and I are in a specific sense ‘simultaneous’, […] we ‘coexist’ 
(Schütz 1967: 102).  
Schütz states here, that two streams of consciousness are synchronized 
by and in interaction, in the practical operations involved in perceiving one 
another, communicating, or acting together.  The two or more streams of 
consciousness involved have their own rhythm, their own feeling of time, heir 
own subjective time constituted as described above. But meeting at a certain 
point of time leads to synchronization of these separated times. The mediators 
are, with Bergson, the bodily expressions of the participants of the situation. 
The mutual perceiving and interpreting the other happens in the present of 
the encounter, and, as the formal structure of both streams of consciousness 
involved is the same,  they are synchronized in their mutual reference to the 
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other. So, production of synchronicity is a practical achievement. And it holds 
true only for the specific social situation. That means, the newly constituted 
intersubjective time is not a temporal dimension for itself, but just two or more 
interconnected or interwoven subjective times. This way of «growing older 
together», of coexisting in simultaneity  in spatial immediacy is the basic so-
cial situation. The temporal dimension of such a situation is structured by the 
involved subjective times phased on to the other. This is the second form of 
time, Schütz describes. It implies quite a lot of presuppositions, that are ne-
cessary, if the intersubjective time should be connected to both the subjective 
times: awareness of the other, perceptibility of the other, and bodily media-
tion of perceptions and actions. These presuppositions are necessary, if the 
egological constituted time should be fundamental for intersubjective time, 
which then is only a short-termed deduction of subjective times. 
In addition the in pragmatically constituted intersubjective time in the world 
of working (“Wirkwelt”) Schütz mentions an objective time, which seems to be 
the physical time of the objects «which is quantifiable, divisible, and spatial» 
(Schutz 1967: 103). This is also the time of history (see Schütz 1967: 212 ff.). 
Summing up, we can find, at a first glance  to Husserl three forms of time in 
Schütz’ Phenomenology of the social world: the subjective time of consciousness, the 
intersubjective time of a specific social situation and the objective time of things 
and of history. But at a second glance at least the subjective and the intersubjec-
tive time differ in a quite great extent from Husserl. In both forms elements of 
Bergson’s theory are introduced, not at least to pave a more durable way for a 
sociological theory of time. Therefore, the body and the pragmatic context of 
working (“Wirken”) function as a replacement for the transcendental explana-
tion of Husserl and as a connection to the sociality of the everyday life-world.   
Schütz’s later considerations and clarifications on time
Time remains an important topic for Schütz all through his work. Especially, 
in his Fragments Toward a Phenomenology of Music (1944/1996) he dwells more in-
tensively on the subject of time and adds some detailing to his theory of time: 
If  you look at your watch, you will find that it takes about three minutes to play 
one side of  a twelve-inch record. This is an important fact for the person in 
charge of  making up a radio program.  It is entirely immaterial for the listener. 
To the listener, it is not true that the time he lived through while listening to 
the slow movement of  a symphony was of  equal length to the time he lived 
through while listening to its finale, although each movement needed the play-
ing of  two sides of  a twelve-inch record (Schütz 1944/1996: 254). 
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There are two modes of time shown in this example: the (external) time of 
the watch, the radio program, the record and the time of the subjective ex-
perience of music. Both modes of time are incommensurable and as it seems, 
unlinkable. But there is a link between the record and mind of the listener: 
the music coming out of the loud speakers. Again, the bodily perception of 
the music functions as mediation to the mind. And there is another link: 
What is not mentioned is the practice of turning or changing of the record 
right in the middle of the adagio or the allegro. In this moments the action, 
the world of working interrupts the pure experience of music and links the 
subjective time to the temporal dimensions of the outer world. It is a leap be-
tween two modes of consciousness and between two spheres of time. Again, 
the bodily action mediates the two temporal dimensions. In both cases the 
body bridges the difference between subjective and external time through 
pragmatic action or perception. Combined with the Schützian theory of 
multiple realities, we have here a first reference to differentiated forms of 
time (see Sebald 2011), even if the social status of these different provinces of 
meaning remains unclear.  
«Inner time projected into space becomes the dimension in which our ac-
tions take place, the dimension which we share with our fellow men, and 
which, by a supervening idealization, may be conceived as the cosmic time 
or the time of the physicists» (Schütz 1944/1996: 254). Eventually that leads 
to Riemann’s and Einstein’s conception of spatial time, wherein time is the 
fourth dimension. The theoretical link between these different spheres here is 
just named «projection». The background of this conception is not so much 
Husserl, but Bergson. For him, the time of the durée is the unaccessible base 
of all subjective and social life. Taking this, all forms of time seem to be rooted 
in the egological subjective time for Schütz. 
But when he develops the temporal dimension of music further it becomes 
clear that the subjective time is not only and entirely constituted in the con-
sciousness itself. It is triggered also by the outer stream of tones, its rhythm, its 
specific articulation: 
We have to consider what we called the articulation of  the  musical flux into 
unit and sub-units. Any musician knows this problem very well. It has for him 
the name of  musical phrasing. The art of  musical phrasing consists in making 
each unit  and sub-unit discernible by bringing together into one single phrase 
what belongs together, and to separate it from the next phrase by a very short 
interruption of  the flux of  music – so short, sometimes, that even no sign of  no-
tation is required in order to mark the short pause between the end of  the first 
and the beginning of  the next phrase. It is these small fractions of  time, incom-
mensurable in our current notation, which the singer or the wind instrument 
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player needs for breathing, or the string instrument player needs for changing 
the stroke of  his bow. The composer of  our times order the players by the use 
of  ties or rubato, or even in special cases by the use of  rests, to observe these 
thematical units and sub-units (Schütz 1944/1996: 274). 
The point here is not so much the thematically structured stream of mu-
sic, but that this structure is transposed in listening into a structure of the 
stream of consciousness of the listener: «The listener is invited and incited 
by them [the short intermittences] to look from this end-phase back to initial 
phase» (Schütz 1944/1996: 274-75). The division into units «incited» (not: 
determined) by the phrasing of music is then not only a thematical division, 
but also a temporal one, because the points of reflection, for the mechanisms 
of retention and protention are thus induced into the subjective mind. «The 
attitude of the listener, his decision to follow the flux of music, involved his 
preparedness to perform the reflective attitude as soon as the flux of music 
itself invites him to do so» (Schütz 1944/1996: 275). Again, the bodily percep-
tion takes on external sequences and synchronizes the mind with them. This 
also holds true for the situation of communication or making music together: 
in perceiving and phasing in with the other(s), in a specific tuning-in-relation-
ship, the foundation of common, intersubjective time is achieved.  
There are two more important clarifications to be found in this fragment. 
First, Schütz describes the process of time constitution with the example of 
listening to a piece of music in a very detailed way: 
This attitude of  reflection is made possible by that peculiar function of  our 
mind which is generally called the faculty of  memory. The Now which turned 
into a past does not entirely disappear; it may be recollected; it is no longer an 
actual vivid experience, but it subsists as remembrance of  things past. It is this 
faculty of  memory, which makes the stream of  our consciousness an unbroken 
and interrelated sequel of  our thoughts in inner time  (Schütz 1944/1996: 
255).
In distinguishing with Husserl the short term memory called retention and 
a long term memory, called reproduction, Schütz  develops the time-consti-
tuting potential of memory further. A similar differentiation holds true for the 
dimension of the future: the short termed form, protention and a long term 
form, anticipation. Both the memory of past and of future  not only ensure the 
unbrokenness and interrelatedness of the stream of consciousness, but in con-
necting the different points of time to a unbroken line of time and therefore to 
the ground of each subjective consciousness. In changing between the differ-
ent modes of time (past, present, future), time itself is constituted and memory 
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becomes the founding operation for it. The second clarification deals with the 
role of the body in time constitution. In a only shortly published appendix to 
the Fragments towards a phenomenology of music Schütz discusses the phenomenon 
of rhythm and, again, links it to the body: 
We are not only aware of  the sensation which the air we breathe creates in 
our oral-nasal tract at any inhalation and exhalation, we feel also distinctly 
the movement of  our breast as a rhythmical movement of  a part of  our body, 
a movement which we do not only percieve as a recurrent experience in our 
inner time, but which can be altogether experienced as an occurrence in outer 
space—the optical and the haptical space—in which our body as an extended 
thing partakes like any other object (Schütz 2013: 20-21).
That means, Schütz’s phenomenological research on music takes into ac-
count the Bergsonian connection of mind and body, of (inner) time and space 
and their theoretical characterization. The important point Schütz makes 
here is that rhythm is a occurrence in inner time, but bound to movement and 
especially bodily movements and its kinaesthetic perception. It seems to me, 
that here is the point to understand the unwillingness, which Schütz expresses 
in the Fragments towards a phenomenology of music, to recognize rhythm as a basic 
and universal element of music, because the close connection to the bodily 
sphere lets music step out of pure inner time. Nevertheless, the rhythms of the 
body seem to have an impact on the constitution of inner time3.
The problem in Schütz is the attempt to root all time dimensions in the 
egologically constituted subjective time. From here he develops unspecified, 
but mostly body-based links to other levels of time and assumes an unprob-
lematic transition between the egological consciousness and the intersubjec-
tive life-world. He concludes that a parallelism of the temporal structures 
leads to kind of synchronicity, to the constitution of an intersubjectively shared 
time. But there are some hints to be found that point to synchronization as 
a practical achievement through bodily perceptions and movements. If the 
unproblematic transition between the levels is discarded, there are three levels 
of time left: the subjective time (maybe distinguished between a time of the 
consciousness and a time of the body), the intersubjective time as a pragmatic 
achievement and the external, objective or better: socially produced time. Be-
fore coming to a conclusion, the last form shall be discussed with Ilja Srubar’s 
notion of «produced time». 
3 Husserl came to a similar conclusion in his last manuscripts, when he founds subjective time 
on bodily instincts (see Mensch 2010: 247ff.). 
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Ilja Srubar’s differentiation between constituted and produced time
In relying on great parts of the phenomenological tradition Ilja Srubar (1974) 
accentuates the conception of time with his differentiation of constituted time 
and produced time. The constituted subjective time is, as in the whole phe-
nomenological tradition, the time of the own durée, the time of the inner 
stream of experiences. But additionally he tries to show a social dimension 
in it, an intersubjective validity. In starting from Schütz’ General Thesis of 
the Alter Ego, which includes the parallelism of the temporal structures of 
both minds. Both are operating in a present using retentions and reproduc-
tions, protentions and anticipations. Discussing persons with an associative 
disorder  (aphasia), he concludes that the disorder is a lack of a shared tempo-
ral structure, which produces an inability to speak and act in a meaningful 
way. Srubar concludes that the temporal structure of the life world has to be 
intersubjective in order to enable communication and interaction. Thus, he 
circumvents the phenomenological problem of bridging the gap between the 
egological conceived I and the social situation. 
Meaning and intersubjectivity are built up on and with these shared tem-
poral structures. But the temporal objects constituted in everyday life world 
transcend this sphere and point to another temporal structure: the produced 
time. This form of time is defined as a temporal rhythm or a temporality of 
its own right (Srubar 1974: 102) independent of the life world. Therefore, it 
appears in the life-world (or «constituted social world» in Srubar’s terms) as 
anonymous and maybe as a form of estrangement. Furthermore,  it is the base 
for establishing types and roles in the social environment. These ways, the 
produced time reaches into the life-world. Srubar shows with the examples 
of unemployed people and prisoners that a breakdown of the produced time 
prohibits an adequate comprehension of situations.  
The produced time is produced socially, but not easy if at all to change 
with individual intentional action. The produced time is result of the divi-
sion of labour and is located primarily in the economic production of a so-
ciety. The material processes of (re)production, the time for the circulation 
of capital and the relation of the working time necessary for reproduction 
and the additional working time set specific rhythms and an time of its own 
right. It cannot be controlled by the participants of the production process. 
It is a social form of time, social in the sense of social facts as conceptual-
ized by Durkheim. If the Marx-induced preference for the economic sphere 
is extended to other or all social fields of order, we can take the produced 
times as a product of the differentiation of society, in so far as all fields 
of order develop their own temporality, their own time structures. Srubar 
has complemented the phenomenological forms of constituted temporalities 
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with the produced social temporalities of societies that are differentiated in 
a high degree. 
Conclusions
To sum up, we have complex collection of time forms both in the subjective 
and in the social sphere. All of them could be necessary elements for a theory 
of social time. In a first step I will try to collocate them: 
1. Forms of time on the subjective level:
a) The time of the body: The body is not just an mediator between world 
and mind. The rhythms of a living body, its needs and drives, constitute 
own temporal structures. Chronobiology is active in this field, but as 
these forms of time are also constitutive for action and reflection, they 
are also relevant for a social theory of time.
b) The time of the consciousness: The subjective time, as analyzed by 
Husserl and Schütz, with its form of the specious present, its references 
to the past and future, is central for the perception and feeling of time. 
2. Forms of time on the intersubjective level: In social interactions and situa-
tions the subjective temporalities encounter each other and are confronted 
with produced time forms. The result is a complex conglomerate, which 
has to be synchronized.
3. Forms of produced time on the social level: In societies differentiated in 
a high degree, the different and in a certain sense independent and self-
contained fields of order develop an own temporality, dependent on the 
rhythms of the processes, that built them up. This way, provinces of mean-
ing (if they are social), organizations, bureaucracies or social systems have 
their own temporality, established by the speed of their communication, 
the circulation of objects in them, and their integration of past and future 
into present operations. 
If we distinguish this multiplicity of forms of time, there remain two prob-
lems to solve. Firstly, is there a common mechanism for the formation of these 
different forms of time? And secondly, what kind of interrelations are to found 
between these different forms? 
For an answer to the first question, I would propose to rely on Husserl’s 
and Schütz’s form of time constitution. Time is constituted in the permanent 
change from present to past and future, the permanent oscillating between 
past, present and future as Luhmann (1996: 38-40) in an explicit reference to 
Husserl has called it. The operation necessary for that is memory. Not only 
the individual memory of minds, but especially for the produced temporalities 
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the specific social memories of organizations, of systems, of collectives (see Se-
bald 2014). The processes laying the ground for a social unit or a specific field 
of social order, in their rhythm, in their repetitions and recurrences, in their 
references to past and future produce an own and autonomous time. 
But if there are so much different social times and temporal structures, 
there would be no interaction, no communication, no social process at all. 
Therefore, it is important to take a look at the relations and the connections 
between the forms and levels of time. I would propose to take the differences 
and the demarcations between the different forms seriously in this way, that 
we may not assume an easy crossing and linking between them. Instead, we 
should, like Bergson but without stating an inaccessibility, act on the assump-
tion that a crossing between and a linking of different forms always involves 
a change of them. Luhmann coined the term «structural coupling» for that 
link, but doesn’t really fill it. Renn (2006a) offers the metaphor of transla-
tion, that seems to be more adequate, because it implies a transformation that 
is not entirely disconnected from the primary condition. This translation is 
a pragmatic one, achieved in communications and interactions, that make 
synchronization of the temporalities involved necessary. As a means for this 
synchronizations the coordinated universal time has been introduced and is 
widely used in our globalized world. But that doesn’t mean that all different 
forms and levels of time vanish, on the contrary, the more societies differenti-
ate the more temporalities emerge. 
Both answers are just short sketches of what has to be done yet in order to 
conceive a sociological theory of time, but that would mean a lot of further 
work and is for now left to anticipation.     
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Time, intersubjectivity, and musical relationship in 
Alfred Schutz
Riccardo Venturini
In this work I tackle certain aspects of the relationship between time and intersubjectivity in Alfred 
Schutz. I present a summary of the methodological architecture of the Austrian sociologist, outlining 
the specificity of the relationship between time and consciousness. I discuss the treatment of the musical 
experience as an example of the peculiar declination of a series of temporal dynamics connected to the 
intersubjective creation of meanings. Finally, I set out some thoughts related to the debate on the relation-
ship between time, intersubjectivity and music in Schutz.
The musical relationship is a context endowed with meaning, not the object of conceptualization, that 
allows us to identify in a paradigmatic way the relationship between the subjective sense and experience 
of the other. The theory of appresentation of Schutz is the center of the process of constitution of meaning 
of the understanding of the other. The emergence of meaning is related to the dynamics of the passive and 
active poles of the consciousness and the constitution, in the we-relation, of a radically intersubjective 
dimension that exceeds the Cartesian distinction between inside and outside.
1. Time, consciousness and action
Time is one of the central categories of the noetic analysis of Schutz. It’s well 
known that one of the criticisms of the Austrian sociologist of the comprehen-
sive sociology of Weber is that of not having given sufficient attention to time 
in the examination of meaning, subjectively understood. Schutz reworks the 
theses on time of Bergson and Husserl in a synthesis that helps us to under-
stand a number of processes related to the constitution of subjectivity and the 
intersubjectivity in the world of everyday life1.
According to Schutz, «the problem of meaning is a time problem», it per-
tains to «internal time consciousness» (Schutz 1967: 12). Time is not a matter 
of conscience: it is consciousness that constitutes time. 
1 I’ll take for granted the theory of  finite provinces of  meaning, which constitutes the scope 
from which emerges the problem of  time in the eyes of  Schutz and the fundamental theme of  
the typicality of  experience, which Natanson explains, is perhaps one of  the main terms of  the 
vocabulary of  Schutz (Natanson 1973: 111). 
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The first aspect of the link between temporality and experience implies 
the distinction between sense of action and sense of the action accomplished. 
According to Schutz, we must clearly distinguish between the current action 
(actio) and the act made (actum) (Schutz 1967: 39). The act performed refers to 
the past, while the action is related to the future, the present course with its 
protentions and anticipations. Since the action of the actor is future-oriented 
this anticipatory nature leads to the engagement of a project that precedes it 
in the timeline (ibid.: 82-83). The project is the temporal expression of inten-
tionality, it has the form of the future perfect (modo futuri exacti) and has as its 
object the action accomplished in fantasy. Only the completed actions are 
accessible to the reflective glance, they are acts conceived in the form of time 
past (modo praeterito), while in planning future action the subject refers to its 
hypothetical conclusion2.
As in Weber, the sense of action is linked to the motives; between project 
and motives for action there is a fundamental temporal connection. The au-
thor distinguishes between “final” motives (in-order-to) and “causal” motives 
(because):
From the actor’s point of  view, ‘in-order-to motives’ concern the future [...]. In 
short, the aim motivates the project. “Because motives” instead refer to the past 
and represent the motivation of  the aim itself  of  the action. [...] The nature 
of  this type of  motive is complex: it is rooted in the actor’s personality, in his 
unconscious. It is sufficient here to recall that Schütz affirms the quasi-causal 
nature of  such motives, given that they operate behind the actor’s back, so to 
speak. Furthermore, while I am living the course of  the action, I am also turned 
towards the future. I am therefore driven by in-order-to motives. To grasp the 
“because motives” the actor must turn to his past (Muzzetto 2006b: 15).
According to Schutz, there are two distinct attitudes towards experience: 
the direct and the reflective attitude. The direct attitude is the direct experi-
ence over the course of events of that which is experienced in the “here and 
now.” In this “to live in their own actions” the actors have a very low level of 
awareness of the acts they commit. In the reflective attitude, however, the ac-
2 Moreover, says Schutz, the knowledge now available «at the time of  projecting [...]must nec-
essarily be different from that which I shall have when the now merely projected act will have 
been materialized. Until then I shall have grown older and if  nothing else has changed, at least 
the experiences I shall have had while carrying out my project will have enlarged my knowl-
edge. In other words, projecting like any other anticipation carries along its empty horizons 
which will be filled in merely by the materialization of  the anticipated event. This constitutes 
the intrinsic uncertainty of  all forms of  projecting» (Schutz 1962: 69).
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tor turns his attention to his own experience by engaging in an act to reverse 
the flow of consciousness, figuratively “stops to think.” With reflection they 
delineate clearly those experiences that flow indiscriminately in durée (Schutz 
1967: 102). The change of attitude leads to a change of the temporal structure. 
With reflection you stop to think, time is metaphorically stopped by awareness, 
even if the reflection does not stop the flow of internal time and the changing 
of knowledge underlying this change. Thus emerges the problem of the time 
lag between the flow of experience and the acquisition of knowledge3, that ac-
cording to some is a paradox. The paradox of meaning that would imply the 
contradiction between lived experience and present experience: if only the first 
is delineable reflexively, then the second would seem excluded from the attribu-
tion of meaning4. The solution to this paradox is present in the same theory of 
action of Schutz, that is the frame in which the study of the structure of con-
sciousness occurs. In the predicative moment of reflection there is also active a 
set of experienced imagined futures. If in Weber only the action is meaningful, 
and not the behavior5, for Schutz the meaning of the action is in the act. We 
have seen that the project is taking a position on the future. The meaning is 
the result of the intentionality of the reflective act. As Muzzetto explains, this
3 Muzzetto notes that the relationship between sense and temporality is further complicated by 
the character of  the intentional units. The structure of  these units of  meaning emerges in the 
predicative sphere of  transversal intentionality, but has its roots in the pre-predicative sphere 
of  longitudinal intentionality. The latter is connected to a context, which assumes the temporal 
relationship between current, future and past experiences. The context consists of  quanta, by in-
divisible elements in the flow of  internal time that depend on the passive syntheses (Schutz and 
Luckmann, 1973: 56). Put another way, the intentional units are relational units that consist 
of  idealizations of  the and-so-on (e-cosi-via) and the you-can-always-renew (si-può-sempre-di 
nuovo) idealizations connected to internal time. «The structure of  quanta is consistent with the 
notion of  flux. Thus, the now of  the stream of  consciousness, the present of  human experience, 
is not an instant experienced as separate from the preceding and the following instants: it is a 
“vivid present” which, like James’s “specious present”, 17 is tied to the past and to the future» 
(Muzzetto 2006b: 11).
4 According to Cox, this paradox is the result of  a misinterpretation of  the theses on inner con-
sciousness of  time by Husserl. Schutz would read through the pattern of  Bergson and would 
face an insurmountable predicament. As Muzzetto explains, «Cox fails to discern the original-
ity of  Schütz’s position (Although it is certainly true that in his use of  Husserl and Bergson, 
Schütz is not greatly concerned with proving the compatibility of  their theoretical approaches, 
nor with providing an analytical demonstration of  his own stance)» (Muzzetto 2006b: 13).
5 Giolo Fele speaks of  “Weber’s paradox”: if  behavior endowed with meaning is only that 
which is conscious, that in which one has a «reciprocal intentional orientation [...] in which the 
meaning is given by sharing a repertoire of  meanings, a common set of  symbols that draw on» 
sender and receiver, then most of  the daily actions, such as those of  routine, are foolish (Fele 
2001: 204).
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represents the central point of  the solution of  the problematic node related to 
the relationship between time and meaning: the project makes significant both 
the act and the action. Only the possibility of  imagining an action completed 
allows me to design and then to genuinely bring into being the individual phas-
es of  the action: these depend on the final outcome to be achieved. The action 
can be understood as consisting of  partial actions each of  which represents 
a step towards the final result. The what resolves the problem of  the unitary 
character of  the action and its articulation. The view that the meaning does 
not belong to the immediacy of  the experience in the stream of  consciousness 
thus does not mean that the sense operates as a sort of  Paretian “derivation” 
or in any case a rationalization. The what would be inevitable if  it were at-
tributable only to a reflection ex post on the experience. But we can anticipate 
our steps reflexively. The possibility of  the meaning of  the present is thus in 
the capacity to anticipate, to think in advance about the results (imagined) of  
our steps. Even the action, not only the experience is therefore endowed with 
meaning. And so the present also acquires sense from the anticipation of  the 
future (Muzzetto 2006b: 14).
To argue that the meaning is in the project, doesn’t mean to establish an 
exact match of the future results of the action, nor does it mean to put in 
place an ontological separation between spheres. The project is not realized, 
for example, because the reality is in itself risky or because the actor is un-
able to discover a “right combination” able to put him/her in the condition 
to discover a state of future things connected to a presumed actual uniform-
ity. This view leads to naive realism, because it would mean bringing to the 
world of science aspects of the world of common sense, in which uncertainty 
is suspended “for practical purposes”. The central point is that the future 
will always be configured differently from what has been sketched previ-
ously because the knowledge available and the system of relevances of the 
subject will necessarily be different6. The meaning given to a point in time 
“A” will always be different from the meaning given to point in time “B”. In 
a certain sense the changing of knowledge is an important imposition. The 
relationship between project and reality is a relationship of construction in 
which the time elements of the project shape what is called “reality”7. This 
6 Schutz writes: «Until then I shall have grown older and if  nothing else has changed, at least 
the experiences I shall have had while carrying out my project will have enlarged my knowl-
edge» (Schutz 1962: 69).
7 One must always bear in mind that “reality” in Schutz is a deliberately controversial concept 
that expresses a tension between the idea of  common sense, of  something that exists “out 
there”, and the phenomenological conception that what exists “out there” is always something 
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applies not only for the future but also for the attribution of meaning to past 
events8.
I think the central aspect of the paradox of time is not its solution, impos-
sible as in all paradoxes, but its neutralization. This recalls the comprehensive 
methodological system of Schutz, who translates the principle of “return of 
things to themselves” of Husserl into a radically empirical analysis. With this 
in mind, the meaning that can be established from the “specious present” of 
the social relationship is central, a time that cannot be absolutely defined9.
It seems that the reason for this is the following: We have no power to define 
the limits of  our specious present, to draw its border lines over against the past 
or the future. Our stream of  consciousness is itself  articulated. Impulses and 
resting places, periods of  tension and relaxation alternate. Wave follows wave, 
each wave having its crest and valley. Each of  these impulses is experienced as 
a unit, a movement in inner time which tends to fulfil its final phase as soon as 
meaningful that becomes such only after being experienced. The author says: «I am afraid I do 
not exactly know what reality is, and my only comfort in this unpleasant situation is that I share 
my ignorance with the greatest philosophers of  all time» (Schutz 1964: 88).
8 The vision of  Schutz can be considered a special variant of  the hermeneutical circle. It has a 
reciprocal relationship between the constitution of  experience, sedimentation in the depths of  
knowledge available, activation facing a new experience.
9 One of  the sources from which Schutz draws is Augustine of  Hippo, according to which 
time is made of  more moments that follow one another without ever being present, of  past 
moments that are collected when they no longer exist, of  future moments that never exist. Ac-
cording to Augustine, time exists in the consciousness and not outside of  this, consciousness is 
the only way to measure it. Time does not have a factual consistency, that is to say it does not 
have a measurable extension outside of  consciousness. The past is no longer because when it 
is collected by the consciousness it is no longer present, the present is elusive because we grasp 
it when it has already passed, the future is never present because it is anticipated by the con-
science. Augustine writes: «What then is time? If  no one asks me, I know; if  I want to explain it 
to someone who asks, I no longer know. And yet I calmly affirm to know that if  nothing passed 
there would be no past, and if  nothing happens, there would be no future, and if  nothing ex-
isted there would be no present. So in that sense there exists two of  these times, the past and 
the future, if  the past is no more and the future is not yet? With regard to the present, if  it were 
always present and were not to lapse into the past, there would not be time, but eternity. So if  
the present, to be a part of  time, exists inasmuch as it elapses into the past, in what sense can 
we say that it also exists? If  indeed its only reason for being is that it will not exist: in reality it’s 
true, as we say, that time exists only as much as it tends not to be» (Augustine 1989: Book XI, 
14:17). The size of  conscience recalls the reflexive centrality of  the present. Humans measure 
time through the soul, understood as a reflection on the past, the present and the future. Au-
gustine speaks of  “trinity of  the present.” The past, present and future, Augustine substitutes, 
respectively, the present of  the past, recalling the memory, the present of  the present, linked to 
perception-attention, the present of  the future, related to anticipation (ibid.: Book XI, 20:26).
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it starts. If  we interrupt this development before the impulse comes to an end, 
if  we make this impulse abortive, we cannot grasp our specious present and the 
relevant sector of  our past adherent to it (Schutz 1996: 274).
2. Time, intersubjectivity and music
2.1 Time and intersubjectivity
The time difference between direct attitude and reflection is essential to un-
derstanding the difference between comprehension of experiences, of one’s self, 
and that of the experiences of others, of the Alter. Schutz says:
We cannot approach the realm of  our Self  without an act of  reflective turn-
ing. But what we grasp by the reflective act is never the present of  our stream 
of  thought and also not its specious present; it is always its past. Just now the 
grasped experience pertained to my present, but in grasping it I know it is 
not present any more. And, even if  it continues, I am aware only by an after-
thought that my reflective turning towards its starting phases has been simul-
taneous with its continuation. The whole present, therefore, and also the vivid 
present of  our Self, is inaccessible for the reflective attitude. We can only turn 
to the stream of  our thought as if  it had stopped with the last grasped experi-
ence. In other words, self-consciousness can only be experienced modo praeterito, 
in the past tense (Schutz 1962: 172-173).
In this step, Schutz further specifies a crucial moment in time: to live in 
our acts, the “vivid present”, as opposed to the indirect reflexive grasping of 
the ego or self, in time past. The vivid present, or “specious present”, is the 
civic time or common time, is the result of the union between the internal 
time of the flow of consciousness, quality, and external time, cosmic, quanti-
fied. The vivid present is the matrix of all social relations, it is the dimension 
that regulates the various levels of actors’ lives, making possible the intersub-
jective coordination among human beings (Schutz, 1962: 222)10.
The vivid present is particularly important because it is linked to that idea 
of “being in the world” as pre-predicative evidence of human experiences. 
10  Berger and Luckmann emphasize the “constriction” of  the present vividly: “The temporal 
structure of  everyday life confronts me as a facticity with which I must reckon, that is, with 
which I must try to synchronize my own projects. I encounter time in everyday reality as con-
tinuous time and finite. The same temporal structure [...] is coercive. I cannot reverse at will 
the sequences imposed by it” (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 41).
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Schutz takes some concepts present in the thought of Merleau-Ponty to ex-
plain how this temporal mode, full of intersubjectivity from the start, is fun-
damental for the categories of thought: 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the thinking of  the normal mind does not con-
sist in subsuming experiences under categories. The category imposes upon 
the terms which it unites a significance which is exterior to them. This syn-
thesis originates in the vivid present, that is, in the pre-predicative evidence 
of  the unique world to which all our experiences refer. This primordial world 
is structurized by a system of  significations, that is, of  correspondences, rela-
tions, participations, which the concrete subject spreads around himself, liv-
ing in them and through them and using them not by an explicit conceptual 
procedure but merely by his being within the world. From there the higher 
structurizations of  our conscious life are built up by reactivating our sedi-
mented experiences and amalgamating them with the actual vivid thought 
(ibid.: 274).
According to the Austrian sociologist, intersubjectivity is a given in the 
world of everyday life. The author believes that the vision of Husserl’s tran-
scendental intersubjectivity leads to a series of insurmountable aporia. In the 
world of everyday life, the other is cultured appresentatively11 by the size of 
the we-relation, which is the social relationship in which you live a kind of 
fusion with the other. In this relationship the other body is the pre-eminent 
vehicle of understanding the other12. This understanding does not imply an 
act of inference, there is no perception of a body and then the attribution 
of meaning through a reflexive act. The understanding of the other comes 
directly. I gather the other in the pre-predicative sphere because the signs of 
his/her body (facial expressions, proxemics) immediately recall “our” experi-
11  Schutz reworks the theory of  appresentation of  Husserl adapting it to his analysis on inter-
subjectivity in the world of  everyday life. «It seems to us that Husserl’s theory of  appresenta-
tion covers all cases of  significative and symbolic references dealt with by the various authors 
discussed before. In all these cases an object, fact, or event is not experienced as a “self,” but as 
standing for another object which is not given in immediacy to the experiencing subject. The 
appresenting member “wakens” or “calls forth” or “evokes” the appresented one. [...] These 
appresentational relations may occur on various levels: appresented an object may in turn 
appresent another one, there are signs of  signs, and symbols of  symbols, etc. Moreover, the 
appresenting immediate experience need by no means consist in the perception of  the physical 
object: it may be a recollection, a fantasm, a dream, etc» (ibid.: 297).
12  In the natural attitude, the body functions as an index of  the experience of  others, «the mere 
existence of  a frame of  reference referring to the Other, of  a system of  interpretable signs or 
symbols, for instance, is sufficient for the belief  in the existence of  other persons» (ibid.: 177).
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ence. The size of us is constitutive of social reality; as Natanson explains, it is 
the systemic root of society13.
The fact that I can grasp the Other’s stream of  thought, and this means the 
subjectivity of  the alter ego in its vivid present, whereas I can grasp my own 
self  only by way of  reflection on its past, leads us to a definition of  the alter ego: 
the alter ego is that subjective stream of  thought which can be experienced in 
its vivid present. [...] The alter ego, therefore, is that stream of  consciousness 
whose activities I can seize in their present by my own simultaneous activities. 
This experience of  the Other’s stream of  consciousness in vivid simultaneity I 
propose to call the general thesis of  the alter ego’s existence. It implies that this stream 
of  thought which is not mine shows the same fundamental structure as my own 
consciousness (Schutz 1962: 173-74).
The union of the streams of experience is the main theme of the reflections 
of Schutz on intersubjectivity. It is a theme that recalls the size of the precon-
ceptuality of the sense of social relations, the human universe of pure sociability 
emerging in the temporal sphere of the vivid present.
2.2 The musical relationship and its characters
The analysis of the constitutive dimension of time is configured in a particular 
way in the analyzes on the musical relationship. Schutz was interested in music 
as a social phenomenon to be understood as an act of co-construction and con-
veyance of meanings. The intent of the Austrian sociologist was to provide a rig-
orous theoretical basis for the “scandalous” problem of intersubjectivity, a theme 
taken for granted in the social sciences (as was the problem of language). The 
correctness of following a melody, whether its a piece of music or a symphony, is 
the nucleus of the analysis on the intersubjective character of music. According 
to the author,
music is a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme. Yet 
this meaningful context can be communicated: The process of  communication 
between composer and listener normally requires an intermediary: an individ-
ual performer or a group of  coperformers. Among all these participants there 
prevail social relations of  a highly complicated structure (Schutz 1964: 159).
13 Natanson asserts that, with the theory of  we-relation as «systemic root of  a shared world» 
(Natanson 1977: 110), Schutz passes from an ego-centered approach to one centered on society 
and intersubjectivity.
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When Schutz speaks of a meaningful context he wants to underline that there 
are social rules followed by the actor to establish the correct meaning: the in-
terpreter’s task is to understand the correct meaning (Schutz 1996: 243). In ad-
dition, the standards of correctness are not connected to the conceptual aspect. 
Schutz contrasted language with music. Language has a function of mainly se-
mantic representation, it is formed by a series of terms (nouns, verbs, adjectives) 
which refer to a conceptual scheme. This allows interpretation of the world and 
presents an syntactic apparatus applicable to propositions that can be correct 
or not on the basis of operational rules. To the contrary, music does not have 
a representative function, does not follow operational rules (ibid.: 244). Never-
theless, the experience of music has its own syntax, which is connected to the 
relationship between time and intersubjectivity: it is therefore always possible to 
determine whether the execution of a piece of music is correct or not.
The musical experience has a meaning that can be grasped only polytheti-
cally14, because it is connected to the flow of internal time. The music is an 
entity made of time that is apperceived “step-after-step” independently of the 
spatial perception15, it can not be grasped monothetically, which is equivalent 
to saying that it is experienced without a conceptual scheme connected to 
objects defined spatially. Schutz writes, when we hear a piece of music we 
participate in the flow of the music, «the flux of music and the flux of the 
stream of our consciousness are interrelated, are simultaneous; there is a unity 
between them; we swim, so to speak, in this stream. And music goes on as a 
unit which is indivisible» (ibid.: 250). 
The focal point of the musical experience, then, is the presence of a nucleus 
of meanings unable to be conceptualized. The significance of this nucleus is 
similar to that of the social relationship of us16 because in the here and now of 
14 The attribution of  meaning can happen in two ways: polythetically or monothetically. Polythet-
ic understanding involves reconstitution of  the steps through which the sense of  an experience is 
formed. With a polythetic act those courses of  events that have made the experience are retraced 
by searching for the explanatory connections. The monothetic understanding, however, is the 
synthetic grasp, in a single act, the polythetic sense of  the experiences (Schutz 1970b: 80-81). One 
essential point must be stressed: the ability to monothetically grasp experience polythetically con-
stituted indicates the presence of  connections of  meaning between the experiences themselves.
15 «Music does not require any kinaesthesia on the part of  the listener» (Schutz 1996: 253), 
because it is an ideal object independent of  the vehicle that transmits it (ibid.: 247). Music is 
an event of  internal time, «the time within which we grow old, the inner time of  our stream of  
consciousness, is entirely free from elements of  space» (ibid.: 254).
16 Kersten believes that this is a paradox. Being the ideal-typical sociology of  Schutz, it is centered 
on reflection and presents some methodological tools, such as the postulate of  adequacy, which 
permits work on this theme. Like all paradoxes, however, the non-conceptual aspect of  music and 
social relationship is always the starting point and not the final stage of  analysis (Kersten 1976: 64).
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the specious present, this nucleus is a kind of Arianne’s thread that allows the 
orientation towards meaning.
Schutz summarizes some invariant elements of the musical experience. 
First, the experience of music is «in the flux of inner time, in the stream of con-
sciousness. It does not necessarily refer to objects of the outer world» (Schutz 
1996: 260). The external dimension may be required to coordinate the events 
of internal time with spatial events. Schutz writes of appresentative references, 
which are vehicles of meaning, that is to say media that «originated in the sug-
gestions of movements and, first of all, in the movements of the human body, 
which occur simultaneously in both dimensions – the inner durée as well as the 
spatialized time» (ibid.).
Secondly, the music experience is a temporal synthesis that «takes place in 
a specious present which, by means of recollection and expectation, includes 
elements of the past and the future» (ibid.). 
Furthermore the music is experienced as a whole, it is a theme that is con-
figured with gestalt. «The basic element of all music is a unique configuration 
called the theme. It is itself extended in inner time. It is apperceived as a unit 
(Gestalt), or as a combination of those units» (ibid.). The theme may be used, 
repeated, replaced and recur again; it can be combined with other issues or 
with parts or modifications, successive and simultaneous, of the theme itself. 
Despite these modifications, the theme is always experienced as “the same” 
theme (ibid.: 261).
Finally, the author addresses the problem of rhythm which, is not part of 
the musical experience. Rhythm is an ambiguous concept, it refers to physi-
ological events like the heartbeat or breathing, to events in the outside world 
like marching, walking, dancing and «to specific structurizations of our mod-
ern musical ideas (rhythm as a function of harmony)» (ibid.).
Schutz examines a number of basic categories of the musical relationship: 
continuity and repetition, identity, movement.
The first category is the binomial of continuity and repetition. «By way of 
retention the intermittent repetitions of the same tone are brought to coinci-
dence and apperceived as a specious continuance, although actually repeti-
tion of the same occurs» (ibid.: 263). The apperceptive mode is the intuitive 
reference to something different with respect to the present experience (Schutz 
1962: 296), it is the reference to a meaningful relationship. The virtual unity 
is then a sort of “coherence” of sense of the continuous elements in the musi-
cal flow, which are retentively mediated in the apperceptive process. Schutz 
speaks of “virtual coherence”. The repetition, however, «is merely a special 
case of the intermittence of a continuance. It is intermittence of a sameness» 
(Schutz 1996: 263). He notes that when the continuity and repetition refer to 
a functional unity, to themes or «to independent parts of the musical forms. 
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Then they do not originate in pure retention. They are based upon the oth-
er forms of memory; the repetition originates in a synthesis of recognition 
between the reproduced past experience of the theme with its actually ex-
perienced recurrence, and the continuance originates in a fulfillment of the 
previously anticipated development by the actual experience» (Schutz 1996: 
263). With this affirmation Schutz means that retention alone is not sufficient 
for the determination of meaning, reproduction is also necessary through a 
synthesis of recognition which recalls the category of identity.
The second category addressed by Schutz is identity or uniformity, «the 
question of ‘sameness’ is one of the most difficult problems of phenomenology» 
(ibid.). It is necessary to distinguish identity from sameness. It has identity when 
you are in front of an object that during the moment of attribution of meaning 
it is changed, because it has been identified as the same object at a different 
point in time than the first. It has sameness, however, when we are faced with 
two different objects that can be distinguished because they are not the same 
object. Schutz gives the example of the repetition of two re notes: they are the 
same note, but interspersed with a break. The second re is different from the 
first re because it is a repeated note that begins after the first is finished. First, 
then, there is a temporal differentiation, «the retention of the actual experience 
of the first tone in its complete development - initial phase, enduring phases, 
end-phase – has been retained when the second tone was actually experienced» 
(ibid.: 264). In the second place, the repetition of the note changes our fund of 
knowledge, albeit imperceptibly; the second re has a different meaning because 
it is placed later in time and thus is no longer the re of before because, again 
imperceptibly, it has also changed the system of relevances of the subject who 
listens. In this sense, «the entry of the second tone certainly adds something 
new to our previous experience. But it is not entirely new, there is no contrast 
between this experience and the previous one, as it was the case when the first» 
re followed a do (ibid.). The interaction of retentions attributed to a re that fol-
lows a re has a different character from that of a re that follows a do. Identity is 
therefore characterized by a change of the internal time of consciousness. «The 
same occurrence, if repeated, is not experienced as strictly the same, it is not 
even experienced as being a like experience. Our mind has changed, infini-
tesimally, but, nevertheless, changed by already having once pre-experienced» 
the re note «in the same context» (ibid.). 
The third category is that of movement17. Schutz explains that the identifi-
cation of the experiences of objects of the external world, in the manipulative 
17  Skarda says Schutz is not very clear in defining this category. The analysis of  the movement 
seems a continuation of  the analysis of  identity. Previously, Schutz had written that the spatial 
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sphere, can take place by means of kinesthetic acts. For example, it is possible 
to see and touch an object, stop the perception, return to seeing and touch-
ing the object, check and see if it is the same or not. Schutz says he has an 
intermittence in the understanding of the object, which implies the abandon-
ment and restoration of the field of experience, and the identification of the 
object as the same object as before. «In the case of visible or tangible objects, 
the synthesis of identification can be verified by releasing it from my field of 
experiencing through the performance of an appropriate kinaesthesia and 
by re-establishing the previous field through the performance of an opposite 
kinaesthesia which undoes the first one. These kinaesthesias interrupted my 
experience of the enduring sameness of the object» (Schutz 1996: 265). It is 
possible to perform the same operation in order to compare the uniformity of 
two objects. For example, to control the length of two objects I can move them 
together and compare them in order to see or touch and determine whether 
they are uniform or not. The same thing does not apply to objects acquired in 
the purely auditory field, like musical objects. Schutz gives the example of the 
sound of a waterfall: if you approach it is possible to hear it, if you move away 
it is no longer possible to hear it. The auditory object, therefore, remains in 
the stream of consciousness even if it is no longer perceived. Schutz writes that 
the knowledge of sound «is based on my knowledge that the object, “cascade”, 
exists and that it has lasted while my experiencing of it was interrupted. It is 
the knowledge of a lasting quality of an external object which is in question» 
(ibid.). In the auditory field, the intermittency of a continuity cannot be at-
tributed to a kinesthetic change that «re-establishes or even verifies sameness. 
Intermittence has not a subjective, but an objective character. The sound, the 
tone itself, has ceased to exist, and another one has started to appear. This 
other one may be like the first but it is, strictly speaking, never the same one» 
(ibid.). In internal time the synthesis of the identification does not presuppose, 
as in external spatialized time, the possibility of comparing, to superimpose 
an object and another. If in space the coexistence of two objects as different 
and separate units is possible, namely sameness is possible, «in the sphere of 
inner time, in the sphere of purely auditory experiences, there is no coexist-
ence. Likeness or sameness refers to succeeding objects; there is not the possi-
bility of looking from one object to the other in order to perform the synthesis 
of identification or of recognition. And, nevertheless, we identify the recurrent 
tone as a tone like the first, or we even say that the same tone has been re-
peated» (ibid.: 266). The author’s conclusion is that in the flow of internal time 
category of  movement, of  kinesthesia, is stranger than internal time, the auditory sphere in 
which the musical experience has a place (Skarda 1979: 73).
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and in the auditory musical sphere, «in the dimension of inner time, or in the 
purely auditory sphere of music, the form of sameness is not that of a numeri-
cal unity but of recurrent likeness; and after this explanation we will use the 
term, “sameness”, exclusively for conveying recurrent likeness [...]» (ibid.).
2.3 Passive synthesis in the experience of music
The recognition of an object of experience, «the synthesis of recognition or 
of identification…is a passive synthesis which does not require any activity of 
our mind» (ibid.), that is to say it does not require a reflective effort. Schutz ad-
dresses three aspects of the problem of passive synthesis in musical experience: 
«a) Sameness and likeness having meanings in the spatial world of visible and 
touchable objects different from those in the world of pure music which has 
its existence merely in the dimension of inner time. b) Within the experience 
of pure music the synthesis of recognition is another one if referred merely to 
recurrent times or to recurrent thematical units. c) It is quite another kind of 
synthesis at work if I recognize musical recurrences when listening to a work 
of music for the first time living within the ongoing flux (or if I re-establish 
such a situation), or if I recognize a piece of music or its thematical elements, 
not being immersed in the ongoing flux but reproducing in my mind music 
with which I am familiar» (ibid.: 268).
The first aspect is related to the irreversibility of internal time, that is the 
basis for describing the difference in meaning between the objects perceived 
in the spatial sphere and those perceived in the sphere of internal time. If the 
objects of the spatial sphere can be caught both monothetically and polytheti-
cally, the objects of internal time can be caught only polythetically. Visual and 
tactile understanding of objects in space can be modified in order to see that 
previously we have had experience of the same object that now has changed 
(Schutz 1996: 266, trans. com. 1996: 72). For example, I can turn back when I 
go the wrong way, I can return to a base point, I can go back to the position of 
familiarity and security that allows me to understand the mistake and maybe 
take the right path. Going back where I was before, I have not encountered 
any spatial obstacle. Consequently, through an monothetic understanding I 
made a comparison between the memory of what happened and what is now. 
This example is a case of what Schutz defines as illusion of passive synthesis 
of overlap. The illusion is in the fact that, from the point of view of the mean-
ing, you can never return to the same point in space time where we were, you 
cannot ever tap into the same flow. The comparison, therefore, can only take 
place after the event and what I’m actually doing is a comparison between the 
memory of the total picture of the experience I had in mind at point in time A 
and the memory of the overall picture of the experience I had at point in time 
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B. These two points, from a spatial perspective, are the same; but from the 
point of view of meaning are the same only after they have been understood, 
which is to say a monothetic understanding through which, with a single 
glance, I canceled the infinite number of changes that have occurred in the 
course of my absence from “home base.” Schutz says: «I grasp the field mono-
thetically by one single ray, and I find that there is a coincidence between 
the actual monothetic experience and the recollection – and the monotheti-
cally recollected, previous one. What gives the illusion of a ‘passive’ synthesis 
is merely the superfluousness of starting over again the polythetic activities 
of our mind in which the monothetic experience of the field has been built 
up» (ibid.: 267). The illusion of passive synthesis disappears when I consider 
my experience in a polythetic manner. Retracing step-by-step the way that I 
traveled from A to B, «if any step actually performed corresponds to like steps 
previously performed and not recollected, and if the actually performed step 
had a sedimentation like the ones recollected, I say that the field re-perceived, 
or the objects re-experienced, are the same or the same, although modified» 
(ibid.). Returning to our example, I can spatially retrace the way I have al-
ready come and ascertain if it is the same way or another. In the spatial sphere 
monothetic recognition is possible because in this sphere one has the freedom 
to return to the basic position and undo the changes that have inevitably oc-
curred in the meantime. Also in the spatial sphere I can achieve polythetic 
recognition, which will be apparent if that what is expected as familiar will 
in fact be different. This double possibility does not apply to objects in the 
temporal sphere, which can only be grasped polythetically. «Objects existing 
merely within the dimension of inner time, merely audible objects and, espe-
cially, musical objects, can only be recognized polythetically» (ibid.).
The second point involves how you have different identification depend-
ing on the reference to the succession of time or on the occurrence of the-
matic unity. In the first case we are completely immersed in the flow of in-
ternal time, we do not have any attitude towards temporal objects. Ours is a 
polythetic experience in the indistinct flow of inner consciousness of time. In 
the second case the identification refers to recurring thematic units. These 
gestalt units are in the basic position that alternates with indistinct flow. 
Schutz refers to the points of flight and rest of William James to explain the 
exit and entry from the flow of internal time. The theme is a sort of key to 
understanding, anchored to the Self, of what is happening. This theme may 
be taken up «any time if I am listening to this symphony or reproducing it 
before my inner ear» (ibid: 268).
The last point is closely related to the previous one. There are two types 
of synthesis, according to which an actor listens to a piece of music for the 
first time or recognizes it then as familiar. When I listen to a musical piece 
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that involves me for the first time, I live in the inner flow of time, I surrender 
to the flow; with the retention and reproduction I can bring out uncontrolla-
bly reflexive thoughts and memories. We are in polythetic indistinct step-by-
step experience, but we are out of the passive synthesis of identification. The 
second type of synthesis is exactly that passive identification. We are in the 
environment of thematic reflection, I can attribute the piece I listen to past 
experiences of functional thematic aspects of the music that is flowing or not.
3 Significant aspects of the relationship between time, music and intersubjectivity
The investigations of Schutz on musical relationship are of great value to the 
social sciences. They allow you to identify a number of problems that are re-
lated to the intersubjective establishment of meaning. I will isolate a number 
of points that should be understood in an ideal-typical way: the synchroniza-
tion of time of the actors, the problem of transition from the polythetic to the 
monothetic, the link between intersubjectivity and immediacy of experience, 
music as a finite province of meaning.
3.1 Synchronization of time of the actors
The first point is related to different modes of synchronization between 
different streams of consciousness of the actors involved in the musical 
relationship.
The constitution of meaning of the musical experience takes place in the 
internal time of consciousness, it is mediated by appresentative references that 
in the world of everyday life take the form of objects made by sounds and 
perceptions of movements. Schutz identifies three ideal-typical subjects in re-
ciprocal interrelations in musical relationship: the listener, the composer and 
the performers18.
The listener is one who grabs a piece of music created by another. He is 
therefore not involved in the construction of the meaning of the same song, 
but is interested in rebuilding the meaning. Goettlich holds in Fragments of 
phenomenology of music that Schutz describes the ways in which the listener be-
comes aware of the “right” meaning of a piece of music (Goettlich 2014: 247). 
18 The analysis of  Schutz concerns opera, but it can also be extended to other types of  musical 
genres. As Goettlich explained, through three ideal-types, the Austrian sociologist showed the 
ways in which, in individual experience, a musical meaning is experienced: «(1) as a listener, 
e.g., sitting in a concert hall or listening to his iPod; (2) as a musician, that is, as member of  an 
ensemble or as a soloist; (3) as a composer» (Goettlich 2014: 246).
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Music is an ideal object that exists independently of physical conditions on 
which it bases its communication, conditions that relate to external time19. 
The listener or beholder20 is linked through the music to a number of mean-
ingful aspects connected to the depth of internal time. These meaningful as-
pects involve the synchronization of internal times both with performers of 
the musical text that interpret the text and with the composer and with the 
other actors who listen to the musical means. The music blends the inner 
experience of the listener with that of other actors in the here and now of 
we-relations listen to a piece of music. In this sense, Mori speaks of music as a 
means of expression of the spontaneity of the human being. Music is a vehicle 
that allows the reciprocal tuning of the actions of the actors. The meaning 
of words is secondary to the musical atmosphere created by the appercep-
tion of sound and rhythm. The musical atmosphere is «intrinsically related 
to the inner life of the public» (Mori 2014: 270). The atmosphere is therefore 
a meaningful intersubjective structure that is conveyed by the music, recall-
ing the primordial world of inner experience of the other. The musical at-
mosphere allows the sharing of meanings between performer and audience, 
although in “quasi-simultaneity”21. Fele observes how a musical composition 
is brought to life, “is embodied” in the relationship between composer and 
beholder, through the exclusive moment «of the use (of the reading, listening, 
execution) through concrete reflective practices during the musical flow» (Fele 
2001: 209). The temporal process of listening to a piece of music brings out 
the role of knowledge as intersubjective communicative skill. These reflective 
skills22 and indexicals give effect to the meaning of the song, actualizing in 
a continuous way and «existing while the sound flow develops» (ibid.: 210). 
Fele emphasizes that the analysis of “endogenous” time of Schutz recalls the 
19 Goettlich highlights how Schutz was interested in the social aspects of  music, how his sci-
entific aim was to analyze the act of  intersubjective understanding mediated by music. For 
this reason, the work of  the Austrian sociologist is an example of  fruitful connections between 
phenomenology and sociology. The author observes that the concept of  music as a backdrop 
given meaning with no conceptual framework is unclear. “Context” is too general a category, 
the term “sound” seems to be more appropriate: «Music is a sound, or a sequence of  sounds, 
provided with meaning. Since the same can be said of  spoken language, one has to further 
clarify: Music is a meaningful sound, but the meaning is not expressed in words» (ibid.: 244).
20 Schutz states that «the term “beholder” will include the executor, the listener, the reader of  
music» (Schutz 1964: 169, trans. com. 1996: 103).
21 The experience of  the “quasi simultaneous” stream of  consciousness of  the mediator and 
the listener is also present when listening via other media such as CDs and videos.
22 It should be noted that the reflexivity mentioned by Fele refers «to the embodied practices 
through which social members produce prospectively and retrospectively courses of  action 
recognizably ordered, explainable, normal, natural» (ibid.).
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“light” moment of ordinary interaction, a moment located inside the context 
from which emerge the experienced meanings23. The internal time connects 
the composer, who is spatio-temporally in a past epoch, to the audience, who 
listen to the music in a “here and now” in a “quasi-simultaneous” way24. The 
author observes that the analyses of Schutz are important because they high-
light how the interaction between composer and performer is a temporal pro-
cess in which the notion of meaning emerges as a procedural constitution to 
investigate step by step. In other words, Schutz demonstrates how meaning is 
radically contextual, «where the context is not a false attribute that “adds” or 
that qualifies a meaning predetermined, autonomous in its definition» (Fele 
2001: 212). It seems that Schutz, in examining how the viewer is bound to the 
composer through internal time, «wants to recover the historical dimension 
(in a macro-sociological and structural sense: the size of the tradition, that had 
been raised by Halbwachs), under the form of a personal interview, continu-
ally present in the music, between the living and the dead» (ibid.: 213-214). 
The ideal type of the composer represents the dimension of the tradition, that 
in Schutz takes the form of a cultural pattern transmitted by the predecessors 
and acquired by members of a social group. According to Goettlich, the typi-
fication of Schutz aims to investigate «the constitution of subjective meaning 
(Sinn) without the construction of objective meaning (Bedeutung) [...]» (Goet-
23 Fele explains how Schutz refutes the idea of  a pre-existing meaning to guarantee mutual 
understanding, and does not agree with the assumption, found in George Herbert Mead, that 
language is the foundation of  social relations. This way of  approaching the problem of  mean-
ing, according to Fele, is exemplary of  Schutz’s refusal to treat the social and musical relation-
ship with a mentalist model; on the contrary, these relationships are non-conceptual forms of  
interaction (Fele 2001: 206). Music is based on a precomunicative relationship in which you 
can live simultaneously with each other in specific time dimensions. In other words, like other 
non-conceptual social relations (for example walking together, dancing, making love, playing 
tennis, etc.), the musical relationship is based on the we-relation. Fele observes how «Schutz [...] 
is not interested in analyzing music in itself, the musical experience or the structure of  sounds, 
but rather to examine the problems that arise» during the realization of  a piece of  music (Fele 
2001: 206).
24 Fele cites Garfinkel, who says that the mutual orientation of  two subjects always involves 
a “minimum consensus” of  normative order to follow in the course of  interaction, implies a 
minimum common denominator. Garfinkel speaks of  this moment as a “full-moment” (fat mo-
ment) «that is to say an interval to be treated as a point. A succession of  such dense moments 
produces the notion of  temporal sequence» (Garfinkel 1952: 146-147). Garfinkel also writes 
that the analysis of  this point in time involves leaving the same time stream, and thus the loss 
of  those time relevancies that define the peculiar sense of  inner time, relevancies that are the 
basis of  the definition of  action. Consequently, «we must look elsewhere, and not in the analysis 
of  the time, the answer to the question arises: where to look for the factors that determine the 
conditions of  regularity of  temporal succession?» (ibid.: 147).
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tlich 2014: 249). The meaning of the music refers to previous experiences and 
reproduction processes, that is to say to a scope of reconstruction of meanings 
already established. The question that is raised here is whether the way of 
establishment of meaning of music is the same for both composer and listener. 
Goettlich says the difference between the mode of use of the meaning expe-
rienced of the music of the composer and the listener is bound to a boundary 
between phenomenology and sociology whose analysis implies an assumption 
of the practice of a composer who is neither empirical nor psychological. To 
specify this peculiarity, Goettlich reflects on the modality of understanding of 
a melody. As we have seen, Schutz says that understanding a melody involves 
the creation of a thematic unit, a “place of rest” in the sense of William James. 
This “place of rest” is a reflexive aspect that is alternated with a “place of 
flight”, which is connected to the indistinct flow of internal time (ibid.: 252). 
The relationship between composer and listener is characterized by the re-
flexive production of a theme, that is to say a gestalt configuration by which 
the music sequence can be apperceived as the “correct” one. It is a process of 
construction and reconstruction which, to an extent and in accordance with 
different modes, also affects the ideal-typical figure of the musician. As for 
the composer, his/her task is not to create a melody out of nothing, because 
if it were so he/she could proceed arbitrarily and compose musical sequences 
that would always be correct. On the contrary his/her task is to give life to 
musical meanings different from those that came before, but linked to the lat-
ter on the basis of a relationship that “inexplicably” is already present in the 
internal flow and must reflexively be brought to light. Goettlich says there are 
two ways to understand the act of composing a musical sequence: the creation 
and the discovery:
On the one hand, it is clear that the composer is creating something new: a 
sequence of  tones played in a specific tempo and with specific phrasing; that is, 
a musical theme which comes into existence in the very moment the composer 
plays it for the first time; it is not there before. On the other hand, in a certain 
sense, the meaningful melody is already there before the composer managed 
to arrange the precise tones in the right sequence. This is suggested by the fact 
that the composer can easily discriminate between those series of  tones which 
are wrong and the one which is right (ibid.: 250-251).
The music, then, is both creation of something totally new, and an ideal 
object that already exists. As one can conceive of a musical theme that already 
exists it’s understood: the composer imagines, in his/her mind, that the theme 
is something that is already there. The same invariant process is followed by 
the performer and the listener, which respectively reproduce with action in 
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the outside world a series of sounds and, in the world of interior meanings, 
a series of meanings connected to sound. Listener, musician-performer and 
composer share an intersubjective appresentative core that remains the same 
on the basis of the principle of the relative insignificance of the vehicle (Schutz 
1962: 302). Goettlich observes how the basis of the significance of a piece of 
music, defined as “existing” or “already there”, will be the experience of the 
theme, and not some prior ontological existence (Goettlich 2014: 251).
The ideal type of the musician refers to an individual who plays alone or in 
a group a score written by himself or by someone else. Goettlich explains that 
Schutz is talking about an expert musician who performs a piece according 
to standards of correctness, and not a musician who improvises or a beginner 
who wants to improve their skills. If you also consider the relationship with 
the listener, you could speak of a triple correlation, in which the player acts as 
a mediator between composer and listener. The central aspect of the figure 
of the musician is to be the central pivot of articulation of the foundational 
dimension of the we-relation. The musician assumes the relationship of mutual 
harmony, that is, a relationship in which you have the fusion of the flows of 
the experience of people who “grow up and grow old together in the vivid 
present”. This applies both to the members of an orchestra, who make music 
together in the here and now of we-relation, and for the relationship between 
composer and performer, outside the we-relation, because they live in different 
eras. The reason for this view is that the “mutual self harmony in relation” 
has as a reference the internal time and not the external one. Consequently, 
even if the relationship between composer and performer derived from the 
face to face relationship, derived from the “outer” meeting space, it is in any 
case based on elements of the “internal” experience that can not be separated 
by the sedimentation of past subjective experiences. The creation of a piece of 
music and the musician’s interpretation of the composer’s opera comes “step-
by-step”, in a polythetic way. The polythetic process of the constitution of 
meaning makes the sharing by two individuals of the same or different exter-
nal times irrelevant. The crucial point is that the partners, living through the 
same process, establish the simultaneity between their streams of conscious-
ness; the sharing of internal time is more important, for Schutz,  than the 
fact that making music together is also an event of external time. Goettlich 
repeats the central thesis of Schutz’s view that «this sharing of the other’s flux 
of experiences in inner time, this living through a vivid present in common, 
constitutes what we called [...] the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experi-
ence of the “We”, which is at the foundation of all possible communication» 
(Schutz 1964: 173). Fele focuses his attention on the process of the “step-by-
step” setting up that invests time synchronization of experience between the 
musician and the composer. For the performer of a song the musical score is 
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not an self-explanatory instruction packet, but a set of meanings necessar-
ily vague and open to different interpretations. As for all instructions from 
the world of everyday life, the Austrian sociologist believes that an interpre-
tive work of “closure” of the musical text is necessary. This work of closure, 
continues Fele, was held in accordance with located “social determinants”: 
«tempo, dynamics, and expression, or directions as to the connection with 
other sounds (by such devices as ties, slurs, and the like)» (Schutz 1964: 166). 
In this context, therefore, the closure of musical text takes place in accordance 
with non-formalized practices of the performer, which emerge as the imposed 
relevances of the context of interaction. The radical context of meaning, ac-
cording to Fele, highlights the constructivist matrix, intersubjective and radi-
cally contextual of the investigations of Schutz; the musical experience «is not 
based on the survival of individual interpretations of disembodied documents 
such as written scores (or even on a set of informal interpretive traditions), but 
on the continuing review of the experience again, each time, that piece of mu-
sic in its individuality» (Fele 2001: 209)25. Furthermore, the central element 
of the connection between internal and external time of most performers of 
a piece of music that play together is the externalization of social interaction 
«in a concrete and visible shared space» (ibid.: 215). Through the procedural 
explication, step by step, of the spatial sharing of the stream of consciousness 
of the other, by means of mutual bodily movements, Schutz «overcomes a 
purely private and interior model of musical use to establish the very conditions 
of intersubjectivity» (ibid.).
3.2 Transition from polythetic to monothetic 
The musical experience has a non-conceptual structure. This aspect raises a 
number of problems associated to the central assertion of Schutz according 
to whom the meaning emerges in the predicative sphere, although it has its 
roots in the prepredicative sphere of consciousness. The polythetic character 
of musical experience and its connection to monothetic understanding is one 
aspect of this issue. First of all, the difficulty of rendering logically coher-
25 Fele emphasizes that the aim of  Schutz is to understand «what happens in the effective per-
formance of  a musical piece» (Fele 2001: 209). In this sense, the critique of  Costolloe of  the 
idea of  meaning of  the Austrian sociologist as an exclusively private matter (Costolloe 1994) 
misses the central aspect of  his analysis: the social relationship between a listener and a com-
poser, who share a wealth of  typical knowledge, radically social, that emerge interactively and 
simultaneously through the musical experience. The viewer synchronizes the internal time with 
the composer through a “semiotic-textual” legacy (Fele 2001: 214), that is, by means of  a score 
played by the performer.
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ent the translation of meaning from an unreflective field to a reflective field 
emerges. Furthermore, there is the fundamental problem of awareness and 
knowledge of the Self. Finally, there is the methodological problem connected 
to the background of the construction of the idealtype.
Sebald says there are two ways of dealing with the “pseudo paradox”26 
between polythetic and monothetic. The first method is that derived from 
the elaboration of the theory of William James’ succession of transitive and 
substantive phases in consciousness. Schutz considers conscious reflection that 
unifies the object of experience a “resting point”, while the indistinct succes-
sion of “points of flight” to be not immediately conscious. The second method, 
however, recalls the stream of consciousness that seems to be triggered and 
addressed by external events as in the articulation of musical phrasing (Schutz 
1996: 274-275). In other words, the musical experience is an imposed rel-
evance that brings out “step-by-step” cognitive aspects which are contextually 
relevant. 
Goettlich and Mori tend to interpret the relationship between polythetic 
flow and monothetic experience in the first sense. Sebald, Fele and Stascheit 
are closer to the second perspective. 
According to Goettlich, the reconstruction of the meaning of music needs 
the understanding of the polythetic flow of the meanings of a piece of music, 
but implies monothetic reflection on the entire experience. Goettlich observes 
how the alternation between polythetic and monothetic actually signals that 
the listener is able to understand the music during his listening only through 
the use of “themes” or musical units that imply “a sense of virtual purpose”. A 
sequence of tones is experienced as a melody if it puts the viewer in a state of 
mind in which one can stop look back at oneself and attribute meaning. This 
recalls the importance of the alternation of “places of rest and flight” from the 
theory of William James. Mori retains that the distinction between polythetic 
and monothetic signals a differentiation between orders of consciousness. The 
problem faced by Mori is the phenomenological representation of the inner 
life of consciousness. The author affirms that we can consider music a solitary 
art through which it is possible to spontaneously express one’s Self. For exam-
ple, the technological supports are vehicles through which, alone, the actors 
can listen to their favorite music. In this sense, the use of musical experience as 
artistic experience is a spontaneous activity in the world of everyday life that 
enables us to reflect on the relationship between the structure of conscious-
26 Notably, this paradox is present in the world of  science, in the world of  constructs of  the 
second degree, not in the constructs of  the first degree of  everyday life, in which the experience 
of  music and interaction with others are taken for granted, are “data of  the natural attitude.”
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ness and intersubjectivity. Music is an event of internal time that mediates 
between the various expressions of the mental life of others (Mori 2014: 271). 
Mori picks up Schutz’s distinction between internal time and external time, 
considering the first a spiraling and indistinct time and the second to be lin-
ear. The descriptions of Bergson discuss a cone of light, of Husserl who draws 
a triangle, and of Schutz who elaborates in a more complex way the triangle 
of Husserl, are metaphors that seek to significantly order polythetic internal 
experiences that are increasingly difficult to express. The Japanese sociologist 
places emphasis on how the linearity of the flow of consciousness is a meta-
phor that aims to monothetically simplify the complex process of sedimenta-
tion of knowledge in the memory27. The difference between the polythetic and 
monothetic structure of Schutz can be seen as mirroring the contrast between 
two temporal orders. Mori writes of polithetically synthesized order and 
monothetically synthesized order. The polythetic order is the interconnec-
tion between exclusively graspable perceptual experiences as a complex. The 
monothetic order, however, is the linear order. Schutz reworks the idea of 
polythetic flow and of monothetic understanding as a function of the concepts 
of simultaneity and quasi-simultaneity between two people (ibid.). Music is 
a polythetic flow of the internal consciousness of more people that acts as a 
vehicle of meanings.
The second solution, which seems more innovative, opens up new perspec-
tives on the role of the body as mediator between internal time and external-
space time. It should be emphasized that Schutz expressly denies that the spa-
tial experience can be the origin of the musical experience. Even rhythm is an 
experience that has its origin in internal time. Nevertheless, Sebald28 argues 
that Schutz’s theory can be reorganized in a coherent manner as occurrence 
of internal time confined to bodily movements. The structural opening of the 
phenomenological machinery of Schutz allows a harmonious integration of 
the relationship between internal time, consciousness, and external time, un-
derstood as corporeal sphere, as the basis for developing a theory of emotions 
(ibid.: 15). Fele is of the same opinion, who states that the role of public space 
and external time, understood as a «concrete physical place where music is 
shared» (Fele 2001: 215) is fundamental because the face-to-face relationship 
27 «A perception, namely a perceptively lived experience, can be positioned as a distinction. 
Therefore, a perception can entail distinct differences. However, whether these positioned 
points can be put onto the same straight line or not, is dependent on each view point, from 
which man pays attention to something intended» (ibid.: 272).
28 Sebald poses a series of  problems: the non-conceptual structure of  meaning, the problem of  
passive synthesis, the phenomenological concept of  ideal object, the problem of  thematic units, 
the connection of  body, mind and space (Sebald 2013: 11).
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can emerge, understood as the mutual physical presence of other bodies in the 
present experience. The bodies of the performers of a musical piece become an 
additional score from that of the semiotic-textual composer. The interaction 
of gestures between performers is unthinkingly assumed as a set of commands 
that guide the mutual behavior. Fele writes: «Schutz in this way is transported 
into the open, to the surface of social relations, as embodied scenic features, 
those conditions of possibility of sharing a stream of activities that were previ-
ously hidden: they are no longer confined within the consciousness, as events 
of internal time, but they see the light in the concrete interaction with my di-
rect interlocutors in the flesh in front of me» (ibid.: 215-216). Fele accentuates 
the importance of the mutual physical presence in communication, rework-
ing the idea of Schutz according to which the knowledgeable communicative 
intent is not always present. The musical relationship is an example: «The 
Other’s facial expressions, his gestures in handling his instrument, in short 
all the activities of performing, gear into the outer world and can be grasped 
by the partner in immediacy. Even if performed without communicative in-
tent, these activities are interpreted by him as indications of what the Other 
is going to do and therefore as suggestions or even commands for his own 
behavior» (Schutz 1964: 176). Fele stresses that Schutz was one of the first 
sociologists from which Garfinkel was inspired to investigate communication 
as a procedure located in a “here and now” that is linked to the external time 
of interaction. Schutz «laid the foundations of a sociology of interaction, in 
which the body takes on a significant value. No longer are the intentions or 
the will that determine the communication: the processes of communication 
no longer take place in the recesses of consciousness, but relate primarily to 
the presence of at least two persons» (Fele 2001: 217). Fele cites the analysis of 
Schutz of the steps constituting the process of construction of meanings that 
are «a little gem of a study of social interaction» (Fele 2001)29. The investiga-
29 Fele’s use of  Schutz to explain some aspects of  the vision of  Garfinkel is a great example of  
how to confront the theoretical between phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology 
in a balanced way. Fele is very diplomatic in his elaboration of  the themes of  the empirically 
intersubjective experiences of  making music together. This in light of  a series of  unbridgeable 
distances between instances of  postanalytical ethnomethodology and those of  comprehensive 
sociology: one among many is the underestimation of  the subject in ethnomethodology and 
the importance of  memory and internal time in comprehensive sociology. The ethnometh-
odological interpretation made by Fele of  Schutz can be understood as a methodologically 
interesting extension that, nevertheless leaves open many questions. Chief  among these issues 
is the relationship between the internal time of  consciousness and spatialized external time. In 
ethnomethodology there is a substantial elimination of  internal time and a reduction of  social 
relations to external time, spatially located contexts (see Rawls 2015). According to Schutz, al-
though the body, with its symptoms of  expression, is the element of  mediation between internal 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA188
tion on the processes of coordination between social actors in “the flesh” and 
the relationship between the internal and external time of Schutz are an ex-
ample of ethnomethodological “respecification” of traditional objects of con-
ventional sociology, in order to «penetrate into the practices that constitute a 
culture, trying to return from inside the same logic that participants adopt to 
make their conduct, in the same moment in which they are mutually related 
to each other, coherent and sensible» (ibid.: 218-219)30.
According to Michael Stascheit, monothetic reconstruction of meaning re-
fers to a context of objects, not a monothetically synthesized single element. 
He retains that the interpretation of musical experience as a relationship giv-
en meaning that doesn’t have a conceptual framework of reference leads to 
the core problem of the hermeneutic interpretation (Stascheit 2014: 121). The 
hermeneutic circle recalls the problem of the prepredicative dimension and 
extra-linguistic meaning. This theme is a real challenge of Western thought: 
the author speaks of borderline experience. The experience of the hermeneu-
tic circle is connected to sociability and its many forms. The most radical form 
of sociability is the experience of the “we-relation”. From the empirical point 
of view all social relations are experiences of time objects that have a polythet-
ic structure, they flow in the consciousness of internal time. The problem of 
Stascheit is coherence between the polythetic and monothetic plane of distinct 
streams of experience. The meaning of the experience of temporal objects is 
contained mainly in the polythetic structure of the elements present in the 
consciousness of time (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 53). In order to grasp the 
time and external time or space, he is also drastic in the assertion that the spatial and rhythmic 
element is not the origin of  the musical experience and is irrelevant (Schutz 1996: 253-254).
30 Although many ethnomethodological studies can be considered an empirical application of  
the theories of  Schutz on the musical relationship, «it should be emphasized, however, that eth-
nomethodology is not interested at all in issues of  internal time, but considers social interaction 
as theatrical devices that are publicly available» (Fele 2001: 219). According to Fele, one of  the 
nuclei of  ethnomethodological analysis is in the four-page essay on comunicative relations in 
the outside world that Schutz intended to pick up again and develop. The analysis of  the heirs 
of  Garfinkel seems to be of  a different opinion however. Anne W. Rawls, Michael Lynch and 
Wes Sharrock, for example, have repeatedly stressed the dissonances rather than the similarities 
between the vision of  Schutz and Garfinkel. This was well demonstrated by Alex Dennis in a 
lively debate with Lynch and Sharrock, the latest interpretations of  postanalytical ethnometh-
odology equated Schutz to a kind of  scientist that would separate the world of  science and the 
world of  common sense. Because of  this view, the thought of  the Austrian sociologist would be 
an obstacle to the attempts of  Garfinkel to empirically analyze the world of  daily life. It should 
be emphasized that between phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology there are 
even some stark differences, but it is equally true that the elimination of  Schutz by the authors 
to better understand the ethnomethodological movement is a misinterpretation that produces 
only a loss to the same ethnomethodology (Dennis 2004).
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meaning of the experience of a temporal object the subject must complete in 
a reflexive way the polythetic constitution of that experience. The problem is 
that the sharing of monothetic transformation is problematic. The solution of 
Stascheit is found in the presupposition of a common level of physical atten-
tion rooted and expressed in the relative tension of the bodies. The perception 
of the body is the vehicle of the synchronization of time of the experiences 
between subjects who are involved in the musical flow. The intensity of the 
tension between the bodies is the temporal measure that is experienced as 
a succession of steps of mutual attention. The author speaks of a number of 
stages of the musical experience. The first level is that of listening to music as it 
usually is found in the world of everyday life, a mode that we can define as na-
ive. It has a low tension of consciousness, the musical experience is presented 
in an indistinct way. This naive mode of the undifferentiated flow of music 
is defined as mode of resonance. The second level is the intentional mode: it 
has a greater attention which commits the subject to perceive sounds related 
to a focal moment of the musical experience, a moment connected to the con-
tinuous co-presence of the musical flow. Finally, there is the co-performative 
mode, in which listening is focused on a part of the musical flow and is direct-
ed towards the future (Stascheit 2014: 117). The demarcation of these three 
levels makes it possible to clarify the problem of the “independence of hands”, 
that is to say the problem of how the junction between body movements and 
the polythetic musical flow come about. In this case, the medium that allows 
simultaneous access to the experience of polyphony, coherently maintaining 
the pace of hand movement, is the piano (ibid.: 115)31.
31 The analysis of  Stascheit is articulated by the theoretical systems of  Bergson and Merleau-
Ponty, translating the appresentation of  Schutz into an intersubjective field theory, of  a gestalt 
matrix, that seems to oversimplify the relationship between experience, intersubjectivity, music 
and the body. The result is a kind of  Okkam’s razor centered on the theme of  “incarnation” 
of  meanings. Consequently, Stascheit develops the problem of  the hermeneutic circle in a vi-
sion that emphasizes the non-conceptual nature of  the intersubjective relationship. This is in 
contradiction with the central aspects of  the vision of  Schutz, which is divided on the primacy 
of  the selection. For the Austrian sociologist the hermeneutical circle is certainly present in the 
form of  a link between appresentative reference and totality of  experience. It is equally correct 
to say that this recalls some gestalt aspects, integrating them with concepts of  pragmatism - as 
the idea of  points of  flight and rest in James. Nevertheless, his perspective is linked to that of  
a reflexively oriented subject (a “weak” subject), even if  a non-Cartesian one. In other words, 
the vision of  Schutz is essentially noetic. Schutz has always had strong reservations about the 
theory of  the field of  gestalt matrix. For a long time he debated vigorously against the attempts 
of  his friend Aron Gurwitsch to eliminate the idea of  the subject (see Schutz, Gurwitsch 1989, 
Sacchetti 2010). On the contrary, Stascheit seems to help the noematic dimension prevail, 
emphasizing the holistic aspect of  the lack of  reflection and of  the perception of  the body. The 
danger of  this operation is to eliminate key aspects like the theme of  meaning understood and 
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3.3 Intersubjectivity and immediacy of experience
The musical relationship is an empirical example of sharing of prelinguistic 
meanings within the field of the “we-relation”: it has the union of streams of 
consciousness and the establishment of a “common We” which is the basis of the 
“grow together” in the specious present. This idea involves crossing the classic 
Cartesian distinction between internal and external knowledge and also forms 
the basis of the conception of the socio-centric meaning of Schutz. The idea that 
intersubjectivity is a given in the world of natural attitude and its articulation 
through the theory of signs and symbols has been the object of several criti-
cisms.32 The latter is of particular importance to Zaner who criticizes the idea of 
“mutual tuning-in relationship”, the basis of the “we-relation” and constitutive 
aspect of the musical relationship. In summary, Zaner argues that Schutz ar-
ticulates intersubjectivity in a Cartesian manner by treating it the same way as 
a kind of interior that would emerge in relationship with the Other. Because the 
interior is accessible only to the subject, it would spring from an elusive symbolic 
interpretation in communication and is therefore meaningless. In addition, the 
author evaluates the theory of problematic appresentazione because it does not 
permit understanding of how one can catch the Other. Finally, he sustains that 
the notion of the Other as a given in the world of everyday life is incomprehen-
sible. The “we-relation” is a enigmatic concept (Zaner 2002).
One of the clearer responses to Zaner’s observations is that of Belvedere, 
which can be summarized in three points: first, intersubjectivity emerges 
through mutual reflection in the world of everyday life; second, the appre-
sentation of the other implies the empirical perception of a body that is con-
stitutively experienced as a set of meanings; and lastly, the other is a given in 
the world of daily life because, in this context, he/she is an immediate and 
indubitable manifestation.
The first point is placed within the now classic critique of psychology that is 
leveled, by different authors at different times, at phenomenology and specifi-
cally at Schutz33. The development of the theory of language by Luckmann, 
of  reflection, the problem of  the relationship between individual experience, musical experi-
ence and system of  relevances.
32 For a detailed analysis of  the critiques of  the idea of  intersubjectivity of  Schutz see Muzzetto 
(Muzzetto 1997).
33 A paradigmatic example is represented by the arguments of  Gorman (Gorman 1977). He 
charges Schutz of  moving himself  from a psychologist’s perspective, without explaining the 
meaning of  intersubjectivity and, in fact, placing himself  within the category of  naive realism.
Not to be missed, the biting work of  Edward G. Armstrong, who believes there is a general 
trend of  “anti-phenomenological” thought – a sort of  “phenomenologofobia” – accuses phe-
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as articulated by the encounter with the other that is captured as the body 
conveys appresentativamente meanings, is a fruitful example of radically em-
pirical co-construction of meanings themselves. The appresentative under-
standing of meaning is “direct” because it takes place in a situation of face to 
face interaction in which one has the “mirroring” of the Self in another Self 
and vice versa. With mirroring one has the attribution of subjective mean-
ing to that which has been caught by an interpretative scheme (Luckmann 
1983: 83)34. Belvedere shows how the reflection has a perceptive basis given by 
synchronization between elements of internal time and external events. This 
perceptive basis is present in every intersubjective relationship and forms the 
core of the “theory of the existence of the alter ego”.
Secondly, Zaner says that the theory of appresentation of Schutz is ob-
scure. Actually Schutz and Luckmann well explain the analytical steps of 
the perception of the other starting from the process of passive synthesis. The 
body of the other, with all its expressive symptoms, immediately recalls the 
idea of being human that Schutz calls “my fellow”. The other is caught, first, 
in an immediate way, with an appresentative perceptive synthesis; only in a 
second moment have you the reflexive categorization35. Schutz’s theory of im-
nomenologists like Schutz of  being psychologists and solipsists. The “phenomenologofobes”, 
evoking the solipsism as a common sense term, do not address the philosophical problem of  
the minds of  others. In fact they face solipsism from a solipsistic point of  view. Armstrong 
finds irony in this position, which would mask a «last line of  defense against the terrors of  the 
unknown» (Armstrong 1979: 68).
34 Luckmann summarizes the relationship between theory of  appresentation and meaning in 
the following points. 1) When two details are both present in the unity of  perception and are 
characterized by the transfer of  meaning (inference by analogy), then we are faced with as-
sociative coupling. In this relationship A, which is present, is associated with B, which is also 
present. 2) When two details, one present, the other absent, are characterized by analog trans-
fer of  meaning, then we are faced with appresentative coupling. In this relationship A, which is 
present, appresenta B, which is not present. 3) When two details, one present, the other absent, 
are characterized by the theming of  that which is absent through that which is present, then 
we are facing meaningful coupling (reflexive). In this relationship A, which is present, means 
B, which is not present. There is a relationship at increasingly complex levels that involves the 
following elements. 1) The flow of  consciousness, 2) the passive syntheses, 3) the thematisation, 
4) the activation of  the ego through the attention, 5) experience 6) the reflexive outlet (the re-
turn to experience), 7 ) the significance of  the experience, 8) the project, 9) the project directed 
towards the alter ego, 10) social action (Luckmann 1983: 77-78).
35 Belvedere points out that «one of  Schutz’s main contributions on the subject is (regardless of  
Zaner’s criticisms) to reveal that intersubjectivity relies on my perception of  the other’s body medi-
ated by signs and objects of  the outer world, ie, that there is no perception of  his inner time flow in-
volved in intersubjectivity, even though I can experience the same flux of  experience as others, not 
by grasping it through empathy but reproducing it on my own by a synchronization of  our fluxes 
of  experiences mediated by a pre-conceptual kind of  ‘communication.’ Put otherwise, I do not 
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mediate perception of the other (i.e. appresentation in the world of everyday 
life), according to Belvedere is the foundation of empirical certainty of the 
existence of the other (certainty, however, that is “always subjected to contrary 
evidence”)36. This means that the other is grasped within a pre-conceptual 
level on the basis of body language. This prelinguistic level is the basis of the 
entire intersubjective relationship and is based on an attitude that has to go 
beyond the limitations of positivism, whether by vulgar empiricism or sensible 
intuition. Schutz’s settings offer us a model that allows «a profound and mul-
tifaceted description including not only sensorial data but also, and particu-
larly, the types and categories that shape our perception of things» (ibid.: 226).
Finally, Belvedere clarifies the steps of Schutz’s theory of alter ego that Zan-
er found confused. Intersubjectivity theory articulates the idea that «the other 
is constituted in a passive synthesis of our minds; thus, our knowledge of the 
other is not the product of our active reflective grasp but it is imposed on our 
perception in a compelling and indubitable way» (ibid.). The other is a given 
in the world of life intending it as a body through which, in a pre-reflective 
way, «I can start a social relationship. Thus, the given of the Other is not the 
appresentation of his inner stream of consciousness but his bodily signs, per-
fectly presented to my perception and which work along with mine in a pre-
linguistic ‘conversation’» (ibid.).
3.4 Music as a finite province of meaning 
Music separates the reality of the art world from the world of everyday life 
(Schutz 1964: 197), the language that accompanies music refers to relevances 
reproduce other’s experiences: I produce my own, in a similar by way means of  communication 
mediated by signs, living in a We-relationship while growing older together» (Belvedere 2014: 225). 
Belvedere continues: «Although Schutz does not say so, we could think of  this as a non-intentional 
bond to the Other given that - just as Zaner argues - in Schutz’s position the only intentional rela-
tionship is between my noesis and my noema – i.e., there is no intentional relationship between my 
noesis and the other’s. So one could say that I do not experience the flux of  experience of  the other 
but I do experience the same as him, not only in his duree but in mine. Consequently, perception is 
a good enough fundament for stating intersubjectivity in the framework of  a phenomenology of  
the natural attitude, which means that no empathy is needed» (ibid.).
36 According to Belvedere, «for transcendental phenomenology, this kind of  attachment to per-
ception would give us no more than a subjective and relative experience and would lead us to 
reject philosophical certainty and remain in skepticism. On the contrary, for Schutz (and the 
author), perception is the ultimate fundament of  all certainty. Our claim here is not to drop 
back into relativism and skepticism but setting universalism on different grounds arguing that 
all certainty comes from the natural attitude, which shall be described not as mere subjective 
and relative but – in “thick description” – as objective and absolute» (Belvedere 2014: 225-226).
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(Schutz, 1996: 245) and to reordered symbolic meanings at almost infinite 
levels (Schutz 1964: 187). The analysis of alternation between musical melody 
and rhythm as the basis of the passage between orders of reality is an example 
of how «music expresses and creates spontaneously ordered lived experiences 
which are composed of sensory perceptions and bodily movements» (Mori 
2014: 273). According to Mori, melody, harmony and rhythm are three musi-
cal elements of the constitution of a configuration of meaning articulated in 
time. In the same mode as intervals of perception of the sounds of one’s body 
(for example heartbeat, pulse, respiration and step), the musical experience is 
a lived experience which constitutes a primordial rhythm based on a subjec-
tive axis and temporal primary present in the mind of every individual (ibid.). 
The melody is closely linked to this axis of time, because it is an element of 
the perception not objectively definable: once created it disappears from the 
flux of experience. Similar to harmony, when combined in various ordina-
tive shades of the experience, the melody is a set of meanings perceived in 
a unified way. The rhythm, however, is nothing more than a division of the 
melody in the field of space and time. Rhythm is caught through a perception 
experienced in the form of intervals that are followed and distributed back 
into a melodic flow. The function of mediation between orders of reality of 
melody and rhythm can be exemplified by the role of language. The sound of 
the words and the rhythmic accompaniment of body movements are the basis 
of the transition from a time dimension to a spatial dimension. The sound 
of language invokes a mutual duality: on the one hand, it has a conceptual 
meaning inherent in words; on the other, the sound of the speaker’s voice or 
song is similar to a melody that conveys meanings that transcend the cogni-
tive and conceptual aspect. The voice becomes a vehicle for mediation of 
emotions that you express through words. Put differently, the cognitive order 
mediated by the sound of words is always linked to other aspects that recall 
different symbolic orders. Music has a meta-trascendental specificity «which 
is a priori creating and coordinating an order of lived experiences, depends 
very strongly on an experienced duality of rhythm» (ibid.: 275).
Another aspect is the problem of understanding the specific difference be-
tween sound and music. The use of the theory of signs and symbols of Schutz 
can distinguish three possible types of meanings of music: an indicative mean-
ing, an emblematic meaning and a symbolic meaning. The latter meanings 
are related, respectively, to small, medium and large transcendences.
In the first case, music is understood as an indication, overcoming so-called 
“Small Transcendencies”; in the second case as a sign, overcoming so-called 
“Medium Transcendencies”; in the third case as a symbol, overcoming so-
called “Great Transcendencies”. According to the “Principle of  the Relative 
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Irrelevance of  the Vehicle” [...], music may be used as an indication as well as 
a sign or a symbol” (Goettlich 2014: 245).
Music is a means of overcoming a small transcendence when it is used as 
an index, for example, like the sound of an alarm clock that reminds you of the 
time when you have to wake up. Obviously, this is not the meaning of the mu-
sic Schutz intended, but it is a sort of “indebted appropriation” of the intrinsic 
end of music. The indicative meaning of music is derived and does not furnish 
distinctive criteria with respect to sound. The emblematic or symbolic meaning 
of a musical expression tells me something of my interlocutor, for example, the 
sound of teeth grinding can suggest to me information about his mental state. As 
Goettlich explains, the more comprehensive distinction between mere sounds 
and music is to be found in the third sense, relative to the symbolic meaning.
Music, in opposition to mere sounds, has the capability to overcome a “Great 
transcendency”. In other words, music is an acoustic phenomenon occurring 
within the paramount reality and referring – at least potentially – to a transcen-
dent sphere of  reality, that is, the world of  arts. It is this third potential meaning 
which distinguishes music from mere sounds” (ibid.).
Conclusions
According to Schutz, the inner consciousness of time is an indispensable uni-
versal structural basis of all the processes of the attribution of meaning. I 
agree with Skarda when he maintains that the Austrian sociologist examines 
the problem of music with an emphasis on how the acoustic field of the spatial 
sphere depends on a temporal structure that may remain implied, but that is 
methodologically essential. This structure recalls the knowledge sedimented 
in the past37. Among the egological and internal temporal dimensions there is 
a indissoluble link. To eliminate the internal time dimension means to elimi-
37 Skarda writes: «Emphasis should be placed on the word ‘spatial’ here. Although Schutz does 
not, in this quotation, specify that he is speaking of  the absence of  spatial structure, I believe 
that is what he intended. To be sure, there is structure in the acoustic field, but it is temporal not 
spatial. For example, if  there is depth in acoustic experience then it is the experience of  tempo-
ral depth, i.e., the past, that is meant» (Skarda 1979: 99). Pedone is of  the opposite view, who 
claims that this thesis is unfounded, «for the lack of  an explicit consideration of  the symbolic 
processes that come into play when listening» (Pedone 1996: 20). The observations of  Skarda 
are a stimulus for further reflection on the centrality of  the egological dimension, of  that sym-
bolic and that of  constitution of  meanings that can not be developed here.
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nate the dimension of subjectivity and the intended meaning. The sociology of 
Schutz is noetic, it is radically anchored to an entity that continuously recon-
figures the meanings as a function of systems of relevance that emerge from 
time to time in the multiple fields of experience. One can parenthesize the in-
ternal temporality, for methodological purposes (for example in dealing with 
the musical rhythm and the dimension of the body), but always bearing in 
mind that the reflective dimension, linked to the Self, cannot be eliminated.
The egological dimension recalls the theory of appresentazione, the theme 
of music as a finite province of meaning and that of the relationship between 
individual and collective dimensions of meaning. The musical relationship 
is an example of “we-relation”, in which it has a fusion with the others in a 
symbolic “We” in which the appresentative is the common situation and the 
appresented is the participation in a world of ideal categorizations. Music is 
thus a relationship that expresses in a non-conceptual way symbolic aspects 
that can form the basis of an infinite chain of appresentative relationships38. 
Among these symbolic aspects those related to intersubjectivity are nodal. 
The musical relationship therefore constitutes a potential vehicle of union be-
tween individual center and social center of the constitution of meaning39.
In Schutz the attribution of meaning is always based on emergencies of 
the “here and now.” These emergencies are a sum of imposed and intrinsic 
relevances, and are never defined a priori. The voluntarism or passivity, the 
reflexivity and the irreflexivity are methodological hypotheses not likely to 
be of clear demarcation. In the world of everyday life, the realization of a 
project cannot be subjected to a control system that can bring into being clear 
dividing lines between intrinsic or imposed relevances, between reflective or 
irreflective aspects. Only if the actor could master all the total connections of 
their experiences past, present and future, and all possible combinations be-
tween these links might one arrive at a precise demarcation. This hypothesis 
of hyper-rationality, however, would be a metaphysical hypothesis40.
38 Schutz explains how, for example, Kierkegaard uses the work of  Mozart as a symbol which is 
the starting point of  a symbolization of  different degree. Specifically, Kierkegaard contrasts the 
immediacy of  the music, connected to an aesthetic-erotic plane, the reflection of  the language, 
connected to the ethical plane (Schutz 1964).
39 According to Schutz, in the works of  Mozart the characters are ideal-types that express uni-
versal feelings. These feelings are developed intersubjectively through action, highlighting as-
pects linked to the interior life and to personality. In the works of  Mozart, musically, an atmos-
phere is created that characterizes the social climate; more people express their individuality 
in a unified manner, making the complexity typical of  the experience clear to the public. In 
other words, the multi-dimensionality typical of  social situations is created (Schutz 1964: 199).
40 Awareness of  the impossibility of  accurately controlling the context of  future predictions is 
an epistemological hinge of  the antipositivist thought of  the author. In the essay on Tiresias, 
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The anthropological model of Schutz shows how internal time is the key and 
uneliminable element in the process of attribution of meaning and intersubjec-
tive constitution of reality. The division between internal and external time 
of Schutz is not similar to the Cartesian distinction between res cogitans and res 
extensa, but it is a heuristic distinction which aims to clarify the phenomenon 
being studied, which stands out from the idea of intentionality of consciousness. 
In this view, time and intentionality are analytical elements inevitably subordi-
nate to common inter-subjective time. The problematics of the nonconceptual 
aspects of the musical experience and of intersubjectivity is a way to conjugate 
the relationship between the process of polythetic construction and monothetic 
synthesis. The intersubjective coconstruction of meaning always implies a ten-
sion between related areas that entail, for example, subjective and intersubjec-
tive experience, language (constructs of first and second degree), finite provinces 
of meaning (the world of everyday life and symbolic worlds).
Notwithstanding the analysis of Schutz on the musical experience being 
but an outline, the depth and richness of his reflections are still unsurpassed. 
The openness with which the sociologist articulates the meaningful themes of 
the relationship between intersubjective time and musical relationship can be 
exemplified in two non-mutually exclusive points. The first point is the notion 
of musical relationship as “step-by-step” co-construction of meanings, that 
has been the area of origin of a series of empirical studies on the located con-
struction of meaning. As Fele explained, Harold Garfinkel (Garfinkel 1967) 
took cues from essential surveys of Schutz on the interaction of experiences 
in musical experience, on the temporal relationship and intersubjectivity. The 
father of ethnomethodology, with the appropriate differentiation, then em-
pirically developed part of the assumptions of Schutz, attempting to make a 
connection on the side of taken for granted. Aaron Cicourel (Cicourel 1964; 
1973) was another author who, on the one hand, developed in a critical key 
the problem of Verstehen by applying the methodology of empirical research, 
and on the other, reorganized the study of temporal processes of interaction 
and procedural practices with which the actors attribute meaning, in an em-
pirical key consistent with the assumptions of Schutz. The second point is that 
Schutz applies that principle to the relationship between time, forecasting in the world of  eve-
ryday life and the assumption of  risk that that particular prediction will be wrong (cf.. Schutz 
1964). The view of  the Austrian sociologist not dissimilar to the wholism of  Pierre Duhen, 
which, in physics, explained how one «can never submit an isolated hypothesis to experience, 
but only a whole set of  hypotheses. When the experience is in disagreement with his predic-
tions, it [...] teaches that at least one of  the assumptions constituting the set is unacceptable and 
should be modified, but does not [...] indicate which must be changed» (Duhem 1906, trans. 
en. 1978: 211).
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of the link with the social construction of meanings and connections with the 
social structure. As Mori explained, the scope of music is connected to an 
intersubjective structure of meanings mediated symbolically, that go beyond 
the situationality of the context or subjective goals. Through the linguistic 
experience – for example, the tone, the pauses, the volume of the sound of the 
words – appresentatively called and created meanings that have a spectrum 
of almost infinite shades. With this in mind, Luckmann proposes a theory 
of language that unfolds from the appresentative elements connected to the 
sound of the voice (Luckmann 1975; 1983). In a manner consistent with the 
symbolic interactionism of G. H. Mead, he develops themes related to the lat-
er attempts of Schutz to address the phenomenological problem of language 
(cfr. Schutz 1958). Cicourel, however, articulated an ethnography of located 
contexts centered on the idea of language as a typical vehicle of knowledge 
and social practices that multidimensionally structure, “from the beginning”, 
relations between the actors in interaction, allowing the connection between 
individual and social structure (Cicourel 1973; 1981)41.
Finally, I borrow a thought from Schutz to say that I’m not sure if I was 
able to highlight the relevant aspects of the relationship between time, inter-
subjectivity and musical experience, and I’m not even sure if my observations 
are adequate to either the author or to those of whom have studied him. Of 
one thing, however, I am certain: that the relationship between time, inter-
subjectivity and musical relationship is a central aspect of the debate in the 
social sciences that has not yet been overcome.
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Alfred Schutz’s main contributions  
to the field of economic reflection
Daniela Griselda López
For several decades, contemporary social theory has held a considerable misunderstanding around phe-
nomenologically oriented sociolog y, which has undermined its heuristic potential and, as a consequence, 
has pushed its conclusions to a marginal place in current discussions. In contrast, our article aims to 
recover that hermeneutical framework in order to think economic phenomena such as the economic action 
and the order of the market processes. It is undeniable that Alfred Schutz’s work provides theoretical and 
methodological elements for the sociological analysis of the economic world. The linkages between Schutz- 
ian sociolog y and economic reflection vary widely, ranging from his formative stage within the context 
of the Mises Circle to the current recovery of his work by Economic Sociolog y. Within this framework, 
the aim of this work is to summarize Schutz’s main contributions to the field of economic reflection. 
The recovery and systematization of the Schutzian vocabulary -in the interface between sociolog y and 
economics- can contribute with new elements not only to think from a theoretical point of view but also 
to address economic phenomena empirically. 
Introduction
For many decades, contemporary sociological theory has held a consider-
able misunderstanding around phenomenologically oriented sociology, which 
has undermined its heuristic potential and, as a consequence, has pushed its 
conclusions to a marginal place in current discussions. Thus, Alfred Schutz’s 
sociology has frequently been interpreted as a paradigmatic example of «sub-
jectivism» given that it supposedly places exclusive emphasis on the actors’ 
«subjective» interpretations, occluding –not to say denying– the possibility of 
thinking «objective» social structures such as power relations or social order. 
However, the indication that there exists a misunderstanding around labe-
ling Schutz as subjectivist is not new. Some years ago, an expert on his work 
(Endress 2005) defended phenomenology against the accusation of subjectiv-
ism when he critically examined the way in which Pierre Bourdieu shapes 
his slogan-like label «subjectivism». Along these lines, in previous research, 
we demonstrated the groundless character of the dominant criticism against 
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Schutz’s work shedding a new light on his reflection around themes such as 
social order (López 2012, 2014a, 2014b) and power (Dreher & López 2015). 
In the framework of that research, the recovery of the connections between 
the author and the Austrian School of Economics became a central theme, 
because it is in that intellectual context that his sociology develops and where 
his notion of the life-world is based, a notion which makes clear the author’s 
interest not only in the subjective aspects but also in the objective dimension 
of social reality (López 2014c). The ideas we present herein stems from those 
previous investigations and from an interest in recovering Schutz’s contribu-
tions both to the theoretical and to the empirical sociological research on 
economic phenomena. The reflection will be conducted in the interface of 
phenomenologically oriented sociology and economics, specifically highlight-
ing the theoretical potential of the Schutzian paradigm for the study of the 
economic world.
In order to accomplish this goal, the first section presents a detailed 
overview of the links between Schutzian sociology and economic reflection. 
Our attention is primarily focused: a) on the Austrian roots of Schutzian epis-
temological concern which – as we will show later in this work – was directed 
not only at social sciences in general but also at economics in particular; b) on 
the Schutzian roots in the contemporary discussions of Austrian Economics, 
i.e., in the debate opened some decades ago about the links between herme-
neutics and economics; and, c) on the appropriation of Schutz’s work by Euro-
pean economic sociology, i.e., the studies which make fruitful use of Schutzian 
phenomenological program for the empirical research of market processes. In 
the second section we propose that it is the problem of economic coordination 
that at first glance seems to have profited most from the Schutzian perspec-
tive and we present a review of the main contributions of Schutzian sociology 
to that paradigmatic problem of economics. Finally, in the third section and 
closely related to the previous one a critical analysis of Schutzian alleged po-
litical liberalism is sketched out.
Schutzian sociology and economic reflection
The Austrian roots of Schutzian reflection
The analysis of the links of Schutz’s sociology with the economic reflec-
tion constitutes a rich and prolific field of study not only for the specialists 
in his work, but also for interpretive economics and for economic sociology 
itself. The first of the multiple cross-links which can be highlighted organ-
izes around the Austrian School of Economics. As mentioned before, what 
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motivated our previous work was the inquiry on the «Austrian roots of Schut-
zian reflection», which go through his project of a sociology of the life-world 
(López 2014c). There is ample evidence1 to assert that the discussions within 
the Mises Circle constitute the immediate antecedent of Schutzian sociology: 
«economic issues (…) are important to Schutz’s early intellectual development 
and provide much of the context of Schutz’s great work, The Phenomenology 
of the Social World» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 15). Motivated by the purpose of 
finding a response to the problem posed by Misean apriorism Schutz largely 
concentrates on the phenomenological foundations of the concepts of social 
sciences. Misean theory of catallactics was part of a pure a priori theory of 
action considered as abstracted from its historical circumstances: «though the 
men of the Middle Ages would not have understood the law of marginal util-
ity, they nevertheless did not and could not act otherwise than as the law of 
marginal utility describes. Even the man of the Middle Ages sought to appor-
tion the means at his disposal in such a way that he attained the same level 
of satisfaction in every single kind of want» (Mises 1933 [2003]: 103). The 
implications of such a theory included a disconnection of economic concepts 
from worldly life and a rigid dichotomy between theoretical and historical 
sciences. While the object of inquiry of catallactics was subjective actions, the 
methodology of formation of objective categories consisted in an intellectual 
intuition which involved «oblivion» or a disconnection of the subject under-
stood as a real person. The problem of formalism that the Austrian tradition 
represented by Mises’ work entailed, involved a separation of theory from the 
contact with the life-world. Against this background, Schutz’s epistemological 
concern was directed not only at social sciences in general but also at econom-
ics in particular. As Lester Embree clearly explains, Schutz’s reflection on 
economics as a theoretical social science «is expounded in relation to his the-
ory of science especially what he calls ‘postulates’» (Embree 2009: 165). These 
postulates of wide application -called «procedural rules» or «rules for scientific 
procedure»- are the postulates of subjective meaning and of adequacy. As viewed 
by Schutz, and in stark contrast to the Austrian tradition of Carl Menger and 
Mises, the concept of action must refer to the subjects within the social world 
and to the interpretation of the actors in terms of systems of projects, available 
means, motives, relevances, plans, and so on. With regard to this postulate of 
subjective meaning it is worth remembering the repeatedly cited quotation by 
Schutz that applies to our discussion:
1  See also Prendergast (1986), Foss (1996), Koppl (1997), Boettke (1998), Kurrild-Klitgaard 
(2001, 2003), Knudsen (2004), Barber (2004), Wilson (2005), Srubar (2007).
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Is it not the “behavior of  prices” rather than the behavior of  men in the mar-
ket situation which is studied by the economist, the “shape of  demand curves” 
rather than the anticipations of  economic subjects symbolized by such curves? 
Does not the economist investigate successfully subject matters such as “sav-
ings,” “capital,” “business cycle,” “wages” and “unemployment,” “multipli-
ers” and “monopoly” as if  these phenomena were entirely detached from any 
activity of  the economic subjects, even less without entering into the subjective 
meaning structure such activities may have for them? (…) Closer investigation, 
however; reveals that this abstract conceptual scheme is nothing else than a 
kind of  intellectual shorthand and that the underlying subjective elements of  
human actions involved are either taken for granted or deemed to be irrelevant 
with respect to the scientific purpose at hand - the problem under scrutiny - 
and are, therefore, disregarded. Correctly understood, the postulate of  subjec-
tive interpretation as applied to economics as well as to all the other social sci-
ences means merely that we always can - and for certain purposes must - refer to 
the activities of  the subjects within the social world and their interpretation by 
the actors in terms of  systems of  projects, available means, motives, relevances, 
and so on (Schutz 1962: 34-35).
On the other hand, the postulate of adequacy «deals with the formation of 
ideal-typical constructs» and «states that the type must be sufficient to explain the 
action without contradicting previous experience» (Schutz 1932 [1967]: 236. Italics in 
original). As stated by Schutz, each term in a scientific model of human action 
must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-
world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would 
be understandable for the actor him or herself as well as for his or her fellows in 
terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life. Compliance with this 
postulate warrants the consistency of the constructs of the social scientist with the 
constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality (Schutz 1962: 44).
Both postulates «serve to anchor the second-order constructs of the cultur-
al scientists in the first-order constructs through which the actors themselves 
understand the social world» (Embree 2009: 171). The cultural sciences «de-
velop a model of the social world in terms of a system of mutually coordinated 
ideal types of actions as well as relationships, situations, and products». The 
ideal types «also called “constructs” (…) are actually concepts of a higher 
level, i.e., constructs about constructs» (Embree 2009: 169). 
All in all, as a social scientist both economist and sociologist try to explain 
the economic phenomena using the postulate of subjective interpretation and 
the postulate of adequacy. Both should refer to the actor within the social world. 
The notion of life-world becomes the touchstone of Schutzian theory of social 
sciences. The life-world is conceived as a subjective formation resulting from 
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the activities of the subjective pre-scientific experience: «Schutz’s big achieve-
ment in the present context is the “descriptive analysis of economics” (…), which 
elucidates what economists do. Most of them, including Mises, overlooked the 
lifeworldly ground of economic theory» (Eberle 2009: 505. Italics in original). 
Closely related, Schutz is very critical of the principle of marginal util-
ity «the fundamental hypothesis of modern theoretical economics» (Embree 
2009: 175). He offers a critique to that principle which, he believed, functions 
as a regulator of the creation of concepts in economics. Schutz agrees with 
Mises that social theory should seek a prioris. But, in agreement with Hus-
serl, he proposes a different notion. The a priori cannot be stated as proposi-
tions, such as laws and principles, but rather should be sought after at a more 
fundamental level, mainly in the constitutive features of the life-world. As I 
have shown elsewhere (López 2014c), the concepts of the social sciences are 
grounded in the structure of the life-world. The postulate of subjective mean-
ing leads quite quickly to the sphere of intersubjectivity. As a consequence, the 
structure of the life-world not only has its roots in the experience of the soli-
tary ego but also in the sphere of intersubjectivity: in the realm of the directly 
experienced social reality, the face-to-face relationship; and in the realm of 
the indirectly experienced social reality, the realm of contemporaries, prede-
cessors and successors. In both areas Schutz develops two a priori structures 
of consciousness related to intersubjectivity: the pure We-relationship and the 
pure They-relationship. The pure We-relationship constitutes an a priori struc-
ture of consciousness linked to the realm of the directly experienced social 
reality and is characteristic of the domain of face-to-face relationships. Schutz 
calls «pure We-relationship» the face-to-face relationship in which the part-
ners are aware of each other and sympathetically participate in each other’s 
lives for however short a time. But likewise, the «pure We-relationship» is only 
a limiting concept. The directly experienced social relationship of real life 
is the pure We-relationship concretized and actualized to a greater or lesser 
degree and filled with content. On the other hand, the pure They-relationship 
constitutes an a priori structure of consciousness linked to the realm of the 
indirectly experienced social reality. My face-to-face encounters with others 
have given me a deep prepredicative knowledge of the Thou as a self. But the 
Thou who is merely my contemporary is never experienced personally as a 
self and never prepredicatively. On the contrary, all experience of contempo-
raries is predicative in nature. It is formed by means of interpretive judgments 
involving all my knowledge of the social world, although with varying degrees 
of explicitness. The term «They-orientation» is defined by the peculiar way 
in which I apprehend the conscious experiences of my contemporaries. For I 
apprehend them as anonymous processes. The «They-orientation» is the pure 
form of understanding the contemporary in a predicative fashion, that is, in 
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terms of his or her typical characteristics or ideal types. These make up first 
order constructs, the foundation and reference point for any second order con-
struct in social sciences. That’s the reason why the concepts of social sciences 
are grounded in the constitutive features of the life-world. However, there are 
no propositions related to the contents of those formal features; these contents 
may vary in different social, cultural and historical contexts and should be 
empirically explored (López 2014c: 22).
Schutzian criticism toward Misean formalism and his reflections on the 
need to find the foundation of the concepts of social sciences in the constitu-
tive features of the life-world brings to mind Karl Polanyi’s criticism of eco-
nomic theory for being essentially «formal» (Polanyi 1957 [1992]), i.e., a kind 
of logic focused on choice, the means-end relationship, and the alleged scar-
city of things that people want. To the formal concept of economics Polanyi 
counterposes a «substantive» concept, grounded in reality and not in logic 
(Swedberg & Smelser 2005: 13): «the substantive meaning of economic derives 
from man’s dependence for his living upon nature and his fellows» (Polanyi 
1957 [1992]: 29).
By distancing himself from those formal principles of catallactics Schutz 
distinguishes theoretical economics with economic history or economic 
sociology2:
The so-called ‘principles of  catallactics’ certainly have as their subject mat-
ter human acts considered as finished products, not actions in progress. The 
meaning-content of  these principles is exhausted in the subsumption of  such 
acts under the interpretive schemes of  economic theory. To be sure, no eco-
nomic act is conceivable without some reference to an economic actor, but the 
latter is absolutely anonymous; it is no you, nor I, nor an entrepreneur, nor 
even an “economic man” as such, but a pure universal “one.” (…) However, 
one can study the economic actor as such and try to find out what is going on 
in his mind; of  course, one is not then engaged in theoretical economics but in 
economic history or economic sociology (Schutz 1932 [1967]: 137).
According to Schutz, economic sociology is not engaged in theoretical 
economics; instead it aims at studying economic action with reference to an 
economic actor, not a universal «one», but a concrete actor living among other 
fellows in social, cultural and historical contexts.
2  In Collected Papers II (1964a), Schutz reworks this contrast between theoretical economics and 
economic sociology in the distinction between pure theory and applied theory (Embree 2009: 167).
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The Schutzian roots in the contemporary discussions of Austrian Economics
Within the framework of the analysis of the links of Schutz’s sociology with 
the economic reflection it is also possible to trace the «Schutzian roots in 
the contemporary discussions of Austrian Economics» in the debate opened 
some decades ago about the links between hermeneutics and economics. The 
discussions within Austrian tradition around the importance of sociologi-
cal analysis constitute a development independent from and parallel to con-
temporary economic sociology which has a common ground in the strong 
criticism against essential principles of neoclassical economics regarding the 
economic behavior of the individual3. During the late 80’s and early 90’s an 
«interpretive turn» was introduced in the economic sciences. These econo-
mists, interested in recovering the relevance of interpretive theory for Austri-
an Economics, formulated what was called «economics of meaning» (Boettke, 
Lavoie, & Storr 2001) or «interpretive economics» (Boettke 1990; Prychitko 
1990)4. This movement gave place to a paradigmatic book on the epistemo-
logical turn edited by Donald Lavoie, Economics and Hermeneutics (1991), which 
mainly deals with the link between those two intellectual traditions that until 
then had been total strangers. The two economists who provoked the debate 
on the use of hermeneutics to revise Austrian Economics were Richard Ebe-
ling (1985, 1986), who had drawn principally from the works of Schutz and 
Paul Ricoeur, and Lavoie (1986), who made use of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
ideas. Both authors found inspiration in the work of Ludwig Lachmann and 
his book The Legacy of Max Weber (1970), immediate precedent for the attempt 
at establishing bridges between sociology and Austrian economics. In fact it is 
maintained that Lachmann’s book on Weber can be called «the first explicitly 
hermeneutical contribution to Austrian Economics» (Lavoie 1991: 13). Schut-
zian sociology allowed overcoming the limitations of neoclassical thought. 
In opposition to the rational maximization of the individuals, these authors 
pick up Schutz’s claims regarding the existence of intersubjective structures of 
meaning which enable the individual to act in the social world. In his book, 
Lachmann sought to articulate how the troublesome aspects of the Weberian 
concept of ideal type could be replaced with the notion of plan. According to 
the author, human action exists as a scheme of plans designed to reach ima-
gined futures: 
3  For a comparison of  mainstream economics and contemporary economic sociology see 
Swedberg and Smelser  (2005: 3-6).
4  It is important to mention that Werner Sombart was the first sociologist who pointed out the 
need for a «verstehende economics» (Sombart 1930 [2003]).
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One trait distinguishes all cultural phenomena from natural ones. When men 
act they carry in their minds an image of  what they want to achieve. All hu-
man action can be regarded as the carrying out of  projects that are designed to 
give effect to imagined ends. But every man pursues a multiplicity of  ends, the 
achievement of  at least some of  which precludes that of  other ends. Moreover, 
the scarcity of  the means at the disposal of  each actor imposes further re-
straints upon his choice. In other words, men have to choose the purposes they 
wish to achieve, and they have to make such choice within the constraints of  a 
given ‘situation’. To act at all, men have to make plans, comprehensive surveys 
of  the means at their disposal and the ways in which they might be used, and 
let their actions be guided by them (Lachmann 1970: 30).
This background was the kickstart for further developments. In Austrian 
Economics: a hermeneutic approach (1991), Lachmann was critical of the success 
that after 1930 had obtained the method of classical mechanics among econo-
mists. Economists all over the world followed Pareto in embracing that method 
as the only truly «scientific» method. In the decades that followed «this became 
the dominant style of thought in all countries» (Lachmann 1991: 132). In this 
environment, rational action became the methodological tool par excellence. The 
mainstream advocated the powerful tool of positive analysis, the objective model 
of rational action. The interpretive turn in social thought demanded a funda-
mental rethinking of basic questions given that modern discourse concerning 
economics and sociology was stalled at this point «concentrating on the merits 
and demerits of the rational choice framework for social analysis» (Boettke 
1998: 57). Then the hermeneutical Austrians’ challenge was primarily aimed 
at mainstream neoclassical economics, which they charge with the vice of for-
malism: «formalism is the artificial severing of economic theory construction 
from application, in effect the separation of theory from contact with the life-
world, with everyday reality as we know it» (Lavoie 1994: 55). However, the 
challenge had implications for the mainstream of the Austrian tradition as 
well: 
the overall hermeneutical challenge to tradicional Austrian economics can 
be summarized by referring to (…) three ‘core methodological tenets’ of  the 
school, subjectivism, methodological individualism and market process (…) 
For the school to take its own interpretive turn it will need to overcome its 
tendency towards atomism, which mistakenly locates the domain of  meaning 
in isolated individual minds, and objectivism, which over-dichotomizes the-
ory from history, and scientific from everyday understanding (Lavoie 1994: 
55-57).
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Given that Schutz had already drawn attention to the problem of formal-
ism characteristic of his intellectual context, the recovery of his work by con-
temporary Austrian tradition was not a random decision. 
Economic sociology
The third cross-link can be found in the appropriation of Schutz’s work 
by economic sociology in the studies which make fruitful use of the phenom-
enological program for the empirical research on market processes. In the 
«Introduction» of the Handbook of Economic Sociology (2005), Swedberg and 
Smelser acknowledges that new economic sociology is primarily a U.S. phe-
nomenon. However, many European contributions to economic sociology are 
mentioned, among which Schutzian phenomenology occupies a special place: 
«Knorr Cetina in Germany and Aspers in Sweden have independently of one 
another embarked on the project of applying phenomenology to economic 
sociology» (Swedberg & Smelser 2005: 19). 
In an article published in 2002 Karin Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger 
(Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002), examines the patterns of integration which 
distinguish the global social system embedded in economic transactions. 
Called «global microstructures» these patterns, which are global in scope but 
microsocial in character, constitute the basic features of the interaction order. 
The authors draw on Schutz’s reflection on the temporal coordination as the 
basis for the level of intersubjectivity for their analysis of global markets, which 
posit «a form of market coordination that supplements relational or network 
forms of coordination» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 905). In an article 
of 2004, they clarify this point: «one important purpose of this chapter is to 
bring together elements of several microsociological literatures –interaction-
ism, ethnomethodology, phenomenology– with elements from new economic 
sociology, specifically, its interest in institutions (…) in embeddedness, and in 
symbolic and expressive dimension of economic objects and activities» (Knorr 
Cetina & Bruegger 2004: 159).
The authors highlight the relevance of Schutzian approach or «microso-
ciology» to issues of globalization and to the understanding of markets «when 
they are sketched out in geographical space» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 
907). In those fields participants bridge the geographical distances and ori-
ent toward one another using patterns of relatedness and coordination called 
microstructures that are global in scope but microsocial in character and 
that assemble and link global domains. The authors also draw on Schutz and 
Luckmann’s notion of appresentation to advocate that participants’ reciprocal 
observation of markets in screens, combined with temporal coordination 
mechanisms, may constitute a basis for both a form of intersubjectivity and the 
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integration of some global spheres. Making use of this core notion of Schutz’s 
theory of symbols they describe the transportation of local details from par-
ticular time zones and geographical regions where they are observed to the 
global arena on screen. The «screen world» is the global market into which 
local details are transposed (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2004). This clearly 
shows the central role of the Schutzian approach to intersubjective structures 
and the importance of his theory of symbols in the analysis of economic phe-
nomena. The strategy for organizing their argument consists on recovering 
Schutzian analysis of temporal coordination at the level of intersubjectivity in 
order to «supplement» relational or network forms of coordination. The goal 
here is to complement or «bring together» Schutzian «microsociology» with 
the interest of economic sociology in relational or network analysis.
The major difference between Knorr Cetina’s approach and Aspers’ (As-
pers 2009) is that the latter does not aim at making use of Schutzian phenom-
enology in order to «supplement» other perspectives. Instead, his main objec-
tive is to introduce empirical phenomenology as an approach in its own right: 
phenomenology has taken three routes that are relevant to social sciences. The 
first is the one taken by Schütz and his followers, which is essentially non-
empirical. The second is ethnomethodology, which is only remotely related to 
phenomenology, and the third and perhaps most well known is the integration 
of  phenomenology into the mainstream of  social science. (…) I present what 
can be seen as a fourth route, empirical phenomenology, which is a devel-
opment based on interpretations of  the phenomenological literature (Aspers 
2009: 4).
The author intends to make Schutzian approach «more empirical applica-
ble» highlighting that the basic premise of empirical phenomenology is that 
an explanation in the social sciences should be connected with the meaning 
structure of real people. From this perspective, both the postulate of subjec-
tive interpretation and the postulate of adequacy proposed by Schutz are re-
covered. The author’s assessment of the practical implications of empirical 
phenomenology leads him to conclude that a fruitful strategy for accessing 
the perspective of actors could be participant observation and interviews. In 
order to «ensure that the actors’ perspective comes through, and thus that no 
scientific explanation exists unless what is studied is related to the first-order 
constructs of those studied» (Aspers 2009: 10). As claimed by Knorr Cetina: 
«[w]hat the phenomenological approach means in regard to data collection 
and data treatment is first of all a focus on actor’s meaning» (Knorr Cetina 
2006: x).
In the same line, Aspers (2006), recovers the phenomenological perspec-
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tive for empirical qualitative investigation in the fashion markets. The author 
conducted an empirical study of fashion photography in Sweden, an inves-
tigation of an understudied market. He maintains that a variety of actors 
are relevant to understanding these markets (fashion photographers, agents, 
editors of fashion magazines and art directors). As stated by Aspers, the three 
main goals that have been addressed in the book are: «to understand, and 
thereby explain, the market fashion of photography in Sweden, to present 
and ethnography of this market, and to incorporate the phenomenological 
approach to the social sciences» (Aspers 2006: 155). The author examines the 
relation between the different positions in those markets from Schutz’s notion 
of reciprocal expectations. This recovery of Schutzian work opens the discus-
sion on its general relevance to economic sociology and allows analyzing how 
far it is possible to go with this approach. 
The problem of economic coordination
Fundamentally, it is the problem of economic coordination that at first glance 
seems to have profited most from the Schutzian perspective. According to 
Knorr Cetina and Bruegger (2002), the starting point for an understanding 
of global microstructured domains is the distinction between «embodied pres-
ence» and «response presence», a differentiation which has a family resem-
blance to Schutzian distinction between We-relationship and They relation-
ship. The first one corresponds to the face-to-face situations, while the second 
corresponds to situations in which participants are capable of responding to 
one another and common objects in real time without being physically pre-
sent in the same place. The question that lies at the core of the notion of a 
response-presence-based social form that extends across global distances is: 
«what are the possibilities of its inherent connectivity and integration as the 
key to overcoming the geographical separation of participants?» (Knorr Ce-
tina & Bruegger 2002: 911). The response to this problem of coordination is 
the notion of global we-relationship which is based on temporal coordination. 
The notion suggests that a level of microintegration, or intersubjectivity, is 
possible in global fields.
In global markets, adjustments must be made to compensate for the geo-
graphic distance between participants. Schutzian concept of intersubjectivity 
allows the authors to characterize the social binding in this kind of markets, 
bringing into focus the idea of temporal coordination which is central to the 
phenomenon of intersubjectivity. Rather than two individual facing each oth-
er, they are interested in the example of two subjects watching a third object, 
for instance a bird flying, for the conceptualization of sociality of global fields: 
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«to illustrate global orientation in financial markets, we address the three ele-
ments that are central to intersubjectivity: (1) participants’ orientation toward 
and observation of a common object, (2) the reciprocity of these orientations, 
and (3) interlocking time dimensions» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 923). 
As opposed to face-to-face situation, the authors coin the concept of face-
to-screen situation. The face-to-screen concept replaces the face-to-face one 
in response-presence-based situations, i.e., the orientation of participants to-
ward the global sphere that is present on screen. Secondly, the reciprocity of 
orientations takes place when the screen itself, like a mirror, reflects market 
participants’ activities to one another in real time: «the reciprocity of observa-
tion is an essential and invariable aspect of these temporally focused global 
interaction systems, in addition to being an underlying source of intersubjec-
tivity» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 925). Finally, temporal coordination 
within the authors scheme means that these markets are communities of time, 
a condition that is central to their historical particularity conceived as a so-
cial system that overcome the geographic separation between participants. 
The aspects of temporal coordination between participants are: synchronic-
ity, continuity and temporal immediacy. Moreover, «temporal coordination 
involves a temporal division of labor across time zones, such that the com-
munity of time extends around the clock». All this complex structuration and 
reciprocity allow the authors to maintain the argument of a level of global 
intersubjectivity that extends beyond the face-to-face situation. It is important 
to indicate here that, according to the aforementioned point of view as regard 
the use of Schutzian phenomenology in order to «supplement» other perspect-
ives, the authors point out the need to distinguish between different forms of 
market coordination reciprocally related: the network form of coordination 
and the reflexive, temporal form of coordination.
The problem of coordination has also occupied contemporary Austrian 
tradition. In a similar manner, they highlight the problems that involve the 
temporal and geographic distance between participants:
how men, mutually dependent upon each other in that system of  division of  
labor, can successfully coordinate their activities for assurance of  a balance 
between the multitudes of  demands and supplies for various goods and services 
in a complex and developed market order (…). Clearly, such coordination of  
a vast number of  interpersonal plans, in which the market actors are separa-
ted from each other in terms both time and space, requires some mechanism 
through which expectations can be formed (Ebeling 1999: 120-121). 
In this regards, contemporary Austrian economics have benefited from 
Schutzian insights. The centrality of Schutz’s theory of ideal types and of 
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the notion of stock of knowledge is recovered by authors such as Storr (2010), 
Knudsen (2004), Kurrild-Klitgaard (2001), Mote (2001), Ebeling (1999), Kop-
pl (1997), Foss (1996) and Pietrykowski (1996), who claim that one of Schutz’s 
biggest contributions to the methodology of the social sciences is the introduc-
tion of a scale of ideal types based on growing degrees of anonymity. In this 
sense, several authors consider that Schutz’s studies foster understanding of 
the properties of the order creation of the market processes (Ebeling 1999; 
Foss 1996). And this coordination demands a mechanism through which mu-
tual expectations are formed. The Schutzian system of ideal types can help 
build that theory of expectations. Thus, Koppl, Foss and Pietrykowski «have 
looked to the ideal-type method as a way to better understand and model 
two primary economic phenomena: economic expectations and social order/
market coordination» (Mote 2001: 223). Foss, for instance, claims that in their 
daily-life situations, actors are skilled at coordinating their actions, because 
there are things that are more «prominent» than others. In their everyday 
lives, actors draw on the stock of knowledge they have in common, which 
consists of shared typifications of the social world. They are able to coordinate 
their actions because they are equipped with that everyday life knowledge, 
which includes an ample repertoire of courses-of-action and personal ideal 
types and because that common-sense knowledge is presupposed and has an 
origin and social acceptance. Foss makes use of the concept of «prominence» 
of Thomas Schelling, which functions as a principle for organizing common 
sense knowledge and typifications. However, he (as well as Koppl) disregards 
these typifications as being organized in domains of relevances, as Schutz 
states. It is Pietrykowski who moved forward in the direction of recovering 
Schutz’s theory of relevances, a key theme which has not yet been paid the 
attention it deserves. The author makes use of the notions of «intrinsic» and 
«imposed» relevances. Intrinsic relevances are related to the freedom of the 
individual to choose what he/she is interested in, whereas imposed relevances 
have to do with the fact that situations are also imposed on us as significant 
although they are not related to our own interests. Pietrykowski contends that 
«negotiation» of these (in some cases) conflicting relevances is a matter of «the 
readiness with which individuals accept or resist the imposition of the other’s 
relevances systems» which «differs from situation to situation»5.
Together with the aforementioned importance of the theory of the ideal 
types to give an answer to the «paradigmatic problem» of the economic theory, 
the limitations of Schutz’s theory regarding the concept of «unintended conse-
5  As I have shown elsewhere, through his valuable observations Pietrykowski opened the ana- 
lysis to the Schutzian problem of  relevance in the field of  economic reflection (López 2014c).
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quences» are also highlighted. The focus on the «unintended consequences» is 
based on the concept of the spontaneous social orders proposed by Friederich 
von Hayek, who emphasizes, among other things, that those orders are not 
the result of human intention. As Storr (2010) points out, for Hayek «sponta-
neous orders are the unintended consequence of the nonetheless purposeful 
action of multiple individuals». As mentioned by Lavoie, «in economics market 
processes stands for what is really a more fundamental category which applies 
not only to markets, but to all sorts of institutions: spontaneous order. It is the 
principle that the social manifestation of meaningful action is that of an evolv-
ing system which exhibits systematic, but generally unintended, consequenc-
es» (Lavoie 1994: 56). The critics claim that in the Schutzian scheme there is 
no reflection around this notion and, in this sense, the Schutzian categories 
are insufficient. Even Koppl, who has made one of the biggest contributions to 
enlighten on the strengths of Schutz’s theory for the Austrian audience, asserts 
that Schutz does not recognize clearly that human action can produce unin-
tended systemic consequences (Koppl 2002: 54). However, Storr (2010) pro-
poses that this criticism of Schutz is unfair:  «first, the second order constructs 
that social scientists employ are based on first order common-sense constructs 
that individuals use to negotiate the social world which necessarily make ref-
erence to unintended consequences and spontaneous orders. Secondly, Schütz 
himself often engaged in causal spontaneous order analysis» (Storr 2010: 176). 
Storr argues that «social stock of knowledge emerges spontaneously» and that 
as a consequence of the pragmatic motive governing the actors in the social 
world understood as a spontaneous social order that contains multiple and 
emerging «made orders», the actors should resort to their stock of knowledge 
to explain the unintended consequences of their actions and other people’s ac-
tions. He adds that «individuals are necessarily spontaneous order theorists». 
Here, Schutzian theory, as though it had fallen into the bed of Procrustes, is 
forced to fit the size of the Hayekian liberal theory of order as regards the no-
tion of unintended consequences. However, Schutz resorts to categories of his 
own to understand the social order resulting from his particular notion of the 
life-world and the analysis of the unintended consequences in Schutz’s work 
not only implies the reification of the author’s heuristic framework but also 
entails defining him as a theorist of liberal order.
Economic theory and liberal politics
A systematic and explicit reflection on the connection between Schutz’s 
thought on social order and liberal politics can be found in a recent article 
by Koppl and Augier (2011) on the occasion of the publication of an inter-
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view with Schutz dating from 1958 (Greaves 1958). In the introduction to the 
interview, the authors contend that: «it may still be true that many of Alfred 
Schutz’s admirers have a limited appreciation for the importance of the eco-
nomic theory and liberal politics in Schutz’s formative years as a young scholar» 
(Koppl & Augier 2011: 15. Italics in original). Mises was a powerful advocate 
of the political philosophy of classical liberalism and, given the strong connec-
tion between Schutz and the Austrian School of Mises, which was strongly 
liberal in the old-fashioned European sense of peace, free trade, and limited 
government: «liberalism and the Austrian School of Economics were twin 
influences on the young Schutz» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 16). 
The authors also make reference to Schutzian review of Mises’ 1933 book 
Grundprobleme der Nationalökonomie6. They critically analyzes the editor’s pref-
ace to Schutz’s review where Wagner, Psathas, and Kersten speak of an «ad-
herence to an utterly unrestrained principle of free competition» shared by 
Mises and the rest of the «Viennese School of the theory of marginal utility». 
There, the editors contend that «Schutz himself would not seem to have been 
enthusiastic about a theory of unrestrained (better, cut-throat) competition» 
(Wagner, Psathas, & Kersten 1996: 88). It is reproached that the editors «sup-
ply, however, no evidence» for their claim (Koppl & Augier 2011). As stated 
by Koppl and Augier, the evidence points the other way. Their manuscript 
sets out the theoretical elements of Mises’ and Hayek’s liberalism, quotes 
excerpts of their works which highlight the non-conservative nature of their 
claims, and takes for granted the fact that Schutz inherits that liberal thought 
without presenting the theoretical traits of his hermeneutical framework in 
order to support the assertion. There is not even a single quotation of pas-
sages of his work where his liberalism becomes evident. The evidence pro-
vided by the authors refers to the intellectual context of Schutzian reflection: 
«the evidence suggests that Schutz upheld the liberal views championed by 
Mises» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 23). First, Schutz was a member of the Mont 
Pelerin Society, an association of liberal thinkers; second, Schutz’s review of 
the aforementioned article of Mises, an outline which is not critical in nature; 
finally, the last evidence comes from Schutz’s work for the Austrian Bank-
ing Association. What calls special attention is the fact that the introduction 
that precedes the interview does not provide theoretical evidence to support 
Schutzian alleged liberalism. Moreover, the interview only captures the dif-
ferences between Mises and his students: 
6  This work by Mises has been translated as Epistemological Problems of  Economics (Mises 1933 
[2003]). Helmut Wagner’s English translation of  Schutz’s review appears in volume 4 of  
Schutz’s Collected Papers (1996) as chapter 9, «Basic Problems of  Political Economy».
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with respect to the differences between Mises and his students, Mises was the 
only consistent thinker in terms of  liberalism who made no concession. He has 
fought all kinds of  interference by government. He has always been so radical 
that everyone has had as an argument against Mises that his proposals are not 
possible politically in our times. You have to make concessions (…) If  somebody 
didn’t accept liberalism in its purity, Mises suspected that he was a socialist, 
Marxist, etc. (Greaves 1958: 30. Italics in original).
Despite the value of Koppl’s and Augier’s insights, a brief remark with 
regard to methodology cannot be avoided. In order to attain a deeper under-
standing of a particular sociological theory, the researcher needs to analyze 
several dimensions. According to metatheorizing perspective (Ritzer 1991), 
the first dimension entails turning to the sociological theorist him/her-self 
and examining, among other things, networks and backgrounds, such as 
his/her biographical context, his/her life-worldly experience, his/her corres-
pondence with colleagues, his/her institutional affiliations and professional 
involvement. In the case of Schutz’s theory, this is the dimension developed 
by Koppl and Augier. However, this analysis should be supplemented by a 
second dimension: a detailed examination of the sociological theory itself, 
in our case, Schutzian texts. The third dimension concerns turning to other 
academic disciplines for ideas, tools, concepts, theories and the like that can 
be used in the analysis of Schutzian theory, for instance, the influences of the 
economic discussion in the context of the Austrian School of Economics and 
the Mises Circle and the subsequent impact of his work on the intellectual cir-
cles of interpretive economics and economic sociology. Finally, the fourth di-
mension calls for shifting to the more macro level to look at the larger society 
and the nature of its impact on sociological theorizing. For instance, by exam-
ining the sociohistorical context in which Schutz lived and worked and the na-
tional and international settings. In this regard, should also be recovered the 
impact of Schutzian historical context on his production, as well as the social, 
political and economic problems of his time. Taken together these dimensions 
would lead to a detailed understanding of Schutzian sociological theory. And, 
for this reason, we believe that the analysis of the intellectual context is insuf-
ficient to conclude that Schutz upheld liberal views. Due to space constraints, 
in the following lines we would like to introduce some theoretical elements 
that appear in Schutz’s work which serve as a base to complement the first 
dimension analyzed by the authors. The elements presented do not allow us 
to make any conclusive statement about Schutzian alleged liberalism. On the 
contrary, they unveil the internal tensions present in Schutz’s work.
To begin with, we must turn our attention to Austrian liberalism in order 
to analyze to what extent Schutzian reflections on social order, politics, soci-
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ety and government reproduce the liberal views championed by Mises and, 
specially, by Hayek. As Koppl and Augier claim «Mises and his followers had 
set about to defend Austrian liberalism, which they interpreted as an offshoot 
of the British liberal tradition of David Hume and Adam Smith. The Austrian 
liberals of Mises and his circle defended property rights as essential to liberty. 
Far from being a threat, private property is necessary to ensure that power is 
dispersed and the dangers of state power are kept in check» (Koppl & Augier 
2011: 17).  In «The principles of Liberal social order» (1967), Hayek mentions 
this fact. At the beginning of the manuscript he also contends that liberalism 
«derives from the discovery of a self-generating or spontaneous order in social 
affairs (…), an order which made it possible to utilize the knowledge and skill 
of all members of society to a much greater extent than would be possible in 
any order created by central direction» (Hayek 1967: 162). Moreover, a dis-
tinction between spontaneous order and organization or arrangement is presented in 
the text as a differentiation between individual and common purposes: while 
organization or arrangement is based on commands, the spontaneous order 
is based on abstract rules which leave individuals free to use their own knowl-
edge for their own purposes. The spontaneous order of a free society will con-
tain many organizations (including government). However, the two principles 
of order cannot be mixed in any manner. The characteristic of a spontaneous 
order is that by using its ordering forces, i.e., the regularity of the conduct of 
its members, it is possible to achieve an order of a much more complex set of 
facts that it could ever be achieved by deliberate arrangement. Particularly, 
the order of the market rests not on common purposes but on reciprocity, that 
is «on the reconciliation of different purposes for the mutual benefit of the par-
ticipants» (Hayek 1967: 163). It is in this regard that Hayek «criticizes the idea 
that orderly arrangements must be either born of nature or arranged through 
artifice. His alternative, spontaneous order, relies on the unintentional coor-
dination of intentional actions» (Heath 2005: 69). As a consequence, the very 
idea of spontaneous order is linked to a political theory of liberalism (Heath 
2005). As stated by Hayek: «free men who are to be allowed to use their own 
knowledge for their own purposes must therefore not be subject to rules which 
tell them what they must positively do, but only to rules which tell them what 
they must not do (…) the rules of just conduct thus merely delimit the range 
of permissible actions but do not determine the particular actions a man must 
take at a particular moment» (Hayek 1967: 167).
Schutzian review of Santayana’s text on «Dominations and Powers» (Schutz 
1964b) provides a first access to recover his position on social order, politics, 
society and government. In the same manner as the review of Mises’ manu-
script, «the presentation of Santayana’s thought follows as closely as possible 
his own wording» (Brodersen 1964: xiv), i.e., without a clear critical intention. 
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Santayana’s study of society and government is structured in three different 
levels: the generative, the militant and the rational orders. The three orders 
are, as Schutz claims, ideal-typical constructs in the established terminology 
of the social sciences. The first «Powers and Dominations» occurs in the gen-
erative order which is the order of growth, custom, and tradition. But as soon 
as the natural growth of the human family is disturbed or disrupted, and the 
dominance of a different social unit is substituted for it, complications may 
arise within traditional society. The new social order is no longer biological 
but is voluntarily imposed, because potentialities in the psyche now come to 
consciousness before they are habitually realized in action. There is therefore 
a contrast, and often a conflict, between the new prompting at work and the 
traditional convention. This conflict constitutes the militant order of society, 
which includes all voluntary associations that cross the generative order of 
society (not only military bands, but also political parties and religious sects). 
The generative order corresponds as a whole to Power because it gathers the 
emergence of those elements society needs; the militant order corresponds to 
Domination or to the emergence of control and the imposition of some pow-
ers upon others; the third one, corresponds to virtue, because democracy or 
representative government are displayed as the rational way to harmonize 
former elements (Moreno Moreno 2007: 134). As stated, these ideal-typical 
constructs are interwoven in reality. The construction of the three orders is 
only a methodical device adopted in order to study «Powers and Domina-
tions» within each of them, as well as to mark the Domination which each 
order exercises over the rest. According to Schutz, it is in the militant order 
that the interplay of Dominations and Powers appears most clearly (Schutz 
1964b: 210).
Schutz makes clear two attitudes toward Santayana’s ideas. Santayana 
leaves the reader «in a state of bewilderment as well as of admiration» (Schutz 
1964b: 224). Firstly, with bewilderment Schutz confronts Santayana’s mate-
rialistic-naturalistic position, the key concept at the foundation of his concep-
tion of society and government. Schutz criticizes Santayana’s metaphysical 
assumption that the generative order of society is the paramount social real-
ity upon which all the other orders are founded. This is due to the attempt 
to deal with individuals from the point of view of a naturalist and materialist 
«who is not satisfied with an analysis of the world as taken for granted but 
aims at founding life, psyche, and spirit, in brief, human nature, upon the 
physical order of nature» (Schutz 1964b: 224-225). Secondly, admiration is 
due to his truly philosophical craftsmanship in organizing the problems of a 
philosophical anthropology around the existential experience of the human 
situation within the world; admiration is due also to the consistency with 
which social and political life is described in terms of a drama of will, psyche, 
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and spirit oscillating between the vacant, the indifferent, and the vital forms 
of liberty, and the forms of necessary and voluntary servitude (Schutz 1964b: 
224). The realm of vital liberty – the inner liberty of the spirit, understood 
as the «awakened inner attention» – opens a chasm between the demands of 
the natural powers of primal will and the path open to action. This conflict 
is manifested in various forms of servitude. Government has traits of the 
militant order of society in which the drama of will manifests. This drama 
«of primal will, psyche, and spirit in the various realms of vacant, contingent, 
and vital liberty, undergoing the various forms of necessary and voluntary 
servitude, is one of the constituent factors of the genetic order of society» 
(Schutz 1964b: 213).
This is not the first time that Schutz recovers Santayana’s thought. Accord-
ing to Schutz the mainstream of Husserl’s argument in Ideas II, has similarities 
with certain themes presented by «William James, Santayana, Dewey, George 
H. Mead, Cooley, and others» (Schutz 1966: 36). Moreover, Schutz takes up 
the notion of animal faith proposed by Santayana in order to support his defi-
nition of intersubjectivity: 
Intersubjective experience, communication, sharing of  something in common 
presupposes, thus, in the last analysis faith in the Others truthfulness, animal 
faith in the sense of  Santayana; it presupposes that I take for granted the Oth-
er’s possibility of  bestow upon one of  the innumerable sub-universes the ac-
cent of  reality, and on the other hand that he, the Other, takes for granted 
that I, too, have open possibilities for defining what is my dream, my phantasy, 
my real life. This is the last insight into the intersubjective dialectic of  reality 
(Schutz 1964a: 155). 
This theoretical evidence suggests that Schutz has strong connection with 
Santayana’s ideas of animal faith. And animal faith, in turn, has a connec-
tion with Keynesian notion «animal spirit» (Padua 2014: 37). However, we 
cannot be conclusive on this point and these guidelines need to be further 
developed. What is important to mention here is that an argument focused on 
the intellectual context of Schutzian thought should be further enriched with 
an analysis of the conceptual and philosophical work of the author. Taking 
this dimension into account, it should be nuanced, as Wagner does, the state-
ment that the mere membership of Schutz to Mises Circle constitutes evidence 
that Schutz was a liberal thinker. According to Wagner, what kept Schutz 
within the Mises Circle were «its underlying interpretive assumptions» in terms 
of which economic processes were explained. It is with this backdrop in mind, 
that we can support Wagner’s idea that: «Schutz accepted marginal utility 
theory in principle. However, in contrast to von Hayek and in agreement 
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with many other students of von Mises, he did not subscribe to the extreme 
economic liberalism of his teacher» (Wagner 1983: 12). 
As seen previously, Schutz appreciates Santayana’s reflections on conflict 
and drama of will that the author highlights as characteristic of social and po-
litical life and which is described in terms of a drama of will, psyche, and spirit 
that oscillates between the vital forms of liberty and the forms of necessary 
and voluntary servitude. As I have shown elsewhere (López 2014a), another 
kind of tension or conflict appears in Schutz’s early work as one of the prelimi-
nary conditions of social order. And this tension has certain similarities with 
the one proposed by Santayana. In Schutz’s words, the multiplicity of social 
persons that «revolve» around the nucleus of the self range from the intimate 
person to the full development of the process of anonymization in the social 
world. The incorporation of the external world means that the person finds: 
givennesses and structures that do not stem from me, myself, but instead are 
pregiven from without forcing on me an attitude along with an attention à la 
vie coming from the things themselves but not from the sources of  my durée, 
from my intimate person, and that are, so to speak, imposed upon me (Schutz 
2013a: 235-236).
At all levels, we find «a continuous transition from the absolute intimate 
person to the highest anonymous behavior» and «the tension continues» to the 
highest anonymous contemporary world. There is a development of the pro-
cess of anonymization in the social world. Supplementary typifications appear 
because it is not I alone who carry out my own self-chosen plans, but I work 
together «with others and against others, also caring and setting goals not just 
for my self but also for others» (Schutz 2013a: 237). This issue «concerns the 
problem of intrinsic relevance (…) in contradistinction to the type of relevance 
imposed» (Barber 2013: footnote 139). The process of anonymization in the 
social world involves imposed relevances which prescribe our personal choice: 
custom and culture, customary and self-imposed duties and rights, inclination 
and upbringing, prescribe certain of  our attitudes toward our fellow human 
beings, our personal choice and the external need assign us our place in the so-
cial cosmos with which we are satisfied or which we may strive to change (Schutz 
2013a: 243-244).
As a citizen of my community, for instance, «as someone who belongs to 
my political party, as a member of my church, over against these contempo-
rary, more or less anonymous institutions, I take up attitudes that have their origins 
in quite distinctly anchored levels of my self» (Schutz 2013b: 247. Emphasis added). 
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Occasionally, it would seem that all of the sides of my self are independent 
persons with their own wishes and wills. However, «it is consistent with the 
unity and unification of self-consciousness that always other sides of ourselves; 
other moments of our personality, are put into play in our daily social life 
while other and perhaps more essential sides, where not entirely excluded, are 
thus still in such measure crowded in the background» (Schutz 2013b: 249-
250). There is the diversity of standardized or normative attitudes demanded 
of me at every step by living in the cultural world of daily life (for instance, If 
I am to travel by train, then I must conduct myself according to the prescrip-
tions required when traveling by train). In everyday life, specific attitudes in 
their standardization and normativeness are imposed on us. They touch upon 
a peripheral sphere of ourselves, we incorporate them on the basis of our edu-
cation, inclinations, our settling of goals, without thinking too much about 
them. The ultimate goals of our bearing on the great systems of the state, of 
the law and of the economy are of an entirely similar nature. 
In short, a tension or interplay between intrinsic and imposed relevan-
ces constitutes one of the preliminary conditions of social order in Schutzian 
scheme. The freedom of the individual to choose what he/she is interested 
in, is confronted with the fact that we work «with others and against others», 
and this incorporation of the external social world involves that imposed rel-
evances prescribe our personal choice. Among the diversity of standarized 
or normative attitudes which are imposed upon us, the state, the law and the 
economy establish the ultimate goals of our bearing. However, the tension is 
reflected in the fact that we could be satisfied or we could strive to change the 
imposed duties and rights. It is important to mention that this tension, which 
may vary in different social, cultural and historical contexts, should be em-
pirically explored.
The connection between Schutzian theory of relevances and Hayekian 
theory of spontaneous order has also been explored by Mori (2009). The au-
thor suggests that «Schutz should have already understood Hayek’s view on 
so-called given data as the problem of relevance» (Mori 2009: 529). Addition-
ally, he points out that the relevance theory itself «leads to a spontaneous order». 
In our view, there is not in Hayek’s theory such a tension between intrinsic 
and imposed relevances. Free men who are to be allowed to use their own 
knowledge for their own purposes must not be subject to duties, that is, to 
rules which tell them what they must positively do. In this respect, the main 
dangers of state power are pointed out. On the contrary, Schutzian theory of 
relevances points out to the very existence of a conflict and a tension within 
social order between intrinsic relevances, which are related to the freedom of 
the individual to choose what he/she is interested in, and imposed relevances, 
which have to do with the fact that situations are also imposed on us as signifi-
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cant although they are not related to our own interests. For these reasons, we 
argue that it is no possible to explain the theory of the intrinsic and imposed 
relevances as an extension of Hayekian theory of unintended consequences. 
There is not a self-regulation or reconciliation of the different interests and 
purposes nor an unintentional coordination of intentional actions within so-
cial order but interplay of intrinsic and imposed relevances. Pointing out this 
deficiency in the economic theory of the self-regulated or spontaneous mar-
kets from Schutzian sociology not only allows placing Schutz on the same crit-
ical line as the new economic sociology regarding the marginalist economic 
school, as it supposes the existence of self-regulated markets and of a homo 
economicus who organizes his/her actions according to perfect rational criteria, 
but mainly, it may be asserted that, in contrast with Hayek and Mises, Schutz 
did not subscribe to extreme liberalism in his intellectual context.
Final comments
In this work, we aimed to synthesize a phenomenological program for socio-
logical analysis of economic action and of the order of the market processes 
which serves as a foundation for the development of a phenomenologically 
oriented economic sociology. In this regard, we showed that there is in Schut-
zian phenomenologically oriented sociology an economic sociology in embry-
onic form which has not been deeply explored and which can build bridges 
between sociology and economics. 
Firstly, we showed, against the background of the Mises Circle, that Schutz’s 
epistemological concern was directed not only at social sciences in general but 
also at economics in particular. Social scientist both economist and sociologist 
need to explain the economic phenomena using the postulate of subjective 
interpretation and the postulate of adequacy. Both should refer to the actor 
within the social world. The notion of life-world becomes the touchstone of 
Schutzian theory of social sciencies, of sociology and of economics. Secondly, 
Schutz’s contribution to reflections on economic sociology is also based on the 
subsequent reappropriation of his work. The subsequent recovery of Schutz’s 
work shows its relevance both for theoretical and empirical research in eco-
nomic sociology. For this reason, a phenomenological program for theoretical 
and empirical research of the market phenomena from Schutzian sociology 
must incorporate his reflections on intersubjectivity and notions such as com-
mon-sense of knowledge, the theory of the ideal types, the theory of expecta-
tions, the theory of relevances and the theory of symbols. Finally, as regards 
the problem of coordination as a way to approach the order of the market pro-
cesses, we demonstrated that Schutzian sociology makes it possible to point 
225SCHUTZ’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC REFLECTION
out the limitations of the economic theory of the spontaneous or self-regulated 
market orders to such an extent that it can be asserted that Schutz did not 
subscribe to extreme economic liberalism in his intellectual context. This re-
covery and systematization of Schutzian vocabulary -in the interface between 
sociology and economics- many times ignored in sociological reflections on 
economics, can contribute with new elements not only to think from a the- 
oretical point of view but also to address the economic phenomena empirically.
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Biography and Action:  
A Schutzian Perspective to Life-world
Hermílio Santos
Starting with the discussion on free-will and action, this paper discusses how Alfred Schutz approaches 
these issues for the comprehension of life-world. After a brief overview on how contemporary philosophers 
as Ernst Tugendhat and Ulrich Pothast face these problem, it is argued that for Schutz action plays a 
central role in his conception of life-world. The article goes further and advocates for the importance of 
exploring individual biographies as a way to provide an accurate understanding of actions. By the end of 
this text, it is suggested that the biographical narrative approach, as proposed by Fritz Schütze, as well 
as by Gabriele Rosenthal, is an important contribution to the Schutz’ perspective of the life-world and 
to adequately explore the most different social phenomena.
Contemporary thinkers devoted their attention to the problem of action, in 
which the question on how free individuals are to make choices plays a central 
role. Although still remaining a disputed issue, the sociology of Alfred Schutz 
discusses mainly the genesis of action as a central matter for the comprehen-
sion of social phenomena. The aim of this article is to focus on how Schutz 
deals with this subject, arguing that understanding individuals’ biography is 
seen by the Austrian sociologist as the most adequate way to approach it. It 
should also be emphasized how sociologists have been tried recently to go 
further and make the Schutzian perspective feasible for empirical research 
approaching the comprehension of individuals’ action.  
On free-will and action
Even though considered as a classical issue, some contemporary philo-
sophers have dedicated themselves to the discussion of free-will. Ernst Tu-
gendhat (1992), for instance, conceived this problem as intimately related 
to the meaning of imputability (Zurechnungsfähigkeit), that is best understood 
through the elucidation of the spheres of praxis: the moral sphere, the sphere 
of the penal law and the sphere of the practical reflection in general. 
In the moral sphere it can be seen a deep disagreement between Tugendhat 
and the Kantian school, since for Tugendhat the moral exigency implies im-
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putability, given the fact that if we act immorally, we could have also acted 
morally. 
The question of imputability is also relevant for the penal law, made prob-
lematic through the expression “he/she could have acted differently”. The 
establishment of a punishment is dependent on the understanding of this ex-
pression – in the case that the punishment is legitimate at all. Anthony Kenny 
(1978) lists four meanings for the use of the verb “to can” that appear in this 
sentence. One of these meanings indicates the presence of the capacity as well 
as the opportunity. It is precisely this meaning of “can” that is discussed here, 
that is to say, when free-will implies the capacity of acting in another way. In 
this sense, to be able to do X freely, one has to have the capacity as well as the 
opportunity of not doing X. Kenny defines this meaning of “can” as the start-
ing point to establish the imputability or not of someone facing his/her own 
act. However, it would not be fair to consider someone responsible for his/her 
own acts if he/she lacked the relevant freedom, in this case, i.e., the possibility 
to act differently. 
Ulrich Pothast (1987) argues about the conditions to talk about “guilt”, 
especially if someone has decided to do the “wrong thing”, although he/she 
could have decided for the “right thing”. In conclusion, Pothast idea is not 
only different, but it also opposes the argument presented by Kenny, which 
is already anticipated in the title of his book Die Unzulänglichkeit der Freiheits-
beweise (The insufficient demonstrations of liberty). It seems that for Pothast, the 
expression “he/she could have done differently” doesn’t make any sense. He 
suggests as an alternative “punishment” for criminal acts, to substitute the 
penalty by a therapeutic treatment or the introduction of the mechanism of 
a “social quarantine”. The most positive side of this kind of “punishment” is 
that the criminal will be treated as a “friend” or “guest”, since he/she will not 
stay isolated for a very long time, and during this period there will be always 
someone talking to the intern and willing to restore a trust relationship. 
A question that arises here is how not to recognise the imputability and 
at the same time to admit any kind of punishment, even a therapeutic treat-
ment? Assuming the definition of Tugendhat for imputability (understood 
as the responsibility of someone for an event) or the definition proposed by 
Kenny for the term “responsibility” (to be subject of a punishment), it can be 
asserted that it is inappropriate to think that Pothast tends to deny the possi-
bility of imputability, even if he wants to. His attempt is a contradiction, since 
that to deny the imputability would imply in not admitting even the possibil-
ity that someone could be object of a forced therapeutic process because of a 
criminal act. Therefore, the disagreement between Pothast and Kenny and 
between Pothast and Tugendhat is not very concerned with the existence or 
not of imputability, but on how to deal with those that violate laws. 
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There is another sphere, in which the concept of imputability is not di-
rectly concerned: the practical reflection in general. What is relevant here is 
the possibility to act freely. As proposed by Aristotle, two conditions should be 
considered when establishing limits for acting freely in a determined situation: 
a) that we know what we are doing and b) that we do not act under coercion. 
But Aristotle was referring just to the external coercion. Things become more 
complex if one introduces the phenomenon of internal coercion. In this case it 
is also referred as a compulsory action, when there are obstacles to the exten-
sion of the autonomy, i.e., for the extension of the possibility of thinking and 
to make effective the result of the thought. For some sociologists, the idea of an 
internal coercion explains the limits for an action without visible restrictions. 
Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu represent two schools of socio-
logical thought that seems to postulate the idea of an internal coercion. In 
his structuralist perspective, Giddens (2003) conceive the structure not as 
been external to the individuals, but as mnemic traces made visible in social 
practices. In this sense, individuals incorporate restrictions “imposed” by 
others. Operating this way, individuals anticipate the limits for their ac-
tion, restricting the possibility of talking about freedom of action. Because 
of this internalization process individuals are rarely aware of the restric-
tions they face in everyday life. Giddens (1993) asserts that individuals are 
in some way compelled to choose and define the lifestyle that synthesize 
their place in the world; here lifestyle implies a whole range of practices, not 
only because such practices fulfil utilitarian necessities, but because it gives 
material forms to a particular narrative of self-identity. However, based in 
his structuration theory, this definition is only apparently dependent on in-
dividuals’ own criteria. 
Another influent sociologist postulated the idea of a social process which 
result is the creation of a kind of internal limitation not only to the free ac-
tion, but also to the free-will, considered here as a necessary and preliminary 
moment of the action without restriction. The concept of habitus, as employed 
by Bourdieu (1980), i.e. a system of socially constituted dispositions that gen-
erates and unifies the whole of practices and ideologies of an agent, defines 
the agents’ practices in a regular and constant manner (Crossley 2001: 83). 
Bourdieu states that habitus makes possible the production of all thoughts, of 
all perceptions and also of all actions; in this sense, it seems to enormously 
restrict the possibility of individuals’ interpretation of their own habitus. Ex-
ploring concrete possibilities of internal coercion, Bourdieu presents the idea 
of a symbolic violence, in which the masculine domination is just an example. 
According to Bourdieu (1999), the subordination of women in contemporary 
societies is so deeply sedimented that it doesn’t need to be made explicit with 
the use of more visible instruments of domination, as the physical or psycho-
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logical violence. Through the consent of the dominated person, the masculine 
domination is exercised without the conscience of that. 
In opposition to those philosophers and sociologists that could be consid-
ered affiliated to a “soft determinism” (Kenny 1978), Alfred Schutz seems 
to solve this problem assuming that individuals, distinct to the objects of 
the natural sciences, have the faculty to interpret the world and to interpret 
themselves in the world. The interpretive work of individuals implies, in the 
Schutzian sociology, having at their disposal a system of relevance and typifi-
cation that is part of what is transmitted to the members of an internal group 
through education (Schutz 1979: 119). Although both concepts refer to dis-
tinct problems, we can affirm that relevance and typification are elements of 
the same system, whose role is precisely to “naturalize” or harmonize social 
life. According to Nasu (2008: 92), relevance is the most important problem 
for the phenomenological investigation of life-world, since it implies asking 
for the ways individuals experience objects and events around them, which 
means how they perceive, recognize, interpret, know and act in everyday life 
through the selection of facts in each situation. The experience itself occurs 
as a process of choice and not as a fatality or as a passive reception of data 
and information, due to the fact that individuals choose which elements of 
meaning should receive their attention, that is, which elements among those 
involved in a situation are made relevant. In this sense, the investigation of the 
motives for an action plays a key role.
The Schutzian sociology presents an explicit pragmatic component, since 
the individual is considered from the point of view of action, or of the immi-
nent action. Individuals are neither adrift nor submerged under the stream 
of the facts they experience, since they are “equipped” with the instruments 
needed to orient them. These instruments are the relevance and the typifica-
tion system, which selects the knowledge on hand, that is relevant to their 
action (Nasu 2008: 91); thus, pure events or facts do not exist, but only inter-
preted facts and events.
Action and life-world
It should be clarified that Schutz assumes that the raw material for the action, not 
being a trivial one, is the “objectivities and events which are already found …” 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 3), which represents a limit for the possibility 
of free action. This limitation is given, for instance, by the pre-existence of a 
natural language in a culture in which individuals are socialized or even by 
the acts and the results of actions of others. This conception gives the idea 
that individuals are not isolated objects, on the opposite, they are seen in 
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their horizons, which are submitted to the interpretation of the individuals 
themselves. This context is called by Schutz as the reality of the everyday life-
world, in which “man can engage himself and which he can change while he 
operates in it…” (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 3). 
Life-world (Lebenswelt) is the pre-existing intersubjective world that an indi-
vidual “takes-for-granted” in a “natural attitude” (Schutz 2003: 182), recog-
nizing objective elements of life as laws and customs that can guide the indi-
vidual’s action, as well as the conditions for the action (for instance, the other’s 
intention and his or her own). A natural attitude in everyday life does not 
suspend the belief in the existence of elements from the environment; to the 
contrary, what is suspended is precisely the doubt concerning the existence of 
these things (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 27), since all past experiences are lived 
in the present as if they were ordered, as knowledge or as expectation that 
something in the near future will occur exactly the same way it occurred in 
the past. However, everything that is taken for granted in the life-world is sur-
rounded by uncertainty (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 9). Thus, a natural attitude 
occurs simultaneously to the interpretation conducted by individuals, mostly 
based on the stock of knowledge available to individuals and on their previ-
ous experiences and of others with whom they are directly or indirectly in 
contact (for instance, parents, teachers, teachers of teachers, etc.), that means, 
based on the knowledge on hand (Wissen vorhand), which serves as a “refer-
ence code” (Schutz 1979: 72) for the individual. In this sense, this knowledge 
system – as the result of the sedimentation of subjective experiences in the 
life-world (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 123) – assumes for those individuals that 
recognize themselves as internal members of a group, community or move-
ment an aspect of coherence, clarity and consistency sufficient for all to have 
a reasonable chance to understand and to be understood (Schutz 1979: 81). 
This way, the assumption that the sociology of Schutz would emphasize a too 
individualist perspective, “disconnecting” the individual from his/her reality 
(the social context) is obviously at best a misreading of his writings. 
Schutz dedicated himself not only to argue for the action as an expression 
of freedom, even with its constraints and limitations, but he went further and 
proposed that the sociology should investigate the motivation for the actions. 
The comprehension of a social phenomenon would not be accurate, from a 
schutztian sociological perspective, without having as starting point the inter-
pretation of the interpretation of those with experience in the phenomenon un-
der investigation. Proceeding this way would avoid replacing the experience of 
the actors by the view of the scientific interpreter, since any sociological study 
would be possible by simply replicating the ordinary view of common sense. 
To investigate the motivation for an action is to consider the subjective 
meaning for the agent, since it is intrinsic to the idea of action, at least in a We-
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berian perspective, that when action is concerned the agent assign a meaning 
to his/her action and, at the same time, gives a direction to it, which should be 
understood by others as meaningful. However, Weber was not very accurate 
in explaining how sociologists should proceed to access the actor’s subjective 
perspective and reach the construction of meanings. Schutz proposes that 
the subjective meaning of individual actors could be approached through the 
knowledge accumulated in direct and indirect experiences. Experience is not 
restricted to the practical events in which the individuals were personally in-
volved, but also events in which their contemporaries or even their predeces-
sors were involved, transmitted in some way (Schutz 2004: 69). It is exactly 
the knowledge acquired through experiences that will organize the different 
levels of relevance mobilized by individuals in all situation of everyday life. At 
the same time, the constitution of the meaning process could be accessed by 
the social scientific observer through the knowledge of the motivation of indi-
vidual actors (Dreher 2011: 493). Here, we see how Schutz developed the soci-
ology inaugurated by Weber when the Austrian sociologist proposed the dis-
tinction between “in-order-to motives” and “because motives” (Schutz 2004: 
110). While the in-order-to motives refer to the actor’s future expectation, the 
because motives concerns the past experiences and convictions anchored in 
the environmental and socio-historical circumstances in which the actor was 
involved (Dreher 2011: 493; see also Barber 2004).
The distinction between these two kinds of motivations offers a theoretical 
key to understanding the complex process of individual decision-making and 
action. By considering the temporality, the scientific observer obtains access to 
different aspects involved in the action, especially the past experience and the 
future expectation. The time aspect is probably only rarely incorporated as a 
clear criterion for defining a guide of action and is maintained implicit, even 
though time is a constitutively part of meaning (Muzzetto 2006: 5) as will be 
see next. In this sense, sociology is about making things explicit, through the-
oretical considerations and arguments or through empirical evidences, even 
if individual actors are not aware of all these aspects involved in their action. 
Even after decades of these contributions from Schutz to sociological the-
ory, we still see a marginal interest of social researchers for this temporal as-
pect. Here, again, most sociologists – when and if they put the question about 
the reason for having done something at all – are not very much convinced 
that the answer or at least a significant part of it can be found in the agents 
themselves. Even after the emergence of many sophisticated approaches in 
sociology, the most influential ones are still very loyal to the precursors of the 
discipline that tends to refer the question to an external, collective sphere, as 
classes, hierarchies, culture, social inequalities, gender, race, etc. It could be 
mentioned several recent examples of researches that do not consider both 
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the subjective component of the agents and at the same time the distinct time 
lived by the individual actors as a key issue for the comprehension of a social 
phenomena.
A balance of the literature on social movements, for instance, shows that 
these analyses grant a privilege to approach this phenomenon almost exclu-
sively from a systemic perspective. Paradoxically, an analytical dimension 
that is left aside by many in approaching social movements concerns the com-
prehension of the everyday life-world of those engaged in such movements. 
To know how a movement acts and the meaning of social movements for 
contemporary societies is not the same as to know how the members of this 
movement act, and the meaning of the movement for them. Knowing how the 
participants of a movement act means to know their motivation and their in-
terpretation of the movement itself, which means to understand the subjective 
meaning they conferred to the movement, considering the time perspective in 
this interpretation. To offer an analysis on social movements based on the sub-
ject’s perspective could open new possibilities to understand current societies. 
Actually, this is possibly the only way to conduct an investigation that could 
deserve the label of sociology, since the natural sciences as well as the positiv-
ist-oriented social sciences doesn’t assign a relevant role to the experience of 
individuals to understand the social reality. The same is valid for any other so-
cial phenomena, such as migration, the practice of violence, unemployment, 
for instance, since an “insider’s” perspective is the only way to get access to 
the experiences of those that are intrinsic part of any social phenomena. Even 
if this aspect is made clear in the writings of Schutz, a persistent critic on this 
theoretical perspective is that it doesn’t sufficiently consider the social context 
or the social structure. This kind of criticism assumes that the elements of a 
social structure are made valid without the active intervention of individuals, 
as if it could be considered as “something” external to those living in a specific 
time and place. In a schutzian perspective we could state, on the opposite, that 
there is no social context without the meaning assigned by individual actors, 
or at least its existence is sociologically irrelevant without the consideration of 
the subjective meaning, since no social context is socially inanimate.
Indeed, sociologists who dedicated to investigate and discuss social action 
are not totally inattentive regarding the motivation aspect of action when 
they discuss or ask for the reason of an action. However, not considering 
the temporality significantly constraints the observers to be satisfied with a 
partial answer to the individual’s reasons for the action. When dealing with 
the problem of the reasons for action, social scientists are usually much more 
concerned with the future expectations of the agent, there is to say, with the 
in-order-to motives. There is no doubt about the value of this topic for any 
sociological investigation. What is, then, the conflict pointed out by sociolo-
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gists when dealing with the concept of the “because motives”? One problem 
might be the fact that sociologists are permanently afraid to be considered 
as been performing a kind of psychology. Another conflict might be the fact 
that questioning about the “because motives” implies two kinds of difficulties: 
a philosophical and a methodological problem. The philosophical question 
refers to the issue discussed at the beginning of the text, i.e., the scope of re-
sponsibility from individual actors for their own actions, which is of difficult 
solution since it implies convictions already encrusted in the life trajectories of 
the researchers and is only hardly changed. To argue about the “because mo-
tives” would lead to admit a reasonable spectrum of individual responsibility. 
The methodological difficulty concerns the sociological access to the socio-
historical context of the individual actor. In many different passages Schutz 
indicates that the biography of individual actors is what should be considered 
in order to obtain any knowledge about the past experiences, especially in 
the articles The Problem of Relevance (Schutz 2004: 69), Choosing Among Projects of 
Action (Schutz 2004: 251) and The Biographical Situation (Schutz 2004: 208). It 
should not be forgotten that any biography is located in time and space and 
cannot be understood without taking into consideration its historical back-
ground (Schutz 2004: 209). This warning is just to remember that there are 
some relevant aspects of the structure and genesis of biographies that are sin-
gular and specific for an individual, but others that are shared by those living 
in the same socio-historical period. For an accurate comprehension of social 
and historical phenomena, it is important to incorporate the biographical 
component in the sociological investigation. 
Biography and the motivation for action
Biographical situations play a particularly important role in the definition of 
individuals’ relevance system. Of course, part of one’s biographical experi-
ence is determined not by the individuals themselves, for instance the lan-
guage in which he/she was socialized and which is considered as his/her 
“mother tongue”, or the legal system in all locations the person may visit or 
live, or even the different means of transportation used in these places. In 
these cases, individual actors have to deal with imposed relevances (Schutz 
2004: 92). However, how the mother language will be in fact used, or the in-
terpretation and the relation to the legal interdictions or even the evaluation 
of the transport used are not defined in absentia of the users themselves. These 
experiences can be considered as unique, even though it can be shared with 
others, it cannot be shared with all individual actors. Biographical experi-
ences are an integral part of all future situations, but it doesn’t mean that all 
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these experiences will be maintained intact in memory or even that the mean-
ing of these past experiences will be preserved. The opposite is what might be 
the case, due to the fact that new experiences play an important role when the 
individual is mentally reviewing what occurred in the past. In this sense, even 
the past is slippery and may occupy another place and role in the present and 
in the future; in short: past experiences are constantly reinterpreted and the 
result of this process is that, to understand as much as possible the action of 
individual actors or of a group of individuals that share some experiences in 
common, their biographical experiences must be considered. Even though the 
intention of accessing these kind of register of the memory is not to necessarily 
obtain the facts as they occurred in the past, the importance of this methodo-
logical approach is ratter to gain perspective from a primary source (those 
that experienced events under investigation), their interpretation of their own 
experience, that should not be crystallized as the most reliable report of the 
past. It doesn’t matter if the discourse about the actor’s own past corresponds 
to concrete facts; important is that it will be confronted to reliable narratives 
that correspond to the interpretation of those that narrate. 
Even referring to a subjective interpretation, the sociology of Schutz cannot 
be accused of not giving the adequate attention to individuals’ socio-historical 
experience. Unlike the most influential contemporary sociological theories, 
especially the new versions of critical theory and the post-structuralism ap-
proaches, the social and historical experiences, as well as the social context 
with its constraints, are incorporated and should be incorporated in any so-
ciological (empirical) inquiry following the writings of Schutz. Biographical 
experiences are the key component to track the motivations for any action, 
due to the fact that motivational relevance is made out of sediments of previ-
ous experiences, which were relevant for the person (Schutz 2004: 115). Not 
all experiences can be considered meaningful, only the already lived experi-
ences when viewed in retrospective (Muzzetto 2006: 10). To say that experi-
ences are meaningful implies that it is possible for individuals to distinguish 
and accentuate them, which means to confront them with other experiences 
when it is not possible to manage current experiences (see Muzzetto 2006). 
This can only be undertaken if the experience can be delimited through what 
Schutz calls “an attention act”. So, to assign meaning to an experience is to 
interpret it ex post through the recovering of the memory. 
Although Schutz did not delineate instruments and guides for empiri-
cal research based on his phenomenological-oriented sociology (Hitzler and 
Eberle 2000: 117), this can be undertaken through biographical narratives, 
since the approach makes it possible to recover the most important elements 
for the subjective interpretation, i.e. the system of relevance and the typifica-
tion process.
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Biographical and everyday life narrative approach, although very influen-
tial in European sociology, especially in the German scenario, mostly based 
on the sociology of Fritz Schütze (1983), is still unknown in many national 
sociological communities. The biographical narrative approach is capable of-
fering a very important access to the narrator’s interpretation, but also to the 
connections between individuals and their groups, communities and move-
ments (Carvalho 2003: 293) in a specific period of time. Nonetheless, it must 
be considered that any narrative is an interpretation viewed from a specific 
biographical situation, since a biography is a description of processes and 
lived experiences by the individual him/herself. In this sense, biography is 
someone’s “subjective interpretation of their own life trajectory” (Born 2001: 
245). To approach a problem this way implies a research concerned not only 
with the narrator – since his/her interpretation on life-world is what will be 
analyzed – but also with the researcher perspective, who plays simultaneously 
the role of the interpreter and a partner in the construction of a narrative. In-
dividuals whose narratives are the object of analysis are guided by their own 
relevance system. Here, the analysis of everyday verbal language (vocabulary 
and syntax) permits the access to the comprehension of the relevance and typ-
ification system, since “everyday life is, above all, life with language” (Berger 
and Luckmann 1991: 51).
Fritz Schütze is the leading German sociologist from a group of research-
ers that in the 1980s at the University of Bielefeld proposed the approach 
known as “biographical narrative”; the main contributions were a) to propose 
an specific way to conduct open interviews in a way that the relevance system 
could be expressed without the systematic intervention of the relevance sys-
tem of the researcher as usual in most qualitative research using interviews, 
and b) to introduce in the sociological analysis the distinction between dif-
ferent kinds of discourses that appear during an interview, i.e., arguments, 
description and narrative itself (Schütze 1983). This distinction comes from 
the socio-linguistic and is essential for the sociological approach based on the 
experience of actors having as starting point their own narrative, since it is the 
discursive resource more strictly connected to the chain of actions (Rosenthal 
2004: 53; Labov and Waletzky 1973), i.e., it is the kind of discourse most 
related to the way the narrator presents his/her interpretation of the develop-
ment of facts (Küsters 2009: 25).   
According to Gabriele Rosenthal, whose writings brought enormous con-
tributions to the biographical narrative approach, especially in the process of 
analysis by distinguishing the life history and narrated life story (see Rosenthal 
1995 and 2004), the comprehension of individual action requires investigat-
ing the actor’s subjective perspective as well as the course of his/her action. 
That means to investigate experiences considering the meaning that individu-
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al gave to their action by the time it occurred and the biographical context 
in which the narrators place their experiences (Rosenthal 2004: 49). In this 
sense, the resource of biographical narrative can be assumed as a possibility 
of combining a diachronic (the biography) with a synchronic approach (the 
interpreted biography from a biographically specific moment: the present). 
Regarding the past is in some way an interruption of the flux of durée, 
when the biographer makes his/her acts objects of reflection (see Muzzetto 
2006: 10). In this sense, dealing with one’s own biography is a systematically 
way to define provinces of meaning, which are delineated as past experiences. 
As Muzzetto remembers quite well, “past experiences are not stored in this 
‘stock’ at random. Nor are they isolated experiences. Experiences are, on the 
contrary, interconnected through manifold types of relationships…” (Muz-
zetto 2006: 16). However, all these connections are not always explicit for 
those who are systematically presenting their own past experiences. In part, 
the act of speaking of events that occurred in the past is already a constitution 
of meaning, but a great part of it can only be accessed through the explicit 
reconstruction of these experiences by a scientific observer, a sociologist for 
instance.  
With the analytical distinction introduced by Rosenthal in the biographi-
cal narrative approach just mentioned – between the experienced life history 
and what the “biographer” narrates about it (or the life story) – it is possible 
to make explicit in the biographical flow important elements for the compre-
hension of different kinds of social actions in a specific historical period and 
in a specific social context. The starting point is conducting the interview in 
a way to avoid what we could call a “colonization of the biographer” with 
the relevance system of the researcher. Of course, in any interaction there 
is a pre-given exchange of perspectives, but the process of invasion can be 
minimized as much as possible. The way found and used by biographical 
narrative researchers – trying to maintain loyal to the epistemological prin-
ciples of the Schutz sociology – is to conduct the interview without been 
anchored to the research interest. It means, defined that the person could 
potentially provide reports from his/her own experience of a phenomenon 
under investigation, that it doesn’t matter which subject is being explored (for 
example, migration, violence, unemployment, etc.), the task of the researcher 
is to stimulate the interviewees to tell their all life, in as many details as pos-
sible (for more information on how to conduct biographical narrative inter-
views, see, Rosenthal 1995; 2004; 2008). Proceeding this way it will be more 
feasible that the interviewee will expose spontaneously elements of his/her 
thematic field. 
The thematic field, as postulated by Gurwitsch (see Rosenthal, 2008), is the 
main structure of someone’s biographical presentation, even if the interviewee 
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is not very much aware of it. An important contribution of Rosenthal to the 
comprehension of individual’s life-world is to “decant” the large volume of in-
formation obtained during a biographical interview through several analyti-
cal steps. In this process, the already mentioned distinction between the possi-
ble discourses used in a life’s presentation – especially arguments, description 
and narrative – plays a central role. An advantage of this kind of distinction 
is that these discourse modalities may allow the access to the variation of tem-
poralities in the biographical presentation. For instance, arguing can indicate 
the interest of the biographer to justify in the present an idea or a past action 
when facing the researcher or an interlocutor in general. On the other hand, 
Schütze and the socio-linguistics prefer to call narrative the kind of discourse 
that register the action on the move that occurred in the past, doesn’t matter 
when in the past occurred the reported action, important is that it is possible 
to the interlocutor to follow the sequentiallity of an event through acts of the 
biographer him/herself or of any other person. Having these elements avail-
able for analytical means for the social researcher, to deal with important 
elements of the interviewee’s subjective interpretation of the life-world. The 
analysis follows the principle of abduction. Unlike the inductive proceeding, 
the empirical material collected, in this case, biographical narrations, does 
not aim to verify hypothesis formulated in advance, nor sustains hypothesis 
originated from a theory, as in the deductive approach. According to the ab-
ductive approach, proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce and largely adopted in 
biographical narratives researches, as well as by the so-called Grounded Theory, 
by Glaser and Strauss, the empirical material guides the formulation and 
tests of hypothesis able to make the case under investigation understandable 
(Rosenthal 2008: 58). Proceeding this way makes it possible to uncover the 
complexity of social phenomena by bringing new knowledge provided from 
the reality itself. 
If Schutz brought to the social theory the pathways of how to under-
stand the everyday life-world, the German sociologists, especially Schütze 
and Rosenthal, provided a feasible approach on how the social researcher 
could have access to it. The combination of the Schutz theory of life-world 
and the biographical narrative approach (as proposed by Schütze and in-
cremented by Rosenthal) represents the enlargement of the horizons and 
possibilities of a sociology anchored in the writings of Alfred Schutz. Al-
though very well established, especially in the German social sciences com-
munity, and internationally recognized, posses the potential of refreshing 
the sociological contribution to understand the complex dynamics of social 
realities.  
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The question of the natural attitude
Luigi Muzzetto
The purpose of this paper is to highlight different interpretations of the fundamental characteristics of 
the natural attitude, as formulated by Berger and Luckmann, and Alfred Schutz respectively. The first 
part of the paper explores the notion of taken-for-granted in the everyday life-world in The Social Con-
struction of Reality by Berger and Luckmann and The Problem of Multiple Realities: Alfred Schutz 
and Robert Musil by Berger. The two essays show the presence of a articulated vision based on the same 
theoretical matrix. The second part of the paper analyses the essential characteristics of the natural at-
titude in the work of Husserl and Schutz. Although Berger and Luckmann are commonly viewed as being 
Schutzian scholars, their work actually presents significant differences, not only with respect to Husserl, 
but also to Schutz himself.
Part I
Among the various aspects of Schutz’s work on the “life-world” which require 
study, the nature and characteristics of taken-for-granted knowledge is un-
doubtedly a key element. A clear vision of the semantic spectrum of this con-
cept, and that of the natural attitude, is essential for a correct interpretation of 
the entire structure of the life-world.
The first part of the paper aims to show how the well-known essay by 
Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, follows a similar the-
oretical path to that of Schutz, but presents significant differences with regard 
to key aspects of the latter’s work. It significantly modifies Schutz’s theoretical 
framework on the essential point of the type of belief that belongs to the natu-
ral attitude, yet without discussing this change, or discussing the differences 
with respect to Schutz’s original vision. Berger’s essay The Problem of Multiple 
Realities: Alfred Schutz and Robert Musil moves further away from Schutz’s ideas 
but can be interpreted as a legitimate development of the model presented in 
The Social Construction.
The change in the original theoretical framework, together with the fact 
that the work of Berger and Luckmann is commonly viewed as an organic 
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development of Schutz’s ideas, contributes to creating misunderstandings and 
clouding the concepts of taken-for-granted and natural attitude, which oc-
cupy an important place in Schutzian thinking1. First of all let’s take a look at 
the main issues mentioned in The Social Construction.
1. In the introduction the two authors repeatedly underline the difference 
between epistemology and the sociology of knowledge: the first deals with 
issues that concern the methodology of the social sciences, and therefore phi-
losophy, while the second regards issues to do with sociology as an empirical 
science. The central terms of the work, according to the authors, are “reality” 
and “knowledge”. For the actor living in the world of daily life, his world is 
“real”, “albeit in different degrees, and he ‘knows’, with different degrees of 
confidence, that this world possesses such and such characteristics”. All of 
this is therefore taken-for-granted by the actor. «The philosopher, of course, 
will raise questions about the ultimate status of both this ‘reality’ and this 
‘knowledge’» (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 13). The sociologist takes a dif-
ferent stance: “One could say that the sociological understanding of ‘reality’ 
and ‘knowledge’ falls somewhere in the middle between that of the man in the 
street and that of the philosopher” (ibid. 14). In the sense that the sociology of 
knowledge cannot simply adopt the actor’s perspective on reality and knowl-
edge of it, or investigate these phenomena on an ontological or epistemologi-
cal level. «Within the frame of reference of sociology as an empirical science 
it is possible to take this reality as given, […], without further inquiring about 
the foundations of this reality, which is a philosophical task» (ibid. 33). The 
sociology of knowledge has to deal with the relativity of reality and knowledge 
with respect to the social context and «the general ways by which ‘realities’ 
are taken as ‘known’ in human societies» (ibid. 15).
Berger and Luckmann, therefore, separate the sociology of knowledge 
from phenomenology. But, as I hope will become clear further on, in The 
Social Construction the phenomenon of taken-for-grantedness is not fully inves-
tigated, and retains a high degree of indeterminacy.
I cannot say whether this is the necessary consequence of the separation 
between sociology and phenomenology. But it is certain that Schutz indicates 
the need for “a philosophical analysis” to capture the world of daily life. A need 
that therefore regards the matter in hand (Schutz 1962a: 117). Only a philo-
sophical (phenomenological) analysis enables us to explore the self-evidence of 
the natural attitude and highlight its characteristics. As Natanson underlines, 
1  I analysed some aspects of  this topic in my work Il Soggetto e il sociale. Alfred Schütz e il mondo 
taken-for-granted (Muzzetto 2006).
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the phenomenology of the natural attitude is not «simply a methodology but 
an anatomy of man’s existence with his fellow-man in the midst of everyday 
life, within what Husserl called the ‘natural attitude’» (Natanson 1974: 35).
The need stressed by Schutz is disregarded by Berger and Luckmann. I 
therefore believe that Endress is more than justified in arguing that it is nec-
essary to move beyond the different interpretations of the path opened by 
Schutz, in “protosociology” and “phenomenological sociology” (the author 
proposes a “phenomenologically based sociology” which takes full account of 
the complexity of Schutz’s vision, something which is not captured by the two 
previous positions) (Endress 2005a: 4).
To return to the work of Berger and Luckmann, the first chapter, dedi-
cated to the foundations of our knowledge of the world of everyday life, «is 
based on Schutz, as developed by Luckmann in Die Structuren der Lebenswelt, 
in toto» (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 219). It is specified that the considera-
tions made in this chapter regard “the philosophical prolegomena”, that are 
«in themselves, presociological» (ibid. 34). Considerations that represent the 
theory of finite provinces of meaning in a nutshell. It should be underlined 
that the authors report Schutz’s ideas without any critical annotations, includ-
ing the question of the natural attitude, and the belief that characterise it2. In 
these pages there is no significant departure from the ideas of Schutz.
The second chapter opens what Berger and Luckmann view as the more 
strictly sociological component. And in this case, though Schutz is the key 
frame of reference, their interpretation draws on various authors from Marx 
to Hegel, Durkheim, Weber, Mead, Plessner and Gehlen, to name a few of 
the main authors.
Given the relevance for the issue we are addressing I will refer to only two 
areas of the general theoretical framework.
a) The first regards the central aspect of Gehlen’s philosophical 
anthropology.
In Gehlen’s view, animals, including higher mammals, but with the excep-
tion of humans, have a environment that is common to the species. «The envi-
ronment is structured by its own instinctual organization» (Gehlen 1983: 33); 
in other words it is the biological apparatus that determines the relationship 
with the environment (so the animal world is therefore a “closed”, pre-given 
world).
2  «The reality of  everyday life is taken-for-granted as reality. It does not require additional 
verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply there, as self-evident and com-
pelling facticity. I know that it is real» (ibid. 37). In any case, the suspension of  disbelief  that 
characterizes the natural attitude «is so firm that to abandon it […], I have to make an extreme 
transition» (ibidem).
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Man, on the other hand, is lacking when it comes to instinct: his instinct 
is not enough to give his conduct stability. The basis for stabilisation must 
therefore be sought in culture, which becomes a second nature. Man however 
remains «an as yet undefined animal, in some ways never really finished» 
(ibid. 43). Man and culture, man and world mutually complete each other. 
The result is a social order that is objectified, externalized and lastly internal-
ized: this in a nutshell is the dialectical process of the construction of reality 
as Berger and Luckmann see it. Given the contingent nature of the construc-
tion of man’s world, the latter is intrinsically precarious, as is his “reality”, his 
belief in it, and its binding nature.
b) The second section consists of an “existentialist” reinterpretation of 
Durkheim’s notion of anomie. Berger and Luckmann underline that “the use 
of certain perspectives on ‘anxiety’ (Angst) developed by existential philosophy 
makes it possible to place Durkheim’s analysis of anomie in a broader anthro-
pological frame of reference” (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 226-227).
So Gehlen’s ideas (the notion of man as characterized by an instinctual 
deficit, and his consequent openness to the world) are combined with issues 
such as the fundamental insecurity of life - the negative and destructive as-
pects of existence. Hence the image of a social world that is not only inher-
ently fragile, but also dominated by a fear of disintegration, chaos, anomie, 
and as a consequence, a constant search for nomos3.
Both of the aforementioned points are related to the natural attitude. Al-
though this is not directly considered, in Berger and Luckmann’s interpreta-
tion, belief in the world is severely weakened. And therefore the whole theory 
of finite provinces of meaning is transformed.
It is no coincidence that the authors believe that symbolic universes serve 
not only to lend coherence to the social world as a whole and the biographies 
of the actors inside it, but also to ensure that the reality of the world of every-
day life remains paramount, dominating that of the other finite provinces of 
meaning.
We may now inquire further about the manner in which symbolic universes 
operate to legitimate individual biography and the institutional order. The 
operation is essentially the same in both cases. It is nomic, or ordering, in 
character. The symbolic universe provides order for the subjective apprehen-
sion of  biographical experience. Experiences belonging to different spheres 
3  Blin, after highlighting the “uncertain state” of  the relationship between philosophy and 
sociology in the work of  Berger and Luckmann, asserts that the work contains “a call for the 
construction of  an existential phenomenological sociology” (Blin 1995: 106).
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of  reality are integrated by incorporation in the same, overarching universe 
of  meaning. For example, the symbolic universe determines the significance 
of  dreams within the reality of  everyday life, re-establishing in each instance 
the paramount status of  the latter and mitigating the shock that accompanies 
the passage from one reality to another. The provinces of  meaning that would 
otherwise remain unintelligible enclaves within the reality of  everyday life are 
thus ordered in terms of  a hierarchy of  realities, ipso facto becoming intelligi-
ble and less terrifying. This integration of  the realities of  marginal situations 
within the paramount reality of  everyday life is of  great importance, because 
these situations constitute the most acute threat to taken-for-granted, routi-
nized existence in society. If  one conceives of  the latter as the ‘daylight side’ 
of  human life, then the marginal situations constitute a ‘night side’ that keeps 
lurking ominously on the periphery of  everyday consciousness. Just because 
the ‘night side’ has its own reality, often enough of  a sinister kind, it is a con-
stant threat to the taken-for-granted, matter-of-fact, ‘sane’ reality of  life in 
society. The thought keeps suggesting itself  (the ‘insane’ thought par excellence) 
that, perhaps, the bright reality of  everyday life is but an illusion, to be swal-
lowed up at any moment by the howling nightmares of  the other, the night-
side reality. Such thoughts of  madness and terror are contained by ordering 
all conceivable realities within the same symbolic universe that encompasses 
the reality of  everyday life - to wit, ordering them in such a way that the latter 
reality retains its paramount, definitive (if  one wishes, its ‘most real’) quality. 
This nomic function of  the symbolic universe for individual experience may 
be described quite simply by saying that it ‘puts everything in its right place’. 
[…] The symbolic universe allows one ‘to return to reality’ - namely, to the 
reality of  everyday life (ibid. 115-116).
«The origins of  a symbolic universe have their roots in the constitution of  
man. If  man in society is a world-constructor, this is made possible by his con-
stitutionally given world-openness, which already implies the conflict between 
order and chaos» (ibid. 121). «The legitimation of  the institutional order is 
also faced with the ongoing necessity of  keeping chaos at bay. All social reality 
is precarious. All societies are constructions in the face of  chaos. The constant 
possibility of  anomic terror is actualized whenever the legitimations that ob-
scure the precariousness are threatened or collapse» (ibidem).
In this context, the belief that underpins the natural attitude can be un-
derstood as a “force” that sustains the daylight vision. But this force is limited. 
It is in constant struggle with the forces that belong to the night side, those 
marginal realities that constantly threaten to destroy the reality of everyday 
life. This vision seems to indicate the presence of an eternal conflict, similar 
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to that between Eros and Thanatos, between forces that strive to maintain the 
sense of everyday reality, and others intent on destroying it.
The weakening of the belief that belongs to the natural attitude is accom-
panied by more fragile borders, compared to Schutz’s vision. For example, 
in Schutz’s view the idea that the world is an illusion resides naturally in the 
provinces of philosophy, literature, and the imagination, but can only become 
part of the paramount reality in extreme situations. Within the confines of the 
world of everyday life, this idea would be a sign of madness.
There is no doubt that the symbolic universe performs the essential func-
tion of lending coherence to the vision of the social world and individuals’ bi-
ographies. It undoubtedly represents an inescapable individual and collective 
point of reference for constructing a meaningful world. We are not concerned 
about the role of the symbolic universe, but the importance attributed to it. It 
appears to operate as if the natural attitude had restricted the importance of 
its influence. In the image provided by Berger and Luckmann, the fact that 
the nature of reality is given, in the first place, pre-predicatively remains in 
the background. As does the fact that the assumption that among the various 
provinces, the world of everyday life is the province of fundamental reality, is 
also given pre-predicatively. All of this is given with absolute certainty. A cer-
tainty that underpins the symbolic universe. There is undoubtedly a complex 
relationship between the characteristics of the natural attitude and symbolic 
forms of experience that cannot be avoided.
In an essay written many years later (1995), Berger and Luckmann con-
firm their vision of the fragility of the universe of life. In the essay that ex-
plores the crisis of modern man, the authors raise a preliminary issue: is this 
really a new crisis, as much of the literature appears to assert, or is it just a 
variation on the angst that grips man every time the order of the world begins 
to falter? And also: is this crisis not based on the eternal problem of meaning 
when faced with the inevitability of death and the fear that this meaning does 
not exist? (Berger and Luckmann 1995). Harbouring doubts about the nature 
of the crisis of modern man should have prompted an in-depth analysis of 
taken-for-granted knowledge, but this is not the case.
2. Berger’s essay The Problem of Multiple Realities: Alfred Schutz and Rob-
ert Musil (1970) can be viewed as the most significant “implementation” 
of the model formulated in The Social Construction. I believe that there is a 
broad convergence between the visions that underpin the two works, al-
though Berger’s essay moves down the path that takes him further away 
from Schutz’s theory.
It should be noted that the differences mentioned can be traced throughout 
Berger’s work, and were present in works that pre-date the essay written with 
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Luckmann. The Precarious Vision (1961) presents the core of Berger’s vision and, 
I would say, even traces of the deep concerns that inspire his thoughts4.
Berger formulated his interpretation drawing on authors such as Weber, 
Mead and Cooley, and more generally the Chicago school, Goffman and his 
dramaturgical analysis, the sociology of knowledge, from Mannehein to Schel-
er, etc. A decisive role is played by elements from Heidegger and Sartre such as 
“inauthenticity” and “bad faith”. These concepts are presented as enabling us 
to grasp the artificial nature - as construct, fabrication and manipulation - that 
lurks under the surface of the social world. The latter is a drama, not without 
comic or grotesque aspects: humans perform in the comedy of life, playing the 
roles or parts that society assigns them. But sociology is not the only prism that 
enables us to capture this unsettling characteristic of the social world. There 
are many social experiences which allow the actors of common sense to aban-
don their usual vision to capture deeper, less visible aspects of the world. This 
phenomenon is known as alternation5. Given its presence, despite the natural 
attitude’s tendency to accept that the social world is the pre-given world, and is 
“real” in itself, the image of the social world is ultimately precarious.
In short: the social world constitutes itself as a reality that is as «self-evident 
and as solid as those of the natural cosmos. Very likely, society could not exist 
otherwise» (Berger 1976: 10-11). Nevertheless, the author believes that «this 
consciousness of what Alfred Schutz has called the ‘world taken-for-granted’ 
is not of such solidity that it cannot be breached. When such a breach occurs 
the world is transformed, takes on new dimensions and colors» (ibid. 11).
But why does this awareness that society is not a pre-given reality, external 
to man, and cogent, but merely a construct formulated by the actors them-
selves (i.e. the awareness that there are no “social laws” similar to natural 
laws, but only rules created by man) not translate into a moral stance against 
«the crimes committed in the name of that society?»6.
4  The essay, which revolves around the issue of  whether it is possible to be a Christian today, 
is not, according to the author, strictly scientific. We could describe it as a “sociologically in-
formed” essay, as it draws on sociological theories and “material from the social sciences” 
(Berger 1976: 9).
5  It is interesting to observe that, according to Fontana and Van de Water, something very 
similar to the notion of  alternation can be found in Sartre. The experience of  seeing the world 
“in different ways”, the experience of  nausea, enables Roquentin (a character in the novel La 
Nausée) to see “things in a different reality”. By means of  an optical displacement Roquentin 
experiences “a Husserlian epoché without the long preparation involved in Husserl, but occur-
ring suddenly, by accident, and resulting in a vacuum feeling of  terror, not one of  reassurance, 
as in Husserl” (Fontana and Van de Water 1977: 106).
6  For instance, why do we continue to accept the death penalty, and why do we continue to 
accept war, once we have understood that these are not caused by entities outside of  ourselves?
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Berger’s response is that assuming “fiction as reality” can become a “mor-
al alibi” and lead people into a state of “inauthenticity” (ibid. 84). The author 
does not mean to say that “bad faith”, as conceived by Sartre, is responsible 
for the taken-for-grantedness of the social world. But that this characteristic is 
an intrinsic part of the taken-for-grantedness of the social world, and is there-
fore a function of taken-for-grantedness. «Bad faith means that society assists 
us in hiding our own actions from our awareness. The role becomes a moral 
alibi. It goes without saying that possibility is inherent in the most basic way 
in our social existence” (ibid. 89). This has another possible function. “Func-
tion which can be described by Heidegger’s concept of ‘das Man’» (ibid. 95). 
Heidegger believes that resorting to “social generalities” enables us to «evade 
confrontation with the reality of death» (ibidem). Death, and more generally 
anything negative, “the terror of our existence”, is thus tamed by tracing it to 
the world of everyday life and the characteristics of the latter7.
Therefore while on one hand the fact that the social world presents itself as 
something taken-for-granted is perhaps inevitable, on the other this phenome-
non has significant consequences, such as offering alibis for human behaviour, 
and an antidote to the fear of death.
There is no need to recall that the concepts of bad faith and inauthentic-
ity are not Schutz’s8. The phenomenology of the natural attitude is radically 
descriptive. Taken-for-granted knowledge is viewed as an essential part of the 
natural attitude. There is no intention to explain how it functions as a form of 
self-deception. Or to prefigure the inauthenticity of das Man as conceived by 
Heidegger. (Anonymity is an essential feature of society, a trait associated with 
the typifying nature of consciousness).
The following quote shows the image of a world strongly characterized by 
the fear of dissolution, chaos and also by the need for nomos, which represents 
the urge to construct a taken-for-granted world. This image both enables us 
to grasp the affinity with existentialism, and introduces a theme that is also 
central to The Social Construction.
One does not have to be an existentialist to perceive that existence lurks with 
terrors. Thrown into the world in one brief  moment of  consciousness, we are 
7  These aspects appear in various essays that refer to Schutz’s work, as well as that of  Berger 
and Luckmann. As if  there were an evident continuity between the two, without noticeable dif-
ferences. See in particular the essays by R. W. Maloy (Maloy 1977) and L. Baron (Baron 1983).
8  As Natanson underlines, “without going into Heidegger, it might be said that for Schutz the 
anonymity of  types and the entire dynamics of  typification has an ontological ground funda-
mentally different from Heidegger’s placement of  the inauthentic ‘Man’” (Natanson 1974: 91). 
As for Sartre, in various essays Schutz expresses criticism that underlines his distance.
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surrounded on all sides by mystery which includes our own destiny and the 
meaning of  a universe not too obviously constructed for our comfort. From the 
first reassuring smile of  the mother bending over a frightened infant, society 
provides us with structures in which we can live with a measure of  ease and 
which announce to us every day that things are in order. Busying ourselves at 
the warm, well-lit spots of  the marketplace we can forget the howling visions of  
the night. Existence is leaning over a bottomless abyss. Society is the Potemkin 
village that shelters the abyss from our fearful eyes.
It happens sometimes in the middle of  the night that we wake up and can-
not fall asleep again. It is in such hours that strange thoughts may come. Our 
own existence and identity suddenly cease to be matters of  course, but highly 
doubtful fabrications in a world constantly threatened by nightmarish trans-
formations. If  we are what is regarded as sane, well-balanced individuals there 
are very definite ways of  coping with such experiences. We tell ourselves very 
forcefully who we are. Nonsense, we tell ourselves, we have nothing to do with 
the faceless horrors of  our dreams. There can be no question about our identi-
ty. We can promptly give name, address, profession, marital status. If  necessary, 
we can wake up wife and children, who will laughingly confirm the identifica-
tion. We can switch on the lights and walk around in our house. We call this 
process of  recollection a coming back to reality. We would contend, however, 
that it is a very special reality that we come back to in this way. It is the daytime 
reality of  society as taken-for-granted. And it certainly is reality. But let us not 
too easily dismiss the nighttime from the domain of  the real. Names, addresses, 
professions, and wives have a way of  disappearing. At the latest it will be in 
the confrontation with death that we will be thrown back into that night-time 
world where identities are questioned (Berger 1976: 97-98).
Various subsequent articles, also prior to The Social Construction, explore 
the nature of the social world as a construct. The theme of the institutions is 
a central point.
Le Mariage et la Construction de la Réalité (1964), written with Kellner, em-
phasizes the social function of marriage and the institutions in general. While 
Durkheim examined anomie, Berger believes it is more useful to draw atten-
tion to the opposite dimension, namely the nomic dimension. The latter is 
much more important than the former because it is within the socially cre-
ated order, within this set of rules, «that our experience of life [...] gathers 
meaning»(Berger and Kellner 1964: 3). In this way “a coherent reality is con-
structed, preserved and if need be modified” (ibid. 4). «Reality shared as such 
by the members of a group and therefore taken-for-granted and lastly consid-
ered the only social reality, the world ‘tout court’, the only world that ordinary 
people can constitute» (ibid. 7).
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A later essay, written with Kellner in 1965 (Arnold Gehlen and the Theory of 
Institutions), explores Gehlen’s theory of institutions more directly9. The two 
authors return to the differences between the instinctual dimensions of hu-
mans and animals, and the consequences of these differences. These include 
man’s instability. The latter must therefore ensure the stability of his con-
duct by means of “structures produced by himself”, namely culture. But these 
structures must be continually reproduced. «Social institutions are the core of 
this process of cultural stabilization», producing a «‘background’ for human 
activity» (ibid. 112).
Another essay, also dated 1965, written with Pulberg, Reification and the So-
ciological Critique of Consciousness, represents a further step in the formulation of 
his vision of the construction of the social world: reification is a greater degree 
of stabilization of the social order.
3. Now we have clarified the background to the essay he then authored 
with Luckmann, we come to The problem of multiple realities: Alfred Schutz and 
Robert Musil, published in 1970. The essay, as we have already noted, moves 
further away from Schutz’s theory, but in the direction already taken in The 
Social Construction10.
In the essay on Schutz and Musil, the theory of finite provinces of meaning 
is the central focus of the analysis. In this case the analysis does not regard the 
world of everyday life in its structural, static characteristics. It concerns the 
processes under way in a period of epochal change11 such as that of the col-
9  Institutions that constitute «the core of  [the] […] process of  cultural stabilization» (Berger 
and Kellner 1965: 112).
10  Nasu recalls the interpretation of  another phenomenon in which Berger moves away from 
Schutz’s theoretical framework. Berger interprets the pluralization of  social worlds (a phenom-
enon linked to post-modernity) from the perspective of  finite provinces of  meaning. But these 
are actually separate phenomena. There are a few similarities between social sub-worlds and 
provinces, but substantial differences prevail. The main difference highlighted by Nasu is that 
the sub-worlds are not the product of  a particular tension of  subjects’ consciousness, but real-
ities existing “out there”. The cognitive style that characterizes each sub-world is part of  each 
of  them and has to be acquired by the actors. This implies that Berger’s analysis is “empirical 
factual” and not “eidetical” (Nasu 1999).
11  Berger begins the essay Robert Musil and the Salvage of  the Self (1984) by saying that it is nec-
essary to distinguish between the constant, anthropological characteristics of  the self  and the 
characteristics produced by specific historical changes in a given period. Unfortunately, he 
continues, the social sciences have not yet produced an adequate representation of  the differ-
ences between the constant and variable characteristics. I think it is interesting to note that the 
consciousness of  post-modern man represented in the essay on Musil’s novel does not deviate 
significantly from the anthropological view of  consciousness represented in The Social Construc-
tion, apart from accentuating the negative tendencies that have obviously been present since 
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lapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Berger’s words, «The Man Without 
Qualities contains perspectives of some interest for a phenomenology of the 
Lebenswelt and for the general problem of multiple realities». The imminent 
war and the end of the Habsburg empire symbolize the catastrophe of the tra-
ditional world, its order, its vision. This catastrophe brought about a change 
in the sense of reality itself. And with it, the disintegration of the subject itself. 
«What Musil attempted in his gigantic work was nothing less than a solution 
of the problem of reality from the perspective of modern consciousness» (ibid. 
343). «Ulrich, ‘the man without qualities’, is deliberately presented by Musil 
as a prototype of modern man […], open to an indeterminate number of re-
ality – and self – transformations» (Berger 1978: 363-364). A man, in short, 
who tends to replace the sense of reality with a sense of possibility. Musil has 
Ulrich say that «the sense of possibility could also be defined as the ability 
to conceive of everything there might be just as well, and to attach no more 
importance to what is than to what is not» (Musil 1972: 12). The sense of pos-
sibility implies not being firmly anchored to deeply rooted beliefs, and also a 
willingness to take on different points of view and inhabit worlds that are dif-
ferent from what is commonly viewed as the real world.
So Ulrich, with his sister Agate, attempts to build another world, a private 
world, a different reality (“the other condition”). The world of reality, as it is 
commonly understood, is devalued, hit by a “negative creed”. Let’s look at the 
essential characteristics of the negative creed according to Musil.
• It has to do with the importance of that fundamental trait of the natural at-
titude that Schutz calls “fundamental anxiety”: “the weight of living, that 
secret melancholy of the knowledge that we all must die, that everything is 
so difficult and in all likelihood so futile” (Musil 1972: 713).
• The awareness of the relativity of all morals. “There is neither good nor 
bad, only faith or doubt” (ibid. 738).
• The fragmentation of the self. Any activity one performs relativizes the 
others.
• The impossibility of having certainties.
• The disenchanted vision of the world that follows the rise of the scientific 
perspective, the death of the holistic vision.
• The subject’s detachment from the world. “There is no kind of mediation 
between what happens to us and what happens outside of us” (ibid. 719).
• The awareness of the absurdity and artificiality of the world, a world that 
controls its “normalcy” by sanctioning any other possibility. “Our civi-
time immemorial. In this way the fragility of  the consciousness appears endemic. The crisis 
glimpsed on the horizon has finally come to pass.
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lization is a temple of what, if left unchecked, would be called madness” 
(ibid. 743).
• The realization that the abandonment of the point of view of the given 
social world, the “inessential” world, makes new visions possible.
The crux of the novel, in terms of the theory of provinces of meaning, is the 
tendency to look for a new way of being in the other condition. In other words, 
the novel does not merely describe the characteristics of the crisis of meaning 
affecting the world of everyday life, but also narrates the attempt to replace it 
with a different reality, a mystical arena without a religious creed. The other 
condition is a world that combines irreconcilable, syncretic positions that, ac-
cording to Musil, would only make sense for a different, more complex self 
than that hitherto conceived12. A world that defies anthropological logic and 
constants, that forges a mystical union between the self and the world13.
When examining Berger’s interpretation, we should bear in mind the dif-
ficulties involved in comparing the world of science with the world of fiction, 
two finite provinces of meaning that relate to the world of everyday life in 
different ways, and use different modes of expression14. Moreover, in addition 
to the general problems that this relationship entails, we should also consider 
the specific function that metaphor, allegory and simile play in the work of 
Musil15.
12  Berger asserts that for Musil The Man Without Qualities represents an attempt to save the self, 
in response to Mach’s assertion that the self  cannot be saved. This does not contradict the idea 
expressed by Harrington, according to which the novel is a critique of  the traditional concept 
of  the self, an expressed by Descartes, Kant and Hegel (Harrington 2002).
13  In other words, what looks like an incestuous relationship between Ulrich and Agate, as not-
ed by Harrington, symbolizes some higher, ultimate, yet still elusive state of  human together-
ness and love, some utopian state of  redemption that Musil famously calls ‘the other condition’ 
(der andere Zustand) (Harrington 2002: 67).
14  For an interpretation of  Musil’s novel from the perspective of  the relationship between liter-
ature and sociology, see in particular G. Sebald (2014).
15  As Gargani claims, Musil intends to reject «any version of  the world that claims to be unique, 
privileged and inexorable» (Gargani, 1982: 10). And oppose «Zivilisation (namely modern civili-
zation based on the automatic causal mechanisms of  the technological organisation of  society): 
rejecting it by presenting an ethical and aesthetic alternative aimed at recovering that sense of  
motivation and responsibility that are gradually taken from men of  their time» (ibid. 11). In 
Musil’s work, therefore, metaphor, allegory and simile are not simple “semiotic devices”, but 
«conceptual links of  his literary project intended to provide ‘contributions’ to enable us to spir-
itually transcend the world» (ibid. 20). Musil believes it is impossible to express indescribable 
experiences by means of  a direct, denoting language. Metaphor, analogy and simile succeed 
in «uniting in a sole meaning things and experiences that the language of  one-sided rationality 
leaves in a state of  scattered fragments» (ibid. 29). It is only through this language that Ulrich 
is able to express his idea of  another condition, «a human condition where being here would 
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But in any case, it is only broadly speaking that Ulrich’s position appears 
quixotic in the Schutzian sense. A more careful analysis shows a significant 
difference. As Endress maintains, “the other condition” does not belong to 
the Schutzian provinces, the life-world. The other condition is on “the other 
side of denied reality”. «‘The other condition’ seeks to overcome the human 
condition or the very idea of existence» (Endress 2014: 170).
Endress shows the need to extend Schutz’s framework in order to fully 
grasp the complexity of the different planes in Musil’s novel. He suggests three 
levels of reflexivity where the theory of finite provinces of meaning can be 
articulated. Berger stops at the first of these levels, the descriptive level, which 
is incapable of grasping the wealth of meanings present in Musil’s work. But, 
apart from this aspect, Endress emphasizes the presence of significant prob-
lems in Berger’s perspective. Let’s take the main ones: the concepts of every-
day life-world and life-world are used indiscriminately; similarly the concept 
of multiple realities is used both as a “functional differentiation of society” 
and as “types of subjective constitution of meaning”; Berger uses the term 
“abolition of reality” much more frequently than the more Schutzian expres-
sion “interruption of reality” (ibid. 163).
To these I would add another critical observation: Berger’s interpretation 
significantly alters the Schutzian model. Let’s see some examples. In Musil’s 
novel the other condition is glimpsed through the cracks that open up in the 
“crumbling structures” in the world of everyday life (Berger 1978: 348). Cracks 
that are «points at which the ‘epoché of the natural attitude’ breaks down. 
These points then become possible transfer stations to the ‘other condition’, not 
yet identical with the latter, but potential occasions for its attainment. While 
differing greatly in their experiential content, all these transition points have 
in common a violent breakdown of the taken-for-granted routines of everyday 
life and, ipso facto, an intimation of novel and strange modes of being» (ibidem).
Berger recalls Ulrich’s experience of being attacked at night, the powerful 
emotion of falling in love, his sexual experiences with Bonadea, “the violent 
aesthetic experiences” (music, theatre), religious experiences16. These inhabit 
the world of life as alien intrusions that Berger interprets as islands, enclaves. 
Alongside these the author recalls the criminal reality of Moosbrugger, «a 
reality that, unless negated, threatens the suspension of doubt on which all 
social order rests». «Moosbrugger foreshadows the interruption of everyday 
merely be the image of  being there, and even the dream of  one person in two bodies would 
lose its impossibility» (ibid. 28). Language therefore plays a particular “constructive” function.
16  Berger points out that sexuality and sexual experiences play an important role for Musil «in 
terms of  their efficacy in creating breaches in the structures of  everyday reality». Sexuality and 
sexual experiences are seen as chaotic, Dionysian forces (ibid. 350).
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reality by the collective crime of the coming war […]. Then, replicates on the 
level of public life the reality-shattering effect of sexual and aesthetic experi-
ence in the life of individuals» (ibid. 352-353).
But Berger’s interpretation, according to which sexual experiences, musical 
experiences, experiences of violence can be viewed as enclaves, cracks which 
cause the abandonment of the epoché of the natural attitude, is debatable.
When it comes to war, violence crime and sex, their potential for destroy-
ing the existing order is undoubtedly clear. And it is also evident that this order is 
a constitutive feature of the world of everyday life. But the break with routine, 
and the existing social order, does not automatically mean the dissolution of the 
nucleus of the natural attitude, the belief in a pre-given reality.
Lastly, however, given the specific nature of the effects generated by the 
aforementioned experiences, these can be linked to an individual’s biography. 
But how can we view this person as an emblem of modern man? Are these ex-
periences that can be generalized as typical of a specific time in history, from 
a descriptive, rather than a highly symbolic point of view?
The images provided by Musil are a highly effective hyperbole that stresses 
the radical nature of the processes taking place; nonetheless these images can-
not be acquired by sociology without translating them into its language. In 
my view Berger has not fulfilled this essential task.
I would like to clarify a key point. I do not mean to argue that the mean-
ings that belong to a finite province of meaning should be viewed as constitut-
ed separately from other provinces. What I intend to say is that the meanings 
imply the relationship between provinces, but the way in which this relation-
ship produces the meanings is a complex problem that we only have an ap-
proximate vision of. It seems to me that Berger simplifies the results of these 
relationships. In other words, an overly literal reading of the events in the 
novel, together with the idea of using finite provinces of meaning as a frame-
work for interpreting the experiences narrated, leads Berger to formulate two 
ideas that are slightly forced. The first is an over-elastic use of Schutzian prov-
inces, which are stretched to take in events. The second is that of simplifying 
the sense of events in a one-sided way.
Underlying the topics covered in this last part, there is a significant problem 
that has not yet been solved: that of the ways of structuring meaning (considering 
the classification of experiences into finite provinces of meaning, and assuming 
that the latter are not static ontological structures). Here we cannot tackle this is-
sue, which is undoubtedly one of the core issues of the basis of Berger’s analysis17.
17  I will merely indicate a trace of  the process. Schutz envisages a series of  readings, from the 
most simplified image of  reality to the that which comes closest to the complexity of  reality. 
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However the concept of reality that emerges from Berger’s analysis is not 
exactly the world of everyday life understood as the world of fundamental 
reality, as represented by Schutz. There is no doubt that this difference also 
stems from the fact that Berger uses the concepts of life-world and the world of 
everyday life interchangeably. But, beyond this inconsistency, the most radical 
consequence that I would like to focus on is the loss of Schutz’s framework. 
The life-world, not distinguished from the world of everyday life that it is 
based on, ends up coinciding with a generic “existential” world. And the crisis 
evoked becomes a “crisis of meaning”, variously described in many works, 
from Beckett to Ionesco’s plays to Adamov, Genet18, works that evoke images 
of the absurd, the void, the “catastrophe of meaning” (Bodei 1987: 33).
Interestingly, the aforementioned 1995 work by Berger and Luckmann, 
Modernity, Pluralism and the Crisis of Meaning: The Orientation of Modern Man, also 
formally accomplishes this step. The analysis, from the construction of mean-
ing to its crisis, is no longer carried out using Schutz’s framework of the finite 
provinces of meaning. This structure disappears. The crisis, broadly speak-
ing, becomes a “crisis of meaning”19. A crisis that is ever latent in the modern 
world, ready to emerge if the protective barriers of the intermediate structures 
of the social world collapse.
Consciousness is seen as consisting of accumulated layers of experience. 
What is taken-for-granted occupies the bottom layer, the firm foundation that 
supports the layers in which meaning is less solid, beliefs more uncertain. The 
top layer is a layer of total uncertainty. The basic assumption of the paper is that 
in the post-modern world what is taken-for-granted gradually tends to shrink, 
and this process gradually takes in increasingly broad, decisive areas of life.
The simplest interpretation indicates the formulation of  meaning in a single province. Devot-
ing attention to one issue determines the main province where the meaning of  that specific 
experience will be formed, and the articulation of  consciousness in terms of  the field, topic 
and horizon (the other provinces are placed on the horizon of  the main one). The system of  
relevance applied is that of  the latter province. Schutz renders this basic interpretation progres-
sively more complex. And he does this based on the assumption that we simultaneously inhabit 
different finite provinces of  meaning with different degrees of  our personality. It can be seen 
as a process in which one main theme produces “the apparent unification” of  the activities 
involved (Schutz 1970: 1). Schutz also examines the way in which two themes flow into the 
consciousness in parallel, and each becomes the horizon of  the other, and so on. Even the most 
comprehensive reading of  the author remains unsatisfactory. Natanson’s work on the functions 
of  the enclave intended as possible structural arenas for the construction of  meaning is of  great 
interest (Natanson, 1986).
18  Cfr. L. Goldmann 1971.
19  It is true that Schutz and Husserl share the idea that real units are units of  meaning. But that 
does not mean that the meaning and reality coincide.
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In this essay too, Berger and Luckmann do not examine in detail the con-
stitutive structure of the taken-for-granted. The two authors merely observe 
that taken-for-granted knowledge is non-problematic, obvious, self-evident 
knowledge. The taken-for-granted sphere is once more accepted without 
question20.
M. Rogers claims that Berger and Luckmann are close to formulating 
an «explicit theory of taken-for-grantedness», which «links habitualization 
and institutionalization, objectivation and anonymization, and reality main-
tenance and mundane routines». They link these aspects to the typifications 
that are constituent elements of common sense knowledge. Nevertheless, «al-
though they repeatedly note the taken-for-granted quality of everyday life, 
Berger and Luckmann do not thematize that matter for detailed treatment 
in and of itself. Their construction of what amounts to a sociological theory 
of taken-for-grantedness leaves unaddressed the one question such a theory 
must confront: what, precisely, is taken-for-grantedness? And, correspond-
ingly, what is excluded from the taken-for-granted sectors of everyday experi-
ence? Sociologically, then, the nature and range of taken-for-grantedness in 
mundane life remain ambiguous» (ibid. 138).
Part II
1. In Husserl’s work, the belief in the world that characterizes the natural 
attitude is presented as an absolute. «I find continually present and standing 
over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I myself belong, 
as of all other men found in it and related in the same way to it. This reality, 
as the word already tells us, I find to be out there, and also take it just as it 
gives itself to me as something that exists out there. All doubting and rejecting 
of the data of the natural world does not alter the general thesis of the natural 
attitude. The world as reality is always there; at the most it might be ‘different’ 
to what I assumed […] but in the sense of the general thesis, it remains a world 
that has its being out there» (Husserl 1965: 62). It is a world that is ‘present-
at-hand’ (vorhanden) «in part crossed, in part surrounded by an obscurely in-
tended horizon of indeterminate actuality» (ibid. 58).
This world is immediately and intuitively grasped by humans. In other 
words, the general thesis «does not consist in a particular act, in an explicit, 
20  This critique does not intend to reiterate Bourdieu’s point of  view, according to which the 
stances of  phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology, without distinctions, would be 
naive: actors’ taken-for-granted knowledge would be taken-for-granted. For a critique of  Bour-
dieu see Endress (Endress 2005b).
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predicative judgement about existence. Rather, it is something that endures per-
manently for the duration of the attitude, that is, for all of our natural life in a 
waking state». If I explicitly address, by means of a judgement, the world as it 
exists, I am in any case aware «of having predicatively grasped what, […] being 
‘present-at-hand’, is already out there, not thematically or cogitatively or pre-
dicatively, in the original experience or what has been experienced» (ibid. 63).
But what do we mean by “real” in the natural attitude? Real, as Natanson 
underlines, «is ‘what is given’ [...]. Reality is an added predicate to immediate 
experience» (Natanson 1973: 22). Reality “is the ‘fact-world’”. A world that 
«has not origin or source; it is simply ‘there’ and always has been ‘there’ for all 
of us. ‘There’ is less a spatial than epistemological term» (ibid. 26).
Accepting the reality of the world, its givenness, is not based on having 
the opportunity to refer to evidence. Indeed, as pointed out by Natanson, the 
question of proving one’s belief «does not arise in any fundamental way» (ibid. 
24). Nevertheless, this belief is a certain belief: in this way it is like faith. Hus-
serl says: «The existence of the world as a whole is that obvious truth that is 
never challenged [...] and that is the basis of every judgement. Our conscious-
ness of the world is consciousness of the world of certain belief» (Husserl 1960: 
25). Husserl refers to that set of «original beliefs that stand before any doubt, 
which all forms of doubt have to keep faith with in order to exist: we must 
all necessarily adhere to these, and without them we would not be capable of 
taking a single step, not only in everyday life but also in logical and scientific 
investigation. This belief system, that we are unable to genuinely doubt, even 
if we wanted to, is what we call ‘common sense’» (Di Martino 2004: 165).
As Husserl sees it then, there is a foundation layer of pre-given, pre-judged 
certainties that form the basis of our judgements and make it possible for us 
to doubt: doubt is only possible within a framework of certainties. But how 
is this cornerstone of certainties structured: what does the world of original 
evidence include?
In the first place we need to specify that the world Husserl is talking about 
is not the exclusive product of that form of intentionality that is “representa-
tion”, separate from desire, will, affection and various social dimensions; in 
other words, from the concrete life of the consciousness. According to Lévinas 
the exclusive emphasis on representation characterized only Logical Investiga-
tions21. Yet in Ideas Husserl had already adopted a stance “that would become 
21  In Logical Investigations Husserl argues that «the existing world that is shown to us has the 
same mode of  existence as the object offered to the theoretical gaze. The real world is the world 
of  knowledge. The characteristics, such as ‘value’, ‘usual’ etc. that are attributed to things are 
attributed by us, but do not represent the object as it exists» (Lévinas 2002: 76). There is a very 
clear distinction between the object itself  and the attributes that are added to it.
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central to phenomenology”, and that can be summed up as “being is what we 
experience”. “This idea requires us to include structures pertaining to non-
objectifying acts in the characteristics of existence and forces us to envisage modes 
of existence which differ from those of the theoretical object” (Lévinas 2002: 
59). As Husserl says in Ideas: the world «is before me not only as a world of 
things, but with the same immediacy, also as a world of values, a world of 
goods, a practical world. I find the physical things in front of me furnished 
with value-characteristics, like physical properties, beautiful and ugly, pleasant 
and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, etc. Things immediately present 
themselves as objects of use, the ‘table’ with its ‘books’, the ‘glass’, the ‘vase’, 
the ‘piano’, etc. These value-characteristics and practical characteristics also 
belong constitutively to the objects as objects […]. And as for mere things, 
this also naturally applies to the humans and animals that surround me, with 
regard to their social characteristics. They are my ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’, my 
‘servants’ or ‘superiors’, ‘strangers’ or ‘relatives’, etc.» (Husserl 1965: 59).
According to Lévinas the equivalence between objectifying acts and ex-
istential modes is sought rather than achieved in Husserl’s work. But what is 
important for us is that the world of life does not stop at representation.
In The Crisis this aspect becomes more apparent: «The life-world is the spatio-
temporal world of things as we experience them in our pre – and extra-scientific 
life, and as we know them to be experienceable beyond what is actually expe-
rienced. We have a world-horizon as a horizon of possible thing-experience. 
Things: that is stones, animals, plants, even human beings and human prod-
ucts; but everything here is subjective and relative, even though normally, in 
our experience and in the social group united with us in the community of life, 
we arrive at ‘secure’ facts» (Husserl 1983: 166). Husserl therefore maintains that 
concrete experience takes place in a historical and cultural world, I would say 
within one’s group, with its own worldview. Nevertheless, even taking this into 
account, we can arrive at «a truth concerning objects that is unconditionally 
valid for all subjects, from which, in spite of relativity», everyone agrees («nor-
mal Europeans, normal Hindus, normal Chinese people agree, etc.»). «The life-
world», Husserl concludes, «despite its relativity, has its own general structure. This 
general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself 
relative. We can attend to it in its generality and, with sufficient care, fix it once 
and for all in a way that is equally accessible to all» (ibid. 167).
So, to simplify, we can say that in Husserl’s work there are two levels of Leb-
enswelt22: a changeable historical-cultural level «that embraces the certainties 
22  Chung-Chi Yu, taking up the work of  Waldenfels, sees in the Krisis three versions of  Leb-
enswelt: «1. the concrete life world; 2. a relative specific world such as a vocational world or a 
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that apply to me as a man of a certain era and a certain culture», and a basic 
nucleus, an «invariant structure that is implied not by our way of life but all 
forms of life in general» (Spinicci 2000: 126).
From this perspective, the problem arises whether there is logical com-
patibility between these levels or an incurable aporia23. Husserl shows great 
certainty when asserting the existence of an arena of “perceptive immediacy”, 
that is universally and tacitly shared, and on which different worlds are built.
Husserl also believes that the presence of different visions of the world does 
not affect the degree of belief we have in its existence. He does not explicitly 
address this issue. But he does not seem to deviate from the idea that belief in 
the world remains in any case a certain belief.
We can therefore say that for Husserl the “form of belief” changes, but the 
“certainty of the world” remains (Spinicci: 128).
2. While for Husserl our “first contact” with the world is by means of per-
ception, for Schutz it occurs through working24. «Basically, the everyday life-
world, which is based on the Wirkwelt, constitutes the core of the Lifeworld, 
which contains many ‘sub-universes’ or ‘finite provinces of meaning’» (Yu 
1999: 163)25.
certain cultural world; 3. a world-nucleus of  nature to be distilled by abstraction, namely, the 
world of  straightforward intersubjective perception […]. This world is composed of  the world 
of  space-time and natural objects, which are not yet culturally interpreted and reconstructed» 
(Yu 2004: 178). The latter world remains the same for all, above and beyond cultural differ-
ences; it remains “the universal ground for all different lifeworlds”. A world that, as Waldenfels 
asserts, is “given first” (ibid. 181). Chung-Chi Yu also recalls that in recent debate on Husserl, 
the notions of  “homeworld” and “alienworld” emerged.
23  Chung-Chi Yu believes that the attempt to reconcile cultural worlds and the basic perceptual 
world, based on the idea of  foundation, leads Husserl into aporias, and a “confused” theory 
(Yu 2004).
24  Natanson underlines the continuity between perception and working. In Husserl’s work 
perception should not be seen as «the factuality of  vision. If  it is at all correct to speak of  a 
‘metaphor’ of  vision as dominant in phenomenology, the metaphor should be understood as 
a nuanced indication of  intuition, not as feeling but as ‘a mental seeing’. Accordingly, action 
is as central to Husserlian seeing as any other aspect of  the spectrum of  perception. It is the 
narrowing of  perception which Schutz rejects; it is the enlargement of  perception which he 
advances» (Natanson 1986: 17).
25  Yu’s statement sums up the evolution of  Schutz’s thought and avoids creating misunder-
standings. The expressions life-world, world of  everyday life, and working world are used in-
terchangeably, as synonyms. It should be recalled that in the 1936 essay that represented the 
pragmatic shift/turning point, Schutz highlights the basic nature of  working (Wirken). And in 
the 1945 essay on multiple realities, working is defined as the “prevalent form of  spontaneity” 
of  the everyday life-world, its distinctive trait. And in the same article the everyday life-world 
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Moreover in Schutz, “from the beginning” the everyday life-world is an 
“intersubjective world of culture”. Schutz criticises Husserl’s view of “pure 
perception” (letter to Gurwitsch dated 13 October 1954): «traditional phe-
nomenology, including Husserl, is naive in the sense that it analyzes percep-
tion as the central paradigm without taking account of the fact that percep-
tion is after all a phenomenon of the life-world and thus implicitly presupposes 
the appresentative structures that lead to the constitution of the life-world» 
(Schutz and Gurwitsch 1989: 235).
Schutz’s criticism of the “naivety” of viewing perception as a fundamental 
paradigm, combined with the idea that the everyday life-world is a world of 
culture “from the beginning”, indicates a position that is clearly different to 
that of Husserl. Yet Yu believes that there is a well-founded reason to believe 
that in Schutz the issue of “foundation” leads to an ambiguous vision of the 
everyday life-world. To sum up Yu’s argument in two points.
a) The problem analyzed by Yu emerges, in the first place, from an ex-
change of letters between Gurwitsch and Schutz (3 September 1954, 13 Oc-
tober 1954). Schutz sets out to indicate the differences between his stance and 
that of Husserl, with regard to both the existence of a basic level of percep-
tion, and in relation to the vision of how culture takes shape in the everyday 
life-world. He agrees with Gurwitsch on a critical interpretation of Husserl’s 
position regarding the level of perception, but not with the way in which Gur-
witsch interprets Schutz’s vision of the constitution of culture. Gurwitsch of-
fers the following scheme: if we view an element in the outside world, a mate-
rial element, in terms of the apperceptive order, we remain on a pre-cultural 
level (the object is therefore seen in terms of its material characteristics), while 
if we view a material element in terms of the appresentative order, it becomes 
a cultural object.
Schutz stresses that Gurwitsch’s interpretation lacks the crucial role played 
by the social context: «The contents of the bag of a primitive witch doctor, or 
a cyclotron is only considered to be a cultural object by the ‘expert’». And he 
adds: «all schemata contained in the appresentative state of affairs are socially 
conditioned, have to be learned» (ibid. 237).
Yu believes that this view actually brings Schutz closer to Husserl: for 
Schutz too there appears to be a basic perceptual layer (the pure experience) 
of the everyday life-world. Because this layer is what remains if the beholder, 
who does not belong to the culture of the cultural object in question, is not 
is taken as the basic province for the finite provinces of  meaning, and the life-world. So if  the 
everyday life-world is the paramount reality, working lies at the heart of  it. Yet even the author 
himself  does not always respect this distinction.
265SCHUTZ, BERGER AND LUCKMANN
capable of decoding its meaning. As there is no appresentation, what remains 
is what emerges from apperception.
b) The second point concerns the possible existence of universal symbolic 
meanings. This would contradict the existence of worlds that are culturally 
different “from the beginning”. In Symbol, Reality and Society, Schutz devotes 
a few pages, in very general terms, to the issue of the relationship between 
symbols and the human condition: «there are first sets of appresentational ref-
erences which are universal and can be used for symbolization because they 
are rooted in the human condition» (Schutz 1962c: 332). And further on he 
attempts to show examples of how «universal symbols originate in the general 
human condition» (ibid. 334).
Chung-Chi Yu asks: «If cultural difference is a consequent interpretation 
of lifeworld, then how is the universal symbolism integrated into his lifeworld 
notion? Are they compatible? Does Schutz want to argue that there exists the 
grounding lifeworld, rather than many concrete lifeworlds?» (Yu 1999: 172).
He therefore asserts that Schutz’s statements are somewhat ambiguous. I 
am inclined to think that Schutz did not express himself clearly, rather than 
that his stance is a contradictory one.
Point one. I think the answer Schutz gives Gurwitsch is markedly incom-
plete. And it is this incompleteness that produces the ambiguity indicated by 
Yu. We must remember the basic premise of Schutz’s argument: perception 
is a phenomenon of the world of everyday life, therefore a derivative phe-
nomenon, not an original phenomenon (as Husserl believes). In other words, 
perception is a phenomenon that implies the prior existence of appresentative 
relationships, therefore a culture. There is no shadow of a contradiction in 
this argument. I therefore find it very unlikely that Schutz would immediately 
reintroduce the idea of a perceptual base layer that precedes culture, and is 
external to it, just a few lines after denying its existence. When Gurwitsch 
gives his version of appresentative relationships, Schutz says: «I fear, my 
friend, that you are here the victim of tracing all experiences back to percep-
tion» (Schutz and Gurwitsch 1989: 236). Schutz by no means asserts that the 
native who does not interpret the cyclotron in line with the meaning “of the 
expert” uses a universal appercettive scheme. He argues that, in order for an 
appresentative scheme to exist, it must be interpreted as such by an actor. And 
also that the appresentative order does is not a private element, belonging to 
an individual actor. Its existence implies the social dimension26. Let’s go back 
26  Not to mention the fact that the idea of  “pure experience” would be in stark contrast to the 
whole of  Schutz’s methodological and epistemological stance. One thing that springs to mind 
is his acceptance of  Whitehead’s critique of  the “fallacy of  misplaced concreteness” (there is 
no such thing as simple, pure facts, only interpreted facts). And his acceptance of  Scheler’s 
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to the native who cannot interpret the identity of the object as a cyclotron. 
Schutz argues that this actor can not grasp the presence of the expert’s appre-
sentative order. But since the Viennese sociologist does not say anything more 
about the behaviour of this actor, it seems logical to believe that he thinks the 
actor perceives the object using the schemes of his own culture, probably with 
its scheme of appercettive order.
Point two. Yu highlights in Schutz’s writing the contradiction arising from 
the existence of culturally different worlds and universal symbols. I think that 
Schutz means that there exist symbols that can be constituted through appre-
sentative relationships themselves. Which does not mean that they have the 
same meaning; the latter is always given by the entire cultural model in ques-
tion. I think we can assume that Schutz, despite the uniqueness of the models 
(and, more generally, of any meaning), accepts the possibility that different 
models can be compared. And therefore, despite the diversity of meaning, 
the possibility to grasp the existence of appresentative relationships that arise 
from the human condition itself. Thomason believes that Schutz’s epistemo-
logical stance can be viewed as moderate constructionism (“methodological 
constructionist”), therefore different from the radical constructionism of Gar-
finkel, Cicourel, etc.27. Schutz’s position cannot be reconciled with radical 
relativism, namely the belief that cultural models are immeasurable, and can-
not be compared.
I think we can conclude that the distance between Husserl and Schutz I 
mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph remains. Which begs the ques-
tion as to whether this distance also signals different ways of understanding 
the issue of belief in a pre-given world.
criticism of  the possible existence of  a “natural” basis common to all men (which led Scheler 
to propose the concept of  a “relatively natural conception of  the world”, that Schutz endorses 
using Scheler’s argument).
27  Garfinkel, when describing the epistemological positions of  Parsons and Schutz, sums them 
up as “correspondence theory” and “congruence theory”. With regard to congruence theory, 
Garfinkel says «Rather than there being a world of  concrete objects which a theory cuts this 
way and that, the (congruence) view holds that the cake is constituted in the very act of  cutting. 
No cutting, no cake». And: «The object is conceived as never appearing except through its 
schema. The schema of  specifications is precisely the object itself» (H. Garfinkel, A comparison of  Decisions 
Made on “Four Pre-Theoretical” Problems by Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz, quoted in B. C. Thom-
ason 1982: 60). Schutz responds (letter of  19-1-1954): «I am not so sure whether there are 
really such fundamental differences between our ‘decisions’ as you assume to prevail […]. I do 
not fully grasp the basic difference between what you call the correspondence and congruence 
theory» (Thomason 1982: 63). The entire correspondence between the two authors was most 
recently revived by Psathas (Psathas 2009).
267SCHUTZ, BERGER AND LUCKMANN
3. In the first part of the essay I repeatedly criticised Berger and Luck-
mann for modifying Schutz’s theory on the crucial node of belief in the eve-
ryday life-world.
Vaitkus believes that this aspect of Schutz’s theory is poorly developed. 
Indeed he asserts that this is the «most important and largely neglected side 
of Schutz’s work». Schutz, «in a number of sketchy remarks never worked out, 
clearly and indisputably points to the foundational importance of the subjec-
tive actor’s faith or belief in the world of the natural attitude» (Vaitkus 2005: 
112). A faith that can also break down in various circumstances.
In my view this argument is contrived. I think it is more correct to say that 
Schutz highlights the basic characteristics of the phenomenon, without cover-
ing it exhaustively. It is a broad topic that is narrowly analysed by the authors, 
despite being in great use currently.
Let’s take a quick look at the main points dealt with by Schutz.
We said earlier that in Husserl’s work the certainty of the world is never 
questioned, beyond the existence of culture, something which is hinted at, 
but not analysed. Schutz’s work takes a different view: culture is an intrinsic 
component of the everyday life-world. A world that Schutz’s 1945 essay on 
multiple realities sketches.
The main characteristic of the natural attitude is that of assuming that the 
everyday life-world is absolutely real – a world that existed before we were 
born, perceived and interpreted by others, our predecessors. This world is 
not perceived as a disorganized set of shapes, lights, sounds, etc., but as a 
structured world. We have a pragmatic interest in it: it is both the arena and 
object of our actions. Working is its characteristic hub. The everyday life-world 
is structured in terms of space and time, and also according to its social struc-
ture. “Fundamental anxiety” has a decisive influence on the lives of actors: 
on the organization of their plans, and the anxieties and fears deriving from 
it. Anxieties and fears that «are essential elements of its reality but [they] do 
not refer to our belief in it. On the contrary, it is characteristic of the natural 
attitude that it takes the world and its objects for granted until counterproof 
imposes itself. As long as the once established scheme of reference, the system 
of our and other people’s warranted experiences works, as long as the ac-
tions and operations performed under its guidance yield the desired results, 
we trust these experiences. We are not interested in finding out whether this 
world really does exist or whether it is merely a coherent system of consist-
ent appearances. We have no reason to cast any doubt upon our warranted 
experiences which, so we believe, give us things as they really are. It needs a 
special motivation, such as the irruption of a ‘strange’ experience not subsum-
able under the stock of knowledge at hand or inconsistent with it, to make us 
revise our former beliefs» (Schutz 1962b: 228).
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So in the everyday life-world epistemological problems do not arise. In this 
world it is not possible to raise the question of the real or apparent nature of 
the world. Nor is radical, Cartesian doubt conceivable. Doubt may only arise 
on certain points and moreover there is always a reason for it: there has to 
be an experience that appears “strange” compared to the knowledge at our 
disposal.
The 1945 essay on the topic of the natural attitude adds an important 
concept: «the epoché of the natural attitude». Just as phenomenology makes 
use of a special technique, the phenomenological epoché, «a device to overcome 
the natural attitude by radicalizing the Cartesian method of philosophical 
doubt», Schutz believes we can assert that man «within the natural attitude 
also uses a specific epoché […]. He does not suspend belief in the outer world 
and its objects, but on the contrary, he suspends doubt in its existence» (Schutz 
1962b: 229).
Why this shift of emphasis from the presence of certainty to the absence 
of doubt? Reeder, commenting on a letter Schutz wrote to Kauffman in the 
same year (September 1945), on the same subject, argues that the author 
wants «to provide an account at the level of phenomenological psychology» 
(Reeder 2009: 105). And from the point of view of phenomenological psy-
chology, experiencing something as real maintains an element of doubt. So 
Schutz interprets faith in the world as a total suspension of doubt. The work of 
Spiegelberg quoted in the note regards this issue28, and Schutz references this 
to support the plausibility of his argument. Wagner asserts that Schutz «wel-
comed Spiegelberg’s ‘analysis of dubitability and dubiousness with respect to 
reality’. In the context of his own essay he accepted it as an expression of the 
‘Cartesian method of philosophical doubt’ as applied to the ‘naïve realism’ of 
man in the natural stance» (Wagner 1983: 176).
While as Schutz recalls, the concept of reality in the world of science, re-
fers «to apophantic judgment, which, through constant critique, is consciously 
brought to approximation of evident self-givenness», in the natural attitude 
28  Spiegelberg distinguishes between subjectival reality and non-subjectival reality. The first 
regards the arena formed by «all phenomena as such are presented to us simultaneously and 
with full adequacy, whether more or less clear in their trans-phenomenal references». This sub-
jectival reality is characterised by three aspects: «our own existence as that of  a believing being, 
our acts of  believing and the thing believed in so far as it is believed». This arena is only a «frag-
ment of  our supposed total of  reality» (Spiegelberg 1968: 89-90). After making this distinction 
Spiegelberg underlines the dubitable nature of  experience: «Certainly everything non-subjec-
tival, including its reality, remains dubitable in principle. Nothing even stands in the way of  
doubting the whole subjectival sphere, though such a doubt would have no reasonable chance 
of  confirmation, and consequently would be essentially unjustified, whereas in non-subjectival 
reality there always is the theoretical possibility of  its proving justified» (ibid. 99).
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the concept of reality «is not gained through judgement». What appears is 
taken as real «in the way in which it appears». It is taken as «something given, 
taken-for-granted (Fragloses), something beyond doubt. […] This attitude is 
the limit (limes) of all possible attitudes of doubt, which start from here and in 
different strata progressively constitute the various other spheres of reality» 
(letter by Schutz 17-9-1945 in Reeder 2009: 104-105). This interpretation of 
the concept of epoché, Schutz adds, is incompatible with Husserl’s use of it.
Reeder believes that Schutz wants to highlight the lack of conscious judge-
ment in the acceptance of the reality of the world of everyday life, which is 
«pre-judgemental (and in fact often pre-linguistic, speaking phenomenologi-
cally)». Moreover, Schutz’s concept of epoché, which differs not only from that 
of Husserl, but also from the philosophical tradition, aims to emphasize «the 
very doubtlessness of the naive attitude’s acceptance of reality» (ibid. 105).
The essay Symbol, Reality and Society, that Schutz views as a sort of comple-
tion of his 1945 essay, indicates the nature of signs and symbols, as constituent 
elements of appresentative relationships. So, while for James the paramount 
reality is constituted by the “subuniverses of senses” and “of physical things”, 
for Schutz the paramount reality of the world of everyday life «includes not 
only the physical objects, facts, and events within our actual and potential 
reach perceived as such in the mere apperceptual scheme, but also appresen-
tational references of a lower order by which the physical objects of nature are 
transformed into sociocultural objects» (Schutz 1962c: 341).
4. We said earlier that in Schutz the everyday life-world is an intersubjec-
tive world of culture. All cultural models include a set of cultural interpre-
tations, systems of relevance, typifications. These include «all the peculiar 
valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as the 
folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which […] char-
acterize, if not constitute, any social group at a given moment in its history» 
(Schutz 1976a: 92). This model is the bearer of a vision of the world that is so-
cially shared, socially approved and socially distributed. As Schutz says: «Any 
member born or reared within the group accepts the ready-made standard-
ized scheme of the cultural pattern handed down to him by ancestors, teach-
ers, and authorities as an unquestioned and unquestionable guide in all the 
situations which normally occur within the social world. The knowledge cor-
related to the cultural pattern carries its evidence in itself – or, rather, it is 
taken-for-granted in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is a knowledge 
of trustworthy recipes for interpreting the social world and for handling things 
[…]. The recipe works, on the one hand, as a precept for actions and thus 
serves as a scheme of expression […]. On the other hand, the recipe serves as 
a scheme of interpretation […]. Thus it is the function of the cultural pattern 
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to eliminate troublesome inquiries by offering ready-made directions for use, 
to replace truth hard to attain by comfortable truisms, and substitute the self-
explanatory for the questionable. This ‘thinking as usual’, as we may call it, 
corresponds to Max Scheler’s idea of the ‘relatively natural conception of the 
world’ (relativ natürliche Weltanschauung)» (ibid. 95).
This is the key point: cultural models are infused with the natural attitude; 
models that have a pervasive presence in the lives of individuals, in their so-
cialization, and are accepted as if their validity was self-evident. Self-evidence 
that remains so until proven otherwise.
Scheler argues that it is absolutely wrong to think of the existence of a 
“natural vision of the world”, namely a basic worldview, common to all people 
in all times and places. A view which would imply the existence of a mythi-
cal “natural state” of the human race. «There is absolutely not one, constant vision 
of the natural world ‘by man’ [...]», says Scheler: «The diversity of the im-
age of the world infuses the categorical structures of the information/data 
itself». He adds: «O. Spengler rightly […] expresses it in the same terms I 
used in 1914: ‘Kant’s table of categories is the table of categories of European 
thought’». Structural changes naturally take place over very long periods of 
time (Scheler 1976: 123). The sociology of knowledge must therefore introduce 
the concept of a “relatively natural conception of the world”. This would in-
clude everything that in a given group is «generally ‘taken-for-granted’, every 
object and idea […] which is generally believed and felt not to need or call for a 
justification» (ibidem).
Schutz takes on Scheler’s idea. He underlines that the addition of the term 
relative «should distinguish this concept from the idea of a general State of Na-
ture as assumed by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and the ancient and modern 
theoreticians of a Right of Nature» (Schutz 1976b: 228). And thus he likens 
the relatively natural conception of the world to the ideas of Sumner, Voege-
lin, MacIver and Lynton. The latter share the idea that each group views its 
own vision of the world as central (ethnocentrism, founding myth, etc.), right, 
correct and obvious as the perspective from which to see the world and them-
selves. While the world view of external groups is seen as foreign, strange, 
questionable - not “natural”.
We can say that the same argument we applied to Husserl also applies to 
Schutz (and even more so): the difference in the contents of cultural models 
coexists with the certainty of the world. The “form of belief” changes, but not 
the “certainty of the world”.
5. Schutz provides a very general overview of the phenomenon of taken-
for-grantedness, sketching its main structural features. In Reflections on the Prob-
lem of Relevance, in the short essay Relevance: Knowledge on Hand and in Hand, but 
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above all in The Structures of the Life-World he develops the distinction between 
on hand knowledge, in hand knowledge, and at hand knowledge29. In hand 
knowledge can be viewed as an intermediate form between the other two30. 
Let’s take a look at on hand knowledge and at hand knowledge.
On hand knowledge
This form of “knowledge” regards the universal characteristics of experience, 
the basic, «fundamental structures of experience of the life-world. […] These 
fundamental structures do not enter into the grip of consciousness in the natu-
ral attitude, as a core of experience. But they are a condition of every experi-
ence of the life-world and enter into the horizon of experience» (Schutz and 
Luckmann 1973: 104). These structures are not perceived as real «on the basis 
of social interaction and internalization», but «on the basis of universal ideali-
zations» (Rogers 1981: 134). This “knowledge” can never become problem-
atic or the focus of attention in the world of everyday life. Or be articulated 
as a specific form of knowledge. Its characteristics are therefore invariant and 
always present in every relatively natural vision of the world. Mary Rogers 
believes that, phenomenologically speaking, this “knowledge” should be un-
derstood as “what is given”, and distinguished from “what is taken” (ibidem).
Elements that belong to on hand knowledge include epistemic constants, 
metaphysical constants and situational constants.
a) Epistemic constants. To recall the general thesis of the existence of the 
alter ego, the general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives (idealization of 
the interchangeability of standpoints, idealization of the congruency of the 
system of relevances) the thesis of the world (general thesis of the natural at-
titude), the idealizations connected to the pre-given nature of existence and 
persistence of the world, and the repeatability of actions, “and so on and so 
forth”, and “I can do it again”, etc.31.
29  «Not only does Schutz delineate what is ‘on hand’ (Heidegger’s Vorhandenheit) and what is ‘at 
hand’ (Zuhandenheit), – says Zaner – but his analysis shows the necessity for a further sphere-viz. 
‘in hand’ (which is of  several kinds)» (Zaner, note 12, in Schutz 1970: 145).
30  As Schutz says: «Among the habitual knowledge stored away some elements are merely at 
hand […]. Others, […], are more permanently present, are more frequently used: the business 
of  living does not permit us to let them entirely out of  grip, and to keep them neutralized and 
dormant. We may say that these elements of  our knowledge are not only at hand but in hand» 
(Schutz 1996: 69).
31  There are other idealizations beyond those mentioned. Cicourel’s interpretative procedures, 
for example, can be viewed as idealizations (Cicourel 1974).
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b) Metaphysical constants. These relate to the “knowledge” that we are 
born from parents, «that the world into which we are born has a history, that 
the world has already been interpreted by others, that communication with 
other human beings is possible, etc.» (Rogers 1981: 145).
c) Situational constants. Each person, at each moment in his or her life, 
lives in a given situation, to which his or her stock of knowledge is related ge-
netically, structurally and functionally. The situation is necessarily limited, by 
the ontological structure of the world, as well as by the transcendence of time 
and the physicality of subjects. This limitation gives rise to the spatial, tempo-
ral and social organization of experience. These therefore represent the limits 
of the human condition and also «the conditions of possibility of all human 
experience in the world - their necessary horizon» (Zaccaï-Reyners 1996: 42).
• Spatial arrangement. Among the various objects present in the world there 
is a privileged object: my body. This is the “vehicle” for my movements in 
the outside world. It is not a «fragment of space; on the contrary, space 
would not exist for me at all if I had no body» (Schutz 1970: 173). The body 
can therefore be seen as the zero point: a system of spatial (and temporal) 
coordinates, according to which I organise the space into left and right, 
above and below, etc. I divide the world into the world currently within my 
range, the world within a reachable range and the world where my reach 
can be restored. It should be added that «I am my body and sense percep-
tions, I am my hand grasping this or that object. My body is the form in 
which my self manifests itself in the outer world» (ibid. 172).
• Temporal arrangement. The transcendence of the time of the world “has 
various subjective correlates”. I experience the necessary, imposed nature 
of time in my expectations. The passing of my inner time, as I get older, 
and in the irreversibility of events. In working, my inner time intersects with 
cosmic time and social time. And in working, present, past and future come 
together. In the passage of time I also experience my finitude.
• Social arrangement. “All experiences have a social dimension”. In this way 
«the Other is given to me immediately as a fellow-man in the we-relation, 
while the mediate experiences of the social world are graduated according 
to degrees of anonymity and are arranged in experiences of the contempo-
rary world, the world of predecessors, and the world of successors» (Schutz 
and Luckmann 1973: 104).
At hand knowledge
This type of knowledge regards culturally variable aspects of experience; as-
pects that occupy the field and issue of consciousness and do not remain on 
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the horizon, in the shadows of consciousness. It is a form of knowledge ac-
quired through actions, interactions, processes of socialization. It especially 
concerns the contents of the cultural model of one’s social group. It settles in 
the stock of available knowledge in varying degrees of clarity, depth, familiar-
ity, habitualization and belief. It is structured into typifications with various 
degrees of generality and anonymity. It is the basic “raw material” that makes 
up the relatively natural conception of the world. It is a form of knowledge 
that is no longer problematic and that requires no further investigation. It is 
“neutralized”, but can be reactivated if «typically the same or like experiences 
turn up in the future» (Schutz 1996: 68). So, while it is taken-for-granted, it 
can always be critiqued: it is always possible to doubt it.
At hand knowledge requires on hand knowledge. The latter, as we have 
seen, determines the scope of the former32.
Concluding remarks
In the first part of the paper we pointed out the discrepancies between Berger 
and Luckmann’s analysis and Schutz’s ideas. The Social Construction of Reality, 
while explicitly referencing the theoretical model of the Viennese sociologist, 
markedly departs from it, especially in the way it interprets the natural at-
titude. This divergence is accentuated in various essays by Berger. Belief in 
the reality of the world of everyday life appears to be tinged by uncertainties 
and fears; cracks caused by looming negative forces, “night-time forces” that 
threaten to destroy it.
The second part of the essay examined the main characteristics of the 
natural attitude, in particular the issue of belief in the reality of the world 
of everyday life in the work of Husserl and Schutz. The aim was to capture 
traces in the works of the two authors that might have led to the image of 
reality described by Berger and Luckmann as characterised by an endemic 
fragility. And to highlight, in a more analytically complete fashion, the vision 
of the natural attitude from which they depart.
In Husserl’s work, belief in the Lebenswelt is a sure belief. The presence of 
culture gives rise to the issue of the co-existence of differentiated basic worlds 
32  It should be added that there is actually no gap between the two forms of  knowledge. There 
is an intermediate level, a form of  habitual knowledge, routine knowledge that, as it were, is 
grounded in on hand knowledge, while part of  it moves gradually (from skills to knowledge 
of  recipes) towards at hand knowledge. There is no clear dividing line between «certain fun-
damental elements of  the stock of  knowledge and certain provinces of  habitual knowledge» 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 105-106).
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and a common level of “pure perception”. In any case, from Husserl’s point 
of view, there is no doubt about the persistence of the general thesis of the 
natural attitude. The contents of this belief in the world can differ, but not the 
certainty, the faith in its pre-givenness.
Schutz shifts the focus of attention from transcendental phenomenology 
to the phenomenology of the natural attitude. This shift in focus enables us 
to concentrate our analysis of the world of everyday life on the social and 
cultural aspects, from its basic level, that of working. These analyses yield the 
fundamental traits of the natural attitude. Traits that make up the general 
structure of a theory of what is taken-for-granted.
Schutz by no means exhausted the analysis of the huge field that emerged 
from his reflections. The author provided a basic framework, the structural 
characteristics of the forms of knowledge of common sense.
He highlighted three ideal types of knowledge: on hand knowledge, in 
hand knowledge, and at hand knowledge. The latter basically represents the 
specific contents of cultural models. It is the result of interactions and is ac-
quired in processes of socialization. This kind of knowledge can be questioned 
in problematic situations. We can also add that it is subject to constant change. 
So in this sphere processes of crisis are always latent. But this is not the only 
form of knowledge that characterizes the world of everyday life. There is the 
point of reference represented by on hand knowledge. This kind of knowledge 
is not learned “directly” in processes of socialization, but formed through 
idealizations. It is, so to speak, “given”. It is the bedrock that supports eve-
rything else. It represents an unshakeable certainty, a belief which cannot be 
questioned in the world of everyday life. This is an essential point. It cannot 
be disregarded without an argument that shows the way in which it can be 
neutralised, its theoretical irrelevance.
What remains poorly investigated is the relationship between the two 
forms of knowledge. The separation between them is an analytical one. The 
world of everyday life is an interweaving of the two forms of knowledge. This 
aspect is what Schutz fails to cover adequately.
Many writers, while dealing with the world of everyday life (in various 
interpretations), do not accept the division of forms of knowledge present in 
Schutz’s work. Nor do they develop their own complete theory of the phenom-
enon of taken-for-grantedness. These include authors such as Mead and Goff-
man and some closer to Schutz’s thinking, like Garfinkel33, Cicourel, and, as 
we have seen, Berger and Luckmann. In the work of the latter, the fact that 
33  M. Rogers shows how in Garfinkel «the unquestioned and the unquestionable are […] ag-
gregated in an implicit characterization of  taken-for-grantedness» (Rogers 1981: 137).
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their theoretical framework lacks an analysis of taken-for-grantedness is what 
then leads to their excessive emphasis on the fragility of the world of everyday 
life. The resulting picture oversimplifies the complexity of the phenomenon.
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The Novelty of Phenomenological Sociology  
and Its Interdisciplinarity.
An interview to professor Carlos Belvedere
Edited by Michela Beatrice Ferri 
Carlos Belvedere is a Researcher of the National Council for Technical and Scientific Research (CONI-
CET) at the Gino Germani Research Institute, and a Professor at the University of Buenos Aires 
(UBA) and the National University of General Sarmiento (UNGS). He is a member of the Society for 
Phenomenolog y and the Human Sciences (SPHS), which he has co-chaired since 2014, and an Edito-
rial Board member of «Human Studies», the official journal of SPHS. He is also a founding member 
of The International Alfred Schutz Circle for Phenomenolog y and Interpretive Social Science. He has 
authored a number of papers and books on Social Phenomenolog y dealing with fundamental problems 
in the Philosophy and theory of the Social Sciences.
Dear professor Carlos Belvedere, which is the place that Sociology covers in the Phenom-
enological Background in North America?
From the outset, Phenomenology aimed to produce a renewal of the sci-
ences, not just of Philosophy. It was Husserl’s commitment to refuse positivism 
in order to start a new conception of the sciences. Many of Husserl’s students 
continued with this aim and contributed to refurbish different fields of research. 
Psychology, for instance, benefited from the contributions of existential analysis.
Nowadays, Phenomenology’s invigorating spirit remains the same al-
though the scientific context has somehow changed. Phenomenology found 
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new disciplines to interpellate, such as the Neurosciences and the Cognitive 
Sciences. It also found new fields of research for practitioners of phenomeno-
logy which in recent years have had a prolific expansion such as Environmen-
tal Phenomenology ( just to mention one of many examples).
The widespread reach of Phenomenology in contemporary context dis-
closes its interdisciplinary aim. This is no news since, as I said before, that was 
the aim of Phenomenology from its very beginning. That’s why some phe-
nomenologists prefer to speak of “multifarious Phenomenology” as regards 
the perennial spirit of its endeavor. This idea, in fact, is part of the title of 
a collaborative volume published by the Organization of Phenomenological 
Organizations, probably the main global institution of current Multidiscipli-
nary Phenomenology.
What to say, then, about Sociology, a discipline oriented science? Is it possi-
ble to save such a perspective in the context of Multidisciplinary Phenomeno-
logy? Indeed it is not only possible but it actually happened that Phenomeno-
logy conceived Sociology in such a way that it became a multidisciplinary field 
of research in itself. For instance, that’s what Alfred Schutz did: he considered 
sociology as a place of encounter with many and diverse disciplines, such as 
Anthropology, Linguistics, Historiography, Cultural Studies, Psychiatry, etc.
Due to the work of Schutz and others, Sociology turned out to be one of the 
scientific fields of empirical research in which Phenomenology has been most 
influential and productive during the 20th Century. In this matter, Phenom-
enology’s contributions were groundbreaking all over the world. But when it 
comes to North America in particular, it should be added that Phenomenology 
has blossomed in Sociology as in no other science (letting aside Philosophy, 
which has also an inspiring development in the United States). What I mean is 
that something happened in American Sociology which captured the attention 
of sociologists abroad and scientists not specifically related to Phenomenology.
In my opinion, the novelty that Phenomenological Sociology brought in 
was to question the dogmatism proper to both, the naïve perspective of com-
mon sense and the unexamined assumptions of positivism. Phenomenology 
provided a new, insightful alternate to mainstream Sociology that could deal 
with fundamental issues that were put aside by a narrow minded positivism, 
such as the problem of meaning, subjectivity and everyday life. It provided not 
only a new perspective but also an alternative method and a new ontological 
region to explore.
Could you explain if it is correct to say that a Phenomenological Sociology exists, or if 
it is correct to state that a Sociological Phenomenology exists?
As a matter of fact, the most frequent wording is “Phenomenological Sociolo-
gy”; although, this expression has at least two different, contrasting meanings.
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On one hand, some refer to “Phenomenological Sociology” implying that 
Phenomenology is one of many perspectives in Sociology, i.e. that it is a part of 
Sociology. They think that Phenomenology makes valuable but partial contri-
butions which need to be complemented with other perspectives. Accordingly, 
Phenomenology on its own would only produce a one-sided Sociology. Also 
this perspective takes it for granted that the problem is Phenomenology, not 
Sociology. I mean, that the bias and flaws come from Phenomenology. There-
fore, we can take Sociology as it is (with its positivist assumptions, method-
ologies and techniques) and then adapt Phenomenology to this unquestioned 
paradigm. By doing this, what we get is the disarmament of Phenomenol-
ogy, which must surrender to Science and set aside all critical and innovative 
pretensions. Once this is done, Phenomenology becomes a kind of Sociology 
among others, not a perspective in its full extent. As you can imagine, this is 
not the view I support.
On the other hand, some refer to “Phenomenological Sociology” as a new 
paradigm that offers an alternative to positivist perspectives and avoids pre-
conceived sociological notions, established recipes and formulas of research 
procedures. In other words, they believe that Phenomenological Sociology 
leads to a paradigm switch, promoting a deep renewal of Sociology as a sci-
ence through the critique of unexamined assumptions. It also questions old-
fashioned positivist divisions of scientific labor, counter to what the perspect-
ive which I criticized before implies (that Phenomenology can be integrated 
into mainstream sociology with no need to question any of its assumptions). 
This is the perspective that I like to call my own.
Alfred Schutz, a phenomenologist more than a sociologist, or vice-versa?
It’s not easy to talk about proportions, but my answer is that he was both, a 
Phenomenologist and a Sociologist. Although, the first part of my answer has 
been contested in the past.
Indeed, some scholars over the years have argued that uis not a phenom-
enologist because he refuses to complete the transcendental reduction and, 
consequently, he sticks to a descriptive, mundane stance which is deemed as 
naturalistic and dogmatic. In my opinion, these kind of objections come from 
orthodox, conservative perspectives which won’t accept any innovative po-
sition. Briefly, they are static, non-historical conceptions of Phenomenology 
condemned to scholarship and recite of already established positions. Phe-
nomenology would have been lost for good if Phenomenologists had lost the 
ability to go back to things themselves over and over again and come up with 
better and better descriptions. 
In this view, Schutz can be depicted as a genuine Phenomenologist, not 
only interested in Husserl’s writings but mostly in pushing forward Phenom-
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enology in new directions. Not all disagreements with Husserl have to be 
interpreted as a “loss of Phenomenology”. In Schutz’s case, at least, it can be 
viewed as a contribution to Phenomenology. Whether or not Schutz is a phe-
nomenologist should not be decided based on his proximity to Husserl (which, 
by the way, was very close and closer than what some of his critics think) but 
on an examination of his own perspective.
The main reason why I think that Schutz was, in fact, a Phenomenologist 
is that he actually had in mind a programmatic view of Phenomenology. He 
conceived of Phenomenology as a scientific, “technical device” (not as a “mys-
tical gift”) which implied a switch of the natural attitude in order to clarify the 
complete system of intentionality within the frame of Phenomenological Psy-
chology, both at the eidetic and the empirical level. Within this framework, 
Schutz pursues a “Constitutive Phenomenology of the natural attitude” as an 
“eidetic mundane science”.
The second reason why I think that Schutz’s stance must be accepted as 
phenomenological is that those “orthodox” critiques are now obsolete since 
there is a new consensus as regards naturalistic positions. They are now 
accepted by some of the most respected Phenomenologists of our times as 
valuable readings of Husserl’s latest writings. For instance, some Husserlians 
nowadays agree that much of what has been contested in the past about Mer-
leau-Ponty’s positions are inspired in Husserl’s papers that were not published 
back then and now make them at least plausible. Well, I think Schutz has 
not yet been absolved by some enthusiastic Husserlians as Merleau-Ponty was 
absolved, and neither his contributions to the “naturalization” of Phenomeno-
logy have been fully appreciated. Whether he was or was not a Phenomenolo-
gist mainly depends on that.
About Schutz as a Sociologist, fortunately we can tell a very different story. 
Schutz’s work was adopted by mainstream Sociology as a contribution wor-
thy to be counted as a part of its own legacy. Schutz himself presented main 
aspects of his work as Sociological. In his early years, he introduced his first 
book as a critique and foundation of Comprehensive Sociology. In his later 
years, he taught a seminar on the Sociology of Language. He had students, 
supporters and even detractors in Sociology. So, he felt like, and he was seen 
by others, as an important Sociologist.
Schutz’s idea of his own Sociology is closer to the first meaning of Phe-
nomenological Sociology discussed before. His contributions are meant to be 
a part of Sociology and not to produce a paradigm switch. Instead, his idea 
of Phenomenology is closer to the second conception of Phenomenological 
Sociology that I mentioned –the one that I support. It works with different 
assumptions than mainstream philosophies and it’s not meant to take part in 
a broader framework but to endorse a holistic view in its own right. So, even 
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if I think that Schutz was both, a Philosopher and a Sociologist, I will have to 
admit that he was a Philosopher in a broader, deeper sense.
Although, regardless to what Schutz might think about his own Sociolo-
gy, it actually is an alternative paradigm to mainstream Sociology. It was 
Schutz’s students who realized that, and started the work of a new conception 
of Sociology. That’s the reason why George Psathas, in his marvelous intro-
duction to Phenomenological Sociology, could establish that, as a matter of fact, 
it exists in the many diverse enterprises and writings carried out in its name.
Which is the focus – “Lebenswelt”, “Everyday Life-World” – of the sociological theory 
of Alfred Schutz?
In Sociology, Schutz is known as a Sociologist of Everyday Life. This is 
true although in some ways inaccurate. His contributions on this matter are in 
fact outstanding, but there is more to it than just another Sociological theory 
of Everyday Life. What makes the difference is that it belongs to a larger 
framework which enhances it since, for Schutz, Everyday Life is not a realm 
in its own but the core of the Life-World. In this broader view, Everyday Life 
is not just an ideology, an ensemble of “social representations” or a mere “cul-
tural construction” but the heart of the paramount reality. Accordingly, the 
proper way to understand Schutz’s Sociology of Everyday Life is to situate it 
at the center of the Lebenswelt. 
In this regard, there is no dichotomy between both concepts in Schutz: one 
leads to the other. You can focus on Everyday Life or on the Lebenswelt, as you 
wish, but one thing will take you to the other. Anyway, the broader scope is 
the latest’s, which includes and completes the former.
Although, it is true that Schutz became increasingly involved in developing 
his own theory of the Lebenswelt. Sure he was inspired by Husserl but his re-
flections on the subject start very early, way before Husserl’s specific writings 
about it reached widespread diffusion. He also kept making progress until his 
late manuscripts, where we find his most extensive and sophisticated Philoso-
phy of the Lebenswelt. 
In Schutz’s view, the Lebenswelt is the Alpha and the Omega of our reflec-
tions, as much in the Sciences as in Philosophy. This is one of the reasons why 
he rejects Husserl’s transcendental reduction, which he considers impossible, 
unnecessary and redundant. Schutz even thinks that some aspects of the Lebens-
welt such as the universal structures of the humana conditio can only be established 
by a philosophical Anthropology whose reach could surpass Phenomenology.
Every time I mention Alfred Schutz in the field of the studies of Phenomenological So-
ciology, I need to talk about Aron Gurwitsch, too. Why our philosopher Aron Gurwitsch is 
a considerable voice in sociological theory ?
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There are a number of reasons why the name of Schutz evokes Gur-
witsch’s. In the first place, they had a long lasting friendship, which endured 
even through exile, and then starting a new life in the States -where Schutz 
felt at home. It was also a philosophical friendship since over the years they 
had shared their ideas with each other, agreed and disagreed on many sub-
jects, and above all appreciated their friend’s advice no matter how critical 
they might have been. Also, they were both “critical Phenomenologists” (as 
Helmut Wagner puts it), since each of them had a creative understanding 
of Phenomenology and pursued the dream of developing their own personal 
oeuvre.
Of the many subjects that overcame their differences and served as a com-
mon ground for mutual understanding, I would like to recall two of them 
which are in turn closely related to one another, the problem of relevance 
and the question of the constitution. They are at once a Philosophical and a 
Sociological issue. As a Philosophical matter, Schutz dealt with the problem 
of relevance as the constitution of the thematic field of consciousness; as a so-
ciological matter, he based those reflections on his theory of power as imposed 
relevances. He discussed these ideas broadly with his friend Gurwitsch on a 
common ground, which is the rejection of Transcendental Phenomenology, 
on Gurwitsch’s side, by getting rid of the ego, on Schutz’s side, by getting rid 
of the transcendental.
How can be defined the relationship between the position of Alfred Schutz and the theory 
of the sociologist Talcott Parsons?
The relationship between Schutz and Parsons could be told from two dif-
ferent points of view. By reading their correspondence, you can tell that, in 
Parsons’ perspective, a discussion with Schutz was meaningless. Parsons faced 
his exchange with Schutz as a Kantian discussion over the possibility of a valid 
knowledge in the Social Sciences. He also thought that their dialogue did not 
arrive at any interesting conclusion. Eventually, this is the interpretation that 
prevailed about the Parsons – Schutz affair. In Schutz’s perspective, a whole 
different interpretation can be established. His expectations prior to their let-
ters exchange was that a dialogue with Parsons was possible because they 
were both concerned with the theory of social action. In particular, Schutz 
was interested in the question of the rationality of social actions. He did have 
some objections to the way that Parsons understood this, partially because 
he misread Weber’s idea of rationality. However, he felt that they shared a 
common ground in the field of sociological theory. And he regretted that they 
could not pursue a dialogue through their differences.
You might think of this as the opposite to Schutz’s correspondence with 
Gurwitsch: they did have some serious differences, however they respected 
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each other and believed that the criticisms they were given actually repre-
sented the most qualified and precious contribution. If only Parsons would 
have been open to an honest debate, Sociological Theory could have profited 
so much from the sincere exposition of their differences and hopefully from a 
higher synthesis of what unhappily remains as one of the core dissents in 20th 
Century Sociology.
Because this consensus was never achieved, all that remains is Schutz’s 
well known criticisms of Parsons as a Sociologist with serious problems of 
adequacy since he replaces the man on the street by a kind of puppet made 
up in accordance with his own theoretical expectations, not with the reality 
of the social world, which is not produced by Sociological Theory but by the 
ordinary man who lives and acts in the Everyday Lifeworld.
Could you explain us which is the relation between Phenomenology and the Ethnometh-
odology founded by Harold Garfinkel?
Even though Ethnomethodology is a fresh perspective, you could say that 
it has Phenomenological roots. If you consider what Garfinkel read during 
his college years, you will realize that he had a solid Phenomenological base. 
For instance, he was familiar with the writings of Edmund Husserl, Alfred 
Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, Marvin Farber, and others. Also his best known 
papers include many quotations from other Phenomenologists, mainly from 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty but also Martin Heidegger, among them. However, 
Garfinkel’s concern with Phenomenology was not philosophical and neither 
theoretical. He was focused on descriptions, not ideas.
Probably, the most important description that Garfinkel borrowed from 
Husserl is that of the “occasional expressions”, which in Ethnomethodology 
gave rise to the concept of “indexical expressions”. That which for Husserl 
is a particular kind of expression (terms such as “I”, “you”, “here”, “there”, 
and the like), whose meaning changes according to the peculiarities of who 
is speaking, for Garfinkel it was an instantiation of a feature common to all 
expressions, which is, that its meaning is irremediably contextual. Briefly, for 
Garfinkel any meaning is contextual.
In turn, the most important claim that Garfinkel borrows from Schutz is 
that Phenomenology must be pursued as a description of the natural attitude 
(which Husserl, as well as Schutz, named Phenomenological Psychology). Ac-
cording to George Psathas, in his PhD dissertation Garfinkel came up with 
the idea of turning Phenomenological Psychology into an empirical research 
program. He realized that the natural attitude had systemic properties, which 
means that an alteration of one of their features would have holistic conse-
quences. Therefore, if you alter any particular feature, you get a shocking 
experience that strikes the natural attitude as a whole. Years later, this idea in-
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spired his “breaching experiments” and the experimental alteration of “trust” 
and Everyday Life “assumptions”.
The position of professor George Psathas comes from the tradition that began with 
Alfred Schutz. But we have also Berger and Luckmann. Could you explain which are the 
right places that these scholars covered and cover now in the history of Phenomenological 
Sociology?
George Psathas played a main role in the institutionalization of Phenom-
enological Sociology. He realized that this perspective existed as a matter 
of fact since there were a number of researches carried out in its name. So 
he organized a session on Phenomenological Sociology at the meeting of the 
American Sociological Association in 1971. Then he edited a book with pres-
tigious contributors whose “Introduction” is, to me, a whole manifesto, since 
it depicts Phenomenological Sociology as “a paradigm”. He also makes a “his-
torical overview” and lists a number of “issues and problems” to be addressed, 
among them, the Life-world, the subjective dimension, the assumptions of 
Everyday Life, and intersubjectivity. He also founded the journal Human Stud-
ies, which gave voice to what had been so far more of a movement than an 
established perspective. He also had the clear minded idea that Ethnometh-
odology was a way of doing Phenomenological Sociology and made evident 
some important relations and affinities (a few of which I commented on in 
my previous answer). Those who practice Phenomenological Sociology are 
indebted to him for his kind work and his mindful observations.
Berger and Luckmann wrote the most influential book in Phenomenologi-
cal Sociology, The Social Construction of Reality. It opened new paths for this per-
spective and got many Sociologists who don’t necessarily consider themselves 
Phenomenologists interested. Of course, there are good reasons for the huge 
success that it achieved. One of them is the systematic aim of the book which, 
among other things, led the authors to take into consideration not only the 
“subjective reality” of society (which is what many would expect from an aver-
age Phenomenologist) but also its “objective reality”, including among others 
the dimensions of the institutionalization, sedimentation, tradition, and social 
organization.
Now, if you allow me, I would like to say a few words about Luckmann’s 
personal contributions to this perspective. He edited Schutz’s manuscripts on 
the structures of the Life-world –in my opinion, one of the most outstanding 
works by Schutz. Even though some scholars consider it a “secondary bibli-
ography,” I think that –with the exception of one chapter- it gathers and sys-
tematizes fundamental writings of the late Schutz in a way that makes them 
available for discussion and enhances the understanding of his oeuvre. Also 
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he developed, in his own perspective, the theory of social action and contrib-
uted to an update of the problem of intersubjectivity in contemporary context.
Which themes, nowadays, are at the center of the debate of Phenomenological Sociology?
It’s my belief that nowadays consensus prevails over debate in Social Phe-
nomenology. Ideas such as the importance of subjectivity, the constitution of 
meaning and the social construction of reality are widely accepted. In recent 
years, they gave rise to a number of insightful investigations on matters such 
as power, social management of time, social aspects of trauma and memory, 
social withdrawal, institutional crisis, politics and the Life-world, and so on. 
These issues drew the attention of many colleagues in the United States, Ger-
many, Japan and South America.
However, over the years, a few debates have taken place. I will mention 
one of them in particular, with regards to the very existence of Phenomeno-
logical Sociology. The question was: Is Phenomenological Sociology possible? 
Basically, the issue was if Phenomenology is solely a Philosophy or if it 
can also be a Science. Here we have two different stances, each one of them 
with its own “geographical disseminations” and “prominent representative” 
(according to Thomas Eberle). The German tradition, led by Thomas Luck-
mann, considers Phenomenology as mere Protosociology. On the contrary, 
the American tradition, led by George Psathas, considers that many impor-
tant contributions of Phenomenology take part of Sociology as a Science.
In Luckmann’s view, since Phenomenology is a Philosophy, it can only 
be Pre-sociological or Proto-sociological because Sociology is an Empirical 
Science. As they proceed through completely different methods, a Phenom-
enological Sociology is a misnomer because Phenomenology is not a Science 
but a Philosophy dealing with phenomena of subjective consciousness from 
an egological perspective. Alternatively, as a Science, Sociology deals with 
phenomena of the social world from a cosmological perspective. Accordingly, 
even if Phenomenology can ground Sociology, it cannot be a part of it.
In Psathas’s view, Phenomenology is at once a Philosophy, a method, and 
an approach for Social Sciences. Thus, it can also be an empirical endeavor 
dealing with the Life-world as experienced by ordinary human beings living 
in it. Consequently, there is a Phenomenological way of doing Sociology (for 
instance, as I said before, Ethnometodology is one of them).
In my opinion, the terms of this debate should be updated since a lot has 
being going on in the Sciences during at least the last two decades. One of the 
main changes, which had a huge impact in Phenomenology (particularly in 
North American Phenomenologists) is the rise of inter- and cross-disciplinar-
ity. This makes it impossible (or at least much more difficult) to sustain such a 
clear distinction such as that upheld by Luckmann between Philosophy and 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA302
the Sciences, which, of course, makes Psathas’s position stronger: not every-
thing that has some philosophy in it is external to Sociology. We should recon-
sider matters like this if we aim at taking Phenomenology as a new paradigm.
Personally, I have been dealing with these issues from the perspective that 
I like to call “Social Phenomenology”. It includes, of course, Phenomenologi-
cal Sociology but it does not exclude Philosophical subjects and it also involves 
all Social and Cultural Sciences. Briefly said, Social Phenomenology is the 
regional ontology of the social realm at all levels, empirical, eidetic and tran-
scendental (if you accept Transcendental Phenomenology). For instance, the 
problem of intersubjectivity would not be seen as a Philosophical problem but 
as one of the core issues of Social Phenomenology. You could even say that 
it’s both Sociological and Philosophical, and even that it involves all the other 
Social and Human Sciences.
This makes Social Phenomenology a multidisciplinary paradigm, with a 
wider aim and scope than Phenomenological Sociology and Phenomenologi-
cal Philosophy on their own. At the same time, it allows us to leave behind the 
sterile discussions about boundaries in order to focus on enhancing Phenom-
enology as a whole. It is my hope that if we, Phenomenologists, accomplish 
this switch in attitude, it will make a brighter day.
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A well-informed ‘model of administration’ for 
agrarian states. Or: how not to fall into the trap of 
‘nostrification’ when comparing colonial West African 
States with 18th century Prussia
Hubert Treiber
In a noteworthy essay entitled “The Operation Called Vergleichen (Comparison)” Joachim Matthes has 
drawn attention to the fact that studies which claim to compare particular phenomena from one’s own cul-
ture (such as law or administration, for example) with those of an alien culture do not, strictly speaking, 
perform a real comparison.  Instead, what takes place is (in his words) a “nostrification”, that is, “an ap-
propriation of the other in one’s own terms” or conceptual assimilation.  Even the ideal-type constructions 
of Max Weber seem largely to confirm this proposition.  In principle, then, it ought to be quite hard to 
find studies which are not exposed to the charge of nostrification.  In what follows works by Gerd Spittler 
are examined in some detail from this particular perspective.  In the first instance Spittler investigated the 
specific problems encountered by the colonial administration in West African peasant states (1919-39), 
before examining if this problematic could be applied to the peasant state of Prussia in the 18th century.  
So, for example, he asked himself how a bureaucratic administration reliant on written documents resolved 
the problem of raising taxes on a body of untruly peasants who to a large extent communicated orally 
amongst themselves.  Since in both cases Spittler relates the typical structures of an agrarian society to 
typical administrative structures, he attains a level of reflection where the ‘“One” can be translated into 
the “Other” and vice versa’ (Matthes), and in this way he escapes the particular danger of nostrification.
1. Introduction
In his noteworthy essay “The Operation Called Vergleichen” Joachim Mat-
thes (1992) has suggested that as a rule the procedures aimed at comparing 
particular phenomena of one’s own culture (administration, for example) with 
those of an alien culture do not, strictly speaking, make a comparison.  In-
stead, this involves “a ‘nostrification’, an appropriation of the other in one’s 
own terms” (Matthes 1992: 84).  Elsewhere in his essay he elaborates on this:
The aporia of  such a ‘comparative’ practice consists firstly in the fact that its 
tertium is not constructed as a meta-reflection, but forms it as a cultural pro-
jection.  The other aspect of  this aporia is that a tertium gained through a cultural 
projection provides at the same time the standard for the search, for the identification of  
comparative phenomenon elsewhere. The there for the substance (Sachverhalt) of  this 
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‘comparison’ is detected with the aid of  this projected tertium using the concept 
that the here of  the content to be ‘compared’ has of  itself  – transposed into an 
abstraction unlimited with respect to time and space.  What is presented as 
‘comparison’ is performed, first, as an identification of  what is ‘like’ (or on a 
‘par’) according to its own standard, before com-parison (Ver-gleichen) as an 
explicit operation begins. (Matthes 1992: 83).
Once this illuminating observation is taken into account, we realise that 
there are very many instances of this.1  Some of Max Weber’s ideal-typical 
constructions take this form, and seem to provide confirmation for Matthes’ 
claim.  On the other hand, it appears much more difficult to show how one 
might avoid this trap of “nostrification”.  However, it seems to me that the 
studies of Gerd Spittler do offer a demonstration of this kind.
Gerd Spittler, a sociologist by training, but one whose first-rate credentials 
as an ethnologist are displayed in his field research (Spittler 1978: 140ff.), had 
a fascinating idea. Having investigated the manner in which (colonial) West 
African peasant states were administered during the period 1919-1939, he de-
vised a ‘model of administration in peasant states’ (Spittler 1976; 1978; 1981), 
applying this model to agrarian 18th century Prussia (Spittler 1980), framing 
it as an intercultural comparison in which he first examined the interaction be-
tween administration and peasant culture in Prussia.2  Spittler demonstrates 
typical patterns of domination in the agrarian Prussia of the 18th century, 
but also administrative problems of the type that regularly tend to crop up 
in the day-to-day practice of administration.  By linking the structures of 
an agrarian society (a peasant state) to typical administrative structures and 
problems (Spittler 1981: 9), he is able to construct a well-informed ‘model of 
administration’ for agrarian states, avoiding the danger of nostrification, the 
“appropriation of the other in one’s own terms” (Matthes), especially since he 
begins his intercultural comparison with the analysis of a twentieth-century 
African agrarian society, then shifting his perspective to eighteenth-century 
Prussian agrarian society, a society which we today perceive as remote.
Drawing upon Spittler’s work on colonial West Africa (1919-1939) and on 
the agrarian society of Prussia in the 18th century, the following paper sketch-
es in outline a ‘model of administration’ in peasant states. In doing so, I draw 
upon more recent studies than were available to Spittler at the time when he 
constructed and tested his model (Eifert 2003; Wagner 2005).  
1 Treiber 2012: 28f.  
2 Spittler’s “model of  interaction between agrarian peasant societies and (bureaucratic) admin-
istration” can in part be “applied to the Prussian bureaucracy as it existed from the turn of  the 
century to the 1860s” (Wagner 2005: 63).
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2. The development of a ‘model of administration’ in agrarian states 
2.1 Typical characteristics of agrarian states or peasant societies
First of all, some terms need to be explained. Spittler, drawing upon Max 
Weber, defines a ‘state’ as a ‘territorial political association with a central 
authority and bureaucracy’, which claims ‘to exert direct domination’ over its 
members (Spittler 1981: 13). A state can be described as an ‘agrarian state’ if 
farmers make up the majority of the population and if the burdens of taxation 
and other obligations fall first and foremost on them, and they can also be 
conscripted when military forces have to be raised (Spittler 1981: 13). Agrar-
ian or peasant states can also be defined in terms of the degree to which 
a monetary and market economy has developed. For the present purpose, 
the following will suffice: where there is widespread subsistence agriculture 
and self-sufficiency (i.e. a low level of market integration), the administration 
will find itself confronted with substantial problems, for example in the fields 
of information gathering and surveillance. The agrarian states investigated 
by Spittler in colonial West Africa (1919-1939) are characterized by an oral 
culture, i.e. ‘communication and intellectual abilities are predominantly gov-
erned (by the oral mode)’, though this is by no means intended to imply that 
peasant farmers lack talents or are ignorant. Where Prussia is concerned, Spitt- 
ler can draw on an outstanding authority, in the person of Christian Garve, 
to demonstrate the contrary, namely that a specific type of intelligence is to be 
found amongst the peasant population that can be ascribed to their methods 
of production and their subjection (Spittler 1981: 18f.; Garve 1796). Even if 
it is accepted that the ability both to read and to write is to be found among 
peasant farmers to a certain degree (Quéniart 1981), it may nevertheless be 
assumed that the description of rural areas in the 18th century as a ‘world 
of semi-oral culture’ is an apt one. For this characterization we are indebted 
to the highly illuminating study by Quéniart (1981: 133). Much light is also 
shed by his remarks and suggestions on the ‘delimitation of partial literacy’, 
in the course of which he states that ‘partial literacy that is limited to the abil-
ity to read does little to change the nature of a person’s cultural dependency. 
In oral culture the memory continues to be the only means of accumulating 
and transmitting knowledge: such partial literacy “does not change the indi-
vidual’s relationship to this culture, but reinforces it.” Only when the ability to 
write has been acquired may we assume that such a change occurs (...)’  (Qué-
niart 1981: 117). The picture painted by von Ungern-Sternberg (1987: 386f.) 
for some 18th century  German states either supports Quéniart’s or at the very 
least does not contradict it:
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Thus while many people who were described as illiterate could not, or could 
hardly, write, they were nevertheless, at least to a certain degree, able to read. 
(...). Around 1800, Württemberg, Saxony and the Thuringian states, above 
all Gotha, were considered to be exemplary regions, thanks above all to their 
relatively well-developed school systems, whereas the Palatinate, for example, 
was judged to be distinctly backward. (...). Even if  elementary reading abilities 
were more widespread in Germany than has been assumed up to now, for most 
peasants, as for the lower social classes and the lower middle class, reading 
was a “surplus activity”, at least to the extent that it went beyond the needs 
of  religious observance and the modest amount of  leisure time available (see 
Friederich 1987: 126ff.).
All this means that ‘information was [predominantly] not laid down in 
writing, but was stored in the memory’ (Spittler 1981: 19) and handed down 
orally. To this extent, the ‘elders’ occupy a special position as reliable sources 
of information. Thus ‘the retrieval of information (...) is much more strongly 
dependent on people than it is in a written culture which accumulates its 
knowledge in books and documents’ (Spittler 1981: 19). Wagner (2005: 106f.) 
finds a particular impressive example that may stand for many others as late 
as the year 1871 (!) in Prussia: 
When there were conflicts about the boundaries between the areas of  land 
assigned to private and to communal use, those concerned found themselves 
on shifting sands as far as the legal basis was concerned, since the stock of  in-
formation that the authorities could draw upon in order to mediate in conflicts 
was diffusely distributed in the village. Mostly it was a case of  memory versus 
memory, while the few written or cartographical documents (…) were all too 
often imprecise and susceptible to different interpretations.’ The procedure 
used to resolve such conflicts tells its own tale: the Dorfschulze, the village mayor 
or reeve, who represented ‘the very lowest level of  the state administrative ap-
paratus’ (Wagner 2005: 112), was permitted, as a person acting in an official 
capacity, to draw upon his ‘personal memory’ if  ‘there were no documents 
available and people’s recollections diverged (Wagner 2005: 107). 
However, the implications of a written culture are more far-reaching: ‘Def-
initions of terms, abstraction from concrete situations and individual cases, 
thinking in lists and tables, all these features that constitute the way a bureau-
cracy operates, cannot be dissociated from written culture’ (Spittler 1981: 19). 
This can be seen above all if, as was the case in Prussia, there are particular 
regions where particular dialects (e.g. Low German) or other languages (e.g. 
Polish) were spoken. Those who are at home in such a dialect or language, 
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those whose whole manner of speaking and thinking is shaped by it, do not (in 
the 18th century) necessarily feel the need to learn the dominant written lan-
guage which is at the same time the language of the administration. Rather, 
for groups of the population who have no need to master the written lan-
guage, bilingualism is more of a hindrance, especially to learning to write 
(Quéniart 1981: 125). Moreover, written information can easily be passed on 
orally by a small number of persons, e.g. by the village clergymen, so that it is 
not essential to be able either to read or to write (Quéniart 1981: 133).
Characteristic features of agrarian states, especially those with a low level 
of market integration, are on the one hand the high degree of inaccessibility 
of the peasants living in remote villages, scattered hamlets or isolated farms, 
and on the other hand the regional and local heterogeneity, which makes it 
extremely difficult to obtain a clear picture: ‘Where every village has its own 
customs, where there are sharp distinctions in language and dialect from re-
gion to region or even from village to village, where a word may mean differ-
ent things in different villages, and the same thing be designated by different 
words, where every little town has differing units of length, area, capacity 
and weight, but all use the same words for them’ (Spittler 1980: 578), any 
administrative apparatus will find it difficult to collect reliable information 
and evaluate it, and to enforce compliance with its general (and increasingly 
abstract) rules. The multiplicity and diversity of local and regional harvest 
customs is well documented for as late as 1865 (!) by a survey, carried out by 
Wilhelm Mannhardt, of the names given to particular harvest customs and 
their dissemination in Germany and some adjoining countries, because he 
was seeking to demonstrate – being in this respect a true disciple of Tylor’s – 
that these were ‘remnants of a Teutonic religious cult’ (Kippenberg 1997: 125; 
Mannhardt 1868; Tylor 1873). 
It is necessary to consider briefly the extent to which 18th century Prussia 
was an agrarian or peasant state. Spittler (1980: 584ff.) states that it was. In 
terms of the features set out at the beginning of this paper, Prussia was not 
only an agrarian state, but was characterized by a degree of heterogeneity 
that was inescapable to any observer and confronted the bureaucratic admin-
istration with substantial challenges: ‘Prussia was heterogeneous not only with 
regard to its weights and measures, but also in language, religion and ethnic 
composition, in manners, customs and law’ (Spittler 1980: 585). Prussia as a 
military and agrarian state was particularly dependent upon its peasants as 
recruits and as taxpayers. They were the ones that bore the burden of the Kon-
tribution (see below) that was regularly levied, and which represented a more 
important source of income for the state than the municipal excise duties; and 
in addition, the peasants made an essential contribution to the incomes of the 
landed estates (Büsch 1962: 5f., 16f., 21f.; Braun 1975). As explained above, 
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the assumption that rural areas were a ‘world of semi-oral culture’ may also 
be taken to apply to 18th century Prussia. Wagner (2005: 111) gives a vivid ex-
ample of this from as late as 1850 (!) in relation to a village in West Prussia. Of 
the 113 people who took part in a parish meeting in that year, 43 (48.6%), i.e. 
almost half, did not sign the record but placed their marks under it in the form 
of three crosses. But illiteracy is likely to have been widespread even among 
the holders of positions in the lowest ranks of the administration, the village 
reeves (Dorfschulzen) and the Kreisreiter, the officials who toured the district on 
behalf of the Landrat (Wagner (2005: 122f.).
2.2 Three types of administration in agrarian societies: bureaucratic, intermediary 
and arbitrary administration
In considering the workings of the administration in colonially governed 
agrarian societies with a view to gaining insights that are susceptible to com-
parison with agrarian Prussia, Spittler constructs three ideal-types of admin-
istration (Spittler 1981: 21ff.): bureaucratic, intermediary and arbitrary (ex-
tending as far as despotic), each of which is distinguished by quite definite 
advantages and disadvantages. Bureaucratic administration rests, according to 
Max Weber’s ideal type (Treiber 2007), on abstract, universally applicable 
rules or on abstract knowledge that is collected and recorded in documents 
or in lists and tables.3 The features characterizing the manner in which such 
a bureaucracy functions are inseparable from the existence of a written cul-
ture, but this is something remote from the population of an agrarian state: 
‘The bureaucratic way of thinking is foreign to peasants who have grown up 
in an oral culture’ (Spittler 1981: 22). Where there is a low level of market 
integration, local and regional ‘heterogeneity in economics, society and cul-
ture’ (Spittler 1981: 22) and an underdeveloped infrastructure (e.g. inadequate 
road networks), the fundamental problems for any bureaucratic administra-
tion that stem from the incongruence of written and oral culture are intensi-
3  In the period following the royal Instruction of  19 January 1723, by which the General War 
Commissariat and the General Finance Directory were amalgamated to form a single General 
Directory, serious efforts in the direction of  rationalization and enhanced effectiveness can be 
seen to have been undertaken within the central administration (Kohnke 1996; Mainka 1998; 
Schellakowsky 1998). It is therefore not surprising that the administrative reform of  1723 also 
involved the creation of  a special statistical office within the General Directory. The Commis-
sariat had played a decisive role in the process of  building up a modern administration and 
smashing the old Estate-based system in the course of  the previous two centuries (Hintze 1981). 
But despite this, in regard to the peasants, the lowest hierarchical level at which the state made 
demands upon its subjects, the central bureaucracy was long dependent upon intermediary 
administration. 
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fied. These are on the one hand the problem of collecting and processing 
information, and on the other hand that of being able to exercise domination 
(i.e. to enforce compliance with laws and regulations). The peasants to whom 
such (abstract) regulations are addressed very rarely display open resistance 
to compliance, however; rather, they generally react to the demands of the 
administration with ‘defensive strategies’ (Spittler) such as avoidance (by hid-
ing), ignoring them, bending them through wayward interpretation or con-
cealed non-compliance (Treiber 1995: 71ff.; Garve 1796). All these ‘defensive 
reactions’ and the associated communicative behaviour are characterized by 
the fact that they are not ‘sophisticated strategies for exercising influence’, 
but are rather quite simply intended to withhold important information from 
the administration, especially since this is the most important resource for 
bureaucratic administration.
These two fundamental problems of bureaucratic domination do not apply 
if arbitrary rule is exercised by government and administration: the type of 
arbitrary administration. This form of administration may appear advantageous 
because it does not ‘require any written documentation or (…) storage of in-
formation’ (Spittler 1981: 23). It is precisely in situations in which obtaining 
and storing information proves to be extremely difficult, that an arbitrary 
style of administration may come to prevail. Arbitrary rule can however only 
be used selectively and in particular places; it therefore has a very limited 
reach, in both time and space. So it is no surprise that arbitrary domination 
is always accompanied by a ‘laissez faire’ attitude, i.e. by largely abandoning 
the attempt to enforce compliance with the regulations.4 This paradoxical 
coexistence of the use of force at one point and laissez faire at another is by the 
way thoroughly characteristic of the early modern state in the Occident (Tilly 
1989). The transition to despotic rule, in which arbitrariness is accompanied 
by the threat or use of force, something to which even the lowest adminis-
trative level commonly resorts (v. Trotha 1995: 136ff.), is fluid: ‘Bureaucratic 
taxation turns into something close to looting, and organized conscription 
for military service becomes more like a hunt after people’ (Spittler 1981: 23). 
One rational solution to these two fundamental problems of bureaucratic 
administration is to be found in Spittler’s third type, intermediary administration, 
or more precisely the combination of bureaucratic and intermediary admin-
istration. The function of such ‘intermediary systems’ is to enforce compli-
4 „The economy of  the use of  violence explains the apparent paradox in the co-existence of  
violence and toleration that so astonished a European observer.  He experienced on the one 
hand a high level of  violence focussed on the imposition of  a few demands, and on the other 
an equally unfamiliar level of  disobedience to many demands made by the state.“ (Spittler 
1978: 69).
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ance with the universal requirements of the central administration and to 
collect basic information on the country and its population. Intermediary 
administration relies on middlemen who are recruited locally and are well 
rooted in the community. These people are no strangers to the written culture 
of the administrative bureaucracy, but nor are they excluded from access to 
the (semi-)oral culture of the peasants. Thanks to the way these middlemen 
are anchored in local or regional society, intermediary administration is also 
more readily able to deal with the heterogeneity described above. The mid-
dlemen fulfil both the expectations of the bureaucratic system and those of 
the (semi-)oral culture, even though, depending on their social origin and the 
prevailing constellation of power factors, they may see themselves as owing 
loyalty more to the one side or to the other. The combination described offers 
substantial advantages both in obtaining information and in collecting taxes. 
To obtain information, the middlemen predominantly communicate with the 
peasants orally, whereas for tax collection the invention of the ‘repartition’ or 
tax-farming system shows itself to be advantageous. In this system (here in 
relation to the tax known as the ‘Kontribution’) a quota is laid down in advance 
for a group of the population, which the middleman is then responsible for 
collecting and handing over to the authorities; but it is left to him to determine 
how the quota is allocated within the group concerned (Spittler 1981: 24).
Spittler’s brief  history of  tax collection, taking the Kontribution as its example, 
tells of  comparable technical difficulties, but also of  the extent to which the 
data collected was dependent on those who furnished it (which also included 
the gentry-dominated district assemblies).  This is not least because the Kontri-
bution, a land tax, was calculated on the basis of  a fictitious or virtual unit of  
measurement. This unit was the hide (Hufe) (HRG, vol. 2: col. 248ff.; Ersch/
Gruber 1980: 369), which was actually a measurement of  area, although the 
areas under agricultural use had not yet been comprehensively surveyed and 
recorded. According to Meitzen (2007: 13), triangulation did not begin in Prus-
sia until 1750. For example, when the “Generalhufenschoss’ (a levy on real 
estate) was introduced in East Prussia (1715-1719), the necessary survey of  ara-
ble land was prevented by the resistance of  the aristocracy (Spittler 1980: 591). 
In Prussia, cadastres or land registries as a basis for land tax assessment were 
first introduced in 1822, initially in the Rhineland and Westphalia, ‘and by the 
the Act of  21.5.1861 for the entire state’ (HRG, vol. 2: col. 661f.). According to 
Wagner (2005: 58), it was ‘ultimately (…) not until the land tax reform [of  21 
May 1861] and the associated creation of  new land registries in the course of  
the 1860s that the foundations were laid for the collection of  more and more 
accurate data on the situation in the countryside. It was the Land Register 
Ordinance of  5 May 1872 that finally created an information system relating 
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to parcels of  real estate, their ownership and the obligations attached to them 
that was both geographically comprehensive and also constantly kept up to 
date.’  In view of  the situation described, the yield of  arable land in Prussia 
was calculated in accordance with the ‘beschworene Aussaat’ or ‘sworn seedcast’, 
a form of  affidavit in which the peasants were required to declare how much 
seed they had sown. This ‘was assessed in bushels for every place in the mon-
archy, and the Kontribution levied in accordance with the number of  bushels 
sown.’  The Kontribution was used to finance the army. As it was levied regularly 
and represented a more or less constant amount (Büsch 1962: 22), it enabled 
the King to make himself  independent of  the Estates. In practical terms, the 
Kontribution was treated like a tribute, i.e. ‘each district was assigned a certain 
quota, which it had to raise.’ 
From the point of view of the central authority and its bureaucracy,   the 
obvious advantages of intermediary administration are accompanied by one con-
siderable disadvantage: these relatively autonomous middlemen not only make 
it more difficult for the central bureaucracy to exercise surveillance, but also 
tend ‘to mediatize the relationship between the subject and the state bureau-
cracy’ (Spittler 1980: 582). In respect of the two principal features that char-
acterize agrarian states – that it is peasants who bear the burden of taxation, 
and also form the pool from which the (standing) army is recruited – Spittler 
describes typical distinctions between the three types of administration: ‘As 
taxation is a function of bureaucracy and tribute of intermediary domination, 
so looting is a feature of despotic rule. A similar distinction can also be made 
with regard to military recruiting: bureaucratic recruiting is based on muster 
lists, intermediary recruiting on quotas; but despotic recruiting relies on hunt-
ing for people – the press gang.’ (Spittler 1980: 580). 
3. The interaction of peasant agrarian society and bureaucratic administration in 
Prussia:  Landrat and village clergyman as typical representatives of ‘intermediary 
administration’
In the 18th century, the Landrat, the chief administrative officer at district level, 
may be regarded as a typical example of intermediary administration, as can 
be seen inter alia from the fact that he was recruited from amongst the land-
owning gentry of his district, who also had the right to propose new personnel 
in the case of vacancies (Spittler 1980: 586; Büsch 1962: 77f.; Gelpke 1902). In 
the 18th century all Landräte were drawn from the aristocracy; they were pro-
posed by the Kreisstände, the district assemblies dominated by the aristocratic 
landowners, and appointed by the Crown. In 1713 the King had restricted 
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this right of proposal, but from 1756 onwards the Kreisstände were once again 
able to exercise it without restriction in all provinces of Prussia, though unti-
tled landowners were excluded (Eifert 2003: 45).
Indeed, ‘the status of the Landräte as representatives of the landowning in-
terest was in line with the concept of their office that had prevailed since the 
18th century’ (Wagner 2005: 67). The repercussions of this view that the Land-
rat represented the landed interests can still be seen as late as the end of the 
19th century in the tax evasion practiced by large landowners and the derelic-
tions of duty committed by Landräte. Both these types of offence were ‘so wide-
spread that those who committed them no longer even subjectively felt them 
to be such, but rather regarded them as representing the correct interpreta-
tion of the law’s intentions, though the application of this interpretation was 
of course to be limited to a certain social class’ (Witt 1973: 217). At the same 
time, this provides a vivid example of shortcomings in enforcement in the 
classic field of fiscal administration just at a time when the Prussian adminis-
tration appeared to be in the process of coming much closer to Weber’s ideal 
type of bureaucracy, and as late as 1911 well-regarded scholars, such as Otto 
Hintze (1981a: 27), extolled the generally admired virtues that were taken to 
characterize the Prussian civil service, namely its honesty, devotion to duty, 
professional competence, observance of the law and personal integrity.
In the 18th century the office of Landrat appeared as an ‘extended squire-
archy’ (Wagner), as can be seen, in an external view, from the fact that up 
until 1861 the Landrat’s office was located on his estate. So the paternalistic 
attitudes that were cultivated by the squire and which consequently helped to 
shape the way in which he saw himself (Wagner 2005: 158f.) were customarily 
reflected in the way he carried out his duties as Landrat, and were considered 
to be legitimate, or appropriate to his status (Wagner 2005: 159). These pa-
ternalistic attitudes are attributable amongst other things to the fact that the 
‘manorial estate (was) not only a large agricultural operation, but also had 
far-reaching rights of rule [Herrschaft] attached to it outside the economic field. 
Purely by virtue of his ownership of the estate, the great landowner exercised 
law and order functions and jurisdiction over his tenants. In 1837, around 
one-third of all Prussian subjects in the areas east of the Rhine were subject 
to this patrimonial exercise of law and order and of judicial functions’ ( Jessen 
1995: 142, referring to Koselleck 1967: 674f.; Lüdtke 1982: 196-227). Only 
after the promulgation of the Decree of 16.12.1861 was a Landrat obliged to 
reside in the town that was the administrative centre of his district and also 
to exercise his official duties from there (Wagner 2005: 74f.). The Landrat had 
to meet both the costs of keeping up his public position and also the costs of 
administration largely out of his own pocket. The latter were a major factor 
especially from the 1840s onwards, when written correspondence increased 
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in volume to such an extent that it was necessary to employ a number – vary-
ing from district to district – of clerical staff to cope with it (Wagner 2005: 76).
Even though the Landräte had officially been required to take an examina-
tion before the Higher Examinations Commission since 1770, most of them 
appear to have managed to avoid it, so that the level of (formal) qualification 
required for the office would not appear to have been particularly demanding 
at first. The same may also be deduced from the fact that the office of Landrat 
was an honorary one performed by its holder on the side (Eifert 2003: 46f.). 
It is also demonstrated by the basic level of manpower available to the Land-
rat, which up to the end of 18th century consisted of ancillary staff with low 
qualifications, a clerk and a Kreisreiter, whose job it was to tour the district and 
keep in contact with the village reeves; from 1815/16 onwards every Landrat 
then became entitled to have a district secretary to manage his office (Spittler 
1980: 586; Wagner 2005: 76; Eifert 2003: 78ff., 85). Eifert characterizes the 
tasks of a Landrat in the 18th century as being ‘an accumulation of supervisory 
duties’, and yet if the office was exercised in the manner outlined above, then 
these supervisory duties must have been undertaken for the most part through 
non-bureaucratic methods, i.e. less by the making and keeping of documents 
than by the kind of oral communication that typified the tours of inspection – 
modelled on the monarch’s ‘royal progress’ (‘koenigliche Revuereisen’) (Eifert 
2003: 78ff.) – which according to an Instruction issued in 1766 were to take 
place ‘twice a year, in the spring and in the autumn’ (Eifert 2003: 43). The 
colonial civil service was also well acquainted with this method of obtaining 
information and exercising surveillance (Spittler 1981: 105ff.) – in this case it 
was the colonial District Commissioner who was required to go ‘on tour’ or 
‘on safari’. With regard to this ‘non-bureaucratic method’ of exercising sur-
veillance, Spittler (1981: 107f.) remarks:
The type of  contact and conversation propagated in this way may allow the 
District Commissioner to penetrate the reality of  a village. But it is very dif-
ficult for him to standardize the results and manage them in a bureaucratic 
manner. The form of  communication is more appropriate to an oral culture 
than to a bureaucracy based on abstract written documentation. To this extent, 
it is no mere accident that the District Commissioner spends most of  his time 
in his office and has no time to go on tour. Producing written documents in an 
office accords with the bureaucratic way of  doing things, and creates a familiar 
reality, even if  it is a fictitious one. (…) The system of  gathering information 
called “going on tour” requires a physical presence and therefore takes up a lot 
of  time. Thus it must of  necessity be restricted to small numbers and is unable 
to cope with any mass phenomenon (large numbers of  peasants and villages) 
such as bureaucracy typically attempts to deal with.
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As late as 1816 – not long after which those areas of activity had begun to 
expand which ‘required a greater degree of written and less personal activity’ 
(Wagner 2005: 72) from the Landrat – Wagner observes that the Landrat’s task 
was ‘to govern not from his office, but from the saddle, to take decisions on 
the spot, in direct contact with those involved’ (Wagner 2005: 68), and draws 
attention to the draft of an Instruction which itself dates from the year 1816 
(!) in which it is stated that the official business of the Landrat should ‘as far as 
possible be exercised orally and should not give rise to unprofitable masses 
of paperwork’ (Wagner 2005: 68). In this Instruction it seems very clear that 
the bureaucracy was prepared to renounce a major tool which would have 
allowed it to keep the Landrat under more effective surveillance. On the other 
hand, it did appear to be interested in having such a tool available, since at the 
same time it raised demands for the Landrat to have prior qualifications and 
practical administrative experience, which would further his integration into 
the bureaucratic hierarchy (Wagner 2005: 73). This was also connected to the 
interest of the bureaucracy in detaching the Landrat from his relationship of 
loyalty to the local (landowning) elite. However, it remains, the case that with 
regard to the requirement for prior qualifications, which was understood to 
mean that the Landrat should have already taken or be in the process of tak-
ing the ‘higher administrative or legal examination’, there were substantial 
shortcomings in implementation (Eifert 2003: 120ff.). As the most important 
representative, together with the village clergyman, of ‘intermediary admin-
istration’, the Landrat was not only at the interface between the bureaucratic 
administration and its peasant subjects; he also had to act in a field of op-
posing forces, exerted mainly by the central government bureaucracy on the 
one hand and his fellow members of the local (landowning) elite on the other, 
which (furthermore) were constantly shifting through the impact of socioeco-
nomic developments (Wagner 2005: 39ff.). 
As a further representative of ‘intermediary administration’ in 18th century 
Prussia, the village clergyman must be mentioned, not least because it was he 
who supplied the data on which all important lists and tables drawn up by the 
bureaucracy were based. To Spittler he was ‘the Trojan horse which enabled 
state bureaucracy to penetrate the rural areas, bypassing the mediatizing ar-
istocracy’ (Spittler 1980: 597). Even though he was subject to the patronage of 
the squire and to this extent was in a relationship of dependency, he neverthe-
less formed an integral part of the bureaucracy: ‘The clergy were more and 
more regarded and treated as state officials. They were required to keep lists 
of the population, plant mulberry trees and proclaim new government regu-
lations from the pulpit’ (Hintze 1967: 81f., after Spittler 1980: 597).  As local 
representatives of the state church they were subject to regular visitations, i.e. 
a type of bureaucratic surveillance. Since the village clergy were on the one 
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hand able to read and write, but on the other hand also thoroughly well ac-
quainted with the ‘semi-oral culture’ of the peasants, they were highly suitable 
to fulfil the role assigned to them by the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy real-
ized that the church registers kept by the clergy, in which all important basic 
demographic data was recorded with the names of the persons concerned, 
constituted a most important and reliable source of information, so that both 
the population lists and the lists of those liable to military service were based 
on them (Spittler 1980: 597).5 There may have been some deficits in its imple-
mentation – as a result, for example, of there being an insufficient number of 
clergymen in relation to the population, or of their being unsuitable or lacking 
in commitment (Spittler 1980: 597f.) – but the fact that the data contained in 
the church registers was collected ‘for religious reasons, and not (primarily) in 
the interests of the state’ (Spittler 1980: 597) vouches for their reliability. 
It has however become customary to query the extent to which the church 
registers are reliable sources of valid information. In this regard it may suf-
fice to recall the suggestion made by the Strasbourg City Councillor Georg 
Obrecht. In his treatises on public order, published posthumously in 1644 
under the title ‘Fünff Unterschiedlichen Secreta Politica’, he presented ‘the 
first comprehensive concept of a modern administrative organization in Ger-
man political literature’. On the basis of comprehensive registers that were 
to be kept by persons designated as ‘Deputaten’ (‘commissioners’), general 
population statistics were to be compiled, while on the other hand ‘effective 
surveillance of moral behaviour’ was also to be facilitated (Maier 1980: 122-
131; Meitzen 2007: 11).  At the same time, Obrecht goes into the question as 
to ‘whether the church registers might not also be able to fulfil the purpose 
of the registers to be kept by the commissioners’ (Maier 1980: 129). It is true 
that he declared in favour of his ‘Institute of Commissioners’, mainly because 
of the objection that the church registers would not afford ‘any overview of 
the total state of the community’, since they would remain in the individual 
5 From 1719 onwards there were ‘population lists’ in Prussia, in which the turnover of  the 
population (baptisms, marriages, deaths) was recorded and these were gradually extended by 
the addition of  further headings and categories and increasingly kept in tabular form (Meitzen 
2007: 12ff.; Schaab 1967: 1). It was also on the basis of  the data obtainable from the church 
registers that the Kantonslisten were drawn up, the lists of  young men subject to military service 
kept by the Landräte (Behre 1905: 145). The population lists and historical tables were also the 
basis for the ‘population policy’, which was a classic instrument of  mercantilist economic policy 
in the 17th and 18th centuries (Blaich 1973: 1-31; 170-178), a type of  economic policy that in 
its turn demanded more comprehensive and more precise information; so that in the end the 
central administration, which initially had done no more than collect the numerical material 
and publish it (Behre 1905: 136), began to present it in tabular form in order to analyse it and 
draw conclusions.
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parishes and would thus not be known in their entirety to the authorities. All 
the same, it remains the case that through this administrative concept ‘the 
individual, detached from his or her position within a social class, the abstract 
“population”, was for the first time discovered as the object of administration’ 
(Maier 1980: 130).
4. How does Spittler avoid the trap of nostrification?
Spittler avoids the trap of nostrification in a remarkably simple way.  By 
asking the question “how does state administration work in agrarian socie-
ties?” he systematically links the structure of (bureaucratic, document-based) 
administration with the structure of an agrarian society (Spittler 1981: 9).  A 
rural peasant economy moulded by market integration not only determines 
the strategies of bureaucratic, document-based administration and the char-
acter of the peasants inhabiting a semi-oral culture; it also presents adminis-
tration with a number of problems that it must solve, and to which it responds 
with quite specific actions. These problems primarily arise from the fact that 
(on the one hand) dues and taxes have to be collected from peasants, who (on 
the other hand) represent the pool for military levies, for which every time 
serious informational problems emerge.  The various approaches selected by 
the administration can be reduced to ideal-typical structural types: to bu-
reaucratic, document-based administration; to arbitrary and despotic rule; 
and intermedial administration,6 which in practice can be observed operating 
in typical combinations, in particular that between bureaucratic, document-
based and intermedial administration.
The comparison between West African colonial administration in the pe-
riod 1919-1939 and eighteenth century Prussian administration is made by 
first considering the structure of West African agrarian society (or societies). 
These typically have “imposts” (tax payments and military service, together 
with their associated informational problems) which for their realisation have 
to be related to a suitable administrative structure, characterised in particu-
lar by a combination of bureaucratic, document-based administration with 
that of intermediaries (canton chiefs).  Separately from this eighteenth century 
Prussian agrarian society is approached in a similar manner, linking imposts 
with an administrative structure appropriate for their realisation. Here again, 
6 The relationship between bureaucratic, document-based administration and its various in-
termediaries is as a rule based upon personal rule of  a clientilist nature – the village priest is 
an exception.
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the combination between bureaucratic, document-based administration, and 
that based upon intermediaries (village priest, councillor) proves especially 
robust.  Even if the analysis in this contribution is concentrated upon the 
Prussian case, it could benefit from the analysis conducted for the West Afri-
can case, together with the insights  gained thereby; and it does not presume 
the “projection of one comparative measure derived from one’s own society.” 
(Matthes 1992: 81).  Instead, this approach opens up the space for reflection 
that Matthes demands (1992: 96), and which in the reciprocity of the analyses 
made reveals a remarkably high level of common features, as well as charac-
teristic (often culturally determined) differences, as happens for example in 
the involvement of suitable intermediaries.
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Cultura politica di partito e cultura politica nazionale: 
il caso del Pci nella Prima Repubblica
Andrea Millefiorini
In the paper we are explaining those aspects of the Italian Communist Party, that, thanks to the par-
ticular organized structure, contributed, in a meaning ful way, to outline some characteristic features of 
the Italian political culture. There are four aspects of them: the first one was represented by a strong level 
of ideologism that for reaction and contamination passed from its main centre of diffusion (which was 
just the P.C.I) to the other actors of the Italian party system, whose high level of ideologization produced 
models of interpretation of problems and of decisions, elaboration and planning, about not so much prag-
matic plans; on the contrary, concerning rhetoric or propagandistic  approaches.A second, relevant effect 
to which contributed in this case not only the political communist culture, we are analyzing above all 
from this point of view: it was constituted by the leadership exerced by  the political parties that acquired 
in the symbolic values of the Italians universe as regards the other components of the Political system; 
the consequences of this situation we are going to analyze in the paper.A third element was the strong 
statalism which constituted the political culture of the country at least till the end of seventies.The fourth 
factor spread by the political communist culture was given by the egualitarianism. It assumed a relevant 
role at the organizing and structural level concerning the burocratic machinery; the values connected to it 
not always produced good results in efficiency, in resources optimization and productivity.
Gli studi e le ricerche sulla cultura politica italiana iniziarono dal Secondo 
Dopoguerra inoltrato, e diedero vita ad un intenso filone che conobbe inter-
venti importanti, a cominciare, inizialmente, dalla politologia statunitense, 
dotata allora di mezzi e risorse facili da reperire oltreoceano, molto più dif-
ficili in un Paese in ricostruzione come il nostro. L’Italia suscitava l’interesse 
di molti addetti ai lavori americani, sia perché alcuni di loro erano già stati 
una quindicina d’anni prima nel nostro paese, in quel’occasione con elmetto 
e fucile, ed avevano avuto modo di scoprire un popolo che aveva certamente 
destato la loro curiosità di futuri scienziati sociali, sia in quanto era una na-
zione che stava vivendo un processo di (ri)democratizzazione dopo un perio-
do contrassegnato dall’oscuramento dei diritti politici e di alcuni importanti 
diritti civili.
È per questo che le misure alla nostra cultura politica vennero prese con 
un metro che se si era dimostrato adatto al sistema politico americano, mal 
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si attagliava ad una tradizione politica come la nostra, che infatti Almond e 
Verba non esitarono a definire “suddita”, almeno in ampie sue parti (Almond 
e Verba 1963). Già ben prima di loro, del resto, un altro statunitense, Edward 
Banfield (Banfield 1958), aveva, come noto, parlato di familismo amorale per 
descrivere la cultura politica del Mezzogiorno d’Italia.
Quelle analisi ebbero, certo, il merito di aver messo bene in luce quanti 
e quali aspetti della cultura politica italiana risentissero di arretratezze, di 
scarsi valori civici, oltre che del retaggio del fascismo, con la sua concezione 
della partecipazione intesa come mobilitazione dall’alto, piuttosto che come 
impegno spontaneo dei cittadini. Tuttavia, esse non presero nella giusta con-
siderazione il fatto che in Italia la cultura politica e la partecipazione, sebbene 
si attestassero su livelli che, se comparati ai parametri statunitensi, erano in 
effetti più bassi (nei cosiddetti “repertori” della partecipazione politica, come 
prender parte ad una manifestazione, apporre la propria firma per una peti-
zione, etc., eravamo in effetti agli ultimi posti nelle nazioni prese in considera-
zione dalla ricerca di Almond e Verba), sebbene ciò, dicevamo, gli italiani non 
potevano affatto essere definiti un popolo che non partecipasse politicamente, 
tutt’altro. 
Perché dunque emerse questa sfasatura tra la “fotografia” scattata dagli 
americani e una realtà ben più complessa e articolata? In cosa quelle ricerche 
erano state lacunose? Ciò avvenne in quanto, mentre negli USA lo spazio 
dedicato all’analisi della partecipazione nei partiti politici era piuttosto cir-
coscritto (e ciò non a caso: è ben noto quanto in quella tradizione politica i 
partiti assumano un ruolo defilato rispetto ad altre agenzie e istituzioni, e ri-
spetto alla stessa cultura civica diffusa nella popolazione americana), in Italia, 
pensare di affrontare ricerche sistematiche sulla partecipazione senza porre 
al centro dell’analisi i partiti, specie in quel periodo, significava omettere dai 
risultati un aspetto fondamentale del fenomeno nel nostro paese.
I partiti italiani, e ancor più i partiti di massa, come meglio si vedrà nel 
corso del presente saggio, costituivano l’alfa e l’omega del processo politico, a 
qualunque livello esso venisse considerato: dalla formazione dei governi sino 
all’organizzazione della raccolta di firme nel più piccolo e sperduto dei paesi.
Tali aspetti vennero invece colti e messi in evidenza nelle ricerche di stu-
diosi italiani quali Alessandro Pizzorno, Vincenzo Capecchi, Agopik Ma-
noukian, Francesco Alberoni, Giacomo Sani, Giorgio Galli, alcuni di loro 
raccolti intorno alle collane editoriali di ricerche sulla cultura politica italiana 
che la casa editrice il Mulino editava in collaborazione con l’Istituto  Carlo 
Cattaneo. 
Proprio in quanto attorno ai partiti ruotavano gran parte delle dinami-
che legate alla partecipazione politica e della stessa cultura politica del paese, 
potrà essere utile precisare che alla definizione di cultura politica a suo tem-
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po data da Almond e Verba ( «L’insieme degli atteggiamenti e orientamenti 
cognitivi, affettivi e valutativi dei membri di un sistema politico nei confronti 
della politica») (Almond e Verba 1963), per il caso in specie, quello italiano, 
occorre aggiungere che tali orientamenti e atteggiamenti risentivano ampia-
mente e in maniera determinante delle culture politiche dei partiti. Queste 
ultime, come noto, discendevano a loro volta, in modo più o meno aperto e 
marcato, da ideologie politiche. Questo, almeno, valeva certamente per i par-
titi della sinistra, e dunque anche per il Pci. 
In particolare, scorrendo i tanti testi, documenti, ricerche storiche e so-
ciologiche prodotti in Italia nel periodo che va dal Secondo Dopoguerra agli 
anni Settanta, si incontrano spesso, nella denominazione della cultura politi-
ca della sinistra italiana, le espressioni “cultura o subcultura politica rossa”, o 
“socialista”, o “social-comunista”, o, infine, “comunista” tout-court.
Ciascuna di esse ha un suo specifico significato, dal valore anche politico e 
non solo puramente sociologico, e non può essere confusa o sovrapposta con 
le altre. Non è compito in questa sede dare conto delle diverse accezioni dei 
termini. Dobbiamo soltanto precisare che intenderemo qui con l’espressione 
“cultura politica comunista” riferirci a quella particolare esperienza politica 
che raccolse milioni di iscritti intorno al Partito comunista italiano nel perio-
do che va dal 25 luglio 1943, data della caduta del regime fascista in Italia, al 
febbraio 1991, quando nel suo XX congresso il Pci fu sciolto per dare vita al 
Partito democratico della sinistra.
Ebbene, avendo il Partito comunista esercitato, a partire dal 18 aprile 1948 
– data delle prime elezioni politiche nella storia repubblicana, nelle quali esso 
superò in consensi l’altro grande partito di massa della sinistra, il Psi – una 
indubbia e riconosciuta egemonia politica e culturale su tutta la sinistra, al-
meno sino alla fine degli anni Ottanta, l’analisi e lo studio della cultura poli-
tica comunista in Italia diventano decisivi per comprendere parte importante 
e significativa non solo della cultura politica di sinistra in Italia, ma anche, 
vista l’influenza politica del Pci sulle dinamiche di funzionamento dell’intero 
sistema politico, su quella che si sarebbe nel tempo configurata come la cul-
tura politica della Prima Repubblica. Con ciò intendendo non solo la cultura 
delle classi politiche, ma, estensivamente, e secondo la definizione classica 
datane da Gabriel Almond e Sidney Verba (Almond, Verba 1963), quella di 
una parte significativa della cittadinanza italiana.
Procederemo, a tal fine, seguendo un percorso esplicativo che sarà suddi-
viso in due parti: nella prima cercheremo di tratteggiare i “caratteri origina-
ri” della cultura politica comunista in Italia a partire dal Dopoguerra sino 
alla fine degli anni Ottanta; nella seconda parte andremo ad evidenziare le 
ricadute e gli effetti più visibili e profondi che tale cultura sortì nel più ampio 
panorama della cultura politica italiana.
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1. La cultura politica comunista in Italia
Con la creazione del “Partito nuovo”, dopo la prima esperienza del Partito 
Comunista di Gramsci e Bordiga fondato a Livorno nel 1921, terminata con 
lo scioglimento del partito per mezzo delle leggi “fascistissime” del 1926, Pal-
miro Togliatti riuscì, in poco tempo dopo la caduta del regime fascista nel 
1943 e dopo l’uscita dalla clandestinità del partito, a ricostruire una forza po-
litica in grado di arrivare a competere in poco tempo con i principali partiti di 
massa organizzati territorialmente in Italia, e di porsi addirittura l’obiettivo 
di governare il Paese (Spriano 1978).
Questa operazione, di cui Togliatti e il gruppo dirigente attorno a lui furono 
gli artefici, fu l’ esito di una visione e di una strategia politica poggianti su un re-
troterra politico-culturale che il leader comunista seppe sapientemente utilizza-
re, ottimizzare e coniugare con le mutate condizioni del dopoguerra, sì da farne 
un unicum, sotto il profilo organizzativo e culturale, nel panorama dei partiti 
comunisti occidentali. Il risultato fu la creazione del più grande e politicamente 
forte partito comunista presente nel panorama delle democrazie europee.
In cosa consistette, dunque, il valore aggiunto che il leader del Pci seppe 
conferire alla rinata organizzazione? Possiamo sinteticamente riassumere la 
valenza di tale operazione nell’aver impiantato, su di una piattaforma politica 
di stampo marxista-leninista, il portato della teoria gramsciana sia sotto il 
profilo organizzativo che sotto quello politico-culturale.
Così, sulla tradizione marxista-leninista, che concepiva il partito ideolo-
gicamente proiettato verso la dittatura del proletariato (Marx) e organizzato 
secondo criteri di tipo quasi militare (Lenin), tradizione che fu comunque ben 
presente per tutto il corso dell’esistenza del Pci (Fisichella 1979: 44) – ancora 
nel 1979, gioverà ricordarlo, Enrico Berlinguer rivendicava il legame del par-
tito con le sue radici leniniste (Salvadori 1999: 176; Aa. Vv. 1985: 7) –, venne 
innestato quel formidabile strumento di controllo, di direzione politica e di 
conquista di una società già industrializzata, che fu il concetto gramsciano di 
“egemonia”, sul quale torneremo più approfonditamente a breve.
Il fine ultimo della lotta politica dei comunisti non può non essere quello di 
costruire una società dalla quale il male sia finalmente e definitivamente estir-
pato. Se in Marx questo concetto, pur presente, faceva però quasi da sfondo al 
ben più centrale elemento della violenza levatrice della storia, e dunque della 
lotta per la conquista del potere, in Gramsci si direbbe che i due elementi sono 
quasi ribaltati in ordine di importanza: l’obiettivo della costruzione dell’Uo-
mo Nuovo e della Società perfetta è talmente importante da imporre strategie 
di conquista politica della società che non necessariamente devono seguire i 
dettami dell’ortodossia marxista.
Siamo in presenza, come osserva Luciano Pellicani, di un impianto ide-
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ologico-dottrinario che altro non è che «uno spiritualismo mascherato, più 
precisamente una versione secolarizzata del messianismo giudaico-cristiano» 
(Pellicani 1990: 24). Da qui una concezione del mondo che, ponendosi in to-
tale antitesi con la realtà esistente, assumeva inevitabilmente tratti di intolle-
ranza. E l’intolleranza nei confronti di qualunque altra forza politica che non 
fosse il proprio partito fu infatti uno dei tratti più tipici del militante comuni-
sta italiano. Basti solo ricordare che i pur alleati e compagni di strada socia-
listi venivano non raramente apostrofati con l’appellativo di “social-fascisti”, 
a volerne stigmatizzare la non integrale, piena e incondizionata adesione fi-
deistica al credo dell’obiettivo finale della Rivoluzione e al modello sovietico 
come riferimento imprescindibile per qualunque progetto politico almeno di 
medio-lungo periodo.
Per raggiungere l’obiettivo della edificazione della società perfetta, essen-
ziale è poter assurgere, da parte della classe proletaria, al rango di classe diri-
gente (Gramsci aveva certamente letto e studiato i classici italiani della teoria 
delle élites: Mosca, Pareto, Michels). Tale ascesa 
non è concepita come una affermazione meramente economica – come av-
viene nel materialismo storico – bensì come una espansione etico-politica di 
un gruppo sociale che, grazie alla sua superiorità intellettuale e morale, sente 
di avere il diritto e le energie per dirigere tutta quanta la società. Il potere di 
una classe dominante, pertanto, più che derivare dal controllo degli apparati 
coercitivi – controllo che presuppone sempre un minimo di consenso: almeno 
quello degli armati – e dal possesso dei mezzi di produzione, deriva dalle sue 
capacità dirigenti, quindi dalle élites creative che è in grado di produrre nel suo 
seno (Pellicani 1990: 38).
L’originalità del concetto di egemonia in Gramsci consiste quindi nell’a-
ver concepito una strategia che non contempla più la violenza come «centro 
di gravità» della propria azione, e che esalta invece tutto ciò che è legato, 
direttamente o indirettamente, all’aspetto etico-culturale della conquista del 
potere. Dalla «guerra di movimento» si passa quindi alla guerra di posizio-
ne» finalizzata alla conquista non violenta delle strutture sociali, culturali, 
educative, comunicative, con le quali si procederà successivamente all’opera 
di indottrinamento di settori sempre più vasti della popolazione, sino alla loro 
totale egemonizzazione.
1.2 La “doppiezza” comunista
Come detto, il fine ultimo della lotta politica dei comunisti è quello di costru-
ire una società liberata dalle impurità storicamente affermatesi con la civiltà, 
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e imputabili in massima parte all’avvento della proprietà privata, del mercato 
e, in ultima, del modo di produzione capitalistico.
L’apporto originale del leninismo, rispetto al tradizionale lascito politico 
di Marx, è stato quello di aver concepito l’organizzazione del partito comu-
nista esattamente in funzione del raggiungimento di questo obiettivo, che, 
come si è visto sopra, aveva in sé un chiaro contenuto messianico. Il partito 
doveva quindi strutturarsi sulla base di veri e propri principi militari (non si 
dimentichi che, nel Partito bolscevico durante la Rivoluzione d’Ottobre, i più 
importanti leader politici ricoprivano spesso anche ruoli militari strategici), 
ovviamente non per l’offesa fisica (sebbene tale eventualità non fosse del tutto 
esclusa, in caso di momenti rivoluzionari o di guerra civile), ma politica. 
Un «partito-caserma», dunque (Zaslavsky 2004: 47 ss.), ma anche un 
«partito-chiesa» (Pellicani 1990: 138-141). Così aveva insegnato Vladimir 
Il’ič Ul’janov, al secolo Lenin. Caserma, per essere sempre e in ogni istante 
nelle condizioni di applicare con la massima efficacia e rapidità gli ordini 
provenienti dall’élite degli intellettuali illuminati dalla vera scienza, ovvero 
il socialismo (scientifico, appunto). Chiesa, innanzitutto per l’aspirazione in-
ternazionalistica o, meglio ancora, universalistica del messaggio di cui erano 
portatori i comunisti; in secondo luogo in quanto il messianismo di cui tale 
messaggio era impregnato non poteva non tradursi in un credo, che come tutti 
i credo necessitava di un preciso luogo di culto, il partito per l’appunto.
Essendo l’obiettivo finale quello più sopra ricordato, esso non poteva non 
essere proiettato in avanti, e i tempi per la sua realizzazione non si potevano 
in alcun modo prevedere con esattezza né tantomeno fissare preventivamente. 
Si trattava quindi di mantenere viva la tensione messianica tra i militanti, e 
in effetti è probabilmente proprio grazie alla traduzione in termini messianici 
del messaggio comunista che si riuscì a radicare quest’ultimo così stabilmente 
nell’animo delle masse proletarie malgrado la sua non immediata possibilità 
di realizzazione. 
E tuttavia, il partito non poteva sottrarsi all’esigenza di adeguare alla con-
tingenza della quotidianità la propria condotta politica, fatta di inevitabili va-
lutazioni di opportunità, di analisi costi-benefici, di accordi e patteggiamenti 
con possibili alleati e “compagni di strada”, come allora li si chiamava;  in una 
parola, di ricorrere al compromesso e dunque alla tattica politica, mentre la 
strategia di lungo periodo, come detto, restava fissata indefinitamente. 
Ciò imponeva ai gruppi dirigenti di saper costantemente mantenere la capa-
cità di non perdere di vista l’obiettivo finale, per lo meno in termini ideologici, 
e di impostare tattiche politiche che, nel breve o medio periodo, non necessa-
riamente potevano o dovevano coincidere con tale obiettivo (Fisichella 1979).
Oltre a ciò, nel caso del Partito comunista italiano il concetto di egemonia 
gramscianamente inteso significò, per i motivi che abbiamo visto, una ben 
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maggiore disinvoltura da parte dei gruppi dirigenti. Ciò anche in conseguen-
za dello scenario politico completamente diverso, rispetto a quello sovietico, 
nel quale i comunisti italiani si trovavano ad agire, essendo esso collocato 
nell’ambito di un regime democratico, e dunque avendo il partito come scopo 
primario la ricerca del consenso elettorale. Ciò portò il «nobile destriero», 
come Togliatti ebbe a definire la creatura da lui rifondata dopo il crollo del 
fascismo, ad adottare stili e condotte politiche che certo non si sarebbero a 
prima vista immediatamente attribuite ad una dottrina politica di tradizione 
marxista-leninista. Si era portati cioè a recepire tatticamente elementi valo-
riali tipici di altre classi sociali, per inglobare anche il loro elettorato tra le 
proprie schiere. 
Ecco dunque che, alla fine, quasi tutto si riduceva a tattica, senza però 
abiurare i principi di fondo del proprio credo, ai quali anzi il gruppo dirigente 
manteneva saldamente ancorato il partito proprio per garantire compattezza 
ad un’organizzazione di militanti che altrimenti si sarebbe trovata in una con-
dizione di disorientamento. 
Il “contrordine compagni” si spiegava quindi sia nel quadro di un’azione po-
litica che poteva di volta in volta rivedere e aggiornare le proprie tattiche di 
lotta e di competizione, sia, non secondariamente, anche perché si trattava 
di giustificare una continua re-interpretazione (senza tuttavia metterla mai 
in discussione dalle fondamenta, ma anzi continuando a legittimarla) della 
dottrina originaria alla luce delle nuove esigenze politiche di breve e medio 
periodo.
Last but not least, la condizione di oggettiva “doppiezza” dei comunisti ita-
liani era dovuta al rapporto tra il Pci e la lealtà alla democrazia e alle sue isti-
tuzioni in Italia, da una parte, e dall’altra alla lealtà nei confronti dell’Unione 
Sovietica e al suo modello di organizzazione politica, economica e sociale.
1.3 La visione polemica della storia e la sfiducia nelle istituzioni 
liberaldemocratiche 
Sotto qualunque lente, sotto qualunque prospettiva lo si voglia considerare, 
tale tipo di organizzazione aveva come conseguenza un fatto certo: la com-
pleta e totale subordinazione al partito da parte del militante comunista. Il 
partito, per l’appunto, esercitava su di lui  la stessa influenza che una chiesa 
ha sui suoi fedeli, e poteva far valere i propri ordini con la prontezza e la velo-
cità con cui un soldato esegue quelli di un superiore. Sicché, il partito, guida 
politica e morale delle masse, non poteva che assumere una conformazione 
di tipo centralistico, monolitica diremmo. Anche perché, ci ricorda sempre 
Pellicani, «il partito non aveva solo una funzione meramente politica, ma, in 
base a quanto teorizzato da Gramsci circa il concetto di egemonia, anche un 
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ruolo etico-pedagogico sulle masse: egli affermava infatti che “ogni rapporto 
egemonico è necessariamente un rapporto pedagogico”» (Pellicani 1990: 30).
Una simile impostazione era anche conseguenza della cosiddetta “visione 
polemica della storia”. L’atteggiamento del militante comunista verso il mon-
do che lo circonda è come verso una realtà che dovrà essere e sarà necessa-
riamente superata da una nuova realtà, più giusta e più umana. Come dire: 
“siamo in questo mondo, ma non siamo di questo mondo”. Anche qui, come 
si vede, una chiara attinenza con una dimensione sacro-religiosa.
Si aveva cioè una considerazione dell’organizzazione sociale in cui si vi-
veva ed operava, sotto un profilo economico, politico e culturale, che era co-
munque quella di una cultura “altra”. Se ne potevano esaltare o sminuire 
questa o quella dimensione, a seconda della maggiore o minore attinenza di 
quest’ultima con la gerarchia di valori tipica della cultura politica comuni-
sta. Ad esempio, tutto ciò che atteneva all’eguaglianza, nell’organizzazione 
sociale, veniva ovviamente tenuto in gran conto, e difeso con grande tenacia 
e passione. Sorte non altrettanto simile toccava a quegli elementi, valoriali o 
direttamente organizzativi, orientati alla differenziazione, alla selezione, alla 
scelta di taluni rispetto ad altri secondo criteri non ritenuti consoni al princi-
pio del “da ciascuno secondo le proprie capacità a ciascuno secondo i propri 
bisogni”, come recitava il principio marxista.
Una delle conseguenze più significative di tutto ciò era che mentre il con-
cetto e il principio di “democrazia”, genericamente inteso, raccoglieva con-
sensi generosi e convinti, diverso si faceva il discorso qualora si scendesse un 
po’ più nel dettaglio e nello specifico, cioè nella democrazia come “concet-
to” più che come “principio”. E nel dettaglio era impossibile non scendere 
qualora si trattasse di dare delle valutazioni non sulla “democrazia” in senso 
lato, ma sulle istituzioni democratiche e, ancor più, sulle istituzioni liberalde-
mocratiche alle quali, sebbene in forme ancora “primitive” rispetto alle più 
avanzate democrazie anglosassoni, la Costituzione del ’46 aveva comunque 
dato vita. Ciò, beninteso, non significava una aperta critica al sistema politico 
come fu concepito dai costituenti (tra i quali un ruolo decisivo ebbero, come si 
sa, gli stessi comunisti), quanto una sostanziale, di fatto anche se non dichia-
rata, subordinazione, in ordine di importanza e di priorità, delle istituzioni 
liberaldemocratiche al partito.
Nel concreto, da ciò discendeva: a) scarsa fiducia o apatia verso i valori e 
la cultura politica liberaldemocratica; b) scarsa fiducia o apatia verso le istitu-
zioni liberaldemocratiche; c) poca (anche se non necessariamente in contrap-
posizione) identificazione con la storia politica nazionale.
In merito al punto b), va comunque precisato che, dopo l’ 89, il lento ma 
costante percorso di adeguamento del neonato Pds al nuovo contesto politico-
culturale venutosi a formare con la Seconda Repubblica, ha fatto sì che la 
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nuova dirigenza del Partito, a cominciare dal Segretario succeduto a Occhet-
to, Massimo D’Alema, si avvicinasse con sempre maggiore convinzione ai 
principi fondamentali che sottostanno alle moderne liberaldemocrazie.
Le istituzioni democratiche non venivano quindi considerate come un 
valore in sé stesse, in quanto tali, ma solo come strumenti utili al raggiun-
gimento dell’«egemonia». Esse erano considerate utili e degne di rispetto se 
permettevano di realizzare attraverso di esse gli obiettivi politici che il partito 
si dava. Erano invece “fasciste”, “borghesi”, “antidemocratiche” se ciò non 
garantivano.
Come meglio vedremo più avanti, in ciò risiede uno dei principali fattori 
che hanno contribuito a conferire alla Prima Repubblica e alla sua cultu-
ra politica quella tipica condizione per la quale i partiti hanno sempre as-
sunto una indiscussa posizione di primato politico rispetto alle istituzioni 
(Millefiorini 1996: 82). Ma su questo nodo problematico torneremo anche 
successivamente.
Stessa e identica sorte, del resto, toccava all’insieme dei valori laici e bor-
ghesi, da sempre considerati e trattati con sufficienza dalla cultura politica 
comunista. Non si spiegherebbe diversamente, altrimenti, la disinvoltura con 
la quale Togliatti liquidò, nell’Assemblea Costituente, le proposte provenienti 
dai partiti laici di superare i Patti Lateranensi, richiamati nell’articolo 7 della 
Costituzione, votato per l’appunto da Dc e Pci. Né si spiegherebbe come mai, 
durante la fase in cui negli anni Settanta i partiti laici conducevano storiche 
battaglie per la conquista di diritti civili elementari, come il divorzio o l’abor-
to, i comunisti abbiano sempre mostrato una certa neghittosità a mobilitarsi 
convintamente e tantomeno a prenderne in prima persona l’iniziativa politi-
ca. Ma anche su questo torneremo meglio più avanti.
1.4 Cultura politica comunista e sentimento patriottico
Un’ulteriore e più approfondita considerazione da farsi riguarda il punto c), 
indicato poco sopra nel precedente paragrafo. Su questo aspetto vi è da dire 
che la cultura politica comunista, per lo meno quella rintracciabile nelle di-
chiarazioni e nelle condotte adottate dopo il periodo della Resistenza, a partire 
dall’insediamento nelle istituzioni repubblicane, è sempre stata caratterizzata 
da un patriottismo che, a prima vista, poteva sembrare piuttosto tiepido nel 
suo lessico, e ridotto a spazi angusti nel suo universo valoriale. Si è a volte 
parlato di spirito “a-patriottico” presente in quella cultura politica.
Tuttavia, le cose non stanno esattamente in questo modo e meritano una 
più approfondita analisi. In realtà, sebbene già durante la Resistenza i comu-
nisti si ponessero su posizioni di netta e marcata differenza, rispetto a tutte 
le altre forze politiche che insieme a loro combatterono la Guerra di Libe-
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razione, quanto all’idea e alla visione futura che essi avevano del Paese che 
avrebbero voluto edificare una volta avuto ragione dell’occupante e delle forze 
fasciste che ancora combattevano per la “loro” idea di Patria (Galli della Log-
gia 1996), sebbene ciò, dicevamo, questo non significa che anche i comunisti 
non avessero, appunto, una loro idea di Patria, e che per tale idea non abbiano 
combattuto talvolta anche eroicamente nella Guerra di Liberazione. Fu lo 
stesso Togliatti, del resto, che si fece carico dopo la fine della Guerra di fare 
da intermediario con Mosca per risolvere la questione di Trieste, e, va detto, a 
lui molto si deve se la questione fu infine risolta a vantaggio dell’Italia.
Il punto non è questo. Da nessuna ricerca effettuata nel nostro Paese negli 
anni del Dopoguerra, né da quelle dell’Istituto Cattaneo, né dai tanti studi 
effettuati in quel periodo da ricercatori americani è mai risultato che al mi-
litante comunista difettassero sentimenti di attaccamento al proprio Paese. 
Ciò che invece va specificato è un altro aspetto. Come abbiamo spiegato, 
nella concezione che i comunisti avevano delle istituzioni democratiche, tutto 
ciò che in qualche modo potesse ostacolare, rallentare o deviare dalle proprie 
prospettive politiche di breve o lungo periodo, veniva molto semplicemente 
liquidato come “fascista”. Così, fascisti erano quei socialisti che si definivano 
“riformisti”, fascisti erano i socialdemocratici, fascisti tutti i partiti di centro-
destra, non soltanto ovviamente i missini (i quali non disdegnavano affatto 
l’epiteto), ma anche i liberali, i monarchici, gli elettori dell’Uomo qualunque. Fa-
scisti i prefetti che opponessero dinieghi a richieste di sorta, fascisti gli intellet-
tuali che si permettessero di muovere critiche alla visione ed alla concezione 
comunista della società, fascisti i presidi che non dessero il benestare a inizia-
tive di assemblee promosse in orari o luoghi non consentiti, fascisti gli ispettori 
del lavoro che non si limitassero a far osservare agli imprenditori i (sacrosanti) 
diritti dei lavoratori, ma che adissero altresì elevare sanzioni a lavoratori non 
in regola con mansioni o tempi di lavoro, fasciste le forze dell’ordine che impe-
dissero occupazioni contadine di terre avallate e spalleggiate dal Pci.
Oltre a ciò, nella mentalità comunista tutto ciò che direttamente o indiret-
tamente fosse riconducibile al lascito e all’eredità storica e politica del Venten-
nio veniva immediatamente bollato come retaggio fascista, e dunque espunto 
senza appello da qualunque possibilità di considerazione sotto un’altra luce, 
sotto una diversa prospettiva. Ciò è per l’appunto quanto toccò in sorte al con-
cetto di patriottismo1, associato e confuso con quello, in realtà completamente 
diverso, di nazionalismo, uscito, quest’ultimo sì, con le ossa definitivamente 
rotte dall’esperienza dell’avventura bellica mussoliniana (Rosati 2000). 
1 Sul concetto di patriottismo si veda  M. Rosati, Il patriottismo degli italiani. Culture politiche e identità 
nazionali, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2000.
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C’era infine, cosa non da poco, la questione del legame con l’altra Patria, 
quella del comunismo, cioè l’Unione Sovietica. I sentimenti di ammirazione 
verso il modello sovietico erano forse ancor più forti tra i militanti che non tra 
i dirigenti del partito. Questi ultimi, recandosi spesso in quel Paese, avevano 
sin dagli anni Cinquanta preso l’abitudine, una volta rientrati in Italia, di 
elogiarne pubblicamente le virtù e di lamentarne privatamente le storture e 
le inadeguatezze. Sino ai primi anni Ottanta, dalle ricerche effettuate sugli 
iscritti al Pci emergeva che più del 50% di essi riteneva il modello sovietico 
superiore, per efficienza produttiva e per capacità di erogare diritti, alle de-
mocrazie occidentali.
Stando così le cose, non può sorprendere che, ad esempio in materia di 
deterrenti missilistici, il Pci e i suoi aderenti abbiano sempre contestato aper-
tamente, e con grandi manifestazioni,  le testate Nato sistemate in Italia (allo 
scopo di difendere il nostro Paese e l’Europa), mentre nulla era dato sapere cir-
ca i giudizi politici di quel partito sui missili sovietici puntati anche sull’Italia.
In realtà, simili atteggiamenti si spiegano, più che attraverso il (supposto, 
ma, come abbiamo visto, del tutto assente) sentimento a-patriottico, grazie ad 
un altro elemento, questo sì tipico e fortemente caratterizzante la cultura politi-
ca comunista durante tutta la Prima Repubblica, che è stato il forte e marcato 
antiamericanismo (Teodori 2002). L’antiamericanismo veniva declinato e ma-
nifestato in diversi modi, quasi tutti aventi precisi obiettivi politici e propagan-
distici, si trattasse dell’intervento in Vietnam piuttosto che la questione della 
cortina di ferro, o delle testate nucleari. Anche qui emerge quella “doppiezza” 
spesso ravvisabile nelle condotte dei comunisti italiani, nel senso che se da un 
lato si denunciava il modello istituzionale ed economico americano, dall’altro 
non si rinunciava, da parte di militanti, iscritti o simpatizzanti, a seguirne stili 
di vita e di consumo, nonché alcuni precisi valori culturali, spesso rappresenta-
ti nel cinema americano, del quale i comunisti italiani sono stati probabilmente 
tra i più  voraci consumatori ed estimatori, per non parlare dei tanti riferimenti 
agli autori della letteratura americana amati da Cesare Pavese, Italo Calvino e 
diversi altri intellettuali più o meno vicini all’area comunista.
1.5  La “diversità” comunista e le sue conseguenze
Se consideriamo l’insieme degli elementi evidenziati sino a questo punto della 
nostra analisi, non sarà difficile comprendere perché si sia parlato di “di-
versità” comunista, e come mai fossero gli stessi comunisti a ricorrere spesso 
all’espressione “siamo uguali ma siamo diversi”, espressione che rimase cara 
ai militanti e iscritti al partito sino ad almeno tutti gli anni Ottanta: talmente 
cara da essere stata immortalata nella scena del noto film “Palombella Rossa” 
del regista Nanni Moretti.
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La diversità comunista aveva un doppio risvolto: da un lato essa traeva la 
sua ragion d’essere dalla effettiva distanza che separava la cultura politica co-
munista da quella del resto di coloro che erano direttamente o indirettamente 
coinvolti in processi di partecipazione politica. Dall’altro, come già abbiamo 
avuto modo di sottolineare, essa aveva bisogno però di essere continuamente 
rimarcata dall’organizzazione e dai vertici del partito, pena il suo progressivo 
affievolimento e la sua inevitabile diluizione nel corpo di una società che dete-
neva ben altra capacità di forgiare e plasmare i valori e i modelli d’azione e di 
comportamento di chiunque avesse un minimo di familiarità con i beni, mate-
riali e immateriali, che essa dispensava copiosamente per tutti i suoi membri. 
È per questo motivo che il Pci si premurò di innalzare dei robusti steccati 
intorno al terreno politico solcato dai suoi appartenenti. Lo fece attraverso 
quello che Giovanni Sartori ha chiamato l’ «incapsulamento organizzativo» 
di iscritti e militanti (Sartori 1982). Trattandosi di un partito anti-sistema, 
altra nota espressione e definizione di Sartori (Sartori 1976), esso ricorreva, 
a tal fine, a strumenti ideologico-propagandistici come l’auto-attribuzione di 
una sorta di superiorità morale rispetto agli avversari politici, o il loro scre-
ditamento, oppure il voluto innalzamento del livello dello scontro, laddove 
la tattica politica lo rendesse opportuno o necessario. Era, questa, una prassi 
del resto tipica di tutto il movimento comunista, a qualunque latitudine e in 
qualunque periodo. Nel caso italiano, si pensi, per non fare che un esempio, 
a come il partito giunse alla decisione di promuovere il referendum per l’abo-
lizione del Decreto del governo Craxi che aboliva la scala mobile, nel 1985: 
in quel caso, sebbene molti dirigenti del partito, e della stessa Cgil, fossero 
sinceramente convinti della non utilità del ritorno alla scala mobile per le ta-
sche degli operai, si decise comunque per il referendum in quanto occorreva 
rimarcare la propria differenza e quindi la propria posizione conflittuale nei 
confronti di un Governo, e soprattutto del suo leader, socialista, che stava ra-
pidamente cambiando la “grammatica politica” della sinistra italiana.
Questa caratteristica così marcata della cultura politica comunista creò le 
condizioni affinché quello che più sopra abbiamo indicato come l’eccesso di 
“tatticismo” del Pci – ossia la continua rincorsa rispetto ai cambiamenti che 
avvenivano nella società, per non perdere il contatto con un elettorato sempre 
più di ceto medio, ritenuto giustamente strategico per il rafforzamento delle 
proprie posizioni – si dispiegasse dovendo però fare i conti con un fardello 
piuttosto pesante, costituito appunto dalla “diversità” comunista. 
Quando Togliatti affermava che, per conquistare i nuovi ceti, il Pci doveva 
«aderire a tutte le pieghe» della società, in fondo non faceva altro che riba-
dire, in forma di dettato ufficiale, quella politica che, lo abbiamo visto, era 
diretta conseguenza dell’impianto ideologico gramsciano, legato al concetto 
di egemonia e di conquista culturale della società, prima ancora che politica.
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Ma «aderire a tutte le pieghe della società» imponeva al partito una sorta 
di rincorsa ai cambiamenti sociali e culturali in atto, che arrivava però sem-
pre in ritardo rispetto alle svolte chiare, in termini politici e culturali, che si 
rendevano necessarie da parte del partito. E ciò proprio a causa della posi-
zione di partenza che era, per l’appunto, di “diversità” rispetto alla cultura 
prevalente. Ciò imponeva quindi tempi, energie e risorse aggiuntive al partito 
per adeguarsi e per metabolizzare i cambiamenti; tempi e risorse aggiuntive 
rispetto a quanto non occorresse invece ad altri partiti, a cominciare dal Psi, 
più flessibili e aperti, in quanto non gravati dal retroterra ideologico della 
“diversità”. 
Sicché, la storia del Pci può essere anche definita come una storia di ritar-
di e di appuntamenti mancati. Il Pci si è sempre trovato in ritardo, quando 
cioè i tempi politici erano ormai proiettati su altre priorità, su nuove agende 
politiche. Bastino qui, per tutti, gli esempi della tardiva presa d’atto dell’erro-
re dell’invasione sovietica dell’Ungheria, o dell’accodarsi del Pci all’iniziativa 
politica dei partiti laici in materia di diritti civili come il divorzio e l’aborto, 
o, infine, il cambio del nome del Partito avvenuto dopo il crollo del Muro di 
Berlino. 
Infine, «aderire a tutte le pieghe» significava anche assecondare, cercando 
di controllarli dall’esterno, tutti quei movimenti che nascevano da forme di 
lotta, di contestazione, di dissenso (Della Porta 1996; Della Porta e Rucht 
1992). Ciò lo si vide chiaramente durante la stagione politica iniziata con il 
Sessantotto, e proseguita poi lungo tutto il corso degli anni Settanta. In questo 
caso, inoltre, si trattava altresì di mettere in pratica un antico insegnamento 
della dottrina politica leninista, per il quale i comunisti non dovevano avere 
“Nessun nemico a sinistra”. Qual era la ratio che animava tale prassi? Si trattava 
di evitare di avere rivali sul fianco sinistro per soddisfare due necessità: la 
prima, di carattere organizzativo, era quella, già vista, di avere un controllo 
ferreo sui militanti, evitando “concorrenti” che rendessero più appetibile per 
gli stessi militanti, in un’epoca di forte ideologizzazione, la propria offerta 
politica rispetto a quella del Partito; la seconda ragione, di carattere elettora-
le, era diretta conseguenza della prima: non scoprirsi sul fianco sinistro, ma 
anzi presidiare stabilmente tutto il campo alla propria sinistra, rendeva più 
semplice il lavoro di conquista elettorale del centro politico, cosa che, anche 
questo lo si è visto, era essenziale per un partito che oltretutto operava e agi-
va in un contesto democratico (Tarrow 1976). Diversamente, le energie e le 
risorse disponibili si sarebbe dovuto mobilitarle per contendere ad altri quegli 
spazi, e la possibilità di espansione al centro sarebbe notevolmente diminuita. 
Si spiega così, ad esempio,  la colpevolizzazione del gruppo dei dissidenti da 
sinistra (Natoli, Rossanda, Pintor, Parlato, Castellina, Magri e altri) rispetto 
alla democrazia interna del Partito e rispetto alla linea ufficiale inizialmente 
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tenuta sull’invasione sovietica della Cecoslovacchia (alcuni di loro, espulsi dal 
partito, diedero vita nel 1969 alla rivista e poi al quotidiano  il manifesto), non-
ché l’accusa, rivolta loro dalla dirigenza del Pci, di tradimento e frazionismo.
2. Gli effetti sul sistema politico e sulla cultura politica del Paese
2.1 L’ideologizzazione dell’arena politica 
Se quelli che abbiamo qui elencato costituiscono dunque i tratti più tipici della 
cultura politica comunista nel corso di quella che va comunemente sotto il 
nome di “Prima Repubblica”, dobbiamo ora cercare di chiarire in che modo 
essa contribuì, insieme ovviamente alle altre principali culture politiche, a 
cominciare da quella cattolica rappresentata dalla Democrazia Cristiana, a 
delineare i caratteri di quella che è stata, complessivamente, la cultura politi-
ca del Paese (Pellicani 1979).
Abbiamo visto che uno degli aspetti più caratterizzanti il Pci fu la forte 
ideologizzazione sia del suo linguaggio politico che delle sue condotte.
Ciò ebbe l’effetto di far ricadere sulla stessa Dc, per conseguenza, la neces-
sità di difendersi dall’offensiva ideologica dell’avversario utilizzando anch’essa 
un armamentario e un lessico che rispondessero colpo su colpo alla strategia 
comunista, impostata, come sappiamo, sul concetto di egemonia culturale.
Lo si riscontrò del resto sin da subito, sin dalla campagna elettorale per le 
prime libere elezioni politiche dopo il Ventennio, quelle del 18 aprile 1948, 
quando la martellante azione dei comitati civici di Luigi Gedda, unita all’a-
zione capillare svolta dalla Chiesa, soprattutto nei confronti delle donne, portò 
alla schiacciante e storica vittoria della Dc nei confronti del Fronte popolare.
Dopo quell’evento, tuttavia, inizialmente il linguaggio politico democri-
stiano mantenne, secondo l’insegnamento degasperiano, un tono impronta-
to all’understatement (Scoppola 1977), se si eccettua il caso di padre Lombardi 
(Ginsborg 1989) soprannominato all’epoca “il microfono di Dio”, e il ruolo 
che questi ebbe in quella che va sotto il nome di “operazione Sturzo”. 
Dopo l’uscita di scena di De Gasperi – che non a caso avvenne in conse-
guenza di un altro, essenziale momento politico caratterizzato da forte ideo-
logizzazione, ossia il dibattito sulla legge elettorale, ribattezzata dai comunisti 
“legge truffa” –, fu con l’ascesa ai vertici della Dc dei nuovi dirigenti, a comin-
ciare da Amintore Fanfani, che il clima politico-culturale anche all’interno di 
quel partito virò decisamente verso l’utilizzo dello strumento ideologico.
Del resto, a partire dagli anni Sessanta, a Dc e Pci giovava premere sul 
tasto ideologico ai fini della polarizzazione del consenso. La forte ideologiz-
zazione del sistema politico italiano fu quindi il risultato di un gioco di tipo 
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“win-win”: vinci tu e vinco io se entrambi innalziamo il livello dello scontro 
politico. In ogni caso, non va dimenticato il fatto che a questo risultato si 
giunse in quanto la fonte principale di tale immissione di “residui” ideologici 
era appunto il Pci, che in qualche modo influenzava e condizionava, o nella 
stessa prospettiva ideologica (Psi), o in quella opposta (Dc, Pri, Pli, Msi) l’inte-
ro sistema partitico italiano. 
Quest’ultimo, dunque, si connotò sin da subito per un elevatissimo livello 
di ideologizzazione. Ciò significò, come ben si può comprendere, che l’intero 
discorso pubblico italiano, non solo quello nei e tra partiti, ma, per inevitabile 
conseguenza, quello nelle istituzioni rappresentative, quello tra i principali 
protagonisti per la negoziazione dell’agenda politica, quello sugli organi di 
stampa e in parti consistenti dell’intera opinione pubblica, si caratterizzasse 
per modalità di confronto, di discussione, di approccio ai problemi che poco 
si premuravano di andare al nocciolo delle questioni concrete, e molto invece 
di amplificare messaggi politicamente utili per rimarcare e definire confini, 
per inviare messaggi “in codice” all’avversario e, in generale, per catturare 
consensi.
Tutto questo ebbe conseguenze rilevantissime sulla capacità del sistema 
politico di saper approcciare, affrontare e gestire le diverse criticità e richieste 
di output, sotto forma di politiche pubbliche, che una società in rapida trasfor-
mazione continuamente poneva di fronte alla classe politica. Quella capacità 
si dimostrò infatti sempre al di sotto delle reali necessità del Paese.
2.2 Il primato dei partiti e lo svuotamento del valore e del significato delle 
istituzioni liberaldemocratiche
Durante tutto il periodo che va dal 25 luglio 1943 (caduta del fascismo) al 1 
gennaio 1948 (entrata in vigore della Costituzione), i partiti di massa occupa-
rono quegli spazi politici che in un regime già consolidato e legittimato deten-
gono le istituzioni. Il Pci svolse addirittura un ruolo di pacificatore sociale e 
di controllo dell’ordine pubblico, se pensiamo, ad esempio, a come esso gestì 
e governò il difficile, e pieno di tensioni, momento durante il quale in Sicilia 
e in altre zone del Paese i contadini presero ad occupare le terre dei grandi 
proprietari terrieri assenteisti. Esso aveva del resto già conquistato nel Paese 
una indiscussa e riconosciuta autorità grazie al suo impegno come attore di 
primo piano nella Guerra di Liberazione dal nazifascismo.
Sicché, dopo la caduta del regime mussoliniano, e con la nascita della Re-
pubblica, «le masse – scrive Giordano Sivini – furono integrate nei partiti 
prima ancora che nel nuovo Stato» (Sivini 1971: 102). Organizzatisi legal-
mente subito dopo il 25 luglio, i partiti italiani si trovarono immediatamente 
di fronte al problema della conquista del consenso di massa. Il suffragio uni-
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versale a uomini e donne spalancava nuovi ed enormi spazi politici. Spazi che 
in qualche modo dovevano essere riempiti. Pci e Dc non trovarono, in questo 
cammino di conquista della società italiana, molti e irti ostacoli. Istituzioni 
ancora in fasce, e una cultura politica nel Paese scarsamente avvezza alla gin-
nastica civica e democratica, facilitarono ancor più questo percorso. Se cioè i 
partiti riuscirono a porsi come architrave indispensabile per il nuovo sistema 
politico, lo dovettero al fatto che furono essi stessi gli architetti, i costruttori 
e i manutentori di quel sistema. Dopo il crollo del regime, infatti, i partiti 
di massa, a cominciare dal Pci, organizzatisi su tutto il territorio nazionale 
(Manoukian 1968; Bartolini 1976), furono le prime, e per un certo periodo le 
uniche, agenzie politiche dotate di una qualche legittimazione democratica.
Sin da subito fu quindi molto chiara, nel Paese, la percezione del ruolo 
primario dei partiti politici, e forte risultava altresì l’identificazione con essi 
e con la cultura politica di cui erano portatori. Nettissima, lo si è visto, era la 
contrapposizione tra le due principali sub-culture politiche, cattolica e comu-
nista. Alberto Spreafico e Joseph La Palombara parlavano in quegli anni di 
«cristallizzazione delle scelte», emergendo dalle loro ricerche che ben il 78% 
degli elettori aveva già deciso per chi votare alle successive consultazioni poli-
tiche (Spreafico e La Palombara 1963: 690). 
Va ribadito che una delle motivazioni principali di un così forte contra-
sto risiedeva nella forte ideologizzazione del dibattito politico. Fino agli anni 
Sessanta e Settanta le ideologie  tennero saldamente il campo nel sistema 
partitico italiano. Sicché, se Daniel Bell, sin dagli anni Sessanta, iniziava ad 
intravedere il declino delle ideologie in occidente (Bell 1962), nel 1969 Joseph 
La Palombara ammoniva che «la teoria del declino delle ideologie è semplice-
mente non valida per il caso italiano» (La Palombara1965: 71 ss.).
A ciò va aggiunto che uno dei due principali attori della contesa politico-
ideologica era apertamente sostenitore di un sistema politico-economico al-
ternativo a quello allora presente. La caratterizzazione anti-sistema del Pci 
(Cafagna 1991: 108) contribuiva quindi ad alimentare una certa alienazione 
dal sistema politico stesso e creava, in molti cittadini-elettori, una concezio-
ne dei partiti intesi più come partiti-chiesa che non come soggetti politici di 
un sistema più ampio e complesso, sistema nel quale la competizione politica 
può dunque essere guardata come elemento positivo, piuttosto che come lotta 
drammatica tra due contendenti che si affrontano per la conquista finale del 
potere (Salvadori 2011: 65).
Ora, se i partiti svolsero un ruolo di supplenza delle istituzioni demo-
cratiche nel periodo di transizione che abbiamo sopra ricordato, c’è però 
anche da aggiungere che essi, si è sottolineato anche questo, fecero in modo 
di prolungare indefinitamente tale stato, o meglio di assicurarsi una posi-
zione di primato sulle istituzioni anche dopo la fine del periodo di transi-
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zione, una volta entrata in vigore la Costituzione. Ciò avvenne, per quanto 
riguarda in particolare il Pci, cercando, da un lato, di farsi interprete pri-
vilegiato di tutto quell’insieme di istanze sociali provenienti dalla lunga 
stagione politica contrassegnata nel nostro Paese dai movimenti collettivi 
degli anni Sessanta e Settanta e, dall’altro, rassicurato dal crescente con-
senso elettorale alla sua politica, portando avanti una linea impostata sul 
controllo e sull’indirizzo dei mutamenti a livello di massa che stavano av-
venendo in quegli anni: politica salariale, assistenzialismo indifferenziato, 
garanzie e privilegi a settori del mondo del lavoro considerati prima di 
tutto come aree da proteggere, più che come categorie che rispondessero 
anch’esse a logiche di mercato del lavoro.
Questi processi vennero portati avanti seguendo un approccio ed un’im-
postazione che ricalcavano i tradizionali schemi, come lo stretto controllo 
del partito e la tendenza all’ideologizzazione. Tali elementi contribuirono ad 
ingenerare confusione, e a presentare i problemi secondo un approccio che 
non aiutava a porre tali tematiche, certamente importanti, entro un confronto 
politico improntato ad un’analisi pragmatica delle questioni.
Va infine aggiunto, cosa che vedremo meglio nel prossimo paragrafo, 
che “primato dei partiti” significò altresì occupazione dello Stato da parte 
di questi ultimi. Le risorse pubbliche, prima di trovare la loro naturale de-
stinazione nell’utilizzo da parte della cittadinanza, venivano forzosamente 
fatte passare da una stazione intermedia, quella cioè occupata dai partiti 
politici, i quali dunque, oltre ad essere considerati i reali protagonisti e de-
cisori circa l’allocazione e la distribuzione delle risorse pubbliche, traevano 
inevitabilmente da questa posizione anche indubbi vantaggi “logistici”, nel 
senso cioè che, in diversi modi e sotto le forme più creative ed “estrose”, 
anch’essi incameravano parte di quelle risorse, a mo’ di dazio che andava 
pagato a coloro che garantivano a ciascuno la propria fetta di torta. E non 
ci riferiamo qui solo e non tanto a risorse di tipo finanziario, ma anche alla 
possibilità di definire, allocare e destinare risorse umane in ambiti della 
pubblica amministrazione, a livello nazionale e locale, nei quali poter eser-
citare influenza, capacità di decisione e di condizionamento nelle fasi di 
implementazione, monitoraggio e valutazione delle politiche pubbliche. Ci 
riferiamo, in altre parole, a quella “partitocrazia” di cui il grande costitu-
zionalista Giuseppe Maranini aveva chiaramente individuato la presenza 
nel nostro sistema politico sin dal 1949 (Maranini 1949). Egli fu, tra l’altro, 
l’inventore di questa espressione, così efficace per descrivere la posizione che 
i partiti politici hanno, da sempre, occupato nella “Costituzione materiale” 
(come avrebbe detto un altro grande costituzionalista, Costantino Mortati) 
della Repubblica.
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2.3 Lo statalismo
I partiti dunque, nei confronti delle istituzioni, se per un verso si interpone-
vano nel rapporto individuo-Stato, per un altro erano di fatto i garanti della 
fruizione di servizi di interesse pubblico.
Se consideriamo inoltre che ai due maggiori partiti facevano riferimento la 
maggior parte delle strutture subculturali territoriali (Trigilia 1980; Manou-
kian 1968), non si farà fatica a comprendere come il processo di progressiva 
espansione della pubblica amministrazione abbia contribuito ad ingenerare 
un assistenzialismo tutto imperniato sul controllo, da parte delle strutture 
partitiche, delle rispettive aree di influenza. Solo in questo modo infatti, solo, 
cioè, attraverso l’utilizzo di un modello democratico giustamente definito 
“consociativo”, al Pci era possibile fare in modo che la sua esclusione di fatto 
sine die dal governo (la cosiddetta “conventio ad excludendum”) fosse almeno com-
pensata da una qualche forma di compartecipazione alla funzione di aggre-
gazione e di articolazione degli interessi, funzione essenziale e indispensabile 
in qualunque sistema politico (Almond e Powell 1988).
Non, dunque, competizione per il governo del Paese, ma per il controllo di 
rispettive aree di interessi nel più ampio (e dunque molto meno rispondente a 
criteri di accountability) panorama dello Stato.
Una cultura politica statalista, già del resto sviluppatasi in modo abnorme 
a seguito dell’indottrinamento delle masse perseguito per vent’anni dal fasci-
smo, non solo non trovò, con la Repubblica, ostacoli di sorta al suo rifiorire, 
per i motivi appena visti, ma venne favorita anche da tutta un’altra serie di 
ragioni che a ciò contribuirono. Non è, in questa sede, possibile soffermarsi 
dettagliatamente e specificamente su ciascuna di esse. Per ciò che tuttavia 
attiene all’oggetto del presente lavoro, cercheremo di dare ragione delle cause 
che vanno associate più chiaramente e direttamente a quello che è stato il 
ruolo del Pci sotto questo profilo.
Ebbene, non sarà impresa difficile evidenziare come lo statalismo che si 
affermò nella cultura politica del Paese riflettesse in misura assai significativa 
molti dei valori che connotavano la cultura politica comunista.
Vi era innanzitutto, per quanto concerne la sfera produttiva e del lavoro, 
un chiaro giudizio di valore positivo verso tutto ciò che fosse pubblico (Accor-
nero, Mannheimer, Sebastiani 1983) e, specularmente, negativo per quanto 
riguardava il settore privato. 
La cultura politica comunista non può in alcun modo essere tacciata di 
“anti-industrialismo”, vista la valenza positiva che nella teoria marxista han-
no sempre detenuto i concetti di produzione, tecnologia, lavoro, e lo stesso 
concetto di capitale, per lo meno in prospettiva storica. Tuttavia, il settore 
privato del sistema industriale, per lo meno rispetto a quello pubblico, era 
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soggetto in qualche modo a giudizi non esattamente positivi, che riflettevano 
quelli, altrettanto poco entusiasti, sul concetto più generale di iniziativa im-
prenditoriale privata. Si spiega dunque, con molta probabilità, anche grazie 
a ciò il fatto che, come bene emerge dalle ricerche di Gabriele Calvi svolte 
in Italia negli anni Settanta e Ottanta (Calvi 1973; Id. 1980; Id. 1987), l’item 
“anti-industrialismo” raccogliesse nel Paese consensi sorprendenti, e ciò an-
che dopo il periodo del “miracolo economico” grazie al quale il nostro Paese 
divenne un Paese industrialmente avanzato e si lasciò alle spalle secoli di po-
vertà e miseria.
Ulteriore conseguenza del modello improntato all’insieme di valori di cui 
stiamo parlando si ebbe nella grande considerazione con cui venne tenuto il 
ruolo dello Stato interventista in economia. Anche in questo caso, non va cer-
tamente sottovalutata l’esperienza pregressa durante il Ventennio, e tuttavia, 
ancora una volta, quell’esperienza trovava dei continuatori in coloro che il 
fascismo avevano contribuito a sconfiggere. 
Dopo la lunga fase delle politiche di nazionalizzazione attuata dal centro-
sinistra (Tamburrano 1990), e dunque, va detto, con il concorso decisivo an-
che dell’altra importante cultura politica della sinistra italiana, quella sociali-
sta, il sistema produttivo del Paese divenne, agli inizi degli anni Settanta, un 
sistema ad economia mista, non definibile cioè “di mercato”, visto che quasi 
il 50% del Pil proveniva dal settore statale, fosse esso imputabile alla pubblica 
amministrazione o all’impresa di Stato.
Lo Stato, nel quadro di una siffatta cultura politica, non doveva limitarsi 
ovviamente ad essere un mero produttore, ma, più in generale, era considera-
to come una sorta di entità superiore, quasi metafisica, alla quale demandare, 
e dalla quale farsi liberare da ogni tipo di richiesta o problema. Lo Stato di-
ventava quindi la camera di compensazione di differenti e in alcuni casi con-
trastanti visioni e culture della cosa pubblica, che trovavano però nel “grande 
protettore” il modo di scaricare contraddizioni e mancati punti di incontro su 
criteri e modalità di organizzazione e gestione delle risorse e degli interessi, 
privati o pubblici, oltre che dei pubblici dipendenti. Si spiega anche in questo 
modo il fatto che i sindacati riuscirono ad ottenere condizioni contrattuali 
nella pubblica amministrazione che in altri paesi, anche quelli che posero le 
basi storiche del Welfare State, risultavano del tutto sconosciute. Non solo, 
ma, esattamente per questo stato di cose, gli stessi sindacati occuparono pro-
gressivamente ogni spazio nella pubblica amministrazione, sino a diventare 
indispensabili per la nomina dei dirigenti. Del tutto disattesa, ancora oggi, 
è infatti la norma che impedirebbe ai dirigenti della P.A. di essere iscritti a 
sindacati, mentre di fatto, nella sanità, nella scuola, persino in alcuni settori 
delle forze dell’ordine i sindacati sono decisivi per la nomina addirittura di 
dirigenti apicali (Caruso 2012). 
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2.4 L’egualitarismo acritico
Che il valore dell’eguaglianza abbia costituito uno degli architravi dell’in-
tero modello della cultura politica comunista è concetto finanche ovvio. Esso 
ha dato slancio ad una delle motivazioni più forti che hanno animato la pas-
sione politica e civile di milioni di uomini e donne, iscritti, simpatizzanti o 
semplici elettori che si sono riconosciuti nel messaggio di liberazione e di 
emancipazione di cui quel valore era ed è ancora oggi portatore. 
Gran parte delle lotte politiche e delle battaglie che hanno accompagnato 
la storia politica del Pci sono state caratterizzate da quel forte anelito, e alcuni 
dei traguardi più significativi raggiunti in materia di diritti dei lavoratori, 
di garanzie alle fasce più deboli della popolazione, di emancipazione delle 
donne, di diritto allo studio sono anche il risultato dell’impegno politico dei 
comunisti italiani e portano spesso la firma di suoi dirigenti e parlamentari.
Tutto ciò non è qui in discussione. Ciò che merita in questa sede appro-
fondire riguarda quella particolare declinazione del concetto, del valore e del 
“senso” di eguaglianza che andò a caratterizzare una parte rilevante della 
vita pubblica italiana, e che, come abbiamo avuto modo di anticipare già nel 
precedente paragrafo, produsse le sue conseguenze meno “virtuose” proprio 
nel settore della pubblica amministrazione e, in generale, nella conduzione 
dello Stato a livello centrale, periferico e delle organizzazioni ad esso contigue 
(il cosiddetto settore “para-statale”).
Va detto, innanzitutto, che la lunga stagione che in Italia accompagnò 
la progressiva affermazione dei diritti civili, negli anni Settanta, vide come 
protagonisti diversi attori, presenti sia nel sistema partitico (Partito sociali-
sta, Partito radicale, Partito repubblicano, Partito socialdemocratico, Partito 
liberale, oltre naturalmente al Pci), sia in quello dei movimenti (la galassia 
dei movimenti della sinistra operaia, quella dei movimenti studenteschi, il 
movimento femminista). Ognuno di questi attori prediligeva ovviamente al-
cune prospettive politiche e non altre del grande processo di allargamento 
e rafforzamento della cittadinanza che in quel periodo si compì nel nostro 
Paese. I partiti di tradizione politica liberale (Partito radicale, Partito liberale) 
si focalizzavano sui diritti individuali, intesi cioè come i diritti di libertà della 
persona, accomunati in questo anche dai due partiti della sinistra riformista, 
Psi e Psdi, i quali però coprivano anche l’altro grande filone delle battaglie 
per la cittadinanza, tipico della cultura politica di sinistra, dato appunto dai 
diritti di eguaglianza (Breschi 2008). Eguaglianza sul lavoro, nella famiglia, 
tra uomo e donna, di fronte alla legge e nelle istituzioni dello Stato.
Mentre, come detto, nel campo della sinistra Psi e Psdi si posizionavano su 
entrambi i due filoni sopra richiamati, e cioè diritti della persona e diritti di 
eguaglianza, il Pci presidiava politicamente solo il secondo dei due, ritenendo 
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il primo non strategico per la sua politica. I comunisti guardavano da sempre 
con sufficienza alle battaglie per i diritti individuali, sin dai tempi di Gramsci 
liquidate come “borghesi” (Togliatti non risparmiò parole aspre verso l’espe-
rienza antifascista di “Giustizia e libertà” e la sua rivista Non mollare, e addirit-
tura di disprezzo verso il suo fondatore, Carlo Rosselli, quando fu pubblicato 
il suo Socialismo liberale).
Nel multiforme e articolato universo della politica per i diritti che contras-
segnò la lunga fase tra il 1968 e i primi anni Ottanta, il Partito comunista si 
fece dunque interprete privilegiato di tutta quell’area politico-elettorale che 
rivendicava una maggiore giustizia sociale nel Paese.
Se questa fu quindi la chiara linea portata avanti dal partito, è da dire 
che essa produsse effetti non solo sul piano “manifesto” e dichiaratamente 
perseguito, quello cioè dell’approvazione di misure legislative che andassero 
in questa precisa direzione, ma anche su di un piano più in ombra rispetto al 
precedente, e con effetti forse indesiderati ma pur sempre significativi. Stiamo 
parlando dell’introduzione di tutto quell’insieme di misure, provvedimenti, 
accordi partiti-sindacati-governo (Baglioni 1978: 123), i quali, con lo scopo di 
tutelare e garantire i dipendenti della pubblica amministrazione e di mettere 
tutti i lavoratori su di un piano di parità, ebbero inevitabili effetti distorsivi 
sull’efficienza, sulla capacità di ottimizzazione e, in ultima analisi, sulla pro-
duttività complessiva di tutto il settore della pubblica amministrazione. 
Ciò avvenne essenzialmente attraverso due dinamiche fondamentali: una 
di tipo prevalentemente culturale, l’altra dai connotati strutturali e sistemici. 
Con la prima, vi era la tendenza a mettere il pubblico dipendente in una 
posizione di scarso controllo da parte dei suoi superiori. Ciò in quanto ci 
si richiamava a principi di non intrusione da parte di gerarchie che in quel 
periodo scontavano la fase della contestazione verso il principio dell’autorità 
in quanto tale, fase tipica del Sessantotto e di tutti gli anni Settanta. Su ciò, 
e veniamo così alla seconda dinamica, fecero leva abbondantemente i sinda-
cati i quali, confortati dal clima culturale presente nel Paese e dalle politiche 
egualitarie portate avanti dal Pci e dalle “sinistre” (come si diceva allora, cioè 
includendo anche Psi, Psdi e tutte le altre formazioni che nelle diverse legisla-
ture di allora occuparono i banchi di destra2 del Parlamento), non trovarono 
impedimenti nel reclamare a sé stessi sempre maggiore voce in capitolo in 
quelle che erano le impostazioni e le strategie organizzative della pubblica 
amministrazione.
2  Ricordiamo che in Aula i partiti di destra siedono a sinistra, e viceversa; ciò è dovuto alla 
prospettiva, opposta, che li fa invece vedere a destra e sinistra se ci si siede di fronte, sul banco 
del Governo. 
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Il principio dell’egualitarismo, in questa temperie, conobbe quindi una 
chiara torsione nel senso di una deriva di indifferenziazione all’interno dei 
contesti organizzativi del lavoro. Ciò fu a sua volta causa di deresponsabiliz-
zazione, di totale assenza di accountability nell’amministrazione dello Stato e, 
in ultima, di completa scomparsa di principi di avanzamento e di remunera-
zione del lavoro che tenessero almeno parzialmente conto anche del merito.
Uno dei settori nei quali questo fenomeno assunse i tratti e le conseguen-
ze più visibili fu quello della scuola. In questo caso, più fattori conversero 
a far sì che l’istituzione scolastica in Italia conoscesse, soprattutto a partire 
dalla Legge delega del 1973, con i successivi Decreti delegati del 1974, una 
progressiva dequalificazione di alcune delle sue più tradizionali e tipiche vo-
cazioni (Scotto di Luzio 2007: 361). Ciò accadde specialmente nella scuola 
media, anello debole della catena formativa ma decisivo per la preparazione 
ai livelli superiori dell’istruzione scolastica. Se è incontestabile il fatto che i 
ministri della Pubblica istruzione, dal 1947 al 2001, siano stati praticamente 
tutti appartenenti alla Democrazia Cristiana, è pur vero che il Pci, sulla scia 
della dottrina dell’egemonia, ha sempre considerato la scuola come una delle 
“casematte”, come le definì Gramsci, strategiche da controllare, se non attra-
verso strumenti istituzionali diretti, come appunto un ministero, sicuramente 
attraverso la sistematica mobilitazione di docenti e studenti per impedire ogni 
qualsivoglia tentativo di riforma nel senso contrario al modello di scuola che 
venne progressivamente imponendosi nel Paese. 
Quel modello, dunque, fu anche il risultato del consociativismo tacito o 
esplicito tra i due principali partiti, e va dunque ascritto alla responsabilità 
non solo del Pci ma anche della stessa Dc. A te (Pci) il controllo e la mobili-
tazione delle “masse di manovra”, a me (Dc) il controllo sui programmi e sui 
contenuti didattici, ovviamente in linea con un’impostazione che non arre-
casse eccessivo disagio alle gerarchie  ed alla tradizione cattolica, diffusa e 
radicata nel Paese.
In questo quadro, il primo aspetto che ne risultò fu quello per il quale i 
sindacati ottennero che il principio dell’autonomia di insegnamento, aspet-
to certamente fondamentale e irrinunciabile per una scuola moderna, si tra-
mutasse, travalicando le intenzioni iniziali del legislatore, in facoltà di totale 
autoreferenzialità anche per aspetti della professione di insegnante che nulla 
avevano a che vedere con quello della didattica. Ci riferiamo qui, ad esempio, 
al tacito ma ferreo e mai messo in discussione principio della mancanza di 
controllo sulle assenze degli insegnanti da parte dei presidi, o alla completa 
e definitiva rinuncia allo strumento del controllo ispettivo del ministero sulle 
attività e sull’operato dei presidi, degli istituti e dei docenti. Come già detto, 
questi aspetti (assenteismo, assenza di controlli, etc.) non sono imputabili di-
rettamente alla mera cultura politica del Pci. Tuttavia, essi furono conseguen-
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za del fatto che quel partito, con l’intento di tenere sotto la propria ala pro-
tettrice attori e soggetti che operavano all’interno del mondo scolastico, non 
oppose particolari resistenze alla progressiva sindacalizzazione della scuola, 
la accompagnò anzi con uno sguardo compiacente, essendo i principali sin-
dacati ivi presenti, in termini di iscritti, quelli comunque più vicini, se non a 
quel partito, di certo all’area della sinistra.
Un secondo elemento concerne il fatto che il principio dell’egualitarismo, 
sommato a quello dell’autonomia, produsse un clima di totale preclusione 
verso qualunque forma di valutazione dei risultati della didattica e, più in 
generale, dell’attività degli istituti. E ne vediamo le conseguenze ancora oggi, 
con centinaia di istituti nei quali la maggioranza dei docenti si rifiuta di som-
ministrare i test Invalsi ai propri studenti.
Infine, e in conseguenza dei primi due fattori esposti, anche gli studenti 
non poterono che risentire e dunque riprodurre, nella loro subcultura giova-
nile, modelli valoriali e comportamentali che provenivano anche dalla classe 
insegnante. Come potevano dei giovani che si trovavano nell’età in cui ci si 
forma, con fatica e difficoltà di ogni tipo, una qualche opinione su ciò che ci 
circonda, sviluppare uno spirito ed un senso critico verso modelli organizza-
tivi deresponsabilizzanti e nei quali il riconoscimento e la gratificazione del 
merito era merce praticamente bandita dal consesso di chi operava nell’isti-
tuzione scolastica?
Sicché, gli obiettivi verso cui gli studenti rivolgevano (e rivolgono ancora 
oggi) i loro attacchi non erano e non sono di certo le criticità e i limiti che ab-
biamo cercato di esporre, ma riguardano, al contrario, ogni pur timido tenta-
tivo dei governi che si sono succeduti dagli anni Ottanta ad oggi di riformare 
la scuola secondo criteri più meritocratici, produttivi e qualificanti.
I risultati non tardarono del resto ad arrivare. Il Mezzogiorno, che almeno 
nei livelli di istruzione aveva, dall’Unità d’Italia, faticosamente recuperato il 
suo gap rispetto al resto del Paese (Felice 2013: 117-125), conobbe un tenden-
ziale riallargamento del divario rispetto al Centro-Nord. I dati complessivi 
sulla preparazione scolastica degli studenti italiani iniziarono a mostrare cre-
scenti distanze rispetto a quelli dei loro omologhi di altri paesi occidentali e 
persino rispetto ad alcuni paesi non ancora industrializzati.
3. Conclusioni
Con questo saggio si è voluto mettere in evidenza quanto e in che modo la 
cultura politica di un partito di massa, in specie il Pci in Italia, possa avere in-
fluito nel contribuire a delineare i tratti complessivi della cultura politica del 
paese nel quale il partito in questione ha esercitato la propria azione politica, 
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nel nostro caso per più di quattro decenni.
Ciò che dunque, oltre alle evidenze che il saggio ha cercato di descrivere, 
i risultati di questo lavoro vogliono seppure implicitamente sottolineare, sta 
nel fatto che, più in generale, qualunque partito di massa che abbia occupato 
stabilmente la scena in un determinato sistema politico, può aver impresso 
alcuni significativi e duraturi connotati alla cultura politica del popolo che da 
quel sistema politico è stato governato. Nel caso della Prima Repubblica in 
Italia, oltre al Pci, la presenza e l’influenza dell’altro grande partito di massa, 
ancorché non definibile come “ideologico”, la Dc, ha indubbiamente sorti-
to effetti che, sebbene in direzioni e contenuti diversi (per quanto, in alcuni 
ambiti, paradossalmente simili e sovrapponibili) potrebbero essere facilmente 
evidenziati da studi e ricerche analoghe a quella qui presentata.
Oggi, nel 2015, i partiti ideologici di massa europei sono definitivamente 
usciti di scena. Anche quei partiti che hanno avuto come progenitori partiti 
ideologici di massa, come i molti partiti socialisti europei che ancora occupa-
no spazi importanti nelle rispettive assemblee rappresentative, non possono 
certamente più essere considerati tali, ma, al massimo, come partiti elettorali 
di massa (si pensi ad esempio alla Spd, al Psf, al Pd, al New Labour) (Pane-
bianco 1982). Come tali, essi non detengono certamente più né la forza ideolo-
gica né la progettualità politica, né, conseguentemente, la cultura politica per 
riuscire in ciò che ai loro predecessori, come abbiamo visto nel caso del Pci, 
riuscì invece in modo più che evidente: contribuire a forgiare alcuni aspetti 
della cultura politica di un popolo, sia nei suoi aspetti virtuosi sia in quelli che 
tali, almeno nel lungo periodo, non si sono rivelati. 
Quanto abbiamo descritto in relazione alla storia del Pci, dunque, sarebbe 
oggi del tutto impensabile possa vedere protagonisti gli attuali partiti presenti 
non solo nel sistema politico italiano, ma, in generale, in tutto il panorama 
europeo, per non citare quello americano, nel quale partiti ideologici non 
sono mai stati presenti. Questo ci permette di introdurre anche un’altra con-
siderazione. Con il presente lavoro non abbiamo inteso solamente proporre 
una ricostruzione storico-sociologica relativa al periodo e al tema che si è vi-
sto. O meglio, tale ricostruzione ha voluto proporsi di mostrare come i limiti, 
le inadeguatezze, le problematicità che tutt’oggi connotano il nostro sistema 
politico e sociale siano per molti aspetti riconducibili a quel periodo, ancor 
più che a quello della Seconda Repubblica (1993-2015). Quest’ultima – intesa 
come l’assetto politico-istituzionale venutosi a formare in Italia dopo il crollo 
del muro di Berlino, dopo la crisi di Tangentopoli e dopo la importante rifor-
ma elettorale seguita ai due referendum del 1991 e del 1993, e intesa altresì, 
naturalmente, attraverso i protagonisti e le classi politiche che ne hanno se-
gnato la storia – viene spesso additata come causa del degrado politico e della 
“palude” nella quale il Paese si è trovato alla fine impantanato, durante una 
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delle crisi più gravi della sua storia, quella del 2011-2014. Se tuttavia si cerca 
di risalire, come abbiamo cercato qui di fare, alle ragioni che sottostanno a 
certi atteggiamenti diffusi (e non solo nelle classi politiche), a certe abitudini, a 
taluni “tic” presenti nelle diverse categorie di soggetti che, chi per un motivo, 
chi per un altro, calcano l’arena politica del nostro paese, si giunge spesso a 
concludere che, per molte fattispecie, le cause vanno collocate cronologica-
mente ben prima dell’avvento della Seconda Repubblica, e trovano invece 
nella cultura politica dei partiti di massa alcune delle ragioni che hanno con-
tribuito a forgiare la cultura politica complessiva del Paese.
Qui dunque possiamo concludere con un’ultima, forse scontata ma, a no-
stro avviso, non del tutto insignificante notazione. Lo studio della cultura 
politica delle principali organizzazioni e istituzioni di un paese può rivelarsi 
uno strumento efficace quando, per diversi motivi, un passato denso di im-
plicazioni e di stratificazioni tra fatti, istituzioni, protagonisti, classi politiche, 
non permette facilmente di districare e di separare cause e conseguenze di 
determinati fenomeni politici o sociali. 
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In ricordo di Luciano Gallino
Con Luciano Gallino scompare un grande sociologo, padre fondatore di una 
disciplina che è sempre riuscito a nobilitare anche nei momenti più difficili 
segnati da tante improvvisazioni e sbandate ideologiche. È stato il più grande 
dei nostri maestri consegnandoci ben più di un metodo rigoroso ed analisi 
ancora oggi insuperate della società italiana e dei suoi squilibri. Ha insegnato 
ad almeno tre generazioni di studiosi come sia indispensabile coniugare ricer-
ca scientifica ed impegno civile senza che, come è spesso avvenuto nel nostro 
paese, scelte politiche o pulsioni ideologiche inquinino analisi e proposte. Ri-
gore metodologico ed etica scientifica sono state le stelle polari che ha sempre 
voluto mostrare sia agli studenti che a noi più giovani colleghi. 
I suoi libri sono stati tanti e tutti rilevanti non solo per la nostra formazione 
quanto per quello che hanno significato per la cultura collettiva dell’Italia. 
Preziose restano le sue analisi dei molti mondi della fabbrica, da quelli della 
solidarietà olivettiana  a quelli duri ed impersonali segnati dallo sfruttamento 
e dal precariato. Ed ancora fondamentali sono gli insegnamenti teorici dei 
suoi rigorosi trattati e le limpide ricerche  sul capitalismo finanziario e sul 
nuovo feroce mercato del lavoro. 
Fedele al suo impegno civile, presente sin dalle sue prime ricerche ad 
Ivrea, Luciano Gallino ha mantenuto al centro del proprio costante lavoro di 
studioso il nodo delle diseguaglianze che crescenti violano nei fatti i principi 
delle costituzioni che enfaticamente proclamano sin dai primi articoli l’ugua-
glianza dei cittadini.
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Luciano Gallino è stato raro esempio del Berüf weberiano, della profes-
sione che è anche  vocazione. È stato ed è esempio prezioso di una pratica di 
ricerca che acquista senso quando è arricchita dall’impegno civile, di una do-
cenza esemplare fatta di conoscenza e di etica, di una scelta politica rinnovata 
e mantenuta con rara coerenza.
Agli amici ha dato anche il suo affetto sorridente e schivo.
Ci mancherà.
Giandomenico Amendola
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A Brief Intellectual Biography of Alfred Schutz
Alfred Schutz was born in Vienna April 13, 1899. After graduation, he partic-
ipated in the First World War as a cadet officer in the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire. He fought on the Italian front on the Piave river, near Conegliano. After 
the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire, the young Schutz found himself before 
the crisis that hit Austrian society: he wanted to pursue his medical studies 
or follow an academic career, in addition to being a musician. All three pos-
sibilities seemed implausible, due to the lengthy insecurity he would likely en-
counter (Wagner 1983: 8). As a result, he chose to study law, following courses 
of international law at the University of Vienna and international trade at the 
Viennese Academy. Over the course of his university studies, Schutz came 
into contact with lawyers like Kelsen, economists like von Wieser, von Mises 
and Machlup, political scientists like Voegelin. Perhaps the key figure for the 
young Schutz was the mathematician and philosopher Felix Kaufmann, who 
not only directed him towards a more rigorous methodology, but above all, 
introduced him to phenomenology and Edmund Husserl.
In the first semester of 1918, Max Weber gave a course at the University 
of Vienna that had a wide resonance. Schutz was unable to attend because he 
was still at the front, but he was in contact with students who were struck by 
that lesson. The influence of Weber had a fundamental impact on the thought 
of the Austrian sociologist, who studied his work in depth after he finished 
university. The Weberian theme of the subjectivity of the understanding of 
meaning constituted a bridge to fill the gap between the technicality of eco-
nomic theory and the social world (Wagner 1983: 13).
Schutz graduated in law in December, 1921, and began working as man-
aging secretary of the Association of Austrian Bankers. In 1926 he married 
Ilse Heim, who gave birth to him two children, Evelyn in 1933, and Georg in 
1938. In 1929, he began working as an expert in law and banking with Reitler 
& Co., a private bank that operated in Central and Eastern Europe. It was 
also for his intense interpersonal relationships due to his work, that Schutz de-
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veloped the theme of comprehension of the social world, posing the problem 
of intersubjectivity at the heart of this analysis.
In the twenties Schutz worked on Theorie der Lebensformen and Lebensfor-
men und Sinnstruktur (the latter unfinished), two texts in which the influence of 
Bergson’s thought emerges. Voegelin was the friend who introduced him to 
reading the works of the French philosopher. Bergson’s idea of the  temporal-
ity of consciousness was the theme used to develop the Weberian principle 
of selectivity of meaning. Schutz, “starting from Weber’s theory of action, 
accepted and recasted the phenomenological analysis but, ‘rethinking’ Max 
Weber, changed it in the Bergsonian sense” (Protti 1995: 18). Nevertheless the 
voluntary category of intuition of Bergson did not allow him to address the 
problem of meaning in a radical way. The Bergsonian impass of the twenties 
is the result of the realization that ideal-typical access to the social world is 
methodologically inconsistent with the intuition of Bergson, that this last cat-
egory is unverifiable and thus basically metaphorical.
The approach to phenomenology in his late twenties, under the guidance 
of his friend Kaufmann, was motivated by the need to resolve the differences 
between Bergson’s idea of stream of consciousness and the method of Weber 
which were anything but marginal. This is how Schutz “through the port of 
phenomenology can tap into the ‘data’ of consciousness through a methodolog-
ically controller procedure” (Muzzetto 2006: 319), based on a rigorous theo-
retical frame. Kaufmann introduced Husserl to Schutz in 1932, the same year 
of the publication of the book Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. In Freiburg, 
where Husserl lived, Schutz met those who would become the main exponents 
of phenomenology: Dorion Cairns, Eugen Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe. Schutz 
met Husserl several times, who considered him a strict phenomenologist: “one 
of the few people who managed to penetrate the deeper meaning of his work” 
(Wagner 1983: 46). Husserl proposed that he become his assistant but Schutz 
refused because of his work commitments. The influence of Husserl was indel-
ible, even if the relationship with phenomenology was never uncritical: Schutz 
immediately had doubts about the possibility of developing a sociological pro-
gram structured on the idea of a transcendental ego.
In 1938 Schutz was in Paris on business, when Austria was occupied by 
Nazi Germany. After a year’s exile in France, in 1939 he emigrated perma-
nently to the United States, where Reitler had planned the transfer a few 
years before. In 1943, thanks to contacts with the American phenomenologi-
cal movement, he became part-time lecturer of sociology at the New School for 
Social Research. In 1952, he obtained the post of full professor, which allowed 
him to leave Reitler to devote himself full time to research and teaching.
The American period is characterized by the influence of pragmatism 
and Schutz’s interest in language as a vehicle typifying the constitution of 
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meaning. The articulation of the theme of Verstehen in a key of mundane un-
derstanding led the sociologist to finally abandon the transcendental ego of 
Husserl and replace it with the Mead’s theory of the Self. The path to a phe-
nomenology of natural attitude was complete. Two basic points: certainty is 
not to be found on a transcendental level but in the world of everyday life 
(certainty “mundane”). The basis of the phenomenology of natural attitude is 
socio-centric. The subject is “from the beginning” social; the “We-relation” is 
understood as the basic category of the social world, as Natanson explained it 
is “the epistemic root of the shared world” (Natanson, 1977).
Reworking, among others, the ideas of James, Mead and Cassirer, he de-
veloped the theory of finite provinces of meaning, creating a powerful theo-
retical and methodological system, in some ways still unsurpassed, which con-
tinues to draw sociologists and philosophers alike. The publications of Schutz 
in the US, from 1940 to 1959, mostly in the form of journal articles have been 
published in various volumes of the Collected Papers. Alfred Schutz died May 
20, 1959 of severe heart disease.
The first influences of Schutz’s thought
The “phenomenologically oriented” sociology of Schutz has influenced socio-
logical thought to varying degrees. The first vein is that which builds on work 
done by Schutz’s best known pupil Thomas Luckmann. He not only wrote 
the two volumes of The Structure of Social World with Schutz, (more precisely 
the drafting of the two volumes is due to Luckmann, who reworked Schutz’s 
notes which contained the general structure of the work), but has also pub-
lished, together with Berger, what is commonly interpreted as a manifesto of 
phenomenological sociology: The Social Construction of Reality, a volume that 
contributed to making Schutz known worldwide.
The second and more heterodox vein of successors of Schutz is that of 
Harold Garfinkel and Aaron Cicourel. Independent from the current devel-
opments of ethnomethodology, Studies in Ethnomethodology of Garfinkel is one of 
the most audacious attempts to develop the thinking of Schutz, and the phe-
nomenological in general, in a radically empirical key. Method and Measurement 
and Cognitive Sociology of Aaron Cicourel, however, are two texts in which the 
thought of Schutz is used, respectively, to develop a critical discourse on the 
methods of conventional empirical social research and to explain the empiri-
cal modes of the use of language in situated contexts.
Maurice Natanson and Helmut Wagner are some of the last students of 
Schutz who have developed a third approach, the more philosophical social, 
linked to themes of the Self, to intersubjectivity, to categorizations, finite prov-
inces of meaning and to phenomenological methodology.
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Currently, an international circle has been constituted, the Schutz Circle, 
that has given a new boost to the line of study opened by Schutz, extending his 
key of understanding to the whole body of human and social sciences.
In this special issue of SMP, some of the authors that have contributed are 
members of the Schutz Circle, namely Michael D. Barber, Carlos Belvedere, 
Jochen Dreher, Mototaka Mori, Daniela Lopez, George Sebald, and Chung-
Chi Yu.
Riccardo Venturini
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